“Speak well; what matter if you speak late”: A response to Dr. Soroush Dabbagh’s critique

What compelled me, in this article, to write a response to Dr. Soroush Dabbagh’s recent critique of Dr. Ebrahimi Dinani’s book ‘Shu’a-ye Shams’ is a debt I owe, as a student, to ‘him in his capacity as a teacher.’

Dr. Dabbagh’s critique can be summarized, in brief, in this single clause: that Dr. Dinani, in the book ‘Shu’a-ye Shams,’ has committed glaring errors, and like his other works in the arena of written and spoken publication, employs an improvisational style; it is not recognized as a valuable work within the framework of a research and scientific project, yields no significant epistemological gain, and is a source of shame and regret for the country’s intellectual climate that such works are welcomed and that authors still have the audacity to present such low-quality writings. This humble student’s response, having studied ‘Shu’a-ye Shams,’ to his objections is presented in the form of several points, as detailed below.

1) ‘Shu’a-ye Shams’ never claimed to be a technical, scientific research project for such an expectation to be placed upon it. Rather, this work came into being within the space and environment of dialogue, and has taken on all the necessary appurtenances and constraints governing that space. This two-volume book is like a goblet filled in the presence of an Illuminationist philosopher and a mystic of spiritual disposition, and offered to the public. It is not a piece of research or investigation written in a library with a multitude of scientific sources, such that if shortcomings in benefiting from scientific sources were observed, it would merit such an unkind critique.

Rumi has long been a subject for researchers and scholars, and textual insights have abounded in other commentaries available on the market, holding no novelty for society. But this time, this book, in a novel manner and freed from conventional frameworks, has benefited from the insight and perspective of a profound philosopher for understanding Rumi’s passionate ghazals. Moreover, he himself did not undertake the effort of writing this work; rather, through the effort and request of Mr. Karim Feizi, this dialogue was convened, and ultimately the book ‘Shu’a-ye Shams’ was sent forth into the arena of knowledge and culture. What harm is there if, contrary to the common custom of most existing books which have silent lines and frozen words from which no fervor or love accrues to the soul, a different book enters the market that is of the same essence as Rumi’s own poetry, possesses an exhilarating quality, is free from conventional written constraints, and provides the general public—who often lack the opportunity for specialized entry into this space—with a new and profound understanding of Rumi in their leisure time?

The secret of his captivating charm for the general public of our country is that he is a philosopher of the people. Professor Dinani, unlike other philosophers and sages of the past and present, has not hidden himself from public view, nor has he distanced himself from the simple language of the people. Rather, with consummate mastery, solely to take a long and effective stride on the path of a simple, universally understandable exposition of Islamic philosophy and mysticism, he has, by arranging a program on domestic television under the title ‘Ma’refat’ (Knowledge), been a guest in the homes of the people’s intellect and heart for years. And in simple language, he sprinkles abundant drops from the celestial wines of philosophy and mysticism upon the souls of those thirsting for wisdom.

If you wish to critique ‘Shu’a-ye Shams’ and find fault with it on the grounds that it appears discordant within the framework of research projects, you must first turn to Rumi himself, who, in composing the Masnavi and the Divan-e Shams, cast what reckless disarray into the abode of his poems; for instance, in the midst of explicating a philosophical fable, his states suddenly transform, and he abandons the story half-finished and composes poetry of the pain of separation and the yearning for union. Or that in the arrangement of most verses, he does not observe the dignified organization of Persian poetry. Professor Dinani, too, in the course of a mystical dialogue, drawing from what he has tasted with heart and soul and what has brought his spirit to a boil and tumult with sublime knowledge, is himself another Rumi. And in expounding and explicating his ghazals, he sometimes speaks like an ecstatic mystic from the flood of the spirit, and sometimes, like a meticulous philosopher, elucidates the subtleties and truths present in the ghazals.

Just as you find no fault with Rumi and his bold, unmeasured verses, you should likewise not perceive such technical shortcomings in the words of his commentator, a philosopher and mystic by disposition—asking why, unlike other scholars and researchers, he is not devoid of the warmth of speech and soul-stirring ecstasies, and why, unlike others, he has not spoken with precision regarding sources and in the conventional style?

In this oral conversation, which was later turned into a book, Professor Dinani has appeared as a professor of philosophy who was asked to speak about Rumi, and not as a young researcher who has just set foot on the path of knowledge. And fundamentally, in this realm, the more one becomes a master, the more one becomes independent of the books of past thinkers, for one has new things to say and a novel design surges within one’s thoughts. And of course, with this maturity, certain deficiencies in quotation, arising from the failure of memory, may be observed in some places; yet these deficiencies, in the radiance of fresh and pure words, are hidden from fault-covering eyes. And one who overlooks these insignificant flaws deserves the praise and admiration of Hafiz Shirazi, who said: “Blessed be the pure, fault-covering gaze.”

