Reductionism and the Flight from Reality, Seyyed Mohammad Noei

Dr. Hassan Mohaddesi, a sociologist, has written a critique of the reductionist views of Professor Malekian; subsequently, another sociologist and my dear friend, Dr. Majid Heidari Charoudeh, wrote a critique of that critique. Since I had long been waiting for an opportunity to pursue the discussion of reductionism and the existence or non-existence of society and other collective phenomena, and as I am also an opponent of reductionism, a few points came to mind that I will present to my friends.

Reductionism and the Flight from Reality

(How Reductionism Soothes Our Imagination)

On the Occasion of Critiquing Reductionism in Professor Malekian's Views and the Critique of That Critique

Seyyed Mohammad Noei

Dr. Hassan Mohaddesi, a sociologist, has written a critique of the reductionist views of Professor Malekian; subsequently, another sociologist and my dear friend, Dr. Majid Heidari Charoudeh wrote a critique of that critique. Since I had long been waiting for an opportunity to pursue the discussion of reductionism and the existence or non-existence of society and other collective phenomena, and as I am also an opponent of reductionism, a few points came to mind that I will present to my friends.

My brief opinion is this: First, Dr. Mohaddesi's critiques are, in most cases, correct and apt. Second, the objections and critiques of Dr. Heidari have not been able to refute Dr. Mohaddesi's critical views and defend Professor Malekian's reductionism. Third, Professor Malekian, Mr. Heidari, and other proponents must present their reasons and evidence for the claim of the non-existence of society and other collective phenomena, which, at least so far, I have not seen, and only the claim has been repeated. Fourth, the discussion of ontological and epistemological reductionism and its problems remains open in Professor Malekian's views, and its case cannot be closed so easily. Fifth, now that Mr. Heidari and other proponents defend Professor Malekian's reductionism, is the reason that reductionism of any kind is fundamentally permissible and correct, and reasons can be adduced for it; or is it because Professor Malekian has employed this reductionism and we hold him in esteem, therefore reductionism must be correct and must be defended at any cost????

1- Dr. Heidari's text was not, in fact, a response to Dr. Mohaddesi's critiques, but rather a kind of critique of the critique; that is, his text was more a kind of scrutiny aimed at logically undermining Dr. Mohaddesi's critiques. Therefore, the characterization of Mr. Heidari's text as a response on some websites and in virtual spaces is mistaken.

2- Responding to a critique entails isolating the propositions claimed by the critic, then identifying their claim, the reasons and evidence they have presented, and then critiquing each one. Mr. Heidari has merely undermined the critique and, with a critically question-oriented approach (which is a noble and important approach), has tried to question the foundations and bases of the critiques claimed by Mr. Mohaddesi. But however much I searched in his text, I saw less of a response to the critiques and more of a clarification of the text. In a few instances, Dr. Heidari engaged in scholarly discussion, and it was mostly a logical critique.

3- In any case, Dr. Heidari's text must be considered a kind of defense of Professor Malekian's views, because the final result and effect of Dr. Heidari's critiques is to exonerate Professor Malekian and dispel the suspicions of reductionism from him, or to defend the reductionism he has employed.

4- Why a defense? Is this critique of a critique a defense of truth, logic, reason, and science, or a defense of the views of a professor whom we hold in esteem? I have, on several occasions, paid close attention to the stances of my dear friend Mr. Heidari and other admirers regarding Mr. Malekian's works, speeches, and opinions. Since Mr. Heidari is one for clarification, I say with a degree of tolerance and probability that:

4-1- In my view, there is a hidden reason that compels someone like dear Dr. Heydari to be sensitive to the criticisms leveled at Mr. Malekian; I mean the particular intellectual and, at times, emotional ties that exist between him and the figure of Mr. Malekian. Since he belongs to the circle of Master Malekian's disciples, it is natural for him to have an a priori stance against the criticisms directed at his views.

4-2- From my perspective, one of the afflictions within the intellectual system of our society (among both the elite and the common people) is precisely this master-disciple relationship, from which we have suffered so much throughout history, and communities have endured calamities, and misguidance and deviations have occurred and continue to occur. I brought up the above point not with the intention of entering the personal domain of my dear friend Mr. Heydari, but on the occasion of revealing and recalling once more that historical issue. The most significant bane of the master-disciple relationship is the non-receptivity to criticism of that relationship on the part of the disciples. The master becomes absolute truth, and whatever he says is welcomed with heartfelt gratitude by the disciples. A kind of rigid, irrational dogmatism and imitation without reason or proof gradually casts its shadow over this relationship.

