Gerald Lang's Article 'Moral Relativism and Cultural Chauvinism'

There are various views on moral relativism. Some consider it an overdue and invigorating antidote to imperialism and cultural arrogance. Others see it as a self-defeating and hesitant gesture toward cultural fairness and justice. The typically heated and fraught nature of these issues indicates that many of us are ambivalent about them. We may be unable to decide between two fronts: while we may detest imperialism and cultural chauvinism, we may also hold weighty moral commitments that we believe apply beyond the cultural and political boundaries with which we are in direct contact. What seems undeniable is that mud-slinging and harassment are obstacles to precise and meticulous thinking. The prospects of relativism must be discussed in a more realistic manner.

This article intends to make a small contribution to that difficult task. My aim is to clarify what moral relativism is and then critically examine some of its supposed advantages; particularly the suggestion that relativism's advantage is that it avoids cultural chauvinism.

Defining Moral Relativism

According to moral relativism, moral judgments are dependent on their "time and place." Moral relativism is the view that makes the application of moral claims dependent on societies, cultures, or ways of life. Several points about this definition are worth examining. First, what is meant by "application"? The relativist provides a two-part answer. First, and uncontroversially, it must be said that there are limiting conditions for moral decision-making. In some circumstances or situations, moral judgments are meaningless, out of place, or fail to achieve their purpose. Second, the limiting conditions for moral decision-making are cultural in character.

Relativism does not deny the obvious fact that cross-cultural moral judgments are advanced. It does not deny that other cultural customs may seem a perfectly suitable candidate for moral evaluation. But it denies that the judgments we make about other cultures have their usual force. Relativism says that each culture is answerable only to its own standards; therefore, an outsider's judgment about a foreign culture has stepped into a realm beyond the force of moral judgments. So, relativism goes beyond the idea that moral judgments do not function well outside their own context and claims that the export of moral judgments is generally impermissible.

The second point in my definition of relativism concerns the societies, cultures, and ways of life in which, according to relativism, moral judgments apply. If relativism is to have critical substance or force, it must be in a position to demarcate the cultures against which moral judgments are supposed to be relative. We must know where one culture ends and another begins so that we can determine whether the claims and judgments in question truly apply or not. This requirement itself leads to very difficult questions, questions about how the unique characteristics of relevant lifestyles or cultures can be isolated and identified. We are forced to answer questions such as: Who are "we"? Who are "they"? When we address these questions from the philosopher's "armchair," they seem very difficult.

Of course, there are criteria for demarcating cultures that the philosopher can borrow from the historian or anthropologist. These criteria include geographical boundaries, political history, shared language, and religion. Moreover, these criteria often coincide in non-accidental ways. For the sake of argument, let us assume that the relativist can cobble together rough but workable criteria for cultural demarcation. There will still be some grey areas or porous cultural boundaries to grapple with, but relativists will protest that their project is not, more or less, hopelessly indeterminate. Relativists may or may not be right to be so optimistic, but there are other philosophical issues ahead that I intend to explore.

Relativism and Moral Diversity

What is the appeal of relativism? What makes it an attractive doctrine? One advantage of relativism that immediately springs to mind is that it can explain the formation of human moral codes better than non-relativist theories. Relativism, in particular, seems able to accommodate the radical cultural diversity that exists among societies and cultures.

There is undoubtedly great diversity in moral codes, and it is also undoubtedly true that this moral diversity is produced within broader cultural differences. Typically, an upper-middle-class upbringing in Victorian Britain yields outcomes with starkly different moral commitments than the typical upbringings produced by the Samurai culture of medieval Japan, ancient Roman culture, or Californian hippie groups of the 1960s. Relativists can say that the best explanation for this moral difference is the cultural or social origin of moral beliefs. As J. L. Mackie puts it: "For explaining actual differences in moral codes, using the hypothesis that these differences reflect ways of life is far better than the other hypothesis, which sees them as expressions of perceptions; perceptions of objective values, most of which are seriously inadequate and badly distorted." (Mackie, p. 37)

Finding a Place for the Norm

Even if the explanatory picture presented above were not very problematic, this defense of relativism is incomplete because nothing has yet been said about moral justification. If the claim that "our moral beliefs are merely a function of the contingent circumstances or features of our upbringing, or the unique characteristics of the culture in which we were raised" were true, the conclusion that our beliefs are morally acceptable would not follow. Nor would it demonstrate that they are justified. Relativism, like other philosophical theories about morality, concerns itself with how people "ought" to think or how they "ought" to behave. The need to properly examine the moral "ought" is what makes relativism a normative theory.

The normative nature of relativism becomes apparent if I make an ill-considered judgment in condemning the practices of another culture. Relativism would correct me. Relativists would tell me that I should not think that people of another culture are morally accountable to me.