Truly, such criticisms, oblivious to the context of the text’s genesis and the author’s dispositional states, carry no weight on the scales of knowledge and ethics.

2) Another objection that Dr. Dabbagh has raised regarding this book, which again stems from that same scholarly and research-oriented perspective, is the matter of the professor’s engagement with Hegel’s philosophy and the connection he has drawn between Rumi and Hegel. It is interesting that most of Dr. Soroush Dabbagh’s critiques are precisely the same objections that Mr. Feizi himself raised during the conversation with Professor Dinani, challenging the professor. And all of these questions and answers are honestly presented in the text of the book. In six segments of the conversation, Dr. Ebrahimi Dinani speaks of Hegel and considers him to have been influenced by Rumi. And in most of these instances, he is questioned and challenged by the interviewer, and he provides further explanations for his claim. In four of these six segments, he has either said that the spirit and content of Hegel’s philosophy are derived from Rumi’s poetry, or he has spoken of certain important ideas of Hegel that come from Rumi. {Volume One; page 106, Volume One; page 418, Volume Two; page 39, Volume Two; page 401}. And in one instance, although he considers all of Hegel’s philosophy to be from Rumi’s ghazals, he immediately expresses doubt in his own words and considers only the quintessence and the governing spirit of Hegel’s philosophy to be derived from Rumi’s worldview. {Volume One; page 417} And only in one instance on this matter has he spoken in absolute terms. {Volume One; page 418}

When we consider all these statements together and then proceed to judge, firstly, Professor Dinani’s opinion becomes clear to us: that Hegel, as he himself has acknowledged, studied Rumi and learned his philosophy from him, and the governing spirit of Hegel’s worldview originates from Rumi; and secondly, we realize that all these utterances and judgments were formed and nourished within a verbal space, entangled with non-specialist literature and at times in contradiction with one another. Everyone has the right to critique this philosophical opinion of Professor Dinani and, in a reasoned manner, to challenge and question him—and indeed, such questioning, challenge, and scholarly rethinking are among the virtues of an academic community. However, in a critique, expressing regret for the country’s culture and academic atmosphere, and polluting the reasoned space of discourse with such aggressive, violent, ironic language devoid of accepted decorum, from a philosopher of ethics—one who has spent a lifetime in the company of the subject of ethics and has also produced fine works—is most unlikely and a cause for astonishment. In the marketplace of ideas, everyone has the right to speak as they have concluded in their own thinking and to expose their thoughts to public benefit and scholarly critique and questioning; and no one has the right to attack the thoughts of others and to discredit and humiliate them with such harsh expressions.

۳) One of the new principles accepted by contemporary philosophers is that “a text manifests itself differently to each person, and all understandings of a text are not necessarily identical, nor is any single understanding recognized as the final reading, and the way remains open for new understandings.” Based on this very general principle, there is no obstacle to a work on the exposition of Rumi being recognized as a “scholarly work worthy of public dissemination,” while at the same time not being identical to the understanding of others, including Dr. Soroush Dabbagh. That Dr. Dabbagh has written that Professor Dinani has made gross errors in understanding certain verses—of course, ethically, it would have been fitting for him to present his reasons after his claim and to offer his own understanding of Rumi’s poetry for the benefit of the audience. Yet this very kind of absolutist and dogmatic attitude, which seizes upon any divergence of another’s understanding from one’s own as a pretext for humiliation and belittlement, deems it unworthy of public dissemination, and considers its publication a kind of disrespect to the trees turned into paper, is itself in contradiction with a principle that contemporary philosophers and like-minded intellectuals have affirmed for years.

۴) Islamic philosophy, as a mature and independent wisdom, nourished in a religious context and a society interwoven with Islamic teachings and benefiting from the new horizons opened by religion, is permitted to enter the realm of mystical literature with the particular insight it has gained in understanding the world and humanity, and to contemplate it from this window as well, and to be granted magnificent triumphs. And Professor Dinani, as an Islamic philosopher well-versed in the philosophical treasures of East and West, is not deprived of this right.

۵) A final point: let us be mindful that the responsibility placed upon the shoulders of the people of the pen, which constantly impels them to sprinkle a draught of their thoughts upon the dry earth of today’s human science and culture and to leave behind flourishing gardens and orchards as their legacy—it is this very responsibility that compels us never to employ the customary aggressive literature in our critiques and other writings, and not to arrange phrases alongside one another in such a way that nothing but humiliation is inferred from them. Especially in this era, when scholarly writings are greatly contaminated by this bitter poison of violence, and the minds of sages and people of the pen are pained and wounded by one another.

And who is it that can refrain from distinguishing between scholarly discourse and human ethics and the praiseworthy kindnesses brimming with love, and in every scholarly address and speech, with such enchanting adornments, captivate the hearts of friends and create patterns full of flowers and fragrant herbs upon the hearts?

With greetings.

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Miraj Jamshidi | A response to Dr. Soroush Dabbagh’s critique | 18 May 2016

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