5- Another important point is that Mr. Heydari has not stated his own view directly and frankly in this text. Since he has written a response to a critique, he should have also stated his own view explicitly: does he ultimately accept reductionism or not? Or in what sense does he accept it? He should also present his reasons and evidence, and defend the claim that Master Malekian has employed this very meaning of reductionism, and therefore no objection applies to his work. However, his view can only be observed in a few scattered statements in the text; the rest consists of critical questions, which I will address below.

6- A significant part of the confrontation between the two texts goes back to the old but dormant dispute: individual/society, psychology/sociology, and so on. Years ago, during my student days, I had some reflections on this matter, a summary of which I will first present here, and then I will address the other parts of the critiques that have been made:

A Few Explanatory Points: A- Three Fundamental Distinctions: 1) The individual/society relation ...... an ontological dispute (the relation of the whole and the part). Here, existence can be considered in two ways: philosophical-metaphysical existence and existence in the sense of a realized thing or Fact. My claim is this: Society has a realized existence as a fact, but it does not have an independent real existence in the metaphysical sense (i.e., in terms of coming-into-being). Hence, society does not have a philosophical essence or quiddity. But society, as a realized fact, exists because it displays effects, signs, and results, and has effects in the real world. (Whatever is said about society also applies to other collective phenomena such as institutions, organizations, structures, systems, etc.). Those who believe that reduction is correct or incorrect at the ontological level must argue within this space. 2) The methodological individualism/collectivism relation......a methodological dispute (analyzing realities based on the micro or macro level). 3) The psychologism/sociologism relation.....a dispute between two sciences. Each has its own claims. The discussion of reducing one science to another, or the concepts of one science to the concepts of another, arises here. *** Important point: None of these three axes of discussion has a necessary or logical connection to another; that is, one cannot build a bridge from one to the other. This is a mistake. They are 3 separate discussions, and each discussion can be situated in its own place. Pay attention to these propositions: "There is no necessary concomitance between methodological individualism and ontological individualism (ontological atomism)." Or that "Whether the individual is the basis for the formation of society (the primacy of the individual) or society is the basis for the emergence of the individual (the primacy of society), our method of investigation can be independent of this discussion." That is, even supposing we could prove that primacy and priority belong to the individual and that an individualistic method must also be used; one cannot conclude that psychology has primacy and priority over sociology. The dispute and quarrel between the two sciences has nothing to do with those previous discussions, and proponents and opponents should not draw reasons and evidence for themselves from those two domains. b) In the dispute over the primacy (priority) of the individual or society, three discussions must be distinguished: - Ontological priority, which is a philosophical discussion... Which one's existence is prior to the other? Temporal priority and existential priority in the strict sense are at issue here. Which came first, the chicken or the egg? - Axiological priority, which is a discussion of ethics and law... Should the interests of the individual be sacrificed for society, or society for the individual? - Epistemological priority... In the order of knowing, which one must be known first, and then the other subsumed under it? Knowing which one renders us needless of knowing the other? Are these two types of knowledge independent of each other? *** These three axes of discussion are also independent of one another, and one must not build a bridge between them, using one as evidence and proof for another; doing so is erroneous and incorrect.

Dr. Heydari mentions Dr. Mohaddesi's errors in criticizing reductionism.

7- Regarding the first criticism: Here, Dr. Heydari has raised several critical questions. In my opinion, Dr. Mohaddesi's view regarding Professor Malekian's lack of expertise in the field of social sciences is valid, and Dr. Heydari's questions can be answered as follows: First, the Professor himself makes no claim to expertise in all areas of the humanities and social sciences. Second, based on his academic biography, he has pursued his education and studies in fields other than the social sciences. Third, a brief review of the Professor's works and lectures shows what his concerns, areas of study, and expertise are. The Professor has never considered himself an economist, sociologist, historian, cultural theorist, anthropologist, or a specialist in the fields of management, political science, and the history of civilization. He has neither made such claims verbally, nor do his works and lectures indicate such a thing. Therefore, in response to Mr. Heydari's questions, it must be said that, based on the above reasons, the Professor cannot be considered a specialist—meaning an authority with publications, opinions, viewpoints, theories, and research—in the social sciences in the conventional sense current in our society. Rather, considering his academic biography and published works, in my view, the Professor should be seen as a good teacher of philosophy, knowledgeable in the history of philosophy, a specialist in the field of ethics, particularly moral philosophy, and one of its prominent authorities, a scholar of religion from the perspective of philosophy and ethics, whose views in the field of ethics are also based on psychological theories. This is my impression of the Professor.

Of course, I do not have precise knowledge of the concepts of "mind-boggling error" and "general teacher" that Dr. Mohaddesi has used, and it is better that he himself explains them. However, in any case, it is a rule agreeable to reason that when someone like me enters various fields without being very proficient in the foundations, principles, and rules, there is a possibility of my error, and of me offering an opinion that astonishes specialists in that field. This has happened before and is nothing new.

