John Tilley's Article “Cultural Relativism and Toleration”

Cultural Relativism and Toleration[1]

John Tilley

Translator: Omid Keshmiri

Cultural relativists often hold that their theory entails toleration[2] or somehow guarantees it[3]. Their view is presumably that a fully consistent thinker who embraces cultural relativism will certainly tolerate the behavior encountered in other cultures. Many people accept this view, but many others, including moral philosophers, disagree with it. Unfortunately, the reasoning of those who accept this view has rarely been examined, and the considerable arguments philosophers have advanced against it have gone unheard. In this article, I examine the reasoning underlying the view that cultural relativism entails toleration and show that the common objection to it fails. This does not mean, of course, that I think relativism guarantees toleration. In fact, I will show that the reasoning behind this view is fallacious and cannot bridge the gap between toleration and cultural relativism. After demonstrating this, I will address two possible responses from the opposing camp.

By "cultural relativism" (hereafter "relativism") I shall mean the following theory:

What is morally right (wrong, obligatory, etc.) in one culture is not necessarily generalizable to another culture. This is because the truth of any judgment attributing moral rightness or wrongness to an action is somehow dependent[4] upon or "relative to" the cultural norms of the agent's society, and cultural norms differ from one society to another.

Does this theory entail toleration? Many people hold this view for the following reasons. Relativism means that we cannot impose[5] our own morality on people of other cultures; this means refraining from doing so, and such refraining is, in fact, toleration. Therefore, if we accept relativism, we are logically committed to a policy of toleration.

This is an attractive but invalid argument. The reason for its attractiveness is that, if read sympathetically, it contains grains of truth; it is also invalid because, even when understood sympathetically, it fails to reach its conclusion. I will explain all this shortly, but first I will examine the standard response of moral philosophers, which is the well-known objection to the view that relativism guarantees toleration[6]. The claim of relativism, stated somewhat imprecisely, is that morality depends on cultural norms. If the relativist's claim is true, an action is morally right if and only if it is approved of in the agent's society. Therefore, if intolerance is approved of in a society, the people of that society are morally entitled to be intolerant. Thus, regardless of the issue of toleration, relativism means that intolerance is morally permissible, and perhaps even obligatory, for some. This is because relativism makes moral rightness, moral obligation, etc., entirely a function of cultural norms.

This argument fails due to its first premise, because it interprets relativism as follows:

A) An action is morally right if and only if it is approved of in the agent's society.

This is not a sympathetic reading. There are other, more standard[7] readings of the claim that morality depends on cultural norms. For example, we can understand it as:

B) An action is morally permissible only if it is approved of in the agent's society.

To see that (B) is a plausible reading, consider the claim that bachelorhood (the property of being a bachelor) is defined in relation to marital status. There is no need for a ludicrous reading of the claim that a person is a bachelor if and only if he is unmarried. Instead, we can understand it as meaning that a person is a bachelor only if he is unmarried. Similarly, in the theory in question, statement (B) is a standard reading of the theory which holds that morality depends on cultural norms. Secondly, just as in the bachelorhood example the first statement is less acceptable than the second, (A) is also less acceptable than (B). Reading relativism according to claim (A) exposes it to objections that have no force against reading (B). One such objection is that if the relativist claim were true, we could determine the right action by discovering what is customary in a society (e.g., through opinion polls, etc.)[8], and since this consequence is absurd, we must abandon relativism.

This objection is a threat to (A), not (B). The assertion of (B) provides merely a necessary condition for moral rightness, not a necessary and sufficient condition. (B) may be subject to criticism, but it cannot be dismissed as easily as (A).

Nevertheless, (B) is a standard reading of the claim that morality depends on cultural norms. Moreover, (B) is more acceptable than (A). Therefore, fairness requires that in interpreting the claim that "what is right for a person depends on the approvals of his society," we prefer reading (B) over (A). If we do so, the well-known criticisms by philosophers of the view that relativism entails toleration do not apply. Some might disagree with all this and respond that relativists mostly express their view in a way that is closer to reading (A) than to (B).[9] We cannot be faulted for holding that if we wish to be entirely faithful to the author's text in understanding their meaning, we are entitled to understand relativism according to (A) or something similar. Any criticism that refutes (A) is fair to use against relativism.

This response rests on the mistaken assumption that we must always consider the author's own formulations. The principle of charity[10] requires that we sometimes disregard an author's formulations and focus on the more logical content latent within them. In a familiar example, utilitarians sometimes speak as if their theory is the doctrine of "the greatest good for the greatest number." Philosophers agree that this is a poor formulation of utilitarianism[11]. But they also agree that if a better formulation of it is provided, it is shielded from criticism, and fairness requires that in interpreting utilitarianism, we take one of these better formulations as our basis. In the same vein, fairness dictates that in interpreting relativism, we prefer (B) over (A).

Let us return to the argument designed to derive toleration from relativism. According to this argument, relativism implies that we cannot impose our own morality on people of other cultures, which means [the necessity of] refraining from doing so. But refraining from doing this is precisely toleration. Therefore, relativism obliges us to tolerate people of other cultures. Although this argument survives the usual criticisms of philosophers, it is a fallacious argument. The problem is that the phrase "imposing our morality[12]" is ambiguous. The statement that "we cannot impose our morality on people of other cultures" can have at least three meanings:

1- When speaking about other cultures, we cannot say: "They are obligated to perform action x" (where x is an action that people of our culture are obligated to perform) and speak with certainty of its truth.

2- We cannot compel people of another culture to comply with a moral demand merely because it is what the people of our culture want, simply for the reason that it is what the people of our culture want.

3- We cannot make people of another culture victims of our morality.

How do we make someone a victim of our morality? We do so whenever, as a result of our own moral views, we harm an innocent person. This can be clarified by examining our treatment of animals, who are frequently made victims of our morality. We not only harm them, but we do so because of our moral beliefs, which we consciously hold. As a clear example, most people think that killing animals for food is morally permissible. As a result [of this view], many animals are killed.

People often make other people victims of their own morality. In the seventeenth century, the Crimean Tatars thought it was morally permissible to enslave Russians and Cossacks. Therefore, they raided them annually and sold them as slaves throughout the Ottoman Empire[13]. Undoubtedly, some Tatars thought they were morally obligated, so to speak, "to do their part" in these raids. Thus, the Tatars did not actually enslave the Russians and Cossacks they raided in order to harm them; rather, they did so out of their moral beliefs. The Russians and Cossacks were not victims of the Tatars, but victims of their morality.

Now we can distinguish three readings of "imposition" from one another using the terms "imposition1," "imposition2," and "imposition3." For example, to say that we cannot impose3 our morality on others means to say that we cannot make others victims of our morality.

Let us return to the argument for toleration and examine it step by step:

(D) This means we should avoid imposing our morality on people of other cultures.

(E) Avoiding imposing our morality on others is the same as tolerating others.

(F) Therefore, relativism requires us to tolerate people of other cultures.

For (C) to be true, we must employ the first interpretation of "imposition." That is, we must read "imposition" as meaning "imposition1." Relativism says that moral truth is nothing over and above culture. Hence, although this means we cannot impose1 our morality on people of other cultures, it does not imply that we cannot do so in the second and third senses of the term. Think about it with reference to the Tatars. They might accept relativism and conclude that, due to the cultural differences between Tatars and Russians, the statement "We are obligated to raid and enslave people" is true, while the statement "Russians are obligated to raid and enslave people" is false. But this is merely to offer a viewpoint on the truth conditions of moral judgments. This does not logically or morally compel the Tatars to refrain from their raids. In other words, the Tatars can consistently accept relativism and thus agree that they cannot impose1 their morality on the Russians, while firmly maintaining that they can impose3 their morality on the Russians. Therefore, for premise (C) to be true, "imposition" must be read in the sense of "imposition1," and since (D) is the conclusion of (C), (D) must be interpreted in the same way.

When we examine (E), we must understand "imposition" not in the sense of "imposition1" but in the sense of "imposition2" and "imposition3." This is because toleration has nothing to do with success or failure in stating moral truths. Toleration entails avoiding various actions that interfere in people's lives. Even if we do not "impose1" our morality on others, we can perfectly well say that by "imposing3" our morality on them, we are intolerant toward them. It can reasonably be said that by not imposing our morality on others, we have tolerated them, where here "imposition" must mean "imposition2" and "imposition3."

بنابراین استدلال [به سودِ] مدارا چنین می‌شود:

(C´) اگر نسبی‌گرایی درست باشد ما نمی‌توانیم اخلاقیات خود را به مردم فرهنگ‌های دیگر تحمیل1 کنیم

(D´) بنابراین ما باید از تحمیل1 اخلاقیاتمان به مردم دیگر فرهنگ‌ها خودداری کنیم.

(E´) خودداری از تحمیل2 و تحمیل3 اخلاقیاتمان به دیگران به معنای مدارا کردن با آن‌هاست.

(F) بنابراین نسبی‌گرایی ما را به مدارای با مردم سایر فرهنگ‌ها ملزم می‌کند.

این استدلال نامعتبر است. (در حقیقت حتی اولین مرحله استدلال یعنی حرکت از (C´) به (D´) نامعتبر است اما از آن چشم‌پوشی می‌کنم). (C´) و (D´) با تحمیل1 اخلاقیات ما به دیگران ارتباط دارند اما (E´) با تحمیل2 و تحمیل3 مربوط‌اند. نتیجه، استدلالی مغالطه آمیز به این شکل است که:

اگر نسبی‌گرایی صادق باشد، نمی‌توانیم X را انجام دهیم، یعنی باید از انجام X خودداری کنیم. خودداری از Y و Z همان مدارا است. بنابراین، نسبی‌گرایی ما را ملزم به مدارا می‌کند.

نتیجه این‌که هیچ دلیلی مبنی بر اینکه نسبی‌گرایی باعث ضمانت مدارا می‌شود برای ما فراهم نشده است. نسبی‌گرایی به این معنی است که انواع احکام اخلاقی را نمی‌توان به شکلی واقعی، نسبت به فرهنگ‌های دیگر اعمال کرد، اما این با خط‌مشی مبتنی بر مدارا فاصله بسیار دارد. این امر اغلب به دلیل ابهام در عبارتِ "تحمیل اخلاق ما به دیگران" موردتوجه قرار نمی‌گیرد.

III

من دو پاسخ به مدعاهای سابق را بررسی خواهم کرد. اولین پاسخ این است که اگرچه نسبی‌گرایی مدارا را تضمین نمی‌کند اما نسبت به نا-نسبی‌گرایی ارجح است. چون برخلاف دومی بی‌مدارایی را تضمین نمی‌کند. مختصراً اینکه نسبی‌گرایی جذاب‌تر است، چون مقابل آن یعنی نا-نسبی‌گرایی[14] مستلزم بی‌مدارایی با دیگر فرهنگ‌هاست.

این پاسخ اشتباه است. نا-نسبی‌گرایی تنها با نسبی‌گرایی اخلاقی که مجموعه‌ای از نظریه‌ها که شامل نسبی-گرایی فرهنگی است، مخالف است و با مدارا مشکلی ندارد. درواقع بسیاری از نا-نسبی‌گرایان این گزاره را که: "مدارا با دیگران اخلاقاً درست است" فرا فرهنگی می‌دانند.

برخی نسبی‌گرایان منکر این نگاه هستند و چنین استدلال می‌کنند:

(G) نا-نسبی‌گرایی به این معناست که برخی اعمال را به شکلی غیرِ-نسبی نادرست بدانیم و نادرستی‌شان را تابعی از هنجارهای فرهنگی ندانیم. آن اعمال را x، y و z بخوانید.

(H) اما اگر براین باور باشیم که x، y وz به این شکل نادرست‌اند، به باور دیگری ملزم می‌شویم که می‌گوید باید در هر فرهنگی که x، y وz را انجام می‌دهد، دخالت کنیم.

(I) اما این شکل از دخالت کردن، همان بی‌مدارایی است.

(J) بنابراین اگر نا-نسبی‌گرایی را بپذیریم، ملزم به بی‌مدارایی با فرهنگ‌های دیگر، به‌ویژه فرهنگ‌هایی که x، y و z را انجام می‌دهند می‌شویم.

این استدلال در مرحله (H) نادرست است. این دیدگاه که x به شکلی غیر-نسبی نادرست است، مستلزم این نیست که ما موظف به دخالت درx هستیم. می‌توانیم دیدگاه اول را بپذیریم و دومی را خیر. به‌بیان‌دیگر نا-نسبی‌گرایی با داشتن چنین نظریه‌ای سازگار است:

می‌بایست در عمل x دخالت کنیم اگر: الف) x به شکلی جدی خود آیینی شخص را نقض کند یا متضمن درد و رنج معتنابه‌ای شود، ب) عمل x در دفاع از شخصی بی‌گناهِ در معرضِ آسیب نباشد و پ) مداخله ما محتملاً آسیب‌های x را دفع کند ( آن‌هایی که در الف آمد).

Some challenge this theory, saying that it needs, above all, clarification and revision. For our purposes, none of this is relevant. The important point is that the above statement is compatible with non-relativism. Nevertheless, someone who has willingly accepted it will rarely interfere in the behavior of others, even if they think that behavior is wrong. Perhaps a person will sometimes interfere in the affairs of others—for instance, when they commit child abuse, racial discrimination, and the like. But interference in such cases is not an instance of intolerance, at least not in a form that would be considered a vice. This is a noteworthy point, because someone who advocates (J) certainly has a vice in mind when speaking of "being intolerant." If they do not, their argument against non-relativism fails.[15]

The next response to the claims of the second part is that although relativism does not logically guarantee tolerance, it certainly leads to tolerance—in the sense that anyone who believes that morality is culture-dependent will surely have an "open mind[16]" toward other cultures and lifestyles.

The core idea here is that, as a psychological fact, belief in relativism usually leads to tolerance. I have three observations about this view. First, until this claim is supported by empirical research, it is a piece of armchair psychology,[17] and as far as I know, it lacks such support. Second, this cannot make relativism more commendable than non-relativism unless: a) the "tolerance" being discussed is genuine tolerance, not [an act of] indifference or smugness, and b) evidence is provided showing that no other acceptable form of non-relativism exists that possesses this important characteristic—that belief in it fosters [a spirit of] tolerance. But such reasons and evidence do not exist, just as there are various types of non-relativism (such as the Golden Rule) that prescribe the way of tolerance. Third, although I cannot decisively refute the above view, I find it dubious, and not merely on a priori grounds. I will not dwell on this and will simply conclude this article with one piece of empirical evidence that fuels my doubt. I recall the following quotation from a famous (or rather, infamous) relativist whose ethical theory did not cause him to develop an "open" view toward others.

Relativism is a simple fact... Everything I have said and done in these recent years [has been based on] relativism... If relativism signifies contempt for fixed categories and men who claim to possess an eternal objective truth... then there is nothing more relativistic than the fascist attitude and actions... From the fact that all ideologies are of equal value... the modern relativist infers that everyone has the right to create his own ideology and to attempt to enforce it with all the energy of which he is capable.[18]

Benito Mussolini

[1] . This is a translation of the article "Cultural Relativism and Toleration" by John Tilley, professor at Indiana University. Source: LYCEUM, Volume VI, No. 1, Spring 1994. Translator

[2]. Tolerance

[3] . Two examples of these: Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), 278; and Melville Herskovits, Man and His Works (New York: Knopf, 1948), 76, 78

[4]. Ralative

[5]. Impose

[6] . See F. Feldman, Introductory Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), 171; R. L. Holmes, Basic Moral Philosophy (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1993), 37; and P. Schmidt, "Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism," Journal of Philosophy 52 (1955), 786.

[7]. Natural readings

[8]. See Andrew E. J. Oldenquist, Moral Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978).

[9]. An example is M. Herskovits's Cultural Relativism (New York: Vintage, 1973).

[10]. Principle of charity

[11]. For an example of this weak formulation, see the introduction to J. Bentham's A Fragment on Government (many editions). For a criticism of it, see Feldman, Introductory Ethics, p. 27. In brief, the criticism is that if utilitarianism is formulated as stated, it requires us to maximize two independent variables, namely: utility and all the individuals who benefit.

[12]. Impose our morality

[13]. For a brief description of this practice and an indication of why it was morally permissible among the Tatars, see O. Subtelny, Ukraine: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 106–9.

[14]. Non-relativism

[15]. This creates problems for premise (I) in the argument above (and also other problems for relativists who employ this argument), but I will overlook them.

[16]. hands off

[17]. "Armchair psychology" is a pejorative term indicating a type of psychological research that lacks citation and reliance on empirical findings, and for this reason lacks rigor and validity. These objections are mainly raised by proponents of experimental psychology, which focuses on data obtained from laboratory procedures or controlled forms of observation and measurement. A similar ironic expression exists regarding philosophers whose philosophy is solely/mostly based on personal introspection/experiences/intuitions; this objection is also mostly raised by advocates of experimental philosophy. —Translator

[18]. Quoted from H. B. Veatch, Rational Man (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), 41. He cites a speech by Mussolini as the original source. (I do not claim that Mussolini was committed to exactly the form of relativism I have discussed. But I do not think this matters for my purpose in citing the quotation. The difference between cultural relativism and Mussolini-style relativism is not such that we should expect very different psychological effects from the two.)

John Tilley's Article "Cultural Relativism and Toleration"

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