A Conversation with Mostafa Malekian on “The Crisis of Ethics and Spirituality (Moral Philosophy)”

Note: The subject of this conversation is moral philosophy. The crisis of ethics and spirituality that today pervades various levels of society in multiple dimensions prompted us to analyze and elucidate this phenomenon in a dialogue with Professor Mostafa Malekian.

+ Before I pose my question, I wanted to ask why “moral philosophy” has been less discussed in Iran’s intellectual sphere. What factors account for the neglect of this field? Has a lack of socio-political need for these discussions caused it to be overlooked? Or does this field possess complexities and characteristics that reduce the possibility of producing and disseminating its ideas within the intellectual milieu?

The question of why discussions of moral philosophy have had no place or standing in the intellectual debates of our country and in the press associated with intellectual circles and currents can be examined from various perspectives. First, among intellectuals and the press affiliated with intellectual currents, almost no philosophical topic has been pursued in depth, and this is not confined to moral philosophy.

You do not see in-depth discussions related to moral philosophy, nor do you see very profound discussions related to the philosophy of mind, nor epistemology, nor the philosophy of science. You do not see the philosophy of art, nor the philosophy of logic. These discussions do not exist in their profound form. Fundamentally, in our intellectual currents and circles, two characteristics are, unfortunately, more or less evident.

The first characteristic is that discussions are never presented in a deep and academic manner; the second characteristic is that among various subjects, those that are more or less connected to politics receive attention—meaning that intellectual discussions in our country derive their definition, to some extent, from the world of politics. This is why you see that issues such as freedom, justice, and tolerance have found their place, but discussions that, at least in the view of the intellectuals themselves, have a more distant connection to the world of politics have not been raised. That is the first point. Regarding moral philosophy specifically, I must say that our society, both at the level of the masses and at the level of thinkers and the cultured, is afflicted by an illusion, which is that we are ethical, and since we are ethical, we have no need for ethical discussions. We always feel that we need to raise economic issues, and we always feel a need to raise political issues, because we think we are truly backward politically. But we never feel that we are also backward in terms of ethical matters, and because of this, we see that economic and political issues hold priority for us, whereas ethical issues do not. But the reality is that we are not an ethically advanced society, and our moral decline is in no way less than our political decline or less than our economic backwardness. This is the second reason we have not engaged seriously with moral philosophy.

+ The current atmosphere of society is such that the reference point for value judgments—or, better said, the moral reference point in the realms of collective action—has encountered significant questions and doubts at various levels, from intellectuals to the younger generation. This challenge is severely crisis-inducing, especially for those whose hearts are tied to traditional sources of value judgment. Of course, these challenges are mostly in the domain of collective action. That is, what is the ethical criterion in collective decision-making and decision-shaping? I imagine that in the modern approach to this issue, moral philosophy is the field that provides the groundwork for ideation regarding these challenges. Is the way to understand the existing ethical situation an exploration in the field of moral philosophy?

Yes, I think this path is the right one. As Paul Tillich said, the unasked question is not answered. I believe that in the world of culture, a question must always have been asked for an answer to come. Naturally, when we encounter ethical dilemmas and problems at the societal level, that is precisely the moment when the question has been asked, and therefore we must begin to respond in a timely and appropriate manner. And the idea that, for instance, when we feel a need for ethics we turn to moral philosophy is correct; the only point of contention is that we should not think that merely through theoretical discussions—which are a necessary condition for the success of any endeavor—we can set moral matters in order. Theoretical discussions are a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one. Engaging with theoretical issues is very appropriate, but on the condition that we do not imagine that dealing with theoretical issues will make us independent of practical groundwork. Certain specific circumstances must also be established in the realm of reality and practice.

+ What domains do you consider moral philosophy to encompass? That is, what fundamental questions does it seek to answer, and what are the fundamental questions upon which moral philosophy is founded?

By way of introduction, let me make a point. What distinguishes a moral proposition from other propositions? A moral proposition is one whose subject is either the human being, the inner states of the human being, or the outward actions of the human being, and whose predicate is one of these concepts: the concept of good, bad, the concept of right, wrong, the concept of moral ought and ought not, the concept of duty or obligation, the concept of responsibility, the concept of virtue and vice. If we have a proposition whose subject is the human being, the inner states of the human being, or the outward actions of the human being, and whose predicate is one of those concepts I mentioned, we are dealing with a moral proposition. For example, when we say truth-telling is a duty, this is a moral proposition because one of the outward actions of the human being is its subject and duty is its predicate; that is the first point. The second point is that moral philosophy is a branch of philosophy, and because it is a branch of philosophy, it must strictly follow philosophical methods. Therefore, since it follows philosophical methods, what is said in moral philosophy has a rational aspect. We can make statements about ethics that do not have a rational aspect, but those are no longer moral philosophy. For instance, we can have moral psychology, as indeed we do, but these are empirical sciences. These are not part of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy is not an empirical science; it is a purely rational science and a branch of philosophy. Therefore, not every statement we make about the phenomenon of ethics is moral philosophy or belongs to this domain. Only when we speak purely rationally about ethics have we entered moral philosophy. Whatever we say other than this pertains to the various other branches related to ethics, and our current topic of discussion is moral philosophy. Now, if you ask what moral philosophy is, I would say that sometimes moral philosophy is used in a sense that includes all three sciences I will name. Sometimes it is used in a more specific sense that includes only two of these three, and sometimes it is used in an even more specific sense that includes only one of these three. Now, I will briefly introduce these three sciences. One of these three sciences is what is sometimes referred to as descriptive ethics. Descriptive ethics is an ethics that solely and exclusively states what the ethics of various civilizations, cultures, religions, and different philosophical paths and schools are. For example, Buddhist ethics, Kantian ethics, Spinozist ethics, Islamic ethics, Japanese ethics. In such cases, we describe the ethical system that a civilization, a culture, a religion or denomination, a people, a nation, or a society possesses. This is called descriptive ethics. This ethics has an empirical-historical character; that is, if it speaks about an existing civilization, culture, religion, denomination, people, or nation, it takes on an empirical aspect, and if it speaks about a civilization, culture, religion, denomination, people, or nation that lived in the past, it takes on a historical aspect—it has an empirical-historical character. Up to this point, of course, it is not philosophy. Because, as I said, a science that has an empirical-historical aspect cannot be moral philosophy, unless at this very point we go further and extract a unified theory about the moral nature of the human being from the heart of these ethical systems we are describing. In that case, this science is sometimes called moral philosophy. For example, we might say that since in all the ethical systems that have existed throughout history, we see that returning a trust or keeping a promise has been considered good, from this we extract one of the components of the moral nature of the human being and say that one of the components of the moral nature of the human being is that, morally speaking, they consider keeping a promise good and returning a trust good. There is a second science, which is referred to as normative ethics or prescriptive ethics. This science does not at all state what the ethical systems of various civilizations, cultures, religions, denominations, nations, peoples, and societies are—what things they consider good, what things they consider bad, what things they consider right or wrong, what they consider a virtue or what they consider a vice, what they consider a duty, obligation, and responsibility. It has nothing to do with these; it itself presents an ethical system. That is, it comes and says: these are the goods, these are the bads, these are the rights, these are the wrongs, these are the virtues, these are the vices. It enumerates the various instances of these moral concepts I listed. This becomes normative ethics, or prescriptive ethics, or recommendatory ethics.

