A Critique of Moral Realism: Christine Korsgaard and an Ethics Based on Practical Reason

Moral philosophy has faced two challenges. First, explaining moral obligation; second, defining moral terms. Philosophers like John Hobbes considered morality a kind of social contract. But the problem is that this view of morality cannot explain moral obligation—that is, it cannot explain to us why, if morality is merely a kind of social contract, we should obey this morality. At the opposite pole were figures like Samuel Clarke, who said that we can only speak of moral obligation when an action is intrinsically or essentially right. Hobbes's problem, from Clarke's perspective, was that he thought the obligatoriness of a good action was imposed from outside—outside the person himself—by a sovereign. That is, Clarke says that the only factor that might make us perform a moral duty is that the action itself is essentially such that we perform it, but Hobbes's emphasis was on the social contract and that a sovereign enforces that social contract, and therefore obeying that contract becomes morally obligatory.

On the other hand, some in ethics have tried to define moral values with the help of natural concepts. For example, utilitarians try to explain the concept of good, which is a moral concept, with the help of natural concepts like pleasure or pain. But G. E. Moore criticizes this type of view that identifies the concept of good with natural concepts. He says that moral concepts cannot be defined by natural concepts. For instance, suppose someone says that the criterion for an action's being moral depends on the amount of pleasure it produces for the greatest number of people. We can say that, for example, if someone performs such-and-such an action or actions, it brings about the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people; we have no doubt about this. But I can still ask: is this action good? Is there a reason for me to consider this action good because it produces pleasure? Since we can—that is, it is logically clear that there is no problem—ask, "Is such an action, which the utilitarian says is good, good?" That is, we can ask, "Is the increase of pleasure identical with being good?" It is clear that being good is not identical with pleasure or other natural kinds. Therefore, it is clear that "good" is not identical with "increase of pleasure" or any other natural concept we might employ. That is, they are not equivalent.

After raising this criticism, G. E. Moore says that "good" is indefinable. The indefinability of "good" can have two consequences: one is to say it is indefinable because "good" is an unanalyzable property that we can grasp through moral perception, or the other way is that the concept of "good" is indefinable simply because it refers to nothing; in other words, it is meaningless. G. E. Moore chose the first path, but the logical empiricists chose the second option. In their view, only sentences that are verifiable are meaningful, and since moral sentences are not verifiable, they are therefore not meaningful either.

The verification theory of meaning for sentences—and logical empiricism in general—no longer has much support in philosophy, and we might perhaps say it is dead. Yet their approach has left a lingering effect that, according to Christine Korsgaard, influences our thinking about meaningful concepts. Under the influence of the logical empiricists, we still believe that meaningful concepts describe reality. Whereas some of the concepts we use are not like this. Not all the meaningful concepts we use describe reality. For example, when I use the concept of a tree, the meaningfulness of the concept of a tree depends on the existence of trees that exist outside my mind.

Some concepts, such as good or beautiful, are meaningful, and we can say, for example: "Truth-telling is good" is correct. But the concept of "good" does not describe a phenomenon in the external world in the way that the concept of "tree" describes a phenomenon in the external world. To better clarify the difference between moral and practical concepts, Korsgaard examines the view of Bernard Williams, the English philosopher. In Williams's view, scientific theories, with all their shortcomings, are maps of the natural world and describe the world as it is. But ethics is not a map of the moral world, and the function of ethics and ethical sentences or concepts is not to describe the moral world. Because an independent moral world without humans is meaningless and does not exist. Instead, Williams believes that ethics is a map of the social world. Since every culture has relatively different moralities, the ethical views of each culture represent the lifestyle of that culture. Korsgaard believes that this attitude toward ethics is mistaken. Because ethics is not a map; neither a map of the natural world nor a map of the social world.