In any case, Dr. Heydari's criticism here is merely posing questions to the critic. He has not stated his own opinion as to whether he truly considers Professor Malekian an authority and specialist in the social sciences or not, and why?

8- Regarding the second criticism:

8-1- The fallacy of red herring and the fallacy of appeal to the majority. My opinion differs somewhat from Dr. Heydari's regarding fallacies, and we discussed this together in the sessions reading the book Critical Thinking. But I will not go into it here. However, in my opinion, the fallacy of appeal to the majority did not occur here because, within the framework of probability logic, something acknowledged by the majority is generally more likely to be true than false. Generally and probably. That is, reason proceeds cautiously. Especially when we are discussing in the realm of science and knowledge. Let it pass... this is a tangential discussion...

8-2- Dr. Heydari has pointed out: "... He (Mr. Malekian) has repeatedly said that no untoward consequences follow from his reductionist claim." Now my questions: 1) Even if the professor claims that no untoward consequences follow from his reductionist view, does that prove there are none? That is, am I, the claimant myself, also the arbiter of the untoward consequences of my own theories and claims? 2) How can one be sure that the professor has not made a mistake here and has not overlooked the untoward consequences, either deliberately or inadvertently? 3) Must the validity of a scientific theory or view be assessed based on its consequences and outcomes? Is this the only criterion? If I now propose a theory about the control of the human world by supernatural beings, is the validity of my theory assessed based on whether it has untoward consequences or not? 4) Assuming the professor has made such a claim regarding the absence of untoward consequences in his reductionism, when Mr. Heydari cites it, it means he has accepted it. Well, what are his reasons and evidence? It is expected that, based on the same critical method he applied to Dr. Mohaddesi's views, he would present reasons and evidence here with the same precision, free of fallacy? Yet this important matter is not observed, and Mr. Heydari himself has here committed the fallacy of appealing to authority.

8-3- Citing the views of individuals who were opponents and critics of reductionism, such as Sibeon and Moscovici, while it cannot by itself prove a claim, can strengthen the probability of a claim being correct and also indicates that thinkers have previously addressed and discussed this subject; that is, it points to the empirical background of the discussion. Citing the views of others is not problematic in itself; the problem arises when this citation is used as the sole proof. It seems Dr. Mohaddesi has not used these citations as evidence but is merely referring to precedents.

8-4- Mr. Heydari has stated: "Mr. Mohaddesi has not distinguished between ontological, epistemological, and methodological reductionism..." As far as I have reflected upon this, I have understood ontological reductionism and epistemological reductionism, but what does methodological reductionism mean? It would have been better if dear Mr. Heydari had provided some explanations or references regarding these three types of reductionism he enumerated, rather than leaving the discussion truncated in this manner.

8-5- Mr. Heydari has stated: "This claim by Mr. Malekian that society and institutions such as the family, economy, politics, and education have no external existence and that it is human individuals who have external existence, is an ontological claim, and the reductionism contained within it is the ontological reduction of a sociological concept to a psychological concept..." Precisely this interpretation itself is a kind of error. Let us assume I believe in ontological reductionism regarding society; this does not necessitate that I must abandon sociological concepts and turn to psychological concepts. In other words, reducing the concept of society to the concept of the individual or individuals is an ontological discussion, and this discussion has nothing to do with the two sciences of sociology and psychology and the concepts used within them. The descriptive presupposition of this erroneous bridging between the two discussions is that the concept of society belongs specifically and exclusively to the science of sociology, and the concept of the individual belongs exclusively to the science of psychology. Psychology can refer to or employ collective and societal concepts, and sociology can address the concept of the individual and other related concepts. This is an extravagant claim and a major error, for which abundant evidence and examples can be provided to show it is not so. But unfortunately, the majority of defenders of reductionism, and some of its opponents as well, have fallen into this same error. For greater precision, I refer to the explanations within the box I provided at the beginning of the discussion. Of course, in the "Fourthly" section of this critique, Mr. Heydari has alluded to this in a way, but prior to that, he himself has fallen into this same error.

8-6- The point is not whether sociology has a subject matter at all, or that if society and other collective phenomena can be eliminated from existence, then the science of sociology would perish and cease to be. That is a different dispute. The point concerns the existence or non-existence of society and collective phenomena as opposed to the individual or individuals. This dispute over two matters of fact should not be conflated with a dispute between two academic disciplines. In my view, sociology can address the individual, individuals, and collective phenomena, and so can psychology. No one can prevent the scholars of these two disciplines from entering into the analysis of various subjects and events.