در واقع می‌آید می‌گوید به نظر من این فهرست خوبی‌ها است، این فهرست بدیها است، این فهرست وظایف است، این فهرست تكالیف است، و این فهرست مسؤولیت‌هاست. فضیلت‌ها اینها هستند و رذیلت‌ها اینها هستند. این اخلاق هنجاری یا توصیه‌ای یا دستوری است. یك علم سومی هم وجود دارد كه گاهی به آن می‌گویند اخلاق تحلیلی ( Analytic ethics ) یا فرا اخلاق ( Meta _ Ethics ) این علم سوم را باید بیشتر از آن دو تای دیگر توضیح داد حالا قبل از این كه آن توضیحات را بدهم عرض كنم كه فلسفه اخلاق گاهی شامل هر سه علمی كه گفتم می‌شود یعنی هم شامل اخلاق توصیفی می‌شود، هم شامل اخلاق دستوری می‌شود و هم شامل اخلاق تحلیلی یا فرا اخلاق. گاهی فلسفه اخلاق را به اولی اطلاق نمی‌كنند فقط به دومی و سومی اطلاق می‌كنند یعنی به اخلاق هنجاری و اخلاق تحلیلی، و گاهی هم فلسفه اخلاق را فقط به فلسفه تحلیلی یا فرا اخلاق اطلاق می‌كنند. این است كه می‌بینیم عنوان فلسفه اخلاق یك معنی بسیار عام دارد. یك معنای مضیق دارد و یك معنای باز هم مضیق‌تر.

The first two sciences are, in a sense, not philosophy.

Especially the first, even those who use moral philosophy in a sense that includes parts one and two still all acknowledge that the major part of moral philosophy is this third part. The third part, which I referred to as analytical ethics or meta-ethics, itself has three parts. One is Moral Semantics, one is Moral Epistemology, and one is Moral Ontology. These three parts all relate to analytical ethics or meta-ethics; I will briefly explain each. The first part is moral semantics. To understand what moral semantics is, we must note that we usually act as if we know the meaning of ethical terms and concepts. We only search for their instances, that is, we always behave as if we know what good, bad, right, wrong, ought, ought not, duty and obligation, responsibility, virtue and vice mean, and we only do not know what things are instances of these. Then, for example, we ask: Is lying good or bad? And we hear the answer that it is bad. Is truth-telling good or bad? It is good. Is keeping a promise right or wrong? It is right. Breaking a promise is wrong. It is as if our only problem is the problem of the instances of these concepts, but it is apparently assumed that we know the meaning of these terms. That is, we know what right or wrong or virtue or vice means. Now, if someone came and said, from where is this very presupposition known, whether we really know what right means or not? Then this person has entered into moral semantics. There is a time when you do not even know the meaning of the word liquid. That is, you do not know what liquid means at all. Then you ask me, and I say liquid, for example, means a body that, if placed in a container, takes the shape of that container. That is its meaning. Then you might say, well, what are the instances of liquid? Then I say water is one of the liquids. Alcohol, jam, cherry syrup are among liquids. They become instances of liquids. But we must initially know the meaning of liquid itself; then, once we know the meaning, we might then be able to find the instances of liquid using the meaning. The reason I say 'might' is that knowing the meaning is a necessary condition for finding instances, but it is not a sufficient condition. Now, in ethics, we have also apparently assumed that we know the meanings of these terms used in ethics. Then we say, for example, truth-telling is an instance of which of these concepts? Lying is an instance of which concept? Now, if someone said no, it is not clear that we even know the meaning of these terms. Then we must do a semantic analysis of ethical terms. When we enter into the semantic analysis of ethical terms, we have entered moral semantics. In this moral semantics, an important issue is especially whether ethical terms have the same meanings in ethics that they have when used in non-ethics. This is important. For example, when we say that this saw is a good saw, but that saw is not a good saw, we use the word good in a non-ethical context. We use it about a saw. Now, when you use good in ethics too, for example, you say truth-telling is good, does its meaning is the same meaning as when we said this saw is good and that saw is bad? Or does it have another meaning? Whether the terms we use in non-ethics, when used in ethics, have the same meaning or concept or not, is one of the important discussions of moral semantics. The second part of analytical ethics is moral epistemology. In moral epistemology, the discussion is, firstly, when we issue a moral judgment, how can we provide a reason for this moral judgment? Because everyone in any science, whether ethics or non-ethics, when they issue a judgment, for us to accept it from them, we demand a reason, and when we demand a reason, they must be able to provide a reason that the judgment they issued is correct. Now, when we issue a moral judgment, if the other party demands a reason from us and says, for what reason have you issued such a judgment, we must be able to provide a reason. How is reasoning, or in other words, justification in ethics? (Justification in its epistemological sense, i.e., Justification). How can we justify the judgments we issue in ethics? That is, if you said, for instance, that returning a trust is good or returning a trust is the duty of every human being, if someone said, for what reason? You must be able to provide a reason. This is the discussion of moral justification and relates to moral epistemology. Another discussion that relates to moral epistemology is this: from where do we ascertain the truth of moral judgments.