But the fact that relativism must be considered a normative theory should be consistent with what most people perceive as its thoroughgoing tolerance: this rests on the idea that relativism accepts any moral rule as long as that rule can be linked to the culture that upholds it. I will now elaborate further on this issue.

"This is how it is here, this is how we do things here"

Consider two individuals, A and B, having a moral debate about female circumcision. A, who is a relativist, wishes to defend the practice of female circumcision in cultures where it is prevalent. B, who is not a relativist, voices the usual objections to it: female circumcision causes physical harm to women, prevents them from experiencing sexual pleasure, thereby pathologizes female sexuality, and so on. Moreover, B says that because this practice is carried out in another culture, the objections to female circumcision do not lose their moral force. For A, this is of no importance or relevance.

Now, what will A say in response? Initially, he might offer this reply: Well, that is what they firmly believe. At this juncture, B will immediately level the charge that the point at issue was what they ought to believe. A, as a seasoned relativist, must take this point into account, for otherwise he has failed to grasp the inherently normative nature of moral philosophy.

Can A do this? Yes. He can argue that moral justifications must come to an end somewhere. He might point out that B's reference to what people do and what they ought to do is of no help to him. For, eventually, what they do and what they ought to do must be connected. A likely and general feature of moral justification, according to A, is that the final terminus of moral justification is expressed in the phrase: "This is how we do things around here."

Relativism: Some Merits

When relativism is equipped with this type of moral justification, it reappears with a set of attractive features.

First, if, as was said earlier, there is a gap between what we do and what we ought to do, this gap must be bridged somehow. The chain of justifications for our moral beliefs must come to an end sooner or later. And the final station chosen by relativism for moral justifications aligns with deep facts about the diversity of human moral experience. This seems to be among its advantages.

Second, another merit of relativism is that it shows that most conscientious moral agents and reasonable, upright people across different times and cultures have not been hopelessly mistaken about their moral beliefs. Relativism offers us a way to avoid accusing members of cultures and societies that differ greatly from us. Do we really want to condemn the medieval Japanese Samurai for their commitment to values and customs that were very different from ours? Is it not chauvinistic if we think we know better than them? Have we not implicitly accepted the prior and objectionable assumption that our culture is better or more rational than theirs? And is the fact, based on mere luck, that we are alive and they are not, the only reason by which we can escape the charge of chauvinism in evaluating other societies and cultures?

Third, the final station of justification specified by the relativist—"This is how we do things around here"—contains the idea that we can only act and think from where we are situated and as we have been shaped. Hilary Putnam expressed this point by saying that we can only proceed on the basis of our own beliefs (Putnam, p. 161). We cannot step outside ourselves to assess whether we are on the right track. If so, relativism deserves to be considered a reasonable and humane doctrine, not an unsupported view indifferent to differences that some followers of popular thought would have us accept.

Moral Chauvinism and Moral Complacency

Let us take a closer look at the second and third merits. These merits are, first, the claim that relativism avoids cultural chauvinism, and second, the claim that relativist justification reflects the fact that we can only proceed on the basis of our own beliefs. I will examine these two in turn.

First, the charge of chauvinism. Non-relativists may offer a two-part response to it. First, that moral judgments, when sincerely expressed, aim to be true. This is a familiar and entirely general aspect of our moral experience. Even our struggles over highly complex or controversial moral issues—abortion, social justice, genetic engineering, animal rights—are struggles to arrive at a correct view on these matters.

In other words, our moral judgments express beliefs, not attitudes or inclinations. When I say that female circumcision is wrong, I am not merely expressing a "negative attitude" towards it. I am expressing the belief that female circumcision is wrong. Similarly, when I say that the earth is round, I am not expressing a "positive attitude" towards the proposition that the earth is round. I am expressing the belief that the earth is round. If the earth is in fact flat, or if female circumcision is in fact right, my moral judgments are false, and I should abandon these beliefs if these facts are explained to me.

When we make moral judgments, we intend to arrive at the truth, but this should not lead us towards intolerance, inflexibility, self-righteousness, and complacency. Since there is always the possibility that a gap exists between what we consider to be the right and wrong answers to moral questions and what is actually right and wrong, the consequence of our commitment to finding the truth should be humility and circumspection, not intolerance, arrogance, or stubbornness. When the remark, "I hear you have strong political views," was made to the historian A. J. P. Taylor, he replied, "No, extreme beliefs weakly held." There is no necessary contradiction in the combination of conviction and open-mindedness.

Now, in the second part of the response, my intention is to arrive at the truth in moral judgments; I do not claim, as part of the argument for the truth of those moral judgments, that I am superior to you or that I belong to a culture that is superior to yours. What I am saying is this: these customs or practices are wrong, and these are my reasons for believing them to be wrong. If it turns out that these customs or practices are also occurring in my own culture, my verdict will be equally severe. (If it is not, I will rightly deserve the charge of inconsistency or hypocrisy.)