In Korsgaard's view, the realist claims that the actions we perform have properties, for example, one action is good, another action is bad, and these properties are within the action itself, and the realist tries to provide us with a map of the moral world and make moral knowledge possible for us by finding the best map. The problem with the realist's "map" is that it leaves no room for action. The fact that we can perform different actions, for example, using a map, is itself an action. Acting is common to all humans. All humans have the capacity to act. But we cannot create a separate map and, according to that map, understand how we should act. Because in that case, there would have to be another map with the help of which we could understand how to use the map of acting. Therefore, if we want to introduce a map for acting, we are forced to define maps ad infinitum. That is, if I want to perform an action, I need a map based on which I know how to perform an action correctly. Then I must have another map that confirms this first map, that is, to make sure I am acting correctly, and so on ad infinitum. In other words, the capacity to act cannot be the application of knowledge of how to act. That is, we do not have a knowledge of "how to act," therefore the realist cannot explain to us how we have the capacity to perform actions.

Another problem for the realist is that they cannot explain the normativity of the instrumental principle. The instrumental principle means that to achieve an end, one must use the appropriate means or instrument. According to Korsgaard, the realist says that some rational principles, like the instrumental principle, are intrinsically good. But how can this approach make an individual follow such principles (like the instrumental principle)? Because the skeptic can say to the realist, if I don't want to be rational, who should I see about it! In fact, Korsgaard wants to show that the realist cannot overcome a skeptic for whom being rational is not important.

Another example Korsgaard examines is logic. Suppose we want to perform a modus ponens argument.

If today is a holiday, I will not go to work.

Today is a holiday.

Therefore, I will not go to work.

When we perform a modus ponens argument, the modus ponens itself is not seen within our reasoning, or in the premises of the argument we do not say that modus ponens is valid or that we want to use it; rather, logical arguments are practical principles that we employ. These principles are principles based on which we act when we reason; they are not normative truths that we apply in practice.

In other words, Korsgaard's response to the skeptic is that the instrumental principle is constitutive of practical reason. Practical reason is equivalent to rationality, according to the principles of practical reason, one of which is the instrumental principle. Therefore, the skeptic cannot ask why we must be rational according to the instrumental principle, because practical reason without the instrumental principle is not practical reason. Our clapping our two hands together is constitutive of clapping or applauding. The skeptic cannot ask why, in order to clap, we must bring our hands together. Clapping without our hands striking each other is not clapping.

What Korsgaard says about the instrumental principle also holds true for moral principles. The realist says that there are independent facts based on which we can determine principles. For example, when the realist says good means pleasure, they are defining a moral fact, and the principle derived from it is that an action that increases pleasure is a good action. But we can, like the skeptic, ask the realist: why should we increase pleasure?

In Korsgaard's view, in ethics we are faced with problems of practical reason, and we must find solutions for them through practical reason. This is while the realist seeks knowledge in order to apply it in action. Therefore, moral concepts are guides for practical reason. Moral concepts are names for the problems of practical reason, not things that refer to objects in the external world. Korsgaard locates moral philosophy in the realm of practical reason, whereas the realist locates it in the realm of theoretical reason. The moral principles that arise in practical reason include the instrumental principle, the principle of prudence, and the categorical imperative. The instrumental principle says we must choose the appropriate means or instrument to achieve an end. The principle of prudence says choose the end that is best for you, and one form of the categorical imperative is to act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. Therefore, for a moral judgment to be correct, it is sufficient that it follows these principles. Since these principles are laws that a rational person chooses for themselves, moral truths are not independent of the person. These principles are, in fact, standards for rational action and morality. Following Kant, Korsgaard says we must value our humanity. Valuing humanity is the condition that makes valuing anything possible at all, because we humans, through our rational capacity, value different phenomena. Therefore, the value of something depends on the rational capacities of humans. Hence, valuing our own humanity and that of others is a condition of rationality. By criticizing realists in moral philosophy, Korsgaard introduces her alternative solution, a solution based on practical reason.

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A Critique of Moral Realism: Christine Korsgaard and an Ethics Based on Practical Reason

Zohair Bagheri No’parast

Source:

Korsgaard, C. M. (2008). The constitution of agency: Essays on practical reason and moral psychology. Oxford University Press, USA.

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