How do we know that a certain moral judgment is true? Such issues pertain to moral epistemology, which is one part of analytic ethics. But the third part of analytic ethics is moral ontology. In moral ontology, the debate is over whether moral realities exist in the world or whether we bring these realities into being. To clarify this matter, let me explain the difference between invention and discovery: What is the difference between the work of an inventor and the work of a discoverer? A discoverer brings to your and my attention a reality that existed in the universe but of whose existence others were unaware. We call this person a discoverer. Electricity was a reality in the universe. Someone came and discovered this reality for the first time. We were unaware of it. Gravity or attraction was one of the realities of the world, but before Newton, no one knew of this reality. Newton became aware of it for the first time. Therefore, in discovery, we report on a reality that previously existed and of which no one was aware until now, and we have just become aware of it, but this is not the case in invention. In invention, we ourselves bring into existence for the first time a reality that did not exist at all. The inventor of the radio did not become aware of something that existed. They brought into existence something that did not exist. The inventor of television or the satellite brought into existence something that did not exist. Thus, the difference between discovery and invention is that in discovery, you merely become aware of a pre-existing reality, and then you convey the news to others. In invention, you bring a non-existent reality into being. This is the difference between an inventor and a discoverer, and between invention and discovery. Now, in technical terminology, instead of invention, the word 'construction' is used, and instead of discovery, the word 'uncovering'. So the question is: Do moral realities exist and we merely discover them, or not; is there no moral reality at all, and we construct a series of things; we ourselves bring them into existence (for example, through convention)?

A radio becomes a reality after it is made, but before humans made it, it had no reality—now it has acquired reality. We might be able, through conventions, to bring ethical realities into existence ourselves from now on. Just as after someone invented the radio, a reality called the radio came into existence. Now the debate is over whether ethical realities are invented matters or discovered matters. Are they invented or are they discovered? That is, is there truly a goodness, for instance, in truthfulness, whether we are aware of it or not, whether we are informed of it or not, and we discover this goodness and express it in the form of a proposition: the proposition “truthfulness is good.” Or, have we humans, for example, made a convention among ourselves that from now on we shall regard truthfulness as good, and from now on something called the goodness of truthfulness has been invented. This is a debate in moral ontology. Of course, there are other discussions within this same moral ontology, but the most important one is the one I have just mentioned to you. Now, these three branches—moral semantics, moral epistemology, and moral ontology—become the subcategories of what is referred to as analytic ethics or meta-ethics, and this analytic ethics or meta-ethics is definitely a part of the philosophy of ethics.

+ If you could briefly touch upon the other domains of ethics as well, we would be grateful. Moral psychology...

Moral psychology is a branch of psychology. But it is that branch of psychology that relates to ethics. For example: suppose in your ethical system you have decided whether you are an inventionist or a discoveryist (depending on whether you are an inventionist or a discoveryist) that envy is bad. Now the discussion is over the fact that if envy is bad but it has become entrenched in me, how can I uproot this envy? Or if envy is bad and we do not want our children to grow up envious, what should we do? This practical approach pertains to moral psychology. Moral psychology, in fact, deals with psychological discussions that are related to ethics in the sense that they aim to entrench a moral virtue or uproot a moral vice. This becomes moral psychology. Moral sociology, which is another science related to ethics, examines the unconscious and unintended effects of living ethically at the societal level. When all human beings are truthful, whether they know it or not and whether they want it or not, this truth-telling or their being humble creates a series of social effects. The study of these effects pertains to moral sociology. In fact, the known or unknown, intended or unintended effects that the ethical living of each and every one of us humans brings about at the level of society are the subject matter of moral sociology.

+ Where does the concept of practical ethics fit theoretically? Is it a separate branch, a field parallel to moral psychology, moral philosophy, and the sociology of ethics?

Practical ethics is itself divided into two parts, and because of this division, each part connects to one of the branches we were just discussing. In practical ethics, the discussion sometimes concerns whether specific actions, whose rightness or wrongness we do not know, are right or wrong. For example, is euthanasia right or not? Suppose I contract a disease with two characteristics: first, the medical community says that in the current state of knowledge, we cannot cure this disease, so given the present circumstances and progress of medical science, it is an incurable disease. Second, it is an incurable disease accompanied by very severe and unbearable pain and suffering. Now, if I contract a disease with these two features and ask you to kill me and put me at ease, is this euthanasia, or mercy killing, morally right or wrong? That is, if I, as a patient, ask this of you, the physician, is it right for you to do it or not? Or is abortion right or wrong? Especially if we know that the fetus, if born, will have a serious defect—for instance, an abortion where we know the child will be blind, deaf, and mute, or will be paralyzed for life, or will be afflicted with insanity—is aborting this fetus right or wrong? Or if someone gives you a choice between two actions: they say, either you kill one of these twenty people so the other nineteen live, or I myself will kill all twenty. Here, morally speaking, which action should a person take? Should we let that person kill all twenty, or should we ourselves kill one, who is completely innocent, so that the other nineteen are freed? One of the two parts of practical ethics deals with these kinds of issues. This part connects to what we discussed as normative or prescriptive ethics. But practical ethics has a second part, which is this: suppose we know what things are good and what things are bad, what things are right and what things are wrong. How do we raise our children and those under our tutelage and training to cultivate in them the things we know to be good, and prevent the things we know to be bad from emerging in them? This is a branch of education. If this becomes the subject of discussion in practical ethics, it is a form of moral psychology.

