اندیشهفلسفهخردگفتگوحکمتمعناپرسشفرهنگ
Drawing on Thoreau and civil disobedience, Kaveh Behbahani examines the tension between conscience and law in the ethics of elections. Critiquing the sanctification of the state, he insists on the priority of moral values over law.

In this session, I will try to show what kind of election is more ethical. The link between ethics and politics has various layers. Some, like Machiavelli, believe that ethics and politics are two separate spheres and that ethics should not be introduced into politics, but the reality is that if we leave politicians to their own devices and pay no attention to ethics, we will face various troubles.
I will begin my talk by referring to the 19th-century philosopher David Henry Thoreau, who wrote a work called "On Civil Disobedience."
Thoreau deliberately did not pay taxes for 5 years for two reasons: one, the U.S. government of the time supported slavery, and slavery was part of the Constitution, and two, America was involved in a war with Mexico, which Thoreau opposed. When his friend, who happened to be a tax collector, came to him to collect taxes, he said to Thoreau, on the one hand, I am a government agent, and on the other, you are my friend, what should I do?! Thoreau replied, resign. His friend said, if you don't have the tax money, I can pay it, but Thoreau said my moral principles do not allow the tax to be paid at all. Therefore, his friend was forced to arrest him, and Thoreau was sent to prison. In any case, the lesson Thoreau wants to teach us is that one should not cooperate with a corrupt system. Later, Gandhi and Martin Luther King raised the same issue. This idea introduces a new tradition in democratic societies that we today call civil disobedience. Thoreau's tax resistance is an instance of civil disobedience.
For comparison, it is better to also refer to one of Thoreau's contemporaries, namely Hegel. Hegel idealizes the nation-state and sees everything as filled with a form of divine spirit; for Hegel, everything has a kind of divine essence, and the nation-state is the agent of the divine on earth. In Hegel's view, the state has a spiritual essence. With these descriptions, for Hegel, disobedience to the state and law is not acceptable; but in contrast, Thoreau considers the state foolish and believes the best state is one that governs as little as possible. And therefore, for him, disobedience to the state is acceptable in some cases.
For another comparison, I will mention John Locke. John Locke believes that one must always obey the law, and no one has the right to violate this law, which arises from the social contract.
One can also refer to John Stuart Mill, who, although concerned about the tyranny of the majority and the masses and the abuse of government, constantly emphasized that one must act under the banner of the law and should not disobey it, even if it is a government that supports slavery.
Emerson, addressing Thoreau, says, "The state is a poor, good beast who means the best. It means friendly. It is a poor cow that works well with your help. Do not envy its hay."
Ralph Waldo Emerson, who was a friend of Thoreau, considered Thoreau's action narrow-minded and irresponsible. In Emerson's view, Thoreau's view of the state is a liberal one, and the state has no sanctity. He says this moral extremism is a path to moral suicide, and one should not violate the law.
So, in fact, Thoreau opposes the dominant discourse of that era, which believed the state was sacred and that violating the law was by no means acceptable.
Thoreau begins his treatise "On Civil Disobedience" with the sentence that the government is best which governs least, and the best government is one that governs not at all (though Thoreau was not an anarchist). He goes on to say that government is at best an expedient, and then gives an example, referring to that same war between America and Mexico, which a small number of statesmen use as a tool for their own purposes. He says: "What is the American government but a tradition, though a recent one, endeavoring to transmit itself unimpaired to posterity, but each instant losing some of its integrity? It does not keep the country secure, it does not settle the West, it does not educate. The character inherent in the American people has done all that has been accomplished; and it would have done somewhat more, if the government had not sometimes got in its way."
In the last sentence quoted, Thoreau wants to say that this government has even worsened the character of the people (instead of improving it).
Thoreau criticizes the notion of considering representative democracy a perfect, flawless system and thinking it is the end of political history; rather, he asks us to at least seek an alternative.
He considers the state electoral system to be unethical. He says: "A government in which the majority rules in all cases cannot be based on justice. Is it not possible for a government to exist in which the majority of people do not determine what is right and wrong, but conscience determines this? In a government where the majority decides on dilemmas that the rule of expediency dictates, should a citizen, even for a moment or to the slightest degree, sacrifice their conscience to the legislator? Why then do all human beings have a conscience?
I believe we must first be human beings, and only then subjects of the state. Respect for the law is not as desirable as respect for what is right. The only obligation I have a right to be bound by is to do what I at any time deem right. Law never makes people a whit more just; and even the best-natured people, through their respect for law, daily serve evil and injustice. The reason it is said that in a democratic government the majority are permitted to rule for a long duration is not because they are more likely to be in the right, nor because this process brings fairer conditions for the minority, but because they are physically the strongest."
Note that these words are spoken in a context where the state and the rule of law are very fundamental and even sacred, but Thoreau criticizes it; Thoreau challenges the sanctity of the law. Let us assume that sanctity means I attribute infinite value to something. This conception of sanctity is very harmful because I, as a human being in the sphere of values, am always engaged in prioritization. I must always say that such-and-such a thing is valuable to me, but another thing is more valuable under different conditions. For example, I believe truthfulness is valuable, but preserving human life is, under certain conditions, more valuable than truthfulness. Now, if I say something has infinite value, then no other value can be sacrificed for it, even if that other thing also has infinite value. So, if I believe, for instance, that the law is sacred and has infinite value, it means the law can no longer be sacrificed for anything else; and Thoreau is precisely opposed to this. From Thoreau's perspective, there are other values that are higher than the law. In his view, the law can be tested against moral values. Of course, by moral values, I mean a normative matter upon which we all reach a consensus, not a matter of personal taste and whim.
In his critique of the electoral system, Thoreau writes: "All voting is a sort of gaming, like chess or backgammon, with a slight moral tinge to it. Playing with right and wrong is naturally an integral part of it, and naturally, no bet is ever placed on the voter's character. They vote according to chance, believing themselves to be in the right, yet they are not very concerned that the right should prevail, but leave the election to the majority. For this reason, the duty to vote never goes beyond mere expediency. Even voting for the right is doing nothing for it; you merely express your wish, with indifference, that the right should prevail. A wise man does not leave the right to the mercy of chance and fortune, nor does he wish that the right should prevail through the power of the majority, for in practice, there is little virtue in the masses. When they finally vote for the abolition of slavery, it is because they have become indifferent to it, or because there is little slavery left to be abolished."
It should be noted that, as we mentioned regarding several of his contemporaries, Thoreau raised these points at a time when no one had dared to criticize electoral elections. And of course, note that Thoreau's idea of civil disobedience does not mean his agreement with violence; rather, Thoreau, like Gandhi, is one of the pioneers of non-violence.
I mentioned these preliminaries from Thoreau in order to now address the ethics of elections. I will first explain the concept of "bad voting." Bad voting does not mean that we vote for harmful and unjust policies, because sometimes we may vote for a policy that is harmful or unjust, yet it is not an instance of bad voting—such as when we choose the lesser of two evils or choose between bad and worse. Bad voting means that I vote, but the reasons I have for voting do not sufficiently demonstrate the harmfulness or injustice of the candidates' policies. We vote badly in at least three specific situations:
1- When the reasons we have for voting contain an immoral belief or beliefs. For example, voting for racist and discriminatory policies.
2- When my voting stems from ignorance and lack of knowledge. For instance, not knowing what each candidate says or what their views are, yet voting despite such ignorance.
3- Voting that results from cognitive biases. For example, I vote because I hold beliefs acquired through unreliable and biased processes, such as having followed someone unqualified.
Another concept I want to define is the concept of "collectively harmful activity." Sometimes I engage in an activity that would not be harmful if I alone did it, but becomes harmful when a group of people engage in it. For example, if only my car were polluting in the world, it would not cause significant environmental damage. But when a collective engages in this activity, then the activity becomes harmful and, for instance, the environment suffers damage.
A collectively harmful activity is among those activities which, if I commit, I have done something morally wrong; provided, of course, that I do not incur a great personal cost. For example, if I have a critically ill patient who needs urgent treatment and I am forced to use a polluting vehicle, my action here is not immoral.
If I am faced with a collectively harmful activity, do I not have a duty to combat it? In my view, this is too much to expect, and one cannot place too many obligations on a person's shoulders. However, it can be expected that I at least do not participate in the collectively harmful activity (provided it does not incur a great personal cost). And this, of course, is a moral duty.
Now I want to say that bad voting is an instance of a collectively harmful activity and is morally wrong. If bad voting becomes a collective activity, it effectively results in voting for unjust and harmful policies. So, in summary, I have a moral duty not to participate in collectively harmful activities. And bad voting is an instance of a collectively harmful activity, and consequently, I have a moral duty not to vote badly.
But if we have a duty not to vote badly, do we also have a duty to vote well? I believe we do not have such a duty. Because our world is a world of opportunity costs. That is, when I do something, I simultaneously lose the opportunity to do many other things. Meaning, if I want to vote well, I must know political science, economics, statistics, and so on. And this is not a reasonable expectation.
Someone might say that if the victory of a candidate is beneficial, we should all help that candidate win, rather than free-riding. In response, I would say that participating in elections is not the only way to serve society and promote public goods. Rather, I can promote the public good through other means; for example, by being a good citizen, or by being active in the fields of education, the environment, and so on.
So, up to this point, I have claimed that since voting badly is an instance of collectively harmful activity, I ought not to do it, and also, on the other hand, I have no duty to vote well. But you might object that this view is elitist. In response, I would say that elitism has two meanings. One meaning is that I, for example, say that a certain social class has no right to vote at all; this is a meaning I also oppose. But it has another meaning, which is, for instance, to say that a certain person, because they have Parkinson's, has no right to perform surgery. Here, although it is elitism, it is defensible. In my view, everyone has the right to participate in elections, but not everyone has a moral duty to refrain from participating, and furthermore, those who vote badly have a duty not to participate in elections at all. This conception of mine is in no way a violation of democracy. It is like going on a trip with friends and they want to vote on which restaurant to go to, and I say I won't vote because I am not familiar with the city's restaurants. This does not at all mean a rejection of the democratic process; rather, I do not consider myself entitled to participate in that process.
In the times in which we vote, the frequency of bad voting is very high. That is, we are urged from every direction to vote badly. For example, they constantly engage in advertising marketing and manipulate my brain, or they inflame emotions, or they hold debates, or they use specific films to get me to participate in the elections and vote for a particular person. It has come to the point that people mostly vote for an individual's personality and charisma. In those very debates, contrary to the general public's perception, a show is staged where the winner is the one who better employs rhetorical techniques and provokes the audience. All of this has turned individuals into immature voters. We live in a world where irrational drives are far, far more numerous than rational drives. And this demands that we exercise greater care in this regard.
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