Omid Ghaempanah's essay 'In Praise of Doubt'

In Praise of Doubt

Author: Omid Ghaempanah

This piece can be considered a kind of introduction to the ideas of Peter Berger. The following text attempts to answer questions such as: What is the fundamental characteristic of the modern era? What are the requirements of this characteristic? What distinguishes newer generations from previous ones? How do people of the present age, and particularly the new generation, encounter religions and ideologies? Under such conditions, how should intellectual systems operate?

The Pluralization of Modernity

There are various interpretations and understandings of modernity; however, there seems to be a consensus on one of its meanings, which is that modernity has brought about an unprecedented plurality in all matters. Before this, in the distant past, there existed a relative cognitive and normative consensus in every society. This means that the members of a community had a relatively shared understanding of the nature and workings of the world and its creator (cognitive consensus), and on the other hand, common norms prevailed among them (normative consensus). Nevertheless, throughout history, there were always marginal groups that did not share in this consensus, but they were, in any case, just marginal groups and nothing more. Currently, the plurality of modernity has dismantled these homogeneous communities, and in every society, we are faced with diverse and varied spectrums of cognitive and normative beliefs. In recent decades, with the dramatic growth of cyberspace and social media, this plurality has become increasingly apparent, and the new generation, which is situated in such an environment from the very beginning, observes this plurality; such a generation encounters various lifestyles on Instagram and diverse beliefs on Twitter and Telegram. However, what is important here is the very fact of this encounter with a diverse range of cognitive and normative issues; in other words, there exists both a wide spectrum of different beliefs about the world and its workings, and various beliefs about good and evil, and the valuation of matters in general.

Cognitive Contamination

But what will be the consequence of this encounter with cognitive and normative plurality? In the first instance, such an encounter leads to what is termed cognitive contamination. Cognitive contamination means that when a person encounters individuals with different beliefs and lifestyles, they will realize that each has their own reasons, and others are not as demonic, irrational, unwise, and, in short, clearly wrong as was imagined. As a result of such encounters, the firm wall of an individual's beliefs, and even the authorities surrounding them, collapses, and the individual finds their own beliefs to be one option among other options, no longer seeing their own opinion as self-evident and certain, because if it were self-evident and certain, others would have to be like them. This is while in the past, when communities were largely homogeneous, many matters were certain, self-evident, and predestined for each individual; each person saw themselves in a predetermined map, such that even their occupation was preordained. And in this sense, the transition from the pre-modern era to modernity is, in one sense, a transition from destiny to choice. The individual in the present age sees everything as options from which they must make a choice. In an analogy, one could say modernity is like a large hypermarket where the individual sees diverse products before them.

Arnold Gehlen divides the spheres of an individual's life into two parts: background and foreground. The background sphere is an area that is usually fixed, self-evident, and established, like the principle of wearing clothes; for the individual, the principle of wearing clothes is a self-evident matter and they do not question it. But the foreground sphere is an area where matters are not certain and self-evident, and the individual must reflect upon them and then make a choice.

With this in mind, it can be said that in the pre-modern era, the background domain—the taken-for-granted and self-evident matters—was very vast and extensive for individuals, whereas in the modern era, many of those matters have been transferred to the foreground domain, and in many affairs, the individual must make a choice. Such an individual, unlike in the past, must even choose what clothes to wear, and in the same way, lifestyle, profession, religion, and other matters have also been transferred to the foreground domain. The issue that exists is that a religion that is in the foreground domain (and is a matter of choice) no longer possesses the solidity and stability of a religion that was in the background domain (and taken-for-granted and self-evident), and any religiosity that does exist will be more superficial—superficial in the sense that the possibility of change and transformation in it is greater. Nevertheless, this proliferation of plurality also has its effects in ethical matters, and many moral principles may be questioned and reflected upon, possibly losing their former self-evidence.

It seems that this proliferation of plurality and cognitive contamination, as described, transfers something into the background domain that previously existed there to a lesser extent, and that is the acceptance of rights for others. When an individual finds themselves confronted with a diverse spectrum of beliefs and norms, and on the one hand, as a result of cognitive contamination, sees them as possessing a rationality, however minimal, and on the other hand, empirically realizes that everyone cannot be molded into a single form, they become desirous of inherent rights for others and expect tolerance, forbearance, and the acceptance of their own and others' beliefs. It is for this reason that among the new generation, propositions such as respect for others' beliefs and the importance of humanity become more prominent. Such propositions are, in fact, manifestations of the cognitive contamination of the new age; in other words, the acceptance of human rights gradually embeds itself in the background of this era and becomes a self-evident and taken-for-granted matter.

Cognitive Conformity

A pluralistic society, however, in addition to cognitive contamination, also leads to cognitive conformity. To understand cognitive conformity, it is necessary to refer to the Asch experiment. In this experiment, a stick is placed in a room, and an individual is asked to guess how many centimeters long the stick is; the subject, for example, states the number 10. In this room, of course, there are other individuals who have been previously instructed to state a higher number. When they are asked, "How many centimeters do you think this stick is?", they state the number 20. Then the questioner turns back to the subject and asks if they wish to reconsider. These test subjects would then state a number higher than their previous one. What occurred in this experiment is, in fact, cognitive conformity: the person, influenced by the beliefs of others, makes changes in their own belief; even if those beliefs are incorrect, this social pressure still creates changes in the individual's cognitive system. In the same way, the people of the present age experience cognitive conformity in their beliefs, and it is as a result of this very cognitive conformity that, for example, a patchwork religion takes shape, each piece of which is taken from others; in other words, we are faced with a cobbling together, where, for instance, one takes human rights from the West, belief in karma and meditation from the East, and so on.

The Agony of Choice

This proliferation of plurality in modernity, of course, has another effect called the agony of choice. An individual situated in a massive hypermarket finds it more difficult to choose their desired product compared to an individual at a small stall. In such a state, the individual usually either adopts an attitude of indifference and occupies themselves with a life they see as the only certain and accessible reality and value, or, if they wish to think, reflect, and choose in every matter, their reflections will be superficial, and their choices will be made under these same conditions. And it is, of course, for this reason that the inclination towards postmodernism and fundamentalism also increases; these two inclinations can be seen, in a way, as responses to the pluralizing condition of modernity, because each of these two inclinations largely frees the individual from this state of the agony of choice they experience and grants them peace of mind.

Thus, it can be summarized that the individual in the present era, and particularly the newer generations, have increasingly found themselves among a diversity of options, and for them, many matters have taken on the character of a product among other products from which they must make a choice. Such a person, given this plurality and the resulting cognitive contamination, first desires the recognition of everyone, and in the next stage, due to cognitive bargaining, possesses a patchwork identity and beliefs, each piece taken from somewhere else. This is why a comprehensive belief package cannot be offered to these individuals. On the other hand, since the acceptance of tolerance and human rights has been transferred to the background of these individuals, this generation also considers compatibility with these self-evident and obvious matters in their choices and rejects teachings that contradict them.

All of these consequences are the results of a fact (namely, the pluralization of modernity), and it seems that as long as such plurality exists and the tools that manifest this plurality also exist, such consequences will not be far-fetched, and these consequences cannot be eliminated.

Suggestions for Individuals and Worldviews in the Present Age

Berger, of course, also has recommendations for individuals living in such a world to avoid falling into fundamentalism and relativism. His suggestion is to take doubt seriously. He says that both religious fanatics and secular fanatics, firstly, find it difficult to listen to opposing views; secondly, consider themselves the owners of an undeniable truth; and thirdly, believe that their truth is the only existing truth. And this has been the cause of many bitter events in history. Here, Peter Berger speaks of the importance of doubt. Doubt, of course, is not a permanent pessimism toward one's own beliefs and turning doubt into an individual lifestyle such that one can no longer choose or issue a judgment. Nor does this doubt mean the acceptance of relativism, because relativism also leaves no room for doubt. The doubt he speaks of requires the evaluation of beliefs, a method that Socrates and Descartes also practiced. This doubt is, in fact, a kind of critical rational thinking that Karl Popper also pointed to. In Popper's falsificationism, beliefs must be subjected to falsification and others must be asked to show the inaccuracies so that, through this process, our understanding of the world progresses step by step and gradually.

It should be noted that this doubt, of course, has its limits, and in order not to fall into the trap of pessimism, it is necessary to also arrive at moral certainties upon which to base one's steps. According to Peter Berger, all moral certainties can be summarized in the proposition that human dignity must not be violated; the rest is commentary and interpretation.

Peter Berger also offers strategies for worldviews that wish to be present in such a world and not fall into the abyss of relativism and fundamentalism:

1- First, that worldviews distinguish between their essence (essentials) and more peripheral components (accidentals) and consider these peripheral components as open to discussion, flexibility, and change.

2- That they welcome historical research within their own tradition.

3- That they recognize the positive role of doubt within that particular system of thought.

4- That a definition be provided of others whose worldview is different but who are not considered enemies.

5- That they recognize the institutions of civil society for discussion, dialogue, and dispute resolution.

6- That the right to choose be accepted as a morally desirable fact (and not out of necessity).

7- That relativism be rejected.