Of course, there are other fields within ethics. For example, one discussion is the history of ethics. In the history of ethics, we only and exclusively report, doing nothing else, and we do not seek to extract from it a theory about the moral nature of human beings. Another field related to ethics is the ethics of art, which concerns the relationship between ethics and art. For instance, where we discuss whether art should be for art's sake or in the service of ethics.

+ Doesn't this fall under practical ethics?

Yes, but because it holds particular importance, it has been separated out and studied as an independent branch. Another discipline related to ethics is a branch of the philosophy of mind called the Philosophy of Action. The philosophy of action is fundamentally a branch of philosophy that discusses what it means for an action to be issued by a person. One part of the philosophy of action relates to ethics, and that is the part that discusses to what extent the things recommended in ethics to do or not to do are voluntary and to what extent they lie outside the domain of human volition. This, too, is a part of the philosophy of action that relates to ethics.

+ When we say that a series of actions are good actions but we do not perform them, or how good propositions fail to be put into practice, which field of ethics do these questions belong to?

This pertains to moral psychology. This is precisely the issue of Socrates and Aristotle. Socrates said that it is enough for human beings to know what is good and what is bad, what is right and what is wrong, what is virtue and what is vice. Once they know, they will necessarily act according to their knowledge. Therefore, if you want people to become moral, you only need to take one step: make people knowledgeable about goods and bads, rights and wrongs, virtues and vices, duties and responsibilities. As some of our scholars have said, “Teach them, and that is enough.” Just teaching them what is good and what is bad suffices. This is Socrates’ view. In fact, the meaning of Socrates’ view is that moral knowledge will necessarily guide and lead to appropriate moral action; there is never any gap between moral knowledge and moral action. Aristotle was almost the first person to object to this statement of Socrates, saying that there is always the possibility of a gap existing between moral knowledge and action, and he attributed this gap to what is today called weakness of will, and what he himself called moral weakness (Moral Weakness). Moral weakness or weakness of will (in today’s terms) means that sometimes I know what I ought to do and what I ought not to do, but because I have a weakness of will, I do not act upon what I ought to do, or I commit what I ought not to do.

+ What are the general trends in moral philosophy?

It varies greatly depending on whether your question pertains to the semantics of ethics, the epistemology of ethics, or the ontology of ethics. If your question pertains to the semantics of ethics, it can be said that the two very important trends of our time are two trends. One trend says that the application of moral concepts in ethics is no different from their application outside of ethics. That is, just as when these words are used outside of ethics they have a completely instrumental meaning, when they are used in ethics they also have an instrumental application. When you say, “This is a good shovel,” it means that with this shovel one can dig the garden well, that is, it has an instrumental aspect. In the same way, when we say “truthfulness is good,” it means that with truthfulness one can create security in society, create trust, create social cohesion. The second view says: No, when moral terms are used in ethics, their meaning is different from the meaning they have when used outside of ethics.

In the epistemology of ethics, we must say that there are two very important currents in our time: one is moral realism and the other is moral anti-realism. Moral realism is that view in the epistemology of ethics whose proponents believe that reasoning in ethics is possible, and moral anti-realism says that reasoning is not possible. That is, human beings in ethics cannot provide reasons in favor of their claims. So what are we dealing with in ethics? We are dealing with personal preferences. We are dealing with tastes and sensibilities. We are dealing with predilections, and therefore there is no justification in ethics. But moral realism says that justification in ethics is possible. That is, just as if we disagree about the weight of this pear—you say the weight of this pear is 100 grams, I say it is less than 100 grams, and a third person says it is more than 100 grams—there is an external measure that all three of us accept, and by referring to that measure we can understand which of the three of us is right. In the same way, if we disagree on moral issues, there is an external criterion and measure by referring to which the disagreements can be resolved and we can understand whether you were right, or I, or the third person.

+ This view, as a rule, should not align with social ethics. Why?

Because when we are dealing with individual preferences, on what basis and criterion should we act in society? When we are all dealing with individual preferences, we can find a way to vote and act according to the outcome of that vote. In my opinion, the only case for resorting to votes is when there is no scale. Do you ever consult public opinion about how much this plate weighs? No. Why? Because a scale exists: we measure it. You resort to public opinion when no scale exists. You say, since no scale exists—meaning we are dealing with a subjective matter—and on the other hand, we cannot avoid making a decision about this issue in the arena of social action, so let us vote. Let us make the decision that the majority votes for the basis of our social decision-making. Then, in the same way, it can be said that no one can prove that lying is bad. But at the same time, if the majority of people vote that lying should be considered bad, this very 'lying is bad' becomes the basis for social decision-making.

+ Doesn't this provide a basis for moral relativism?

Moral relativism in what sense? Moral relativism also has several meanings. Sometimes we say morality is relative, and we mean that the morality of this society differs from the morality of that society. Whether these two societies are co-spatial but not contemporaneous, contemporaneous but not co-spatial, or neither co-spatial nor contemporaneous. In all three cases, it is possible to say that this society has certain ethics and that society has other ethics. If by relativism you mean this, one can subscribe to relativism, meaning we can say the morality of this society differs from that society. But it is possible that when you say morality is relative, you mean that there is not even a single moral principle that is agreed upon by all human beings. This type of relativism does not necessarily follow from my words. It is possible that one or two principles are agreed upon, but there is no agreement on the rest of the matters, and regarding those matters, we are forced to resort to the majority vote.

But the ethical tendencies related to the ontology of ethics. There are two major tendencies here: one is the tendency of those who believe in the discovery of ethics, and the other is the tendency of those who believe in the construction of ethics. But in general, today there are fundamentally four important schools in moral philosophy. Until the first half of the twentieth century, there were two major schools in ethics. But from the second half of this century, two more schools have been added. Now it can be said there are four ethical schools. One school is the school referred to as deontology or the school of duty for duty's sake (Deontologism). The claim of the proponents of duty for duty's sake is that a series of actions are good and a series of actions are bad. Neither the goodness of those actions nor the badness of these actions depends on the effects and consequences that follow from them. 'Tell the truth, even if the heavens fall.' Telling the truth is a human duty. As a result of this truth-telling, whether the sky falls to the earth, the earth rises to the sky, or the heavens collapse, it does not matter: we must tell the truth. That is, it is just us and our moral duty. These things that are our moral duties must be performed regardless of what consequences follow when they are carried out.

+ Does this school answer the questions of the various domains of ethics?

Yes.

+ That is, in the domain of moral philosophy, which tendency do the proponents of duty for duty's sake believe in, for example, in the domain of moral ontology?

For example, in the ontology of ethics, deontologists consider morality to belong to the category of discovery, not invention. Each of these schools I am naming must have provided answers to many questions in many areas, but I am summarizing the matter. This school, in my opinion, is not defensible. But, well, I am not concerned with judgment for now. There is a second school called consequentialism or Teleologism. This school says the rightness or wrongness of actions is due to the effects and consequences they bring; telling the truth is good because telling the truth brings certain effects and consequences in its wake, and if they have said lying is bad, it is because it brings certain effects and consequences in its wake. This school is teleologism or consequentialism. That is, they look at the consequences of actions and consider good and bad, in principle, to belong to the consequences of actions. These themselves are divided internally into numerous schools, the most famous of which is Utilitarianism. This school says the goodness and badness of actions depend on the amount of pleasure and pain those actions bring about. Any action that brings more pleasure is better, and any that brings more pain is worse. This is the most important school among the consequentialist schools. There is a third school referred to as rights-based ethics. That is, a school that does not base ethics on duty but on rights. That is, it says we should not constantly say in ethics what duties human beings have. Of course, there is no doubt that when a right is established for me, as a result of the right established for me, duties arise for you toward me, but the important thing is that rights are the axis, not obligations and duties. This is a third doctrine. There is a fourth doctrine: virtue-based ethics, a school that says only and solely virtue—that is, the desirable inner state that arises for a human being—should be the focus of attention in ethics. The outward actions we perform with our eyes, ears, hands, and feet, if any goodness or badness is attributed to them, it is because of the effect they have in creating an inner state called virtue, and for no other reason. This is the school Aristotle believed in, and in our time, people like Slote and MacIntyre revived this school anew in the second half of the twentieth century. These are the four important schools.

Therefore, the entire dispute is over whether we have duties that we must perform regardless of their consequences, or whether whatever our duty is, it is because of its consequences; or whether rights are fundamentally important, not duties—duties being subordinate to rights; or whether virtue is fundamentally a desirable inner state of the human being, and whoever possesses this inner state, any action that issues from them is morally good. The debate is over this.

+ If we were to discuss the tendencies of each of the four schools you mentioned and the questions of each, it would become very lengthy. But regarding this last one, which is oriented toward virtue and is very subjective, when it enters the realm of analytic ethics, how does it answer those questions? Since its virtue is very internal and very subjective, how does it answer the questions of analytic ethics in those three domains, which were all very concrete and objective?

First, let me give an example to clarify what this ethics seeks to say. Let me offer an instance of virtue-centered ethics. Suppose we take the narrative of Aristotelian ethics as an example of virtue-centered ethics. Aristotle said that a human being must possess these four virtues within themselves: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. These four virtues must be cultivated within every person. Later, Christians said they either did not accept these virtues at all or that three other virtues must be added to them. They referred to these three as the theological virtues, which were: faith, hope, and love. The gist of Aristotle's argument is that if these four virtues are firmly established within you, then whatever action issues from you is good. First, you must become pure within. Any external action that issues from a pure interior is a good and moral act. The first flaw of this ethics is that, for instance, when the act of lying is committed by two people, we might say that because one of them possesses those four virtues, their lying should be characterized as good, and because the other does not possess those four virtues and their lying does not stem from those virtues, their lying should be considered morally bad. In reality, we cannot make a moral judgment. This ethics, in other words, is an ethics that can be an agent morality (eut merality) but cannot be a spectator morality. That is, this ethics can be an agent's ethics but cannot be an observer's ethics. Because ethics, in this respect, is also divided into two types. There are ethics that are agent morality, meaning they say what I, as a human being, should do and should not do. There are ethics that are spectator morality, meaning they say what moral judgments I should make and should not make about the actions of others. If you pay attention, virtue-centered ethics closes off the path of judgment and is only useful for the person themselves (if it is useful at all). Naturally, in the face of the analyses you referred to, this ethics truly encounters problems, and its contemporary proponents, that is, people like Slote or MacIntyre, also grapple with these same problems.

+ Do we have something called philosophical schools of ethics in the Islamic tradition?

Our Islamic tradition has three shortcomings from the standpoint of moral philosophy. One shortcoming is that what is referred to as moral philosophy, in the strict sense of the term, has not existed as an independent discipline in our Islamic tradition. In our Islamic tradition, concerning moral philosophy, we only have the discussion of good and evil (ḥusn wa qubḥ) that the theologians raised, and their concern was mostly the discussion of the attributes and acts of God. Within the issue of good and evil, there are very, very few discussions concerning ethics to which the Ashʿarites and the Muʿtazilites have alluded. The second problem in Islamic ethics is that it attempts to reconcile things that are irreconcilable. For instance, in our books of Islamic ethics, they want to combine the four Aristotelian virtues and the theory of the mean with our Qurʾanic and traditional ethics, which is a Semitic ethics. Greek ethics and Semitic ethics are irreconcilable, and you see in our later ethical works, such as Jāmiʿ al-Saʿādāt by Mullā Mahdī Narāqī and Miʿrāj al-Saʿāda by Mullā Aḥmad Narāqī, that the discussion of the mean is raised. The mean is virtue; its excess is vice and its deficiency is also vice. Yet at the same time, we have virtues that, according to our own Book and Tradition, are certainly virtues but cannot be accommodated within the theory of the mean. For example, faith (īmān) is a virtue from the perspective of the Semitic religions. Now, this virtue is the mean between which two extremes of excess and deficiency? Is nearness to God a virtue or a vice? It is a virtue. But between which side of excess and which side of deficiency does it lie? A kind of ethics is observed here that wants both to honor the teachings of Plato and Aristotle and to be compatible with the Qurʾan and narrations—this is the second flaw. And the third flaw is that the very actions that are characterized by ethical concepts have not themselves undergone conceptual clarification. This is also important. For example, in Islam you believe that rajāʾ is good, umniyya is bad, and amal is neither good nor bad, but ṭūl al-amal is bad. Now I ask you, what is the difference between these three? What is the difference between rajāʾ, umniyya, and amal? You say rajāʾ in Persian means hope. Amal means wish. But the discussion still revolves around what difference there is between hope and wish. These themselves have not undergone conceptual clarification either. This is why, truly, in the Islamic world, with respect to what we today call analytic ethics, we are in a state of poverty. Without wanting to boast or chant slogans, we must say that we are very, very poor in terms of moral philosophy in the Islamic world.

+ What about other theoretical domains? Moral sociology, moral psychology?

In those, even more so. In the empirical sciences related to ethics, even more so.

+ In the Shia seminaries, has moral philosophy ever been taught, or is it taught now?

No, it has never been taught. In these last two decades after the revolution, some things are taught under the title of moral philosophy, but firstly, they are very superficial, and secondly, many of their discussions are not really moral philosophy at all. They bear the title of moral philosophy.

+ So we have nothing from the heritage of our traditional religious schools concerning moral philosophy?

No, we have nothing in a systematic form. There may be intellectual sparks that could be useful today for building a system. They could become raw materials for a system, but they themselves are absolutely not systematic.

+ Surely you accept that one can speak of political ethics. I wanted to know what, in your view, are its characteristics? What is the theoretical domain of political ethics?

It is better to say that the [difference] between political ethics and other branches of ethics is that in political ethics, the discussion revolves around what one ought to do and ought not to do in relation to power. All the oughts and ought-nots that pertain to the domain of power constitute political ethics. Just as we can have economic ethics, family ethics, student ethics, medical ethics, and other ethics… we can also have an ethics called political ethics. Political ethics is that part of ethics which addresses the question of what one ought to do and ought not to do within the context of power. In fact, any discussion that relates to the category of power, but from the perspective of what one ought to do and ought not to do within that category, is political ethics. The reason I say 'from the perspective of what one ought to do and ought not to do' is so that we do not confuse political ethics with political sociology or political psychology.

The issues discussed in political ethics can initially be divided into two major categories: issues concerning the relations of governments with one another, and issues concerning the relations of a government with the people of its own society. In my opinion, it is better to subsume the issues of the first category under the title of the ethics of international relations, and, in any case, I will only say a few words about the issues of the second category. It seems that the issues concerning the relations of the government with the people can, from an ethical standpoint, be referred and reduced to three major problems (as others have indeed undertaken such a referral and reduction). The first problem is whether, in a government, those who, under the name of president, member of parliament, or any other title, undertake the representation of the people and are elected by the people (whether directly or indirectly) to intervene in the administration and management of the collective life of the people, ought, ethically, to act in accordance with the moral judgments of the people or according to the moral judgments they themselves hold. In other words, in what they do or do not do, should they make the moral discernment of the people who chose them the criterion for action, or their own moral discernment? The second problem is whether there are ethical duties and responsibilities that find their instances only for statesmen and politicians and find no instance or application whatsoever outside the sphere of politics, or not. And the third problem is whether statesmen and politicians can, ethically, violate and trample upon the ethical standards that were binding upon them outside the political sphere in their political life. That is, can it be said that political life has its own specific exigencies and requirements, and one of those exigencies and requirements is that those involved in politics must, in some cases, violate the ethical standards governing the behavior of other people and, for example, do things that, if they were not involved in politics, they would not be ethically permitted to do—for instance, they can lie, deceive the people, exercise unjust violence, break promises, and so on. This third problem is the very issue that is usually raised under the title of the problem of 'dirty hands.'

+ Are there also different tendencies and schools in this field?

Yes, there are different tendencies. One contemporary tendency is conventionalism, which means that in the sphere of politics, we are only bound by what the majority of people have agreed upon by convention, and we are not bound by anything else.

+ In the field of social ethics, you yourself sense the anomalies and disorders. We see a kind of moral anarchy in today's atmosphere of society, which is the result of changes at deeper levels. How do you explain and analyze these reasons and these deeper levels, and furthermore, in terms of theorizing, if we want to depict the current moral situation in Iranian society, which tendency or school can we draw upon?

It seems your question is this: if we currently have ethical disorders and deficiencies in society, what, in the final analysis, is the cause of this ethical disorder or our unethical way of living? In my view, the fact that we are now living unethically is the result of various causes. To mention the first cause of our unethical living, I will draw on a distinction made in psychology, especially in the third force of psychology, humanistic psychology. In humanistic psychology, figures like Rogers and Maslow argue that human needs can be classified. Primary needs, secondary needs, third- and fourth-order needs, and so on. I am not concerned for now with the details of how many categories of needs there are, but I want to say in brief that the theory of hierarchical needs holds that until your first-order needs are satisfied in society, second-order needs do not even emerge to be satisfied or unsatisfied, and until second-order needs are satisfied, third-order needs do not emerge to be satisfied or unsatisfied. The meaning of this, in very simple terms, is that as long as we are still needy in matters of food, clothing, shelter, sleep, rest, and the sexual instinct, and these first-order needs of ours remain unmet, higher-order needs—such as needs related to safety, needs related to love, kindness, and heartfelt belonging, needs related to respect and social esteem, and needs related to moral and spiritual growth—do not even arise in us. And this means that one major cause of our not living ethically is that our basic subsistence needs have not been met; when these needs are unmet, observing ethical rules is meaningless. "What can Rostam do in the ranks with a bouquet of flowers and basil?" When you are in the battle line, you do not hold bouquets of flowers and basil. Bouquets of flowers and basil belong to the feast and party, not the battlefield. When society is a battlefield and a struggle over the basics of life, can one observe ethical rules? Do people afflicted by famine observe ethical rules more in their dealings with one another, or people whose basic needs of life are fully met? This is the first cause of unethical living that exists in our society; because primary needs are unmet, the observance of ethical rules, which are part of our higher-order needs, naturally does not occur. This is a very important factor that must be given great attention. The second cause is that if we want society to become ethical, first the convincing forces must come into play, then the motivating forces, and then the compelling forces. All three forces must come into play, and precisely in this order I mentioned: first, the convincing forces, which through reasoning make people believe that this act is good and that act is bad. The vast majority of people, if they truly believe that this act is good and that act is bad, will do the good act and abandon the bad act. First, the convincing forces must come into play. Through these convincing forces, the vast majority will move toward doing good and refraining from evil, and a certain number will remain. It is here that we must use the motivating forces, that is, a reward system. That is, for those who still have not believed that this act is good or bad, we create a social context in which, if they do the good act or refrain from the bad act, they receive a reward. These motivating forces then do their work. If a small number still remain who refuse to submit to ethical rules, only then, only at this point, must we use the restraining forces, that is, crime and punishment, prison, and crackdowns. In our society, these three stages have begun from the end. First, the restraining forces—crackdowns, beatings, killings, and so on—then, if the turn comes, it reaches the motivating forces, and then, if the turn comes, the convincing forces. I believe that in our society, the turn has never reached the convincing forces. Ethics must begin with the convincing forces, then the motivating forces, and then the compelling forces.

+ How do you depict the ethical situation now? You said it is a deplorable situation. By what criterion, with what lens, from what perspective are you looking?

If we look at it purely from a religious perspective, our society is not ethical now. But if we also look at it from a rational-spiritual perspective, from that perspective too, our society is not ethical. The religious perspective is a purely transmitted one, meaning you refer to the Quran and hadiths to see what they say about which society is ethical and which is not. For example, the Quran says: when you have enmity with a people, do not let that enmity cause you to be unjust to them. In our society, if I hold power and am your enemy, I will do whatever I can to you; nothing stops me… This is contrary to religion: la tajassasu—do not spy on one another. Lahma akhihi maytan fakarihtumuhu—do not backbite. By these criteria, we are not ethical. By the criteria that Ali ibn Abi Talib spoke of regarding the relationship between the ruler and the subjects, we are not ethical. That is the religious perspective. But if we look from the rational-spiritual perspective, this perspective has two concerns. One is that the whole society be administered by rational methods. The other is that it be administered in such a way that people are constantly growing spiritually. Looking from this perspective as well, we are not ethical and we do not live ethically.

+ That second perspective, your own perspective, what kind of perspective is it that says this society is not ethical? What factors does it evaluate positively, which it then applies to the current situation and gives a negative score?

The first thing that exists is that spirituality is realized along with freedom. There is no act, however good, that if you perform it out of compulsion, elevates you spiritually—meaning no good deed, if done under compulsion, brings you spiritual growth, and no bad deed done under compulsion causes you spiritual decline. The good deeds that bring you spiritual growth are those performed freely, and the bad deeds that cause you spiritual decline are those performed freely. An act done under compulsion, if it is good, does not bring you spiritual growth, and if it is bad, does not cause you decline. Therefore, the first condition of a spiritual society is that it be free—but let them not immediately say that freedom means chaos and licentiousness. Freedom is constrained, but its constraints must also be set by free human beings; free human beings themselves must reach a consensus that we ourselves want to limit our own freedom at a certain point. This is the first condition of a spiritual society. The second condition of a spiritual society is that it be a society where, if you are engaged in honorable work, you can live a dignified life in terms of livelihood, so that you can devote your time and energy to spiritual matters. By spiritual matters, I do not mean only invocations and litanies. Engage in art, literature, mysticism, solitude, self-reckoning, talking to oneself, psychological self-analysis—these are spiritual activities. A society in which we can manage our livelihood in a dignified manner with eight hours of honorable work is a spiritual society. But if this does not happen in a society, then what must you do? Two paths can be taken: either you turn those eight hours into twelve, thirteen, fifteen hours—that is, you increase the quantity, in which case, sooner or later, you become worn out spiritually and physically. The second thing you can do is not to increase the quantity, but to reduce the quality of honorable work. You fall into all kinds of deceit, overcharging, shortchanging, embezzlement, slacking off, and so on, and it is clear that this option also yields nothing but spiritual decline. A spiritual society is not like this. A spiritual society is one in which you can be done with your livelihood with eight hours of work and devote the remaining hours of your life to spiritual matters in their broadest sense.

+ You raised the issue that persuasive, motivating, and deterrent factors must be at work—in effect, to make a certain kind of ethics prevail? For our society to have a belief in ethics?

That, of course, is another story. And it is correct, but here I want to say something else. That an ethical belief must prevail is one point, which is not currently our subject of discussion. Our subject of discussion right now is not that we must first have a belief in ethical belief. In order to live ethically, a belief in certain ethics must arise within us. We cannot be made ethical through force and violence. They must approach us through belief.

+ So the starting point is these very theoretical and academic discussions—meaning you have no other prescription besides enriching the field of moral philosophy or the field of moral psychology in general?

Yes. Enrich it. Bring these matters to the threshold of public awareness, not just doing this work within departments of moral philosophy. What I mean is that after the theoretical and academic work is done, it must then reach the threshold of public awareness; this is important. In any case, I was enumerating the factors behind our unethical living. The first factor is a lack of attention to the classification of needs. The second factor is a lack of attention to the forces that instill belief, motivation, and inhibition. The third factor is that a human being can live ethically only when, as much as possible, their inner self is free from three elements: resentment, hatred, and anger. When a person is in the grip of resentment, or when they are in a state of anger or seized by hatred, living ethically becomes very, very difficult. And in this respect, the greatest crime that oppressive, tyrannical, totalitarian, despotic, and autocratic regimes commit against humanity is not at all related to external matters. Rather, it is that they fill people's inner selves with anger, resentment, and hatred, and a person in the grip of anger, resentment, and hatred cannot live ethically. Ethical living requires a kind of cool-headedness. Cool-headedness in a specific sense, not in the sense it is most often used. There must be a kind of calm within a person for them to be able to live ethically; a person who, throughout all their waking and conscious hours, has their anger directed at one place, their resentment directed at one place, and their hatred directed at one place.

These three phenomena are different from one another. Living ethically becomes very difficult. Totalitarian regimes turn people into a gathering place, a reservoir, and a storehouse of the three phenomena of hatred, resentment, and anger. A person whose inner self is such a storehouse can no longer live ethically. This is also important. The next point is that ethical living requires certain philosophical foundations.

+ From a rational-spiritual perspective?

Yes. If these foundations collapse, a person cannot live ethically. One of the most important of these foundations is that a person can live spiritually only when they ascribe meaning to life. A person who does not ascribe meaning to life either falls into hedonism, which is contrary to ethics, or succumbs to despair, which also prevents ethical living. That is, despairing people do not live ethically, and hedonistic people do not live ethically either. For a person to be saved from hedonism and despair, they must ascribe meaning to their life, and this requires a philosophical foundation. This philosophical foundation is, unfortunately, less accessible now because metaphysics is collapsing. That is, all universal perspectives are collapsing, and since these metaphysical foundations have collapsed, such a problem naturally arises in ethics as well. It is constantly said that the youth are experiencing a moral crisis. But this matter is not exclusive to the youth. Young, old, woman, man, educated, uneducated—whoever finds those metaphysical foundations unsteady in their view and sees them as having lost their solidity, ethical living becomes difficult, indeed impossible, for them. Another point I want to mention is that a person lives ethically who has self-esteem, meaning they have respect for themselves, they have self-respect, meaning they value themselves. When a person values themselves, they do not defile themselves with lying. They do not defile themselves with taking bribes, stealing, shortchanging, overcharging, betrayal, and so on. If in a society, wherever you go, you are humiliated, you lose your self-esteem, and then you cannot live ethically. And another issue is that one of the very serious views among education specialists is that ethics will prevail and permeate a society only when that society has not been seized by the delusion of grandiosity and the delusion that 'we are the chosen people.' But if you are told that you are the chosen people, that you are the blessed community, that you are supported by the higher realms, that the celestial world looks only upon you, then in that case, you feel no need to live ethically. You see yourself as above ethical values.

This situation exists both in our society and in other religious societies. Religious societies are always susceptible to a kind of self-righteousness, thinking that because we perform certain rituals and rites, our condition is fine: we are situated in a sturdy fortress and an impregnable castle. When you are told that if you do such-and-such things you will have no problems, then you perform those few things—which are usually ritualistic and ceremonial in nature—and in other matters you feel free and unrestrained. Unfortunately, the potential for this self-righteousness exists in all religions and denominations. Ethics flourishes in a society where no one believes that I, as an individual, or we, as a society, are a chosen individual or people. That we are beloved of God. That we are a blessed community. A Christian who believes that as long as I pay my tithe, attend church every week, and bake pastries to bring to the priest, my affairs are in order and I am a good person—such a Christian is prone to trample any ethical principle underfoot. The six causes I mentioned have worked hand in hand and made us susceptible to moral weakness.

+ I asked a question that I still haven't received an answer to. The reasons you explained pertain to why we need not even consider whether such a society is ethical or not. It is clearer than the sun that it is not ethical. If there is no self-respect in it, if people face major difficulties for their livelihood, and ... But I am saying, suppose you go to an unknown society; if you wanted to see and understand whether that unknown society is ethical or not, what major criteria would you consider?

Through which lenses do you look to characterize a society as ethical or unethical? That is, apart from the analysis of the current situation, what does he consider to be the parameters that explain a society's ethical condition?

I judge whether a society is ethical or not by six measures and criteria.

The first criterion is honesty. That is, a person's inner and outer selves correspond exactly to one another, and this means the negation of hypocrisy, deceit, and trickery. Honesty means the correspondence of three realms in the inner and outer self: the realm of what passes through the heart, the realm of what comes to the tongue and pen, and the realm of what is done. If these three correspond to one another, I am an honest person.

The second criterion is benevolence. Benevolence, in fact, means that I consider you as myself. Not in the sense of financial charity.

The third is humility, meaning that I consider myself as you.

The fourth criterion is justice. Justice means that, to the best of my discernment, I do not violate or neglect anyone's right and I render it to them.

+ To the best of my discernment. This definition is very broad.

Because a human being, no matter how much they wish, cannot behave justly throughout their entire life and is not infallible. But they can behave justly to the best of their discernment.

+ Does this definition leave room for injustice?

No, it is not a prescription for injustice. Because we are human and fallible, injustice may issue from us, but injustice is not morally right. It is not that everything possible is morally right. We must behave justly. But we are not so self-deluded as to say we can certainly behave justly in every moment of our lives.

The fifth criterion is truth-seeking. That is, we do not consider any human being, any religion, any denomination, any culture, civilization, ethnicity, nation, taste, or inclination to be above truth. That is, we have no unreasoned submission to anything. We serve only and solely the right and the truth.

And the sixth criterion is the characteristic of philanthropy.

+ Under which broad tendency do these fall?

My own inclination in ethics—and these remarks of mine also stem from that inclination—is an inclination that, firstly, holds to discovery in ethics, not invention. However, I believe that on the basis of the discovered moral realities, we also find many invented moral realities. But as for the core and foundation of ethics, I hold to discovery. Secondly, my belief is that in ethics, the ultimate end is for individuals in society to attain spiritual growth. Social functions are of secondary importance.

+ Given the current situation in the domain of political ethics, if you have any points, please share them?

I have no particular point. What I truly believe is that in political ethics, the most important issue is the discovery of the truth of reducing people's pain and suffering, and this must be considered more valuable than any factional affiliation. Any factional affiliation must be in the service of discovering the truth and reducing people's pain and suffering.

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A Conversation with Mostafa Malekian Entitled “The Crisis of Ethics and Spirituality (Moral Philosophy)”

Published in Ordibehesht 85

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