9- Regarding the third critique:

9-1- Dr. Mohaddesi's claim regarding the systems constructed by human beings and the unintended consequences and results of those systems, which lead to the corruption and misery of human beings, is correct, precise, and apt, and is not paradoxical. Mr. Heydari apparently has not properly grasped this matter. Human individuals, to meet a need or realize a goal, design and create a system which, after its emergence and a period of operation, development, and change over time, humans become affected by the effects and results of that system's functioning—results they neither knew nor desired from the outset. Numerous examples can be given, such as the prison system and the overcrowding of penal populations, whose unintended and undesirable results have become apparent today. These results had not crossed the mind of any official over a hundred years ago when today's organized, modern prisons were being designed and launched. Marx has a famous saying that conveys this point in the best way: Humans make history, but not as they please...

9-2- However, I do not favor this characterization of will-less, plaything objects; rather, I hold that the intervention of the will, consciousness, and choice of human individuals is relative. It is not the case that all human individuals, as social actors, possess an equal and effective will and equal, similar choices. It exists on a spectrum and depends on their specialized awareness of social processes and knowledge of the mechanisms of systems and institutions, and also, particularly, on their position in the hierarchy of society. Not all actors and individuals possess the possibility and capability of recognizing the unintended effects of systems. Human actors in society and the social world are neither zero-willed nor absolutely willed. We are all in a spectral state of will, consciousness, and choice, all of which depends on our social position.

10- Regarding the fourth critique: Mr. Heydari's point is correct, but it cannot be used to refute Dr. Mohaddesi's critique. The discussion is not at all about whether human will and the effects of institutions are longitudinal or latitudinal. It requires some scrutiny, and the discussion becomes entirely specialized. In brief, we, as actors operating in a social situation and context (even in the most private spheres and personal layers of our lives), possess an interpretive mind that interprets the conditions and situation and then acts. Of course, interpretation here does not mean rational, logical, or philosophical interpretation. It is a kind of reasoning and giving meaning to things and situations. Whether I consider my own desire, or a sense of competition with another, or an appeal to a value, and so on... these are examples of the subjective interpretation of the human actor. But it must be noted that this interpretation is not necessarily and essentially laden with a cognitive and epistemic load that takes into account and understands all the mechanisms and the nature of the functioning of institutions and incorporates them into its calculations. In my daily life, I pay attention to myself to a large extent, and to some extent to those who are in the first layers of my social relations. It very rarely happens that for a behavior or choice, we pay attention to the history behind institutions and systems, as well as to their intended or unintended future, and enter them into our calculations. This discussion is very specialized and extensive, and if the ground is prepared, I will explain it with more specialized terms.

In any case, in my opinion, dear Dr. Heydari's understanding of this issue is somewhat flawed and required more reflection, and with this discourse, one cannot undermine Dr. Mohaddesi's critique and defend the ontological reductionism intended by Professor Malekian.

11- Regarding the fifth critique:

11-1- Professor Malekian has explicitly stated many times that there is no such thing as society and its corresponding collective phenomena apart from individual human beings: "First, there is no such thing as a social institution. These are names. Names without referents. Social institutions do not exist at all. There is no such thing as politics and economics. I say explicitly, there is no such thing as the family. There is no such thing as education. In the human world, only human beings exist. Individual, one-by-one human beings exist. Any other name we give them, we are deluding ourselves."

"Apart from 75 million people, there is no such thing as the Iranian nation. There is no such thing as the country of Iran or the Muslim Ummah. [...] My first point is that these abstract concepts do not exist."

I ask Professor Malekian and also dear Dr. Heydari: Please state explicitly, do society and collective phenomena such as systems, institutions, nations, families, etc., exist or not? If not, why? And if yes, in what sense do they exist? In my opinion, dear Dr. Heydari has not addressed this question and issue directly and explicitly. For each of these two possible answers that he and the Professor might give, I have questions that must be answered so that the meaning becomes completely clear. Does the fact that institutions possess the property of prohibition and encouragement beyond the subjective interpretation of individuals prove that they are constructed/conventional, or that they do not exist at all?

A Conclusion:

Opponents of Professor Malekian's reductionism have reasons and evidence for the existence of institutions, systems, and other collective phenomena (such as Dr. Mohaddesi's explanations), but Professor Malekian and Mr. Heydari have presented no reason or evidence for their claim. It would be better if these esteemed individuals and other friends who share their view would present their reasons and evidence this time so they can be critiqued.

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Reductionism and the Flight from Reality

(How Reductionism Soothes Our Imagination)

On the Occasion of Critiquing Reductionism in the Views of Professor Malekian and a Critique of its Critique

Seyyed Mohammad Noei- Sociologist, Researcher and Social Investigator [email protected]

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. Related Content:

Mohaddesi, Hassan; Psychological Reductionism in the Works of Mostafa Malekian, Iran-e Farda Magazine, 6 December 2015, No. 18, (pp. 60-64).

Heydari Cherudeh, Majid; The Taboo of Reductionism in Sociology, Sedanet Cultural Site, 9 March 2016.

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