Dr. Seyyed Yahya Yathribi's Critique of Dr. Gholamhossein Ebrahimi Dinani

In the 37-page introduction to his book (from p. 7 to 43), Professor Dinani has spoken of everything and everywhere, but has said nothing of the necessary topics such as: philosophy, Peripatetic philosophy, the life, personality, and works of Ibn Rushd, defining the problem, the research objective, hypothesis, sources, method, the history of research, and dozens of other necessary points that should have been addressed in the introduction! In any case, after these mostly irrelevant matters, he enters the body of the book and has arranged the book into fourteen chapters. This collection has many flaws, including: 1– This book, like many of the professor's recent writings, is a non-technical collection that offers nothing to the reader. Because neither the overall content of the book is connected, nor the internal content of the book's chapters. Both the book and each individual chapter begin at a point, are dragged this way and that, and finally end without any conclusion! Without any doubt, if a PhD student, or even a master's student, had prepared such a writing as a thesis, if there were a serious professor and examiner in the defense session, it would be rejected! 2– Professor Dinani has not consulted the necessary sources. At the end of the book, to avoid having an empty bibliography page, he names about forty books, most of which are either unrelated to his discussion or are secondary sources. Irrelevant books such as: a – Some of his own books; like: The Names and Attributes of the Almighty, The Ray of Thought and Intuition... and The Philosopher's Prayer and General Rules of Philosophy. Obviously, these have nothing to do with the discussion of Ibn Rushd's brilliance in Peripatetic philosophy. b – Some of Ibn Rushd's own books, such as Bidāyat al-Mujtahid wa Nihāyat al-Muqtaṣid and Faṣl al-Maqāl, which are unrelated to the subject under discussion. c – Books by other individuals such as: Ibn Arabi's Futūḥāt, Assyrian Poetry and Thought, The Refusal of Thought by Aramesh Doustdar, Sabzevari's Asrār al-Ḥikam and his Sharḥ al-Manẓūmah, Mojtabai's Hindi and Arabic Grammar, Shatibi's al-Muwāfaqāt fī Uṣūl al-Sharīʿah, Sadra's Shawāhid, Albert Camus's The Plague, and several other books. None of these books contain anything about the brilliance of Ibn Rushd in Peripatetic philosophy. For example, what can be found in Ibn Arabi's Futūḥāt regarding Ibn Rushd's Peripateticism and his brilliance? And as for the secondary books, such as: the Philosophical Dictionary, the books of Majid Fakhry, Abed al-Jabri, Qumayr Yuhanna, and a few other books. Most interesting of all is that Ibn Rushd's brilliance and prominence are mostly related to his commentaries on Aristotle's works, and he is fundamentally known by the title “The Commentator,” but Professor Dinani has not studied his commentaries on Aristotle's works, which are very extensive and important, at all, and has not cited them in his sources! You yourself read the detailed account from this summary!

‏In any case, we begin the discussion of the first chapter: ‏The first chapter comprises 25 pages of material. Its title is: “The Radiance of the Thought of Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina in the Philosophical Works of the Western Middle Ages” (Dinani 84, p. 44). One expects that in this chapter, the works of Western thinkers who were influenced by Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd will be examined, and good, prominent examples of Ibn Rushd’s influence on those works will be presented. But alas, what has not been addressed in this chapter is precisely this influence of Ibn Rushd on the philosophical works of the Middle Ages! ‏The esteemed reader has the right not to believe my claim and to ask: Is such a thing even possible?! But a glance at the content of this chapter will attest to the truth of my assertion. Let us now examine this chapter page by page: ‏In the first two pages (Dinani: 44–45), Mr. Dinani raises the influence of Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina merely to the extent of the title itself, and quotes a passage from a book called “Greek Thought, Arabic Culture” indicating that the groundwork for the translation of the works of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd was laid by the emergence of certain events in the West, the most important of which was the rise of a new, middle class of lay teachers. Mr. Dinani considers the author of that book to be following the taste of Marxists because he links the translation of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd’s works to specific contexts, and to refute that taste, he turns to the translation of Greek works into Arabic, and subsequently digresses to the translation of Pahlavi works into Arabic (ibid., p. 46). He then brings up the influence of Iranians in the Abbasid Caliphate, then attacks Westerners for considering Greece the birthplace of philosophy and speaking less of ancient Persia! He then discusses Alexander’s invasion of Persia, the appropriation of Persian sciences, and the burning of Persian books, and then quotes from an Arabic book that Ibn Khaldun also confirmed that Persians paid attention to the rational sciences. Then comes the turn to praise Ibn Khaldun! (ibid.: 47–49). On the seventh page of the first chapter, that is, on page 50 of his book, by which point we have covered roughly one-third of the chapter, Mr. Dinani reaches the conclusion that the translation of Ibn Rushd’s works into Latin “was not dependent on a single, simple factor, and considering the inner rationality that is realized in history, it depends on a series of causes and factors”! ‏If one pays close attention, Mr. Dinