Cultural and Ethical Relativism

Ethical relativism usually makes three claims: morality changes, it is subjective and individual. Thus, for the relativist, morality changes over time. Also, nothing is inherently good or bad; it is our thoughts that make something good or bad. Morality is individual, meaning it differs for each person. Ethical absolutism holds that there are unchanging, objective, and universal moral principles. In the following, we will critique cultural relativism, a position favored by ethical relativists.

Cultural Relativism

Cultural relativism claims that anthropologists and sociologists have found that ethical relativism is not merely a theory but an empirical fact. Different societies and cultures have different moral values. In Eskimo culture, killing the elderly is morally permissible. But in America, this act is immoral. Many such examples of differences can be found.

Descartes, in his Meditations, notes that there is no idea so strange that no philosopher has seriously considered it. Similarly, it can be said that there is no act so strange that at least one society has not permitted it. For example, genocide or cannibalism.

Cultural relativism holds that anyone who thinks moral values are not determined relative to cultures is simply ignoring the existing realities of different cultures.

To grasp the logical fallacy of this argument, we must look at its unstated premise. This premise is as follows: moral rightness means conforming to the values present in each person's culture. In other words, for them, the right thing to do is always to follow the values of your own culture. Only if we accept this premise can we conclude that moral right and wrong differ across cultures, or that what is right in one culture is wrong in another. But this premise actually assumes the very thing cultural relativism is supposed to prove. The ethical absolutist disagrees with the idea that following cultural values is always the right thing to do.

The ethical absolutist has a cross-cultural standard by which they can critique all the values within a culture. This is why the ethical absolutist can be progressive and radical, while the relativist can only be conservative regarding the status quo, as they have no standard beyond their own culture. Only the ethical absolutist can say to Hitler or Saddam Hussein, "You and your entire social order are wrong, criminal, and deserve to be destroyed." The ethical relativist can only say, "Everyone has an opinion, and I hate your opinion and prefer my own, that's all."

The second logical mistake of proponents of cultural relativism in ethics is an ambiguity in the use of "values." The ethical absolutist distinguishes between subjective opinions about values and objective, correct values. Just as they distinguish between subjective opinions and objective facts about God, the afterlife, happiness, numbers, and beauty. It may be difficult or impossible to prove some of these mentioned things, to attain certainty about them, or to gain knowledge of all of them. But this does not mean they are unreal.

The main ambiguity in the cultural relativist's argument lies between values and opinions about values. Different cultures may have different opinions about what is morally valuable and what is not, just as they may disagree about what happens after death. But this does not mean that what is truly right in one culture is truly wrong in another, just as people in different cultures believing that different things happen to them after death does not mean that all those things actually happen after death. If a person merely believes that hell does not exist, it does not prove that hell does not exist and that they will not go there. If that were truly the case, the simplest and best way to salvation would be simply to stop believing in hell. Likewise, because a Nazi thinks genocide is right does not prove that genocide is right, unless the only thing that can tell us something is good or bad is our thinking. Thus, the relativist's conclusion is already present in its presupposition: that our thinking makes something good or bad. This is the second fallacy of this approach.

There is another problem with the cultural relativist's argument. It seems that cultural relativism possesses every weakness an argument can have. This approach does not even correctly state the facts it intends to address. In reality, cultures are not entirely different in terms of values, even if we equate value with the point of view about values. There has never been a culture that believed or taught what Nietzsche desired: to re-evaluate all values. There have been differences in emphasis; for example, our ancestors valued courage more than we do, while we value compassion more than they did. But there has never been anything substantiating the cultural relativist's claim. Try to imagine a society where justice, honesty, courage, wisdom, hope, and self-control are considered moral evils. At the same time, boundless selfishness, cowardice, lying, betrayal, addiction, and despair are considered moral values.

Such a society cannot be found on earth. The only society that could be like this is the society of hell. Of course, there are differences regarding values between cultures. But behind the disagreements over lesser values, there is always agreement on the fundamental principles of morality.

Behind the disagreement over the application of values in different circumstances – for example, whether the death penalty should exist or not – there is always agreement on values – for example, murder is bad because human life is good. Disagreement between cultures and individuals is only possible if there are deeper moral agreements based on shared moral presuppositions. The relationship of moral values to cultural laws is like the relationship of concepts to words. When you go to a foreign country, you are initially shocked. The language they speak is completely different. But behind these different words, you find common concepts. And this is what makes translation from one language to another possible. Similarly, behind different social laws, there are common moral laws.

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Cultural Relativism and Ethics

Peter John Kreeft is a professor of philosophy at Boston College. His writings are mostly in the fields of philosophy of religion, theology, and apologetics.

Translation: Zuhair Bagheri No'parast

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