Undoubtedly, it is often the case that chauvinistic thoughts explain, or at least accompany, instances of cross-cultural moral condemnation. This does not necessarily mean that chauvinism is an aspect of cross-cultural moral condemnation. We must be aware of such self-regarding behavior and condemn it whenever it occurs. But when relativism insists on a blanket prohibition of cross-cultural moral exchange, it reveals itself to be overly dogmatic. By placing cross-cultural moral judgments beyond reach, the possibility of chauvinism increases. Instead of embracing relativism, we should be prepared to examine signs of chauvinism and self-righteousness on a case-by-case basis.

Such an approach can mitigate the severity of chauvinism. Now let us discuss the point that we can only proceed based on our own view. This claim can, in fact, be considered in two ways. One way is revealed by Putnam's subsequent questions: Whom are we supposed to follow? Another person? The idea here is that if we consider that we are generally engaged in judging, then we must accept responsibility for those judgments. Such tasks cannot be delegated to other people.

The claim of relativism goes beyond this idea. Relativism tells us that the reason we should be content to act according to our own desire is that it is based on our own belief. But does relativism not seem chauvinistic or self-satisfied in this case? If we reject relativism, the problem of finding a resting place for the moral “ought” will remain. But this problem cannot be solved by old means. If there are obvious defects in relativism or ambiguities lurking within it, the situation is worse. We must go back to the drawing board and grapple with the problem in another way.

Historical and Moral Parochialism

There has long been a suspicion that relativism enables one to avoid naive historical moral judgments, and this is a reason for people’s attachment to it. Consider this argument:

• 1)      Laws regarding equal opportunities should be enforced.
• 2)      The force of a moral judgment is not inherently dependent on a “particular time and place.”
• 3)      Therefore, the Emperor Nero ought to have implemented equal opportunity laws.

For the sake of this argument, let us imagine that we agree with number one. (If you do not agree, think of another example.) The non-relativist is not going to argue with number two. (Although, as we shall see, he can sometimes disagree with it). As a result, must the non-relativist accept number three? It seems strange or even naive to suggest that Nero ought to have enacted such policies. This will lead to questions about number two. Perhaps equal opportunity laws are “for a particular time and place.”

But the non-relativist can reject number three by rejecting the relativist’s interpretation of number two. It is clear that equal opportunity laws are only meaningful within a moral framework that is broadly liberal. In other words, a commitment to equal opportunity laws is the end of the line of many more fundamental moral commitments that must have emerged before the commencement of such laws leads to an intelligent point. This does not mean that the moral force of equal opportunity laws depends on a particular “time and place.” It means that a great deal of moral work had to be done before equal opportunity laws could seem an intelligent and workable idea. In other words, the point is that in one sense equal opportunity laws are dependent on time and place, but this is not a sense that can support relativism. It is merely a point about moral priorities. One cannot run before one can walk.

Moral Truth and Blame

The final point I will address is the issue of blame. It seems wrong to blame people of other cultures for beliefs and practices that seem objectionable or even abhorrent by our standards. This is because they may not have had the opportunity to reflect on their beliefs and practices in a way that would set them on the path to truth. After all, it is easy for us now to condemn child labor, slavery, human sacrifice, and the denial of the right to vote. What might be challenging for us? But for earlier thinkers, perhaps the effort and sacrifice required to confront unpleasant realities and the benefits derived from those realities was a Herculean task. Another possibility is that the cultural and psychological makeup of these people was such that it was simply impossible for them to even conceive of certain choices. The non-relativist can and should accept these points. These matters must be addressed in a way that does not push us back toward relativism simply by placing great emphasis on the rightness or wrongness of a belief or practice, or on the question of whether it is right to blame the people who hold such beliefs or perform such practices.

Praise or blame of the inhabitants of other historical periods must be sensitive to the opportunities they had for discovering and applying moral matters in their own time. Perhaps for people living in societies very different from our own, arriving at the truth is very costly or perhaps impossible. It might therefore be odd to blame them, or worse, to look back and ridicule them. Perhaps some slave traders, Aztec priests, or feudal barons were, within the limited moral parameters available to them, morally admirable to a limited extent, just as they were admirable in many non-moral respects. We undoubtedly expect future generations to show us the same respect. For we too will most likely fail to arrive at the truth comprehensively. (We can only act on our own basis, remember?)

None of this suggests that there is no such thing as moral truth, nor does it obscure the claim that the inhabitants of those periods failed to arrive at the truth. In short, the impermissibility of a moral act or practice is only one of the factors that must be examined when considering the acceptable blame of members of other cultures. The costs and opportunities of moral reflection and action are equally important.

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Moral Relativism and Cultural Chauvinism

Gerald Lang (Professor of Philosophy, University of Leeds, England)

Translated by: Zuhair Bagheri No'parast

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