Critical Remarks on the Translation of Søren Kierkegaard's The Concept of Irony

Critical Remarks on the Translation of Søren Kierkegaard's The Concept of Irony

Mohammad Mostafa Bayat (Graduate of English Language and Literature, and Philosophy)

*The full version of this article is available here as a PDF.

Introduction

In this article, I attempt to demonstrate that Saleh Najafi's translation of Søren Kierkegaard's The Concept of Irony is not an acceptable translation and cannot be considered a reliable source for an accurate and comprehensive understanding of Kierkegaard's thought, nor, consequently, a reliable source for writing articles and theses on his thought. My effort is to present numerous and varied pieces of evidence under six headings and, with their help, to substantiate my claim. Those six headings are as follows: "Inaccurate Translation or Incorrect Translation or Inaccurate and Incorrect Translation," "Untranslated Words, Phrases, or Sentences," "Lack of Uniformity in Translation," "Lack of Footnotes and a Glossary for Translated Terms, Especially Technical Terms," "Editorial Problems or Awkward Persian," and "Failure to Translate Many of the English Translators' Useful Notes." Also, under the heading "The Unclear Delineation of the Contributions of the Persian Translator and the English Translators in Compiling Information Contained in Some Footnotes"—that is, the seventh heading—I will present evidence that the Persian translator has not done justice to the English translators in his referencing. The details of the English text I have used as the basis for examining the Persian translation are as follows: The Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates, by Søren Kierkegaard, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, published by Princeton University Press, 1989. The details of the Persian translation under review are as follows: Mafhum-e Ayroni ba Erja'-e Modam be Soqrat [The Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates], by Søren Kierkegaard, translated by Saleh Najafi, published by Markaz Publishing, 2016. I have examined the Persian translation in its entirety; however, in this article, I have only pointed out the translator's errors up to page 305 (the entire book is 354 pages). I have also not pointed out all the errors, but have tried to mention some of the most important ones (this article also has a longer version in which more evidence is presented, and some of the evidence provided in this article is also given in greater detail). The errors and shortcomings are also categorized based on the page numbers of the Persian translation, not based on the quality of the errors and shortcomings; therefore, an accurate judgment of the main claims of this article depends on reading the entire text and observing all the evidence. It is worth noting that the reader may sometimes see some evidence for one heading under another heading: for instance, in the "Inaccurate Translation or Incorrect Translation or Inaccurate and Incorrect Translation" section, evidence of "Lack of Uniformity in Translation," "Untranslated Words, Phrases, or Sentences," and "Awkward Persian" can sometimes be seen in the sentence or sentences under review.

1- Inaccurate Translation or Incorrect Translation or Inaccurate and Incorrect Translation

1- Page 13

On this page, the translator has rendered "substantiality" as "ساحت امور جوهری" [the realm of substantial matters], on page 162 as "استحکام جوهر" [the solidity of substance], on pages 187 and 201 as "جوهراندیشی" [substance-thinking], and on page 210 as "جوهرمندی" [substantiality]. The noteworthy point is that he has not written the English equivalent of any of these in a footnote. The first equivalent, despite being inaccurate, does not confuse and bewilder the reader to such an extent; however, pay attention to the phrases in which the second and third equivalents appear:

"استحکام جوهر فرهنگ متقدم یونان {the substantiality of early Greek culture}"

"مقابله سقراط با جوهراندیشی یونانی { Socrates' opposition to the Greek substantiality}"

I do not know whether the term “substantiality” was so unfamiliar to the Persian translator that he tried to make it familiar with such expressions? And whether phrases like “the solidity of substance” and “substance-thinking” were so familiar to him that he saw no need to mention the equivalent in a footnote? One who is familiar with philosophical texts understands what Kierkegaard means by “substantiality,” or even if he does not, he grasps his meaning through Kierkegaard’s own sentences and the context of the expressions. However, an equivalent such as “substantial solidity,” even if it could convey Kierkegaard’s meaning better than “substantiality,” must have its English equivalent mentioned in a footnote. The expression “substance-thinking” is also misleading; a little searching in Persian texts shows that some have used the expression “substance-thinking” to intend “the conception of existence as substance” (see the abstract of “The Existential Foundations of the Genesis of the West,” written by Mohammad Reza Rikhtegaran) and some have spoken of “Cartesian substance-thinking” in their writings (see the abstract of “Hegel’s and Heidegger’s Phenomenology and Modern Art,” written by Siavash Jamadi). The important point is that in the text, Kierkegaard contrasts “substantiality” with “subjectivity.” Even the English translators of Kierkegaard’s book have emphasized this opposition in their introduction; Ronald L. Hall, in his article, “The Irony of Modern Thought: An Analysis via Kierkegaard’s Concept of Irony,” has also confirmed this. (Page 605 of the journal Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Winter 1988)). Now, in the translator’s view and with his choice of words, should we, following “substance-thinking,” also translate “subjectivity” as “subject-thinking”?!

A note on the history of using the equivalent “substantiality” in Arabic and Persian philosophical texts: From the very beginning, Arabic translators used the expression “al-jawhariyya” in translating the Greek word whose equivalent in English is “substantiality.” (See the book The Genesis of Philosophical Terms in Arabic and Persian, written by Soheil Muhsin Afnan, translated by Mohammad Firouzkouhi, Hekmat Publications, page 169). The equivalent “jowhariyyat” in Persian also has a precedent and is not unfamiliar. (See Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Mir Shamseddin Adib Soltani, page 433, Amirkabir Publications, first edition; Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by Bagher Parham, pages 66-67, Kandokav Publications, second edition; Heidegger’s Being and Time, translated by Abdolkarim Rashidian, page 31, Ney Publications, first edition).

Below you can also see the translator’s equivalents for the adjective “substantial”:

Page 171: the equivalent “the material interests of political life” for “the substantial interests of political life”; Page 229: the equivalent “the qualifications of a life revolving around substance” for “qualifications of substantial life” and the equivalent “the substance-oriented life of the state” for “substantial life of the state”; Page 239: the equivalent “substance-oriented ethics” for “the substantial ethic.”

2- Page 15

The chapter title is “Socrates Position as Irony,” which the translator has rendered as “Socrates’ Situation from the Perspective of Irony.” The correct translation of “position” here is “stance.” It is interesting that on page 93, the translator used the equivalent “stance”: “... we will use what it {the Apology} says about the immortality of the soul so that... Socrates’ stance, based on its overarching structure, becomes apparent as irony {o let Socrates' position become apparent as irony}”; on page 265, the aforementioned word is again translated as “situation”; on page 278, the translator again used the expression “Socrates’ stance” {Socrates’ position as irony}.

3- Page 17

On this page and pages 19, 271, 283, 293, and many other instances—which, unfortunately, I merely noted down while collating the text—the translator has rendered “existence” as “هستی و حیات” (being and life). Regardless of the established tradition in translating existentialist texts into Persian, which renders this word as “وجود” (existence) (I mean when they do not wish to use equivalents such as اگزیستانس), and “being” as “هستی” (being), the noteworthy point is the translator’s use of the word “حیات” (life) alongside the word “هستی” (being) to translate the word “existence”; the translator has not mentioned his reason for choosing such an equivalent at all, neither in the introduction nor in the footnotes. It seems, as Walter Lowrie points out in the second volume of his book Kierkegaard, that the translator of Kierkegaard’s texts must convey the author’s terminology, including “existence,” as it is; even if at times the equivalent “life” might seem more appropriate to him:

‘We must habituate ourselves to S. K.’s use of the word ‘existence’. He means by it the conditions of a truly humane life. He means specfifically the good life in its practical aspects, and his gravest complaint against the Hegelian system is that it ‘abbreviates existence’ to such a degree that it leaves out ethics. It would often be far easier and more intelligible were I to use the word ‘life’ instead of ‘existence’—and say, for example, that the truth must issue in a life comfortable to it. But I adhere to our author’s terminology. ‘Existence’ is a far more abstract term than ‘life’, and I suppose that the word ‘life’ was eschewed because of its romantic, sentimental, and even biological associations’ (302).

4- Page 18: “Philosophy ... seeks the eternal {the eternal}, desires the true {the true}”

Why has the translator rendered “the true” as “حقیقت” (truth)? This is while the translator has rendered “the eternal” as “امر ابدی” (the eternal thing) and not “ابدیت” (eternity). A point must be noted here: There is no doubt that according to a grammatical rule in the English language, an adjective plus the definite article “the” sometimes yields a nominal meaning; however, it must be noted that in this rule, that nominal meaning acquires a plural sense, not a singular one. For example, one cannot translate “the rich” in the sentence “The rich are privileged” as پولدار (rich person), but rather it must be translated as پولدارها (rich people), because the modified noun of these adjectives is plural, not singular; note also the verb “are” after “the rich.” Consequently, in the sentence above, if we consider “the true” and “the eternal” as instances of the aforementioned rule, we must translate them as “حقایق” (truths) and “ابدیت‌ها” (eternities) or “سرمدیت‌ها” (perpetuities), not “حقیقت” (truth) and “ابدیت” (eternity) or “سرمدیت” (perpetuity). However, is the use of “the true” and “the eternal” in the mentioned context an instance of converting an adjective into a noun? With a little attention to the text, one can see that when the English translator uses the expressions “the true” and “the eternal” in translating Kierkegaard’s claims, he wants to show that Kierkegaard has left the noun modified by the mentioned adjectives implicit and does not explicitly state the noun modified by the adjectives “true” and “eternal” or “perpetual”; this modified noun could be “existence,” it could be “being,” it could be “life or living,” it could be “cognition,” and so on. In light of this point, the Persian translator must also refer to that modified noun with an expression such as “امر” (thing/matter) and translate the adjectives as adjectives. It is worth mentioning that in the footnote, a sentence like this is also used: “The eternal is the older than the temporal.” The verb “is” also clearly shows that the use of “the eternal” and, consequently, “the true” which follows it, are not instances of converting a noun into an adjective, and they must be translated in their adjectival form.

Likewise, in a footnote on the same page, the translator has rendered “the eternal” once as “the ancient or eternal thing” and another time as “the eternal thing,” and “eternity” as “pre-eternity” (azal): “... I assume that the ancient or eternal thing is older than the temporal or time-bound thing, and even if philosophy’s antiquity is less than that of history, it immediately takes a step so immense that it leaves temporal things behind, considers itself the very eternal beginning, and, in ever-deeper reflection upon itself, recalls its lineage in pre-eternity {eternity}...” By consulting dictionaries such as the Oxford or Webster’s, one can see that “the eternal” and “eternity” mean both “the eternal thing” and “eternity”—that is, that which encompasses both pre-eternity and post-eternity—and sometimes, depending on the context, simply “the endless” and “endlessness.” Now, if the translator claims that, given the context, the equivalents “the eternal thing” and “eternity” and the equivalents “the endless” and “endlessness” are not suitable here, and that the equivalent “the pre-eternal thing,” or in the translator’s phrasing “the ancient thing,” and “pre-eternity” must be used, then it would naturally have been better, instead of this lack of uniformity in translation or dispersion in the translation of terms, to use a single equivalent and then provide a reason for such a translation.

5- Page 21: “Here we have two options before us: either the ironies are immeasurably profound ... or they belong to the category of nonsense, one of those insipid Socratic moments that an ironic nemesis compels him to ...”

Given that the author has not translated “irony” in the book’s title and has also noted in the introduction that: “The reader will most likely agree with the translator that irony cannot be rendered into Persian” (page 11), our assumption will be that the translator has not translated “irony” and its derivatives throughout the text. Consequently, if no Persian equivalent is to be provided for the word “irony” and its derivatives in Kierkegaard’s text, consistency must be maintained throughout the entire text. Now, one must ask the translator on what grounds he has translated “irony” or its derivatives in the sentences above? Has Kierkegaard perhaps used a different word to express his point in these instances? If the Persian translator, based on the context, has determined that equivalents such as “humor and sarcasm” and the like convey Kierkegaard’s meaning and intent, he must certainly write a footnote for such cases so that the Persian reader realizes that Kierkegaard has used the word “irony” or its derivatives in this section {of course, the translator has sometimes included the word “irony” alongside equivalents such as “humor” and “sarcasm,” examples of which you will see below}. It is worth noting that in the phrase “ironic nemesis” in the sentence above, the adjective “ironic” has not been translated at all.

Other examples: Page 24: “mockery and an irony on the state of the world”; Page 35: “... certainly makes the irony of speech not deeper but more lively”; Page 56: “Socrates begins his speech with a kind of irony, but this is merely a skill in employing humor and sarcasm in speech {an ironic figure (formulation)}, for he would not deserve the title of ironist if his sole distinguishing characteristic were that, just as others talked nonsense, he possessed an exemplary skill in speaking ironically” {I truly do not know on what basis the translator sometimes concludes that irony should be rendered as “humor and sarcasm” and its adverb as “humorously”? It is clear that Kierkegaard’s point in the above phrases is that “irony” should not be considered merely a descriptor for Socrates’ manner of speaking}; Page 75: “If it can be said that Protagoras and Phaedrus, because the imitative and sarcastic [=ironic] {the ironical} aspect predominates in them and they incline toward comedy, then Phaedo is certainly strictly tragic...” {in this case, the translator has placed “ironic” in brackets; also on page 146}; Page 65: “Irony with tireless jesting” {the tireless irony}; you can see other examples on pages 77, 141, 143, 148, 149, 153, 154, 155, 191, 195, and 262.

Another noteworthy point is that in the footnote on page 80, the translator has rendered “his sense of comic” as “Socrates’ witty and satirical spirit” (روحیه شوخ‌طبع و طنزپرداز سقراط). In light of some of the translator’s choices of equivalents for irony and its derivatives, the Persian reader imagines that here too Kierkegaard is speaking of Socratic irony.

6- Page 24: “Xenophon in practice presents Socrates as a man entirely given to nonsense, perhaps in retaliation for Socrates having often done the same to others”

‘By eliminating all that was dangerous in Socrates, Xenophon actually reduced him totally in absurdum, in recompense, probably, for Socrates' having done this so often to others’ (16)

First point: “By eliminating all that was dangerous in Socrates” has not been translated at all.

Second point: The translator has been unable to provide a suitable translation for “reduced him totally in absurdum.” This phrase refers to “reductio ad absurdum,” which is one of the forms of argument. This argument is translated as “برهان خلف” (proof by contradiction). It is clear that the translator cannot use the expression “برهان خلف” in translating the above phrase; however, with a little reflection on “برهان خلف” and Kierkegaard’s claim in the preceding sentences, it can be argued that a better and more precise translation of the said phrase is as follows: “Xenophon confronts Socrates with contradiction.” Despite this translation, the translator is obliged to mention Kierkegaard’s original phrase in a footnote so that the reader can see the original phrase and understand in what sense Kierkegaard deals with the relation and connection of this argument to Xenophon’s account of Socratic thought.

*Definition of “برهان خلف” for readers who may not know anything about it: “In proof by contradiction, to advance the discussion, it is assumed that a proposition is false, and then it is shown that this assumption leads to a contradiction, thereby proving the truth of the proposition that was initially assumed to be false” (Thinking: A Concise Critical Thinking Dictionary, Nigel Warburton, Mohammad Mehdi Khosravani, Elmi va Farhangi Publications, page 46).

7- Ibid.: “... a personality that had to express itself precisely with a secretive presence in and a mystical floating over the colorful diversity of Athens’ vibrant life, a personality whose distinctive feature was a kind of existential duality, like the relation of a flying fish to fish and birds.”

Socrates’ being a “flying fish” refers to this meaning: he resembled both a fish that participated in the diverse and colorful sea of Greek life and thus viewed that life from within, and a bird that, by positioning itself on the water’s surface, viewed this sea and life from above. Therefore, it is more precise, instead of the expression “جریان یافتن” (flowing), which is not a suitable equivalent for “floating over” in this context, to use equivalents such as “شناور بودن در سطح” (being afloat on the surface) or “به حرکت درآمدن بالای” (moving over).

8- Page 26: “And what passion it would arouse when, amidst the clamor of the work of laborers and artisans and the braying of pack donkeys, Socrates’ sacred woof wove the web of existence together. If amidst the deafening hubbub of the marketplace, one heard that fundamental sacred harmony...”

‘And what life would then have come into the presentation if in the midst of the bustling work of the artisans and the braying of the pack-asses one had discerned the divine woof with which Socrates interlaced the web of existence. If through the boisterous noise of the marketplace one had heard the divine fundamental harmony…’. (18)

A correct and precise translation, utilizing some of the translator’s own equivalents: “And what life would then have manifested itself to a person if, amidst the clamor of the work of laborers and artisans and pack donkeys, that divine woof with which Socrates wove the web of existence together had appeared before his eyes.”

9- Page 29: «Let us take another example where Socrates, even according to Xenophon, appears to have approached irony... But here Socrates treads more in the realm of the Sophists (“So if a young man asks me where Charicles’ house is or where Critias can be found, do I not have the right to answer?”)»

‘Am I to give no answer, then, if a young man asks me something that I know?-for instance, 'Where does Charicles live?' or 'Where is Critias?’ (21)

The translator has not translated the phrase «something that I know». This phrase, as it happens, clarifies Kierkegaard’s intent with these sentences: «Let us take another example where Socrates, even according to Xenophon, appears to have approached irony... But here Socrates treads more in the realm of the Sophists»; in fact, feigning ignorance while knowing is «treading in the realm of the Sophists», not irony.

Translation of the aforementioned sentences using the translator’s own equivalents: «So if a young man asks me a question that I know the answer to, questions like ‘Where is Charicles’ house?’ or ‘Where can Critias be found?’, shall I not answer him?»

10- Page 33: «... thus in Xenophon’s portrayal of Socrates we do not see that beautiful, harmonious unity between natural determinant and freedom {natural determinant and freedom} that crystallizes in the word ‘self-control’...»

First point: «natural» only describes «determinant», not «freedom».

Second point: The precise translation of «natural determinant» is «natural factor or cause». To make Kierkegaard’s meaning clearer, the translator could have at least, with a little intervention, written «determinant and freedom», not «natural determinant and freedom».

11- Pages 37 and 38: «But we must not disregard the fact that this comparison, that is, history’s repeated attempt at this infinite leap, is also not without truth... Consequently, this comparison can be twofold: either positive, that is, stimulating, or negative... But in both analogies, the relation to a personality such as the one we saw is for the second person not merely inciting... Perhaps at this very moment it is not clear to the reader why I have resorted to these two comparisons... There is also a second view that highlights the other side of the analogy...»

‘Presumably I need but remind the reader that a primitive personality such as that, such a status absolutus [independent status] of the personality, in contrast to the status constructus [conjoined status] of the race, is given and can be given only once. But we must not disregard the fact that the analogy to this, history's repeated attempt at this infinite leap, also has its truth. …Consequently, the analogy to this can be double, either positive, that is, stimulating, or negative, that is, aiding the paralytic… But in both analogies the relation to a personality such as that is for the second person not merely inciting… The reason I have cited these two analogies may not at this moment be obvious to the reader... that a second view… has accentuated the other side of the analogy…’ (28-29)

The referent of the pronoun «this» in the expressions «analogy to this» and «this infinite leap» is «primitive personality» or, in other words, «status absolutus», which is discussed in the first three lines of the English text. «Analogy» in this context also means «similarity» or «likeness», not «comparison». The point is that history repeatedly tries, through an «infinite leap», to produce individuals similar to the «primitive personality» or «status absolutus».

12- Page 41: «the unity of subsequent conception and intuition»

‘… the unity of successive conception and intuition, which only the dialectical trilogy makes possible’ (32)

«succession» means «coming one after another» and «successive» means «one after another» or «consecutive». Kierkegaard says that in the «dialectical trilogy», conceptions that emerge and appear one after another or consecutively achieve unity with intuitions.

13- Ibid.: «I will refer to this important point when discussing the relationship between dialectical and mythical elements, a kind of trichotomization {dichotomy} in Plato's early dialogues»

The translator has been careless and misread «dichotomy» as «trichotomy» and, in accordance with his own particular equivalents, has proceeded to translate it as such.

14- Page 46: «The path that manifested itself in idealism as reflection upon reflection first manifested itself in Socrates' questioning. Questioning—that is, the abstract relation between the intersubjective (intrinsic) and the objective (extrinsic)—ultimately became his primary concern»

‘The direction that manifested itself in idealism as reflection upon reflection manifested itself in Socrates' questioning. To ask questions-that is, the abstract relation between the subjective and the objective-ultimately became the primary issue for him’

The adverb «first» is incorrect and should be removed. Note Kierkegaard's claim on page 212, according to the Persian translator's own translation: «Reflection begins with the Sophists, and in this respect Socrates always has something in common with them».

Also, the half-space in «میان‌ذهنی» should be removed so that the phrase reads «the abstract relation between the subjective (intrinsic) and the objective (extrinsic)» and not «the abstract intersubjective (intrinsic) and objective (extrinsic) relation».

15- Page 48: «Socrates sees his divine mission and duty as going around among his fellow citizens and foreigners so that whenever he meets someone who is thought to be wise but does not appear so, he might come to the aid of the Truth {come to the aid of the deity} and make it clear to him that he is not wise and knowledgeable. For this reason, he has no time to attend to important matters, whether political affairs or his own private affairs {neither in public nor in private affairs}, and this service to God has caused him to live in utter poverty»

It is clear that translating «deity» as «Truth» is not at all a correct translation. One might claim that the context makes such a translation possible. Even considering the context and the use of the phrase «service to God», it can be seen that «deity» should be translated as «God». It is interesting that in footnote 2 on the same page, the translator has rendered the phrase «God{the god}», in a quotation from Socrates, as «Truth (God)». This translation is also not correct, and the term «Truth» should be completely removed. The English translator of Socrates' quotation wrote «God» once with a capital letter and another time with a lowercase letter and the definite article to indicate that the Greek term used for god in the quotation is not explicit and could refer either to the one God «God» or to one of the gods «the god».

Furthermore, there is no doubt that there is a close connection and relationship between «public» and «political» in ancient Greece (as Kierkegaard also points out in the footnote), but the relationship between «public» and «private», which is clearly visible in the English translation, has been transformed in the Persian translation into the relationship between «political» and «private». For a more accurate translation, it would be better to translate the English phrase directly into Persian. Similarly, the translator should reconsider his translation in footnote 3 on the same page, because he has translated «political life» as «political life and the public sphere» and «public meetings» as «political or public assemblies». If the translator insists on his translation, he should at least place his additions in brackets or braces; in the first translation, «the public sphere» should be placed in brackets or braces, and in the second translation, «political».

16- Page 50: «Here we behold irony in its infinite, divine aspect, the humor of truth-seeking that allows nothing to remain as it was before»

‘Here, then, we see irony in all its divine infinitude, which allows nothing whatever to endure’ (40)

The expression «humor of truth-seeking» is an addition by the translator and is misleading for the reader's understanding, as the reader imagines that Kierkegaard used such an expression to speak of «irony.» If we leaf through the entire book, in no part does Kierkegaard refer to «irony» under the title of «truth-seeking humor.»

17- Page 58: «The process of dialectical development is carried out until it fades away in the sphere of pure abstraction. Then a new kind of unfolding of the subject begins, which must attain the idea, but since the idea in itself has no necessary and necessary-being relation to the dialectical development, it becomes apparent that the whole process of development probably does not belong to one person. But on the other hand, one cannot arbitrarily attribute one thing to one, and another to another, so that each acquires something»

‘Here once again we meet a duplexity in Plato: the dialectical development is carried out until it disappears in the purely abstract. Then a new kind of development begins that would deliver the idea, but since the idea as such does not stand in a necessary relation to the dialectical, it becomes apparent that the whole evolution probably does not belong to one. But, on the other hand, neither can one thing be attributed arbitrarily to the one, another to the other, just so each one acquires something’ (46)

First point: The expression «unfolding of the subject» must be understood in connection and relation to the expression «the dialectical development,» or, in the Persian translator's expression, «dialectical evolution.» It would have been better and more precise if the translator had either used one word or at least translated the first instance as «dialectical unfolding and development» to preserve the semantic unity between the two sentences.

Second point: What is meant by «necessary-being relation»? Does it mean a relation that «necessary being» establishes with «dialectical development»? Does Kierkegaard even say such a thing? A «necessary» relation is one thing, a «necessary-being» relation is quite another! This translation is incorrect and one should simply use the description «necessary» in translating «necessary.»

Third point: What is meant by «one» in the sentence «it becomes apparent that the whole evolution does not belong to one» is not «one person» but rather «the dialectical development.»

18- Page 65: «In these dialogues, the method of questioning has reached its peak and the one who affirms resembles an affirming person or a clerk who says «yes» or «amen»»

‘In these dialogues, the question method has had its day, and the one who answers functions more as an attesting or a parish clerk with his "yes" and "amen"’ (53)

The correct translation of «has had its day,» using the translator's own phrases, is as follows: something has currently passed its peak.

19- Page 67: «... and it can also be connected with a deep-rooted longing to be rid of the previous futile and fruitless labor pains thanks to a complete and perfect mode of expression, in other words, when the dialogue can become conscious of itself as a part of a comprehensive inquiry»

‘… it could be connected with a deep longing to be liberated from the earlier unproductive labor pains by an accomplished delivery, in other words, when the dialogue could become conscious of itself as an element in a total inquiry’ (55)

Kierkegaard's language is a language replete with similes and metaphors. Here, "delivery" means "giving birth," and "labor pains" means "the severe pains and sufferings during childbirth." The expression "in other words" shows that Kierkegaard first expresses his meaning in metaphorical language and then in relatively clear and plain language. The correct translation, using some of the translator's equivalents, is as follows:

"And it can also be connected with a profound desire to be rid of the initial pains and fruitless sufferings of labor through a successful delivery..."

Perhaps the translator might say that I transformed his metaphorical language into non-metaphorical language. This is an incorrect thing to do and should be moved to a footnote. Likewise, Kierkegaard's non-metaphorical language should not be transformed into metaphorical language in the Persian translation.

20- Ibid.: "... the conversation can certainly end without a result, but this 'without a result' is by no means synonymous with a negative result... every {even} skepticism {skepticism} always posits {posit} something, whereas irony, like that old witch, continually makes the capricious attempt to first devour everything and then devour itself as well..."

Kierkegaard speaks of the "result" of searching, investigation, and inquiry, not the "premise." For this reason, when he says "even skepticism" posits something, it does not mean that "skepticism" at the beginning of the investigation, as a "premise," presupposes or assumes something, as the translator has conveyed such a meaning to the Persian reader's mind with the infinitive "to take for granted," but rather it means that in the continuation of the investigation, and in the "result," it posits something, that is, it "posits" something. On page 152, the translator also rendered "actuality-positing" as: "taking actuality for granted," whereas the meaning is "the positing of actuality." It is interesting that the translator noticed this point on page 292: "If irony posited {posit} something..."

Furthermore, it would have been better and more precise in the above context to translate "skepticism" as "شک‌گرایی" (skepticism) rather than "تشکیک" (doubt-raising), so that the reader's mind is correctly directed to the thought of the "skeptics," not to the "doubt-raising" that any philosopher might engage in during their own philosophizing process.

On pages 283 and 295 as well, "posit" is translated as "taking for granted."

21- Page 70: "... the unity of virtue becomes so abstract ... that it turns into a reef upon which the individual virtues {the individual virtues}, like a laden sailing ship, crash and are shattered and fall apart"

"the individual virtues" in the above context means "the individual virtues" (تک‌تک فضیلت‌ها). Also, "one sailing ship" (یکی کشتی) should be changed to "a sailing ship" (یک کشتی).

22- Pages 70 and 71: "Virtue, like a soft whisper, like a shudder, skims tangentially past its own existential qualifications and passes without a sound arising from it, let alone finding a clear and expressive manifestation in any of them..."

‘Like a soft whisper, a shudder, virtue skims through its own qualifications without becoming audible, to say nothing of being articulated in any of them…’

"The definition of virtue as one in the sense that Socrates maintains is, in the first place, not a qualification of anything at all, for it is the most weakly inspired statement of its existence..."

‘The definition of virtue as one in the sense that Socrates maintains is clearly in the first place no qualification at all, since it is the most weakly inspired statement of its existence possible…’ (59)

I do not know on what basis the translator rendered “qualification” as “existential condition.” Did the translator imagine that justice, self-restraint, or other virtues could be the existential condition of a human being? I think the answer to this question is clear: the existing human being is characterized by justice or self-restraint; consequently, virtues are “descriptions” of the existing human being, not the “existential condition” of the human being. “Qualification” means “characteristic”: that is, description, trait, particularity, feature, or quality. Likewise, “to skim,” in the above context, means “to pass over gently or swiftly.” Now, I do not know why the translator used an expression like “taking flight.” Perhaps the translator would say that they used such a phrase in view of the context. Do we use expressions like “the whisper took flight” or “the tremor took flight” in the Persian language? Therefore, the correct translation of the first sentence, using some of the translator’s equivalents, is as follows:

“Virtue resembles a whisper or a gentle tremor that skims through its own descriptions or particularities or features or qualities without making a sound…”

In the second sentence as well, “qualification” means “characteristic” and not “existential condition.” In this sentence too, Kierkegaard’s point is that the definition of virtue, as Socrates intends it, is not a “description” or “particularity” or “feature” or “trait” or “quality” at all, or in other words, it is “nothing” at all, because it cannot properly, or in Kierkegaard’s own words, can only “in the weakest” possible way express the “existence” of that virtue.

It is worth noting that the translator has also failed to maintain consistency in their translation here and, contrary to previous pages, has used the equivalent “وجود” for “existence.”

Other examples of the translation of “qualification”: at the end of pages 71 and 72, the translator has translated “qualification” as “ویژگی,” but in the last paragraph of page 72, “negative qualification” as “ویژگی منفی یا شرط سلبی”; page 91: “دو ویژگی‌ وجودی آیرونی {two qualifications of irony}”; page 175: “شروط لازم شخصیت {qualification of personality}”; page 240: “تعیّن کیفی وجود” {qualification of being}.

Page 240: “نخستین شرط لازم برای اصل فلسفه سقراطی همان شرط اصلی و عمده است، گیرم که همچنان از حد تعین صوری برنگذشته باشد؛ این شرط عبارت از این است...”

‘..the first qualification with regard to the Socratic principle is the major one, even though it is still only formal: that consciousness draws from itself what constitutes truth…’

The interesting point in this translation is that the translator has used three different equivalents in two lines: “شرط لازم,” “شرط,” and “تعین.” They have also translated “the Socratic principle” as “اصل فلسفه سقراطی.”

On pages 277 and 283 as well, they have used the expressions “شرط لازم” and “شرط امکان.”

23- Page 75: “... روح از زندان هوا و هوس‌های جسم که از همه سو دربرش گرفته و به ستوهش آورده می‌گریزد تا رها از کندوزنجیر نفس {bodily shackles} در فضای عالم قدس به پرواز درآید”

“نفس” in the second line should be changed to “جسم.”

24- Page 78

The translator has translated “subjective mysticism” as “تصوف درون‌گرا.” The interesting point is that the translator was so confident in their translation that they did not even include the English equivalent of the said expression in the text. In his book ‘On the History of Modern Philosophy,’ Schelling speaks of two types of “mysticism,” which are as follows:

‘There is, namely (1) a merely practical or subjective mysticism which makes no claims to science. But there is (2) an objective mysticism, which makes claims to objective knowledge. This is theosophy, which is speculative or theoretical mysticism, and although relinquishing scientific (rational) form, it nevertheless makes a claim to a speculative content’ (179).

It seems that if a translator wishes to translate the descriptor “subjective” in the expression “subjective mysticism,” they must translate it with this definition in mind.

It is worth noting that on page 91, the translator has rendered the aforementioned phrase as “subjectivist and introvertive Sufism.”

25- Page 82: “These universal concepts are not obtained through the isolating observations of experience or by the usurpations of logical deduction {induction}...”

“Induction” is استقرا (induction) and “deduction” is قیاس (deduction).

26- Page 92: “The thought that one might fall into the abyss of absolute nothingness after death... does not arouse any dread in his nature at all... if there is no other alternative, he seizes the moment... and would rather be nothing and be annihilated. But what expressly distinguishes irony is the abstract standard by which irony measures everything and by which it controls every excessive emotion, and thus it does not set the pathos of love against the fear of death, but finds that it is a remote hypothesis to interpret total extinction in this way.”

‘The thought that one might become absolutely nothing through death … does not horrify him at all. On the other hand, he does not take it along in order, terrified by this conclusion, to drive the eccentric thought home again, but he actually does jest with it and, should the worst come to worst, would rather be snatched out of this error, “for to remain in it would indeed be an evil,” and thereby be totally annihilated. But what expressly characterizes irony is the abstract standard by which it levels everything, by which it controls every inordinate emotion, thus does not set the pathos of enthusiasm against the fear of death but finds that it is a curious hypothesis to surmise total extinction in this way’ (79)

A little attention to the English text and the Persian translation reveals that translating “a curious hypothesis” as “a remote hypothesis” is incorrect. Would someone for whom, in the Persian translator’s words, “the abyss of absolute nothingness arouses no dread in his nature” and who “would rather be nothing and be annihilated,” consider “total extinction” a “remote hypothesis”?! The correct translation of the above phrase is: “a curiosity-provoking hypothesis.”

27- Page 95: “Not like someone who..., not like someone who...; no, like someone who takes pleasure in the play {alternation} of light and shadow found in the logic or either/or {syllogistic either/or}...”

First point: The translator could perhaps have made it clearer for the Persian-speaking reader to understand the difference between the third sentence and the two preceding ones if, after “no, like someone,” they had written “is,” or in brackets after the third “no,” which is accompanied by a comma, they had written “rather” (in the English text, the distinction between them is precisely marked by this comma, and the translator has followed the exact same method verbatim).

Second point: Why has the translator used the word “play” as an equivalent for a word like “alternation”? “Alternation” means that two things repeat one after the other in turn. Perhaps in the above context, “transformation” or “ebb and flow” would be a suitable rendering.

Third point: The translator has been extremely careless in translating “syllogistic.” “منطق” is a very general term. The precise equivalent of “syllogism” is “قیاس” and “syllogistic” is “قیاسی.” What Kierkegaard means by “syllogistic either/or” is in fact “disjunctive syllogism,” or “قیاس انفصالی,” or, in the terminology of our ancients, “قیاس استثنایی منفصل.” The pattern of this syllogism is as follows:

A or B; it is not the case that A; therefore, B;

A or B; it is not the case that B; therefore, A.

Therefore, the correct translation of Kierkegaard’s phrase is: “the syllogistic either/or {or the disjunctive syllogism}”

28- Ibid.: “In other words, as he emancipates people from the fear of death, in recompense he warns them of an unavoidable something about which they know nothing…”

‘… as he emancipates people from the fear of death, in recompense he gives them the alarming idea of an unavoidable something about which nothing whatever is known…’ (82)

In the Persian translation, on the one hand Socrates “emancipates people from the fear of death,” and on the other hand, he “warns” them. In the English translation, on the one hand Socrates “emancipates people from the fear of death,” and on the other hand, he “gives them the alarming idea of an unavoidable something about which nothing whatever is known.” One might say these two expressions do not differ much. In my opinion, they do differ, because in one, Socrates himself presents “the unavoidable something about which they know nothing” as alarming to his audience and warns them about it; in the other, it is Kierkegaard who finds “the unavoidable something about which nothing whatever is known”—that is, what Socrates presents—alarming and describes it as such.

29- Page 101: “To Socrates… it must have seemed extremely ridiculous that someone, in the fabricated Athenian manner of debate and argument, resorted to the opponent’s personal characteristics (argumentum ad hominem)—that he should be condemned to death”

‘To Socrates… it must have seemed an extremely ridiculous argumentum ad hominem [argument directed against the opponent's personal circumstances] the Athenians had concocted- that he should be put to death’ (89)

The translator did not translate the term “argumentum ad hominem” at all and merely contented himself with the English translator’s addition in brackets. Furthermore, the Persian translator himself added the expression “fabricated manner” to Kierkegaard’s text. The precise translation, utilizing the translator’s word choices, is as follows:

“To Socrates… it must have seemed extremely ridiculous that the Athenians resorted to the {fallacious} argument ad hominem [an argument in which the opponent’s personal characteristics are appealed to]…”

{The translation of “ad hominem” as “حمله به شخص” is the conventional translation of this phrase in Persian logical texts, especially applied logic texts}.

30- Page 112: “The mythical presentation of the soul’s existence after death is not related to a historical reflection—as to whether events actually occurred in this way, whether Aeacus, Minos, and Rhadamanthus really sit and judge…”

‘The mythical presentation of the soul's existence after death is related neither to a historical reflection as to whether it actually is this way, whether Aeacus, Minos, and Rhadamanthus do sit and judge…’ (102)

The translations of the verbs in the past tense must all be rendered in the future tense. Historical reflection on life after death means whether these sentences that appear, for example, in Plato's dialogue report an event in the future or not. Is the world really going to be like this, and will those judges come and sit and judge? So the translation should be as follows: "Do events occur in this same way, and will Aeacus and Minos and Rhadamanthus sit and judge..."

31- Page 117: "The beautiful is now defined not merely negatively but as something that will appear in a far more glorious light than gold coins... but Diotima adds"

‘The beautiful is now defined not merely negatively as something that will appear in a far more glorious light than gold, clothes, beautiful boys and adolescents, but Diotima adds…’ (107)

Correct translation: "Now, the beautiful is not defined merely negatively as something that ..."

32- Page 119: "The venturesome deed is noble, and one ought to submit oneself to such deeds"

‘The venturesome deed is noble, and one ought to conjure forth such things for oneself’ (109)

‘… for a noble risk it is- so one should repeat such things to oneself like a spell’ (74-75), Phaedo, Oxford World’s Classics.

‘for the risk is a noble one… and a man should repeat this to himself as if it were an incantation’ (55), Hackett Publishing Company

It is clear that the translator has incorrectly translated "one ought to conjure forth such things for oneself." The correct translation, considering the three English translations of Plato's "Phaedo," is as follows: "one ought to conjure forth such things in one's mind or murmur such things to oneself like a spell"

It is worth noting that the sentence "one ought to submit oneself to such deeds" is repeated again three lines later in the Persian translation.

33- Ibid: "But the mythical aspect remains at the disposal of a power gained over the imagination, like an individual who, wishing to seek help from myth, recalls dreams that have overcome his mind"

‘But the mythical resides in the power it gains over the imagination as one, wishing to conjure it forth, evokes visions that overwhelm oneself’

The correct translation, with a slight modification, is as follows: "But the mythical belongs to a power that is obtained by overcoming the imagination; this overcoming occurs when a person who wants to conjure forth the mythical in their mind brings to mind visions that overwhelm them {overwhelm their imagination}"

The second meaning of "reside" in the Oxford Dictionary:

(of power or a right) belong to a person or body.

(https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/reside)

34- Page 121: "... but nevertheless it should not be forgotten that even the particular and specific manifestations of irony are not unrelated to the idea and ..."

‘But nevertheless it will be of some significance to see that even its particular manifestations are unrelated to the idea that even its particular manifestations are unrelated to the idea…’ (111)

"are not unrelated" must be changed to "are unrelated" or "have no relation or connection."

• 35- p. 126: “From this point, Socrates approaches the hypothesis that injustice is ignorance and, by way of some analogies from the sphere of knowledge, once again dislodges Thrasymachus from the strong position he had taken up behind his reckless contradictions…”

Correct translation: “by way of some allegories drawn from the sphere of knowledge”

36- p. 134: “In one case, the I continually devours the world, and in the second case, the I wants to take up the world”

Correct translation: “to take the world up into itself”

37- Ibid.: “The instrument by which a position goes beyond actual reality is the negative aspect or the negative, that is, the consciously absorbed negation of the validity of experience”

The translator has rendered “the consciously absorbed negation of the validity of experience” as: “the consciously absorbed negation of the validity of experience.” In all fairness, does such an expression have any meaning or sense at all? What harm would there be in turning such a phrase into a sentence, then translating it, and then explaining the reason for this in a footnote for the Persian-speaking reader? The correct translation is as follows: “the negation to which the conscious intellectual position surrenders itself {or, in the translator’s phrasing: in which it absorbs itself} and which negates the validity of experience.”

38- p. 141: “… we make the authorization of Aristophanes’ view contingent upon the earnestness with which he, as an advocate of early Greek culture, had to try to destroy this hornless, tailless modern monstrosity”

‘… if the authorization of Aristophanes were to be sought in the earnestness with which he as an advocate of early Greek culture had to try to destroy this modern monstrosity’ (131)

“monstrosity” has been rendered as “hornless, tailless monster.” In Abolhassan Najafi’s “Dictionary of Colloquial Persian,” the expression “hornless, tailless ghoul” appears, but there is no mention of “hornless, tailless monster.” In its definition, he writes: “Desert ghoul/ hornless, tailless ghoul: (in a contemptuous tone.) An allusion to a very tall, burly, and powerfully built man.” Kierkegaard’s meaning of “monstrosity” is not that a burly creature has risen up against early Greek culture. Rather, his meaning is that the position or principle of which Socrates was the exponent resembled a “monster” due to its strangeness and novelty in the face of early Greek culture. It is worth noting that the translator has rendered the expression “modern monstrosity”—that is, the very expression above—as “the monster of modernity” on page 143.

39- p. 142: “… the chorus… in our play … wears the costume of a symbol. Rotscher, aware of this point, looks for the element of irony in the chorus itself, because, in a sense, the chorus is always ready to leap out from its ambush and …”

‘Rotscher looks for the irony in the consciousness of this on the part of the chorus itself…’ (132)

Correct translation: “Rotscher looks for the irony in the consciousness of the irony that is at work within the chorus itself…”

The expression “on the part of” following “consciousness” clearly shows that the latter term relates to the “chorus” and not to “Rotscher.”

40- Pages 142 and 143: «خواه آیرونی در اینجا نهفته باشد، خواه این جدیت- که می‌کوشد وقوف اساسی به وضعیت را از پوچی هیولای تجدد برهاند- بر نامتناهی شعری و بی‌اعتنایی آیرونی حد بگذارد، و خواه کل پرده آخر نمایش، گیرم که نتیجه‌ای محتوم بیش نباشد، به بهانه آیرونی تمام بشود یا نه—بدون این فرض که ... تلاش استرپسیادس برای انتقام گرفتن از سقراط از راه به آتش کشیدن کارگاه او... بواسطه نامعقول‌بودنش دقیقاً یک درون‌مایه کمیک تازه است و جمله‌های واقعاً بامزه‌ای که به یک معنی خوب‌تر از آنند که حرف‌های او باشند باید به قسمی جنون وجدآمیز و نشئه‌آور تعبیر شوند که استرپسیادس به حکم آن عربده سرمی‌دهد و با قساوت خنده‌آوری مرضی را که بدان مبتلا گشته از میان می‌برد و ریشه‌کن می‌کند—از ورود به این بحث درمی‌گذرم»

‘Whether the irony lies in this, whether this earnestness, which is fighting to rescue the substantial consciousness of the state from the emptiness of the modern monstrosity, restricts the poetic infinity and heedlessness of irony, whether or not the whole finale of the play, even if it were a just nemesis, is effected at the expense of irony-without assuming, something that no one as far as I know has hitherto maintained, that precisely the revenge Strepsiades takes by burning down the building by its inexpediency was a new comic motif, and that the rather witty lines, t which in one sense are too good to be his, should be explained as a kind of ecstatic madness in which he, beside himself, raved and with comic cruelty destroyed and exterminated the disease with which he himself was infected- all this I shall not go into’ (133)

1- This translation is incorrect: «وقوف اساسی به وضعیت».

Correct translation: «آگاهی جوهری دولت‌شهر» {exactly a few lines above the aforementioned sentences, Kierkegaard introduces the chorus as the «نماینده جوهر اخلاقی» and a «نمادی» of it}

2- Also, the dashes before «که می‌کوشد» and after «برهاند» should be changed to commas (exactly like the English text) so that the reader can discern the distinction between the initial clauses and the subsequent clauses that begin with «بدون این فرض» and end with «برهاند».

3- Also, the translation of «از ورود به این بحث درمی‌گذرم» should be changed, as the reader might consider this sentence to refer only to the recent sentences. A better translation is: «از ورود به بحث درباره تمامی این موارد درمی‌گذرم»

41- Page 143: «پس اینک از تو تمنا دارم که او را هر دو منطق خویش بیاموزانی، هم به قول خودت منطق بدتر را که می‌تواند منطق بهتر را با انگیزه بدتر برهاند...»

‘So now, I prithee, teach him both your Logics, the Better, as you call it, and the Worse which with the worse cause can defeat the Better…’ (133)

«به قول خودت», in the Persian translator's rendering, or «as you call it», in the English text, pertains to «the Better», which has not been translated at all and has mistakenly been rendered in connection and relation to «the worse».

42- Page 148: «طنز عالی آریستوفانس بی‌گمان این بود که سقراط را، یعنی همان دشمن قسم خورده سوفیست‌ها را، نه به صورت خصم ایشان بلکه در قامت معلم ایشان به تصویر کشید و به یک معنی سقراط به راستی هم معلم سوفیست‌ها بود»

‘It certainly would be irony worthy of an Aristophanes to perceive Socrates, the Sophists' most ill-tempered enemy, not as their opponent but as their teacher, which in a certain sense he indeed was’ (139)

The translator has been careless in translating “would” and “an Aristophanes.” An accurate and correct translation, using some of the translator’s own equivalents: “This irony would undoubtedly be worthy of an Aristophanes, who apprehended Socrates—that sworn enemy of the Sophists—not as their adversary but in the guise of their teacher…”

43- Page 148: “… then one can understand why it was possible for Aristophanes to identify himself with Socrates”

‘… one already perceives a possibility for Aristophanes to identify him with the Sophists’ (139)

Correct translation: “… it was possible for Aristophanes to identify Socrates with the Sophists…”

44- Page 149: “… a newborn wisdom… capable of arguing everything in or out of existence {to argue everything in or out of existence}”

There is no doubt that the translator has exercised creativity in translating the above phrase. However, in philosophical texts, one must see whether this creativity damages the original text or not. In the following pages, in connection with this very matter, Kierkegaard speaks of a dialectic that individuals learn in light of the “newborn wisdom” and by means of which they negate or posit “actuality.” Therefore, it would have been better and more precise to translate the above phrase literally into Persian: “by reasoning, it argues something out of existence or argues something into it”

45- Page 150: “… is confronted with the same path that Socrates himself traversed to reach the truth { the knowledge of the truth}: becoming indifferent to the world and all that is in it, drowning in the sea of thought and withdrawing into the mantle of vigilance {to become immersed in himself}”

First point: “knowledge” has not been translated.

Second point: Here again the translator has exercised creativity, but Kierkegaard’s main point has been sacrificed for this creativity. As the translator is well aware, both in this book and in other works, one of the central issues of Kierkegaard’s thought is the problem of “to know thyself” or “know yourself.” Therefore, all sentences that express this issue must be translated with precision. In the translator’s rendering, “drowning in the sea of thought and withdrawing into the mantle of vigilance,” the word “self” does not appear at all; in the English sentence, this concept can be inferred from the word “himself.” Thus, the translation “to become immersed in oneself” is a far more precise and better translation. The translator uses the same equivalent again on page 156.

46- Page 154: “hopes by speculating to find a hundred Kantian dollars in his pockets, or failing that, to settle his debt through speculation and get out from under his obligations … we cannot say that this standpoint is the position of the knowing subject, because this position always refers to something, and refers to the entire world of mental constructs, but what is described here is an entirely negative stance that refers to nothing positive”

‘we cannot say that it is the position of subjectivity, because this always yields something, yields the whole world of abstract ideality, but what is described here is a purely negative position, which yields nothing’ (145)

The suggested correct translation is as follows: “we cannot say that this standpoint is the position of subjectivity, because the position of subjectivity always yields something, that is, it yields the whole world of abstract ideality, but what has been described here is a purely negative position, which yields nothing” {It seems to me that rendering “to yield” in this context as “to yield/produce” can better convey Kierkegaard’s meaning}.

What is meant by “yielding the world of abstract ideality” is precisely “finding a hundred Kantian dollars in one’s pocket” through speculation and the like.

47- p. 157: «بنابراین سفسطه عنصری در خدمت اهل آیرونی است، و خواه اهل آیرونی خود را به وسیله سفسطه برهاند خواه چیزی را از زیر زبان دیگران بیرون بکشاند {wrests something from others}...»

ابولحسن نجفی «زبان کسی را کشیدن» را در «فرهنگ فارسی عامیانه» این‌طور معنا کرده است: «کسی را با زیرکی وادار به افشای رازی کردن». وی در ادامه از «از زیر زبان کسی بیرون کشیدن» و «از کسی حرف کشیدن» و «زیرپاکشی کردن» تحت عنوان مترادف عبارت مذکور نام برده است. عبارتِ آمده در متن کرکگور به هیچ‌وجه به معنای «کسی را با زیرکی وادار به افشای رازی کردن» نیست. «wrest» به معنای «چیزی را از چنگ کسی بیرون آوردن» است. عبارت فوق، هم به طور عام، در اشاره به فعل و عملِ آیرونیستِ مورد نظر کرکگور است که باورهای به ظاهر مستدل و مستحکم مخاطب را «از چنگ وی بیرون می‌آورد» و، هم به طور خاص، در اشاره به استعاره «ردا» در نمایشنامه «ابرها» است.

48- p. 157: «... سوفیست‌ها ... معمولاً در گله‌هایی عظیم ]به تعبیر حضرت علی «همج رعاء»[ ظاهر می‌شوند، مانند انبوه ملخ‌هایی که در مصر به مزارع حمله‌ور می‌شوند...»

نکته اول: تعبیر علی‌بن‌ابی‌طالب «همج رعاع» است، نه «همج رعاء» (رجوع شود به «نهج‌البلاغه»، «کلمات قصار»، شماره 147).

نکته دوم: علی‌بن‌ابی‌طالب در جمله‌ای مدعایی درباره «الناس» {مردم} طرح می‌کند و آنها را به سه دسته «عالم ربّانی» {دانایی که شناسای خداست} و «متعلّم علی سبیل نجاه» {آموزنده‌ای که در راه رستگاری کوشاست} و «همج رعاع اتباع کل ناعق یمیلون مع کل ریح» {فرومایگانی رونده به چپ و راست که درهم آمیزند و پی هر بانگی را گیرند و با هر باد به سویی خیزند} تقسیم می‌کند (ترجمه‌های فارسی برگرفته از ترجمه سید جعفر شهیدی است). حال این دسته‌بندی چه ربطی به مدعای کرکگور درباره سوفیست‌ها دارد؟! به نظرم آوردن این عبارت، حتی در قلاب، چیزی جز رهزنی در ذهن مخاطب به همراه نمی‌آورد.

49- p. 162: «... زمانی که این خیره‌شدن در خویشتن {oneself} به نفس {self} رخصت دهد تا به صورت نفس کلی {the universal self} گسترش یابد...»

پیشتر درباره این سخن گفتم که «خودشناسی» یکی از مهم‌ترین مسایل در اندیشه کرکگور است. باید به مترجم یادآوری کرد که واژه «نفس» در ذهن و ضمیر خواننده فارسی‌زبان بیش از آنکه معنای «خود» را تداعی کند معنای «soul» را تداعی می‌کند. بنابراین چرا باید چنین واژه‌ای را معادل «self» آورد، در صورتی که معادل‌هایی چون «خود» یا «خویشتن» وجود دارد؟

مترجم در صفحه 229 کاربرد واژه «نفس» را به اوج خود رسانده و آن را در ترجمه این جمله آورده است:

‘As for the way in which it {irony} disclosed itself…’ (218)

«اما در مورد شیوه انکشاف نفس آن باید گفت...»

همچنین در صفحه 163 «self-immesion» «استغراق در نفس» برگردانده شده است.

50- p. 165: «در سرتاسر این تحقیق، من پیوسته چیزی را در ذهن داشتم، یعنی دیدگاه نهایی را، اما بدون آنکه بدین ترتیب خود را در معرض اتهام قسمی یسوعیت روشنفکرانه {intellectual} ... بگذارم...»

«intellectual» در سیاق فوق به معنای «فکری» است نه «روشنفکرانه». منظور این است که شاید در نظر برخی خوانندگان، دیدگاه کرکگور نوعی«یسوعیت»، لکن «یسوعیتی» در ساحت فکر و اندیشه، تلقی شود.

نمونه‌های دیگر:

Page 191: “On the whole, his position was too personal and isolated from the community… his connection with any individual lasted no more than a moment, and he himself, with a feeling of satisfaction and contentment arising from irony, hovered at a height far above all these relationships. In this connection, one can mention an accusation that has been leveled against Socrates in recent times, that he was an advocate of aristocratic or oligarchic rule (see Forchhammer). Consequently, this interpretation must be understood in the intellectual sense {in the intellectual sense}, and in that case he cannot be acquitted of that accusation.”

Kierkegaard wants to say that if by aristocracy one means aristocracy in the realm and framework of thought and intellect, then Socrates must consequently be called an “aristocrat.” In fact, Kierkegaard considers this “too personal and isolated from the community” position of Socrates to be a kind of aristocracy. It is clear that Kierkegaard has used the expression “in the intellectual sense” in opposition to “in the political sense.”

On the next page, the translator has also rendered the expression “ironic satisfaction in the intellectual sense” as “intellectual satisfaction,” which is again erroneous.

Page 199: “Thus, in an intellectual sense {in an intellectual sense}, it can be said of Socrates’ relationship with the youth that he looked upon them with desire {desire}. But just as his desire {desire} did not seek to possess and appropriate the youth…” It is interesting that on pages 32 and 59, the translator has rendered sentences with the same theme from Kierkegaard as follows: “This is the same Socrates whom Plato, to describe his infinite inner longing, in relation to friends, uses a sensate-intellectual phrase {a sensate-intellectual phrase} such as ‘or because of the love of wisdom… he should love young boys’…”; “It is needless to mention that the amorous relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades was an intellectual {intellectual} one.” Also, on page 201, the translator has used the expression “amorousness in its intellectual meaning {in its intellectual meaning},” and on page 202, the expression “intellectual or rational love {intellectual}” and then “rational love {intellectual}.” On page 210, “in an intellectual sense” has also been translated as “mental correspondence.”

Other examples can be seen on pages 256 and 259.

51- Page 171

“pantheism” means “all-is-God-ism,” not as the Persian translator has written, “worship of all gods…”

52- Page 172: “Socrates—by attributing the determination {determination} of human actions and deeds to insight and firm belief—took it for granted that the individual is capable of making the final decision in ethical matters…”

The above sentences are from Hegel. The translator has rendered this expression, i.e., “determination,” in subsequent pages in other quotations from Hegel, which are in a context similar to that of the aforementioned sentence, as “assignment of duty.” Hegel here wants to say that Socrates, by assuming the “daimonion,” which was something within Socrates and not outside him, and then acting according to its warnings and not acting according to the warnings of the oracles, which were in fact external to him, actually showed that the person himself and, consequently, his beliefs play a role in “determining” his actions. With these claims, I want to say that the precise and correct translation of “determination” is “determining,” not “limits.”

53- Page 173: “Oracles are necessary wherever man does not yet know himself inwardly as being sufficiently free and independent to make a decision solely on his own…”

‘…oracles are necessary wherever man does not yet know himself inwardly as being sufficiently free and independent to make a decision solely on his own’

In the sentence above, Hegel explicitly says, “man does yet not regard himself in his own inner being as an entity possessing sufficient free will and independence to…” but the translator has altered Hegel’s sentence with his rendering, writing that “man, in his own inner being, as an entity possessing sufficient free will and independence.” The “yet” and “as” in the above sentence must be translated with precision.

54- Ibid.: The translator has rendered “conviction” as “firm belief and faith.” The same expression on page 172, in a quotation from Hegel, is translated as “firm belief.” The correct translation is simply “conviction” or “firm belief”; the word “faith” is not only an incorrect translation for it, but is also misleading.

55- Ibid.: “Now the decisiveness and self-assurance of inwardness takes the place of Aidos [the goddess of shame, modesty, and humility], the goddess who with all her power yet mysteriously keeps the individual under the yoke of the state”

‘Replacing the grace to be ashamed (eidos), which powerfully but mysteriously kept the individual tied to the lead string of the state, there now came the decisiveness and self-assurance of subjectivity’

Firstly, the translator has not maintained consistency in translating the word “subjectivity,” rendering it sometimes as “agency,” sometimes as “inward agency,” and sometimes as “inwardness” {to see other instances of the lack of consistency in translating this word, as well as the words “subjective” and “subject,” refer to the section “Lack of Consistency in Translation,” number 7}.

Secondly, I truly do not know what the translator’s basis is for this claim: Aidos [the goddess of shame, modesty, and humility].

As far as I am aware, the translator does not know Danish. Therefore, the basis of the translator’s work is this English text. Hence, has the translator translated the English sentences above? No.

The translation of the above sentences is as follows:

“Now, instead of the grace and mercy of being ashamed (eidos) {before the state}, which powerfully, yet mysteriously, bound the individual to the state, the decisiveness and self-assurance of subjectivity emerges”

56- Page 180: “The predicate ‘human’ here is immensely important and meaningful, because it points to a knowledge that is superior to human knowledge”

‘Here the predicate “human,” which is attributed to wisdom in contrast to a wisdom that is more than human, is extremely significant’ (171)

The correct translation, with slight modification: “The predicate ‘human,’ which is here attributed to wisdom and distinguishes it from a wisdom surpassing human wisdom…”

57- Page 200: “When everything was ready, when the trees were sawed through and lay on the ground {when the trees were sawed through for toppling}, he stood on a height, took up his binoculars, and signaled with his hand—the trees fell…”

Does the translator not see an inconsistency between the two phrases “the trees were sawed through and lay on the ground” and “the trees fell”? The correct translation: “When the trees were sawed through for toppling.”

58- Page 202: “But when this intellectual love seeks its beloved preferably among the young, one can conclude that it clings to [general] possibility {possibility} but shuns actuality {actuality}.”

The translation of “possibility” as “general possibility” is repeated once more on this page, and then suddenly, in the third use of this word in the same paragraph, the translator deems the equivalent “possibility” sufficient. This translation is imprecise and misleading. Kierkegaard speaks of “possibility” in opposition to “actuality.” The expression “general possibility” is a specific term in philosophy which, according to Seyyed Jafar Sajjadi’s Farhang-e Ma‘āref-e Eslāmi (Dictionary of Islamic Sciences), is “the opposite of impossibility and consists of the negation of necessity from the opposing side or from the side of non-existence, or the negation of essential impossibility from the affirmative side, as when it is said that a certain thing is possible, meaning it is not impossible in existence” (p. 300, first edition).

Other examples {in these examples, the translator has pulled the adjective “general” out of thin air}:

Page 275: “Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the new principle is potentially present in him, as a general possibility {possibility}”; Page 297: “The actuality of irony is nothing other than general possibility {possibility}”; Page 300: “When the ironist usually scrutinizes a host of fates one by one in the form of general possibility {possibility}”; Page 305: “The realm between actuality and general possibility {possibility}”

59- Page 207: “In this way, he {Socrates} becomes alien to the whole world to which he belongs... the consciousness of our age has no predicate for him—nameless and indefinable, he belongs to another formation”

‘In this way he [Socrates] becomes alien to the whole world to which he belongs (however much he belongs to it in another sense); the contemporary consciousness has no predicate for him- nameless and indefinable, he belongs to another formation’ (196)

What is meant by “the contemporary consciousness” is the consciousness of Socrates’ age, not the consciousness of Kierkegaard’s age. It is worth noting that on page 228, in a footnote, the translator has correctly translated the above phrase, which is repeated verbatim: “the consciousness of his contemporaries”

60- Ibid.: “...when subjectivity again falters and isolates itself...”

Correct translation: “...when subjectivity isolates itself”

61- Page 218: “This Sophistic thesis can make a considerable contribution to the fate of the often long and difficult quotations from their sayings throughout life. Some quotations resemble ready-made characters in comedies...”

‘This Sophistic thesis can provide a very interesting contribution to the fate of quotations in their frequently long and difficult passage through life’. (207)

Kierkegaard speaks of “quotations” in general, not “quotations from the Sophists.” The correct translation is as follows:

“... the fate of quotations in their frequently long and difficult passage through life...”

62- Page 220: “... infinite negativity}... is the necessary condition {condition} for ideal positivity}.”

The translator has translated “condition” as “necessary condition.” The equivalent for “necessary condition” is “necessary condition.” “Condition” is broader than “necessary and sufficient condition.” When the translator renders “condition” as “necessary condition,” the reader will expect the author of the text to subsequently speak about the “sufficient condition” {sufficient condition} as well.

63- Ibid.: “... the relativity of existence or its not-in-and-for-itself {its not-in-and-for-itself}...”

The translator has overlooked the “not.”

64- Page 221: “If the Sophists could talk incessantly, he could be silent—that is, he was always able to do the opposite of them {that is, he could converse}”

First, “converse” as a verb should not be confused with “converse” as a noun and adjective. “Converse” as a verb means “to engage in conversation,” while “converse” as a noun and adjective means “opposite” and “inverse.” The verb “converse” in the nominal and adjectival sense is “convert,” not “converse.”

Second, the expression “converse” on page 221 is the same expression “converse” on pages 41 and 42 of the Persian text. However, the translator has not paid attention to this point:

“Socrates’ renowned art of asking questions, or, in view of the necessity of dialogue in Plato’s philosophy, the art of conversing {the art of conversing}... The Sophists ... in truth know how to speak but do not know how to converse {to converse}.”

65- Page 224: “In the bright {intelligible} and carefree world of the Greeks, too, the silence born of irony had to be a power of negation {negativity} that prevented subjectivity (being a subject) from appearing idle and superfluous. For just like the law {law}, irony is also a demand, a tremendous demand, because it rejects actuality and demands spirituality or the ideal world {ideality}. It is clear that spirituality or ideal-thinking is already present in this desire, even if only in the form of a universal possibility {possibility}... He demanded ideality {ideality} from the entire established system...” In the translation of Kierkegaard’s footnote, it is again rendered as: “spirituality (ideal-thinking)”

First point: The translator would do well to point out to the reader that the word “law” is used in the text, but because it appears in connection and relation with the Jewish religion, it has been translated as “sharia.” It is worth noting that a few lines earlier on the same page, the translator has rendered it as “law and sharia.”

Second point: The translator has used the equivalent “bright” instead of “intelligible,” which in my opinion requires an equivalent in a footnote.

Third point: The translator has again failed to observe consistency in translation, this time translating “negativity” as “power of negation.”

Fourth point: The translation of “ideality” once as “spirituality or the ideal world” and another time as “spirituality or ideal-thinking” is one of those strange and bizarre translations. In addition to not observing consistency in translation, the translator seems to have brought his own understanding of “ideality” into the translation. If the translator’s impression is that what Kierkegaard means by the demand for “ideality” in Judaism is a demand for “spirituality,” he should mention this point in a footnote. The translator could have used an equivalent such as “ideality” in the translation and not entangled himself in these strange and incorrect translations like “ideal world” and “ideal-thinking.”

66- Page 227: “Socrates himself did not go so far as to point, for consciousness in general, to the simple essence and the discussion of self-thought, that is, the Good [the Supreme], and to investigate the Good in determinate concepts [the Idea], whether those concepts would fully express what they ought to express of its essence, and whether in fact it was the matter that was determined by them...”

‘Socrates himself did not come so far that he expressed for consciousness generally the simple essence of self-thought, the Good, and investigated the determinate concepts of the Good, whether they properly expressed that of whose essence they should express, and whether in fact the matter was determined by them…’ (216)

‘Socrates himself only came so far as to express for consciousness generally the simple existence of one’s own thought as the Good, but as to whether the particular conceptions of the Good really properly defined that of which they were intended to express the essence, he did not inquire.’ (449) (Hegel’s Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1, translated by E. S. Haldane)

The above sentences are a footnote to this claim by Kierkegaard:

‘In the good, subjectivity legitimately possesses an absolutely valid goal for its striving, but Socrates did not start from the good but arrived at the good, ended with the good, which is why it is entirely abstract for him’.

The translator has not correctly understood the expression “did not come so far that” in the above context. Also, I have no idea what the translator means by “تفکر بالذات” as an equivalent for “self-thought.” Furthermore, the translator has provided a strange equivalent for “matter” in the said context.

The correct translation of the first quotation is as follows:

“Socrates himself did not go so far; he generally presented the simple essence of the thinkable that thinks itself {or self-thinking} to consciousness as the Good, and examined and saw whether the determinate concepts of the Good correctly express the essence of the Good or not, and whether they really determine the essence or not ...”

Translation of the second quotation:

“Socrates himself only went so far as to generally present the simple existence of the thinkable that thinks itself {or self-thinking} to consciousness as the Good, but as to whether the determinate conceptions of the Good really and properly defined the essence of the Good, he conducted no inquiry ...”

The difference between the two English translations of Hegel’s text clearly shows that the Persian translator should have translated both the translators’ rendering of Hegel’s text in the book “The Concept of Irony” and Haldane’s English translation of that text, so that the reader, by comparing both translations and possibly a combination of them, could grasp Kierkegaard’s claim.

A note on the translation of “self-thought” as “the thinkable that thinks itself”:

In the chapter “Thought as Self-Thought” of the book “From Word to Silence: the Rise and Fall of Logos” by Mr. Raoul Mortley, I saw a quotation from “On the Soul” and a quotation from Aristotle’s “Metaphysics” which, it can be claimed, explain the concept of “self-thought.” Those two quotations were translated by Alimorad Davoudi, in “On the Soul,” and Sharaf al-Din Khorasani, in “Metaphysics,” respectively, as follows: “The intellect, in this case, is also capable of thinking itself” (216); “Therefore, the intellect, since it is the highest thing, thinks itself, and its thinking is thinking of thinking” (409).

A note on the translation of “self-thought” and “one’s own thought” as “self-thinking”:

The aforementioned English expressions are equivalents of the German term «Sichselbstdenkens» (see page 216 of «The Concept of Irony,» where the English translators have also included the German text of the quotation). After a brief search, I discovered that Hegel also used this term in paragraph 592 of the «Phenomenology of Spirit,» in the section «Absolute Freedom and Terror.» A. V. Miller and Terry Pinkard have translated this term as «the thinking of oneself» and «thinking-thinking itself,» respectively {Pinkard also provides the German equivalent in a footnote} (see page 361 of the translation of «Phenomenology of Spirit,» Oxford University Press, 2004; page 344 of the translation of «Phenomenology of Spirit,» Cambridge University Press, 2018). Baqer Parham translated the aforementioned term as «khod-andishi» [self-thinking] and also wrote the German equivalent in parentheses (see page 635 of the translation of «Phenomenology of Spirit,» Kandokav Publishing, 2011). Abdolkarim Rashidian also translated it as «khod-andishi» in the excerpt «Absolute Freedom and Terror» in the book «From Modernism to Postmodernism» (see the book «From Modernism to Postmodernism,» section «Absolute Freedom and Terror,» page 91, Ney Publishing, new edition, first printing).

It is also worth noting that in this paragraph of the «Phenomenology of Spirit,» a connection and relation is established between the aforementioned term and the term «Self-consciousness» through the use of the word «or.»

67- Page 232: «... the separation by which the unity is dissolved is precisely the negative side of discursive and demonstrative speech {discursiveness}.»

Accurate translation: «reasoning.»

68- Page 237:

From this page onward, the translator has rendered «morality,» based on Hegel's account of Socrates' thought, as «moral conscience» and has subsequently used phrases such as «the founder of moral conscience» in translating «the founder of morality.» In a footnote, he has also grounded his translation in the English translators' note. Upon consulting the English translators' notes, we encounter the following statements:

‘The distinction between these two words is a very important one. Schwegler, in explaining Hegel's position in his

The choices of the aforementioned equivalents are repeated throughout the text. However, a lack of consistency is sometimes observed, for instance: on page 241, “morality” is twice translated as “وجدان اخلاقی” (ethical conscience) and “moral individual” as “فرد دارای وجدان” (individual possessing conscience).

69- The same {sentence is from Hegel}: “Socrates expresses essence as the universal ‘I’, that is, as the good, the consciousness that rests in itself; the good in itself, free from existent reality, free for establishing the relation of consciousness to existent reality—the good in itself is the individual sensuous consciousness (feeling and inclination)—...”

‘Socrates expresses essence as the universal I, as the good, the consciousness resting in itself; the good as such, free from existent reality, free toward the relation of consciousness to existent reality- it is individual sensuous consciousness (feeling and inclination)- …’ (226)

‘Socrates expresses real existence as the universal ‘I,’ as the consciousness which rests in itself; but that is the good as such, which is free from existent reality, free from individual sensuous consciousness of feeling and desire, free finally from the theoretically speculative thought about nature, which, if indeed thought, has still the form of Being and in which I am not certain of my existence’ (385) (Hegel’s Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1, translated by E. S. Haldane)

The referent of the pronoun “it” in the third line is “existent reality,” not “the good as such.”

70- Page 240: “the irrational {irrational}-sensuous part of the soul {soul}”

“عقلانی” (rational) is the adjective describing “عقل” (reason), while “عقلایی” describes “عقلا” (the rationalists/sages). The correct translation of the word “rational” is “عقلانی,” not “عقلایی.”

71- Page 264: “The striking feature of irony is precisely the intrinsic freedom that always holds the possibility of a kind of becoming {a beginning} in hand...”

The translator was careless and misread “beginning” as “becoming” and translated it accordingly.

72- Page 272: “The past actuality, since it still considers itself in the right, demands a sacrifice; the new actuality, since it is in the right, provides a sacrifice.”

‘The past actuality shows itself to be still justified by demanding a sacrifice, the new actuality by providing a sacrifice’ (260)

A precise translation using some of the translator’s equivalents and with slight modifications:

“The past actuality, in order to show that it is still justified and acceptable, demands a sacrifice; the new actuality accomplishes this by providing a sacrifice.”

73- Page 276: “Subjectivity, face-to-face with the given actuality of the world, senses its power, its validity and meaning.”

‘Face-to-face with the given actuality, the subjectivity feels its power, its validity and meaning. But as it feels this, it rescues itself, as it were, from the relativity in which the given actuality wants to keep it.’ (263)

The referent of the pronoun “its” in the phrase “its power” and “its validity and meaning” is “subjectivity,” not “the given actuality.”

74- Page 278: “Just as Schlegelian irony in the aesthetic domain judged on the basis of an all-encompassing sentimentality...”

‘… just as the irony of the Schlegels had passed judgment in esthetics on an encompassing sentimentality…’ (265)

«to pass judgement on something» means «to decide and judge about something,» not «to decide and judge on the basis of something.»

75- Ibid.: «One of Hegel’s great merits is that he intended to prevent the reckless prodigal sons of speculation from falling into ruin. But he {Hegel} never used the mildest means for this purpose… His voice was not always calm and fatherly…»

«prodigal son» alludes to the story of the «Prodigal Son» in the Gospel of Luke, chapter 15, verses 11 to 32. The translator’s inattention to the connection and relation between «son» and «father» is evident in the translation. It is interesting that the translator notices this allusion on page 287, but has not corrected his error on page 278: «modern speculative thought… like the prodigal son… went to his father…»

76- Page 279: «To tell the truth, Hegel looks down with immense scorn and superiority upon those whom he often sarcastically calls «the superior people.»»

The English translators have provided a lengthy note for «the superior people,» which is a part of Hegel’s «Philosophy of Fine Art» (see page 540 of the book «The Concept of Irony»).

One of the meanings of «superior» is «conceited,» but considering the definition of such individuals given in the quotation from Hegel’s book, «superior» here has its original meaning of «higher» or «superior.» Kierkegaard also says that Hegel refers to them as «superior people,» but with «immense scorn and superiority.»

77- Page 279: «We will discuss in the appropriate place what was wrong with Schlegel’s conception of irony and in what respect Hegel gave it scope.»

‘What was wrong and unwarranted with Schlegel’s irony as well as Hegel’s good services in this respect will be discussed in the appropriate place’

In addition to the translator rendering «wrong and unwarranted» merely with the single phrase «what was wrong,» he has made an error in translating the part concerning Hegel. Hegel, as the Persian translator has understood it, did not «give scope to Schlegel’s conception,» but rather Hegel helped us to understand what was wrong and unwarranted in Schlegel’s irony.

78- Page 283: «Actual reality is nothing more than appearance or semblance, nothing other than semblance and vanity.»

The translator was careless and misread «semblance» as «resemblance» and translated it accordingly.

79- Page 288: «That which lies outside the realm of experience and collides with the experiencer like a hard body and then, by the force of this collision, is separated from him—well, this is the thing in itself, which continually tests the experiencing subject… This externality, this thing in itself, was precisely the weak point of Kant’s philosophical system.»

It seems that at times the English text and the words used in it are of no consequence to the Persian translator. Why should the translator choose a single equivalent for two different words in English, even if they have similar meanings, and not inform the reader at all?

Furthermore, «externality» here means «being external,» in the general sense of the word, relative to the «experiencing subject»; therefore, the expression «external body» is not at all precise. Indeed, the expression «body» regarding the Kantian «thing in itself» is a misleading and erroneous expression; it is interesting that if you pay attention, Kierkegaard also says in the first sentence «that which is … like a hard body,» not «that which is … a hard body.»

80- Page 289: “Fichte resolved the problem of the in-itself by placing it within the womb of thought; Fichte turned the I in the {principle of identity} I-I into an infinite essence {he infinitized the I in I-I}”

Where did the translator get the term “essence”? I do not know. Kierkegaard says, “Fichte infinitized the I in the {abstract identity} I-I.” He explains what he means by “infinitized” in the next line:

‘The producing I is the same as the produced I. I-I is the abstract identity’ (273)

It is interesting that a few lines down, the Persian translator uses the following expression, in which there is no mention of “essence” at all: “when Fichte infinitized the I in this manner {infinitized the I}.”

81- Pages 291 and 292: “This Fichtean principle... fell into the hands of Schlegel and Tieck, and based on it, these two turned to intellectual activity in the world. This principle had a twofold difficulty. In the first place, the empirical and finite I was confused with the eternal and everlasting I; in the second place, metaphysical actuality was conflated with historical actuality. Thus, a rudimentary metaphysical position was summarily applied to actual reality”

‘This Fichtean principle that subjectivity, the I, has constitutive validity, is the sole omnipotence, was grasped by Schlegel and Tieck, and on that basis they operated in the world. In this there was a twofold difficulty. In the first place, the empirical and finite I was confused with the eternal I; in the second place, metaphysical actuality was confused with historical actuality. Thus a rudimentary metaphysical position was summarily applied to actuality’ (275)

The “Fichtean principle” does not have a “twofold difficulty,” or in the translator’s phrasing, a “twofold difficulty”; rather, Schlegel and Tieck’s understanding of the said principle and their “activity” in the world based on that principle has a “twofold difficulty.” I also think the expression “was mistaken for” is a better and more precise equivalent for “to be confused with” in this context. Furthermore, “was applied” in the final line should be changed to “applied.”

82- Page 292: “It was not an intrinsic subjectivity that had to advance and forge ahead here, because subjectivity was already given in the situations belonging to the world; rather, it was an exaggerated subjectivity, a subjectivity elevated to the rank of the second power [i.e., the greatest power after the power of God]”

‘It was not subjectivity that should forge ahead here, since subjectivity was already given in world situations, but it was an exaggerated subjectivity, a subjectivity raised to the second power’ (275)

I am truly amazed that the translator has placed such an incorrect statement in brackets. This sentence is almost a repetition of the sentence on page 252 of the Persian text, where Kierkegaard speaks of two “manifestations” of irony in history. What Kierkegaard means by “second power,” according to the Persian translator’s own translation, is as follows:

“... it is in the first manifestation that subjectivity for the first time in world history asserts its rights... for a new mode of irony to be able to emerge, it must come forth from the womb of the assertion of an even higher form of subjectivity. It must be a subjectivity that has reached the second power {it must be subjectivity raised to the second power}, a kind of subjectivity of subjectivity, which corresponds to reflection on reflection... subjectivity... in its second potency {in its second potency}”

83- Page 297: “But the individual also has the duty, for his part, to create actuality”

‘But for the individual actuality is also a task that wants to be fulfilled’ (279)

Pay attention to the following sentences, according to the translator’s own translation:

«اما واقعیت بالفعل (فعلیت تاریخی) نسبتی دوگانه با فاعل درون‌ذات دارد: از جهتی به هدیه‌ای می‌ماند که نمی‌توان آن را رد کرد و از جهتی به وظیفه‌ای مانند است که میخواهد اجابت شود» (293)

‘But actuality (historical actuality) stands in a twofold relation to the subject: partly as a gift that refuses to be rejected, partly as a task that wants to be fulfilled’ (276)

The translation on page 297 is incorrect, but the translation on page 293 has managed to convey Kierkegaard's meaning.

84- Page 298: «از منظر آیرونی، «شاعرانه زیستن» به معنای جدوجهد هنرمندانه‌ای نیست که به یاری گوهر قدسی {the divine} در انسان می‌شتابد...»

The reader of the Persian text assumes that Kierkegaard is speaking here of "the divine essence" in the human being, whereas Kierkegaard is in fact speaking of "the divine" in the human being.

85- Pages 304 and 305: «کسالت {boredom} یگانه رشته تداوم‌بخشی است که اهل آیرونی به دست دارد. کسالت{boredom}، این ابدیت خالی از محتوا، این ژرفای کم‌عمق، این اشباح مشحون از جوع»

I do not know the translator's reason for not using the equivalent "ملال" (melal). All I know is that one cannot change a nearly established equivalent without reason; numerous and diverse Persian-speaking thinkers have used this very equivalent to translate the aforementioned word, including Dariush Ashouri in "Farhang-e Olum-e Ensani" {Markaz Publishing, second edition}, Siavash Jamadi in Heidegger's "What is Metaphysics?" {page 171, Qoqnoos Publishing, eighth printing. Jamadi's equivalent is "ملالت" (melalat). It is worth noting that in a footnote on the same page, Jamadi distinguishes between "ملالت" and "کسالت" and also provides his reasoning}, Morad Farhadpour in Marshall Berman's "The Experience of Modernity" {pages 255 and 342, Tarh-e No Publishing, eighth printing}, Baha'oddin Khorramshahi in Miguel de Unamuno's "The Tragic Sense of Life" {page 291, Nahid Publishing, eighth printing}, and so forth. Interestingly, the translator of the book himself, namely Saleh Najafi, has used the word "ملال" to translate this term in at least one lecture {the emphasis in the quotation is mine}: «مسيحاباوري سياسي تلاشي است براي برقراري پيوند دوباره بين فرم و زندگي. از ديد شارپ، اين مسيحاباوري سياسي هايدگريسم جديد و چپ است و براي اين قضيه آگامبن از تفسير هايدگر از«ملال {boredom} عميق» استفاده کرده و کوشيده يک روايت جديد از آن ارائه کند. ما انسان هاي متمدن موجوداتي هستيم که بين کار دل و خفقان آميزترين فضاهاي ملال هيچ حد واسطي نمي شناسيم...» (Saleh Najafi at the "Theology and Politics" session: Can Only Agamben Save Us? Shargh Newspaper, issue 3163, 12/3/1397, page 8; available here.

It is worth noting that the translator has used the equivalent "ملال" for the word "spleen" on page 305. If the translator claims that the equivalent "کسالت" is a better equivalent in this context, he must write the original word in a footnote and also state his reason.

2- Untranslated Words, Phrases, or Sentences

1- Persian page 41

‘Since it would be too lengthy to quote Baur, may I refer the reader to the section beginning on page 90 and ask him to read pages 90, 91, and 98’ (32)

The translator has not translated the above sentences, which are in fact given in a footnote. Most likely, the translator thought to himself that since this footnote is not of great importance, the book introduced is not available in Persian, and its author is not very well-known, translating the said footnote is therefore not very important. In my view, as a translator, advancing such an argument is fraught with problems, and even if we assume that argument to be unproblematic, the translator should at least write a footnote informing the reader of its omission, or reproduce the footnote from the English version verbatim in the Persian translation (a footnote similar to the said one appears on pages 114, 201, and 228, which has been omitted).

The translator sometimes also omits Kierkegaard's references to page and volume numbers of books in his translation. Examples of these can be seen by comparing the Persian text with the English on these pages: 145, 146, 168, 172, 173, 194, 210, 226, 227, 234, 235, 237, 238, 239, 240, 243, and 244.

2- Page 42: «... if someone speaks at such length about a subject, I lose the thread of the subject, so summarize your speech and tell me in a short sentence, let me see, what answer did you give to my question?»

‘I am a very forgetful man, and if someone speaks so long, I completely forget what the discourse is about. So just as you, if I were hard of hearing, would consider it necessary to speak more loudly to me than to the others if you wanted to talk to me, so now, too, since you have met a forgetful man, you will cut down your answers and make them shorter if I am to follow you.' (33)

The bolded part has not been translated (the bolded parts in the subsequent English evidence also indicate the untranslated portions).

3- Page 141: «... we will acknowledge that this matter gives a far more comic aspect to his personality than when we consider the principle of Socratic thought to be the principle of inner activity [=subjectivity], along with the train of thoughts that follow in its wake...»

‘one will certainly admit that this affords a much more comic side than would be the case if the principle of subjectivity, the principle of inwardness, along with the whole train of ensuing ideas, were taken to be the Socratic principle…’ (131)

4- Page 194: «The state ... can intervene precisely because ... it ranks higher than the family, which resides within the state. But the family, for its part, also ranks higher than the individual individuals, especially in matters concerning the family itself. Therefore, vis-à-vis the single individual, the child's relation to its parents is an absolute relation»

‘As the whole in which the family lives and moves, the state can suspend to a certain degree the absolute relation between parents and children, can to a certain degree use its authority to make stipulations regarding the children's education, but this is precisely because the state ranks higher than the family, which is within the state. But the family in turn ranks higher than the single individual, especially in regard to its own affairs. Vis-a-vis the family, therefore, the single individual, just because he believes himself to be the most competent, cannot without further ado be authorized on his own responsibility to extend his competence. Vis-a-vis the single individual, therefore, the child's relation to its parents is an absolute’.

5- Page 198: «Talented individuals, as a matter of gratitude, necessarily felt indebted to him; they necessarily felt they must be ever more grateful and thankful to Socrates. Thus Socrates' relation to his disciples... »

‘…the gifted ones were bound to feel that they owed it to him; they were bound to feel all the more grateful the more they saw that they had themselves to thank for their rich resources and not Socrates’

6- Page 199: «He did not set out with fine words, with long oratorical effusions, with huckstering trumpeting of his own wisdom. He was seemingly indifferent to the young men…»

‘He did not set out with fine words, with long oratorical effusions, with huckstering trumpeting of his own wisdom. On the contrary, he went about quietly. He was seemingly indifferent to the young men…’ (189)

7- Page 223

‘(Mehring, "Idem zur wissensch. Begrundung d. Physiognomik, " in Fichte's journal, SOl II, 2, 1840, p. 244, stresses the factor of self determination but does not stress the difficulty.) (212)

In Kierkegaard's long footnote, these two lines also appear, which are missing from the Persian translation.

8- Page 229: «… entrusted to a boundless ocean that goodness and beauty and other virtues {the good, the true, the beautiful, etc.}…»

9- Page 262: «In all these cases, irony often manifests itself as an overt satire that absorbs the world within itself, and rather than seeking to remain hidden…»

‘In all these cases, irony manifests itself rather as the irony that comprehends the world, seeks to mystify the surrounding world, seeking not so much to remain in hiding itself as…’ (251)

10- Page 298: «… is specifically supposed to nurture and bring to fruition the seeds that God himself has sown in man's nature, for the Christian is the one who rises up with God's help and, in a sense, becomes God's co-worker in completing the good work that God himself has begun»

‘…but is specifically supposed to develop the seeds God himself has placed in man, since the Christian knows himself as that which has reality for God. Here, in fact, the Christian comes to the aid of God, becomes, so to speak, his co-worker in completing the good work God himself has begun’ (280)

3- Lack of Uniformity in Translation

1- Page 30: «Every individual existence is merely an individual existence that …»; Page 83: «Just as the ideas exist before concrete things, so too does the spirit exist before the body»; Page 84: «temporal existence»; Page 219: «concrete existence»; Pages 271, 283, and 293: «existence and life». «preexistence» on pages 81 and 83 has been rendered as «the prior life of the spirit» and «the existence of the spirit before birth» and «the prior existence of the spirit» and «existence before birth», and «postexistence» on page 84 as «existence after death».

2- Page 41: «dichotomy» has been rendered once as «doubling» and once as «bifurcation», and on page 53 as «dichotomization»; «dichotomized» on page 54 has been rendered as «has been bifurcated», and «dichotomy» on page 58 as «bifurcation». On page 50, the translator has also rendered «duplexity» as «duality or bifurcation».

3- Pages 65 and 113: «the constructive dialogues» has been rendered once as «constructive dialogues» and another time as «system-building dialogues»; on page 115 it has been rendered twice as «educational dialogues», and on page 133 as «educational dialogues».

4- Pages 151 and 152: «actuality» is sometimes translated as «واقعیت» and sometimes as «واقعیت بالفعل». Page 277: «اما درست از آن سبب که سوژه واقعیت بالفعل {actuality} را از منظر آیرونی می‌نگرد، این به هیچ وجه نتیجه نمی‌دهد که او وقتی دیدگاه خود را درباره فعلیت {actuality}اظهار می‌کند... فی‌المثل در دوران مدرن تا بخواهید درباره آیرونی و درباره دیدگاه آیرونیک به فعلیت جهان {actuality} مطلب هست... لیکن هرچه این اتفاق بیشتر روی دهد فروریزی واقعیت بالفعل {actuality}نیز قطعی‌تر... خواهد شد، تفوق فاعل {subject} آیرونی بر واقعیت بالفعل {actuality}...» Page 284: «... از نظر او فعلیت {actuality} مستقر زمانه‌اش واقعیت بالفعلی نداشت {was unactual}، نه به لحاظ این یا آن جنبه خاص بلکه در تمامیتش؛ و در نسبت با این فعلیت {actuality} بی‌اعتبار... ولی این تمامیت واقعیت بالفعل {actuality} نبود که او نفی می‌کرد؛ موضع نفی او فعلیت {actuality} مفروض یا داده‌شده در یک زمان خاص بود، یعنی فعلیت جوهرمدار {substantial actuality}...»؛ Page 302: «هر آنچه در فعلیت مفروض (واقعیت موجود) {in the given actuality} جاافتاده و استوار گردیده است در نظر اهل آیرونی فقط و فقط اعتباری شاعرانه دارد... اما هنگامی که واقعیت موجود {the given actuality}...»؛ Page 305: «در قلمرو نظریه نسبت نامناسبی میان «مثال» و «واقعیت بالفعل»{actuality} برقرار می‌سازد... در قلمرو عمل میان امکان عام و فعلیت {actuality}...»

5- Page 153: «تفسیرهای ... خیالی {imaginary constructions}»؛ Page 240: «...باید بگوییم آنها فضیلت‌هایی ساخته‌وپرداخته قوه تخیل {imaginary constructions} بودند»؛ «... چنین فضیلت‌ها برای فرد فقط به مثابه برساخته‌های قوه تخیل {imaginary constructions} واقعیت دارند»؛ Page 245: «ساخت‌وساز تخیلی {imaginary constructions}»

In addition to the lack of consistency and the occasional use of strange equivalents such as «تفاسیر» and «ساخت‌وساز» to express Kierkegaard's meaning, the English equivalents of these terms are also not cited. It is worth noting that the English translators of the majority of Kierkegaard's books for Princeton University Press, namely Howard and Edna Hong, have written a six-page note on this expression at the beginning of their notes to their translation of the book «Repetition». In my view, attending to that is essential in translating the aforementioned phrase.

6- Page 154: «speculate» is translated once as «نظرپردازی کردن», another time as «نظرپردازی», and a third time as «نظرورزی»; «speculation» is translated as «نظرپردازی» on page 159 and as «نظرپردازی و گمان‌ورزی» on page 176. On page 182, the translator has also rendered the expression «speculative absorption» as «نظرورزی و گمان‌پردازی» {interestingly, without mentioning the equivalent in the footnote}.

7- Page 162: Unfortunately, the translator has, without reason, sometimes rendered «subjectivity» as meaning «فاعلیت درون‌ذاتی», and sometimes as «فاعلیت». On this page, the second equivalent is used. This same word is sometimes translated simply as «درون‌ذاتی», for example on pages 172 and 173: «موضع سقراط موضع درون‌ذاتی {that of subjectivity}، موضع سیر باطن است... قاطعیت و اعتماد به نفس درون‌ذاتی {self-decisiveness and self-assurance of subjectivity} ...». On page 174, it reads: «موضع سقراط به ظن قوی از بسیاری جهات موضع فاعلیت درون‌ذاتی {subjectivity} است، و با این حال چنان است که انگار فاعلیت درونی {the subjectivity} او همه سرشاری و غنای خود را آشکار عیان نمی‌سازد...»؛ Also on page 175, in two consecutive sentences, «فاعلیت درون‌ذاتی» is used once and «فاعلیت» the other time; further on the same page, the expression «فاعلیت» is used twice more; on page 220, the equivalent «فاعلیت ذهن» is used. Below, you can see further examples of the translator's choice of equivalents:

221 and 222: “... but the point he reached along this path was more the negative quality of subjectivity, whereby subjectivity determines itself from within, but he lacked the objectivity in which subjectivity, by virtue of its inner freedom, is free, an objectivity that is not a limiting but an expanding boundary of the mind’s subjectivity... the nonchalant and unlimited freedom of inner subjectivity is ... irony is the spur of every future subjectivity...” ; page 252: “But if irony is a qualitative determination of intrinsic subjectivity... but subjectivity, as soon as it appears in the world” {until the end of the paragraph, the word “subjectivity” is used seven more times, all of which the translator has rendered as “fā‘iliyyat”}; page 276: “... it is necessary that the intrinsic subject also become aware of its own irony... for this to be realized, subjectivity must be at an advanced stage, or more precisely, as soon as subjectivity emerges, irony must appear. Subjectivity...” ; page 277: in one paragraph: “intrinsic subjectivity [= being a subject]” and “subjectivity” and “intrinsic subjectivity”; page 291: “In Fichte, intrinsic subjectivity became free, infinite, and negative. But subjectivity...”

“subjective” has also been rendered on page 173 as “mental or intrinsic”; on page 203 the translator uses the expression “his own personal (subjective) firm conviction” {his subjective conviction} in contrast to “the objective judgments of the state” {the objective judgement}; page 236: “it is thanks to Socrates that the deciding spirit is placed within the subjective consciousness of man; but the next question is how this subjectivity appears in Socrates. Since the person, the individual, now gives the decision, we thereby approach Socrates as a person, as an intrinsic subject (sujhe)... the form in which this subjectivity now... manifests itself... one can observe how subjectivity in Socrates oscillates between finite and infinite subjectivity, because the finite subject...” ; page 240: “{Hegel says} what Aristotle overlooks in determining the limits of virtue in Socrates is the aspect of subjective actuality...” ; page 264: “intrinsic freedom”.

Examples of the translator’s choice of equivalents for the word “subject” can also be seen below: page 204: “the particular subject”; page 216: “the particular subject”; pages 244 and 245: “subject (sujhe)”; page 267, in one paragraph: “subject” and “intrinsic subject”; page 266: “the ironic subject” and on page 277: “the ironic subject”; page 269: “This is precisely the point upon which irony insists, the point that the subject can feel free, so much so that the phenomenon never acquires any reality for the subject (sujhe)” and page 277: “sujhe”; page 290: “philosophy must entrust itself to the billows of its proximate substantial sea, just as in the moment of inspiration the subject almost forgets itself and surrenders to the flow of inspiration...” ; 293: “the knowing subject”.

4- Lack of Footnotes and Glossary for Translated Words, Especially Technical Terms

Persian translators, especially Persian translators of philosophical texts, must, as far as possible, make the Persian reader aware of the original form of many of the words they have translated, particularly technical terms. Otherwise, the Persian reader cannot accurately grasp and follow the author's claims and arguments. The translator of The Concept of Irony has not only failed to do this for most words, but has also not provided a glossary at the end of the book. For example, as I wrote in the first part, "substantiality" on page 13 is rendered as "ساحت امور جوهری" without mentioning its equivalent; "actuality," as I noted in the section "Lack of Uniformity in Translation," number four, is sometimes translated as "فعلیت," sometimes "واقعیت," and sometimes "واقعیت بالفعل"; "ideality" is sometimes translated as "واقعیت مثالی" (e.g., pages 13 and 136), sometimes as "ایده‌ها" (e.g., page 138 in the phrase "the kingdom of ideality"), and sometimes as "مثالی (ایده‌آل)" (e.g., page 139 in the phrase "ideality of depiction"); sometimes both "negativity" and "negation" are translated as "نفی" (pages 13 and 29), and sometimes "negativity" alone is translated as "رکن منفی" (e.g., page 57 in the phrase "the infinite negativity"); sometimes "positivity" is translated across two pages (i.e., pages 220 and 221) with various equivalents such as "وجه ایجابی یا اثباتی," "مثبت بودن," "ایجاب," "اثبات و ایجاب," and "موضع مثبت," and a few pages later (i.e., page 228) as "اندیشه مثبت" and "مثبت‌اندیشی"; we only discover on page 25 that the translator has rendered "existence" as "هستی," because the English equivalent is given in parentheses, yet this same word, before and after this page, is sometimes translated as "هستی و حیات" (e.g., page 17), sometimes as "هستی" (same page 17), and sometimes as "وجود" (e.g., page 30); the translator renders "dichotomy" and "trichotomy" as "دوگانه‌سازی" and "سه‌گانه‌سازی" without any reference to the original equivalents, as if the Persian-speaking reader, upon seeing these two words, would immediately bring "dichotomy" and "trichotomy" to mind; on page 266, the translator renders "sub specie ironiae [under the aspect of irony]" as "ذیل بعد آیرونی," which definitely requires a footnote, because Kierkegaard here transforms Spinoza's expression "Sub specie aeternitatis" into "sub specie ironiae" {in my opinion, it would have been better and more precise to use the equivalent "از وجه آیرونی" for Kierkegaard's intended concept, just as the established equivalent "از وجه ابدی" is used for Spinoza's concept}.

5- Editorial Problems or Unclear Persian Language

1- Page 13: "Irony as infinite, absolute negativity is the lightest and weakest indication of subjectivity."

The expression "سبک‌ترین گواه" is a literal translation of the phrase "the lightest indication." In Persian, the expression "گواه سبک" is an unclear and incomprehensible expression. The collocation of "گواه" in the Persian language is not "سبک." It would have been better and more expressive to use an equivalent like "سست."

Also, on page 46, the translator renders "a strong resemblance" as "شباهت نیرومند." The expressive translation of the phrase "a strong resemblance" is "شباهت بسیار زیاد." In other words, the collocation of the word "شباهت" in Persian is "زیاد" and "بسیار زیاد," not "نیرومند."

2- Page 20: "He was descended from men and women whose appearance alone one could not have the final word about."

The "را" after "ظاهرشان" should be deleted. (Other examples of this type of editorial problem can be seen on the following pages: 33, 55, 65, 66, 70, 71, 79, 116, 119, 153, 223, 247, 302, and 305).

3- Page 40: "... the narrative [diegematic] dialogues are considered ..."

It should be mentioned in a footnote that "گزارشی" is the equivalent of the Greek term used by Diogenes, and "روایی" is the translation of its English equivalent, which the English translator has actually placed in brackets. Also, the equivalent of "گزارشی," i.e., "diegematic," should be provided in a footnote.

I also feel it necessary to mention one point: since the English translators have also added phrases in brackets throughout the English text, the Persian translator should have distinguished his own additions from theirs in some way; for instance, he could have noted this in a footnote, or placed his own additions in braces and then explained the difference between the additions in brackets and those in braces in the introduction.

4- Page 53: "Thus, according to Pausanias, Eros is twofold because Aphrodite is twofold; that is, we have two goddesses of beauty: one is the heavenly Aphrodite… the other Aphrodite is far younger… . The Eros associated with the earthly Aphrodite is the god of earthly love, and the other is the god of heavenly love. The source of earthly love is sexual difference"

‘The one, heavenly love, is the motherless daughter of Uranus; the other, vulgar love, is far younger, has sexual difference as its source’ (42)

These sentences are the translator's additions and should therefore be placed in brackets or braces: "Thus, according to Pausanias, Eros is twofold because Aphrodite is twofold; that is, we have two goddesses of beauty"; "The Eros associated with the earthly Aphrodite is the god of earthly love, and the other is the god of heavenly love." Furthermore, for a better understanding of Kierkegaard's sentences and with his knowledge of Plato's Symposium, the translator has rendered "love" in Kierkegaard's account as "Aphrodite." In general, the translator has tried to clarify Kierkegaard's words in light of the Symposium. The translator should have translated Kierkegaard's exact sentences into clear Persian and then clarified Kierkegaard's words in a footnote, or failing that, placed his own additions in brackets or braces, or at least written a footnote informing the reader that he had tampered with the translation of these few lines to make Kierkegaard's intent and meaning clearer.

On page 305 as well, the translator has translated the English translators' four-line note about "Asa Loki" or "Loki," in the notes section, and by placing it in parentheses, has inserted it into the body of the book and not in a footnote, as if Kierkegaard himself had written that material. All three lines should be moved to a footnote or placed in brackets or braces. (Some other examples: pages 55, 140, 162, and 169)

5- Page 54: "According to {despite} the quotation he brings from Heraclitus"

In typing, the translator mistakenly wrote "according to" instead of "despite." On page 110, "depths" was mistakenly written as "deeds," and on page 145, "commentators" was mistakenly written as "our overflowing."

6- Page 81: "... if the argument based on the observation that everything necessarily arises from its opposite... alongside the argument based on the consideration of the soul's previous life ... with the aim of ensuring the continuity of the discussion, then in my opinion or the concept of the soul's previous life is placed, it rejects the notion of its coming-into-being..."

"is placed" should be moved to after "continuity of the discussion."

7- Page 143: "I traverse the breadth, immersed in contemplation of the sun"

"Earth" is correct, not "breadth."

8- Page 157: "the description of what becomes the first consideration of his teachings {the first consideration in his teaching}, namely the dialectical"

Teachings do not "consider" something, but teachings can contain a set of "considerations." Therefore,

the clear translation is as follows: the first consideration in his teaching

9- Page 171: "This indicated a polemical relationship with the state religion ... in any case, it was a polemic against the state religion that someone substitute this silence (the daimonic voice) for the life of the Greeks... yes, this was tantamount to a battle with the official religion that ..."

‘…it was a polemical relation to the state religion to substitute a silence in which a warning voice was audible only on occasion,… -- to substitute this for the Greek life permeated… to substitute a silence for this divine eloquence echoed in everything’

The expression "official religion" is not in the text at all. It should either be removed or placed in brackets or braces.

6- Failure to translate many of the English translators' useful notes

The English translators of the book have taken great pains and have cited the source of the vast majority of the book's unsourced verses and quotations in the book's endnotes. They have also traced certain Hegelian concepts in the book and cited the probable source used by Kierkegaard, along with a portion of Hegel's text, in the endnotes. Similarly, a section of Kierkegaard's "Journals and Papers," related to certain sentences in the book, has been provided in a section at the end of the book. The Persian translator has arbitrarily included some of these in his translation and has not mentioned others at all. For example, on pages 25, 28, 79, 87, and 200, Kierkegaard makes references, albeit indirect, to certain verses of the New Testament that the Persian translator has not mentioned at all; the Persian translator has disregarded and made no mention of a section of Kierkegaard's "Journals and Papers" that is another account of the first paragraph on page 17, as well as another section of the "Journals and Papers" that more or less clarifies Kierkegaard's intent in using the two terms "polygon" and "circle" on page 29; in their endnotes, the English translators have provided excerpts from Hegel's texts that truly clarify for the reader both part of the footnote on page 18, Kierkegaard's claim about the "negativity of the concept of irony" on page 21, Kierkegaard's use of the concept of the "false infinite" on page 31, and Kierkegaard's claim about irony being "absolute, infinite negativity" on page 34; also, on page 210, Kierkegaard provides a quotation, and the English translators have found the author of the quotation, yet the Persian translator has paid no attention to it and has not included it in the footnote at all.

7- The unclear share of the Persian translator and the English translators, distinct from one another, in compiling the information contained in some footnotes

Up to page 215, the Persian translator has marked some footnotes with the letter "M" and distinguished them from Kierkegaard's own footnotes. From page 215 onwards, the letters "M.A" also appear in the footnotes. Throughout the text, some of the footnotes marked with the letter "M," such as the footnote on page 21, are a combination of the English translators' footnotes and the Persian translator's observations with reference to other sources; some footnotes are the Persian translator's own, and some footnotes are from the English translators. In my opinion, the translator should have distinguished these three categories of footnotes throughout the text with three different letters so that the reader could clearly understand the share of the Persian translator and the English translators in compiling the information contained in the footnotes.

I will provide examples of each:

The footnote on page 26 of the Persian translator's rendering is from the English translators' notes on page 470 of the English text, marked only with the letter "م" {it seems to me that if the English translator's footnote, which is in fact a selection from Plutarch's text, had been translated, Kierkegaard's sentence would have had a clearer meaning}; the footnote on page 34 is of the same nature; the original footnote on page 89 also belongs to the English translators, but the Persian translator has added a sentence to it; the footnotes on pages 46, 61, 69, and footnote 1 on page 232 are by the Persian translator and are marked with the sign "م" (in this footnote, the word "قنسول" is used, which appears to be the translator's equivalent for "consul." The conventional and customary rendering is "کنسول"); the footnotes relating to verses on pages 176, 182, 224, 270, and other instances belong to the English translators, and the Persian translator has merely provided a Persian translation of them by referring to the chapter and verses specified in the English text; these latter footnotes are not marked with any letter at all {incidentally, these latter footnotes create the illusion that Kierkegaard himself wrote the footnote}.

In this article, I have endeavored, under the six headings of "Inaccurate Translation or Incorrect Translation or Inaccurate and Incorrect Translation," "Untranslated Words, Phrases, or Sentences," "Lack of Uniformity in Translation," "Lack of Footnotes and a Glossary for Translated Words, Especially Technical Terms," "Editorial Problems or Inadequate Persian," and "Failure to Translate Many of the English Translators' Useful Notes," to present numerous and varied pieces of evidence and to claim that Saleh Najafi's translation of Kierkegaard's book, under the title The Concept of Irony, is not an acceptable translation and cannot be considered a reliable source for an accurate and complete understanding of Kierkegaard's thought, nor consequently a reliable source for writing articles and theses on his thought. Also, under the heading "The Unclear Distinction Between the Contributions of the Persian Translator and the English Translators in Compiling Information Contained in Some Footnotes," I have presented evidence that the Persian translator has not done justice to the English translators in his referencing. I leave the final judgment on the author's claims, the defined headings, and the presented evidence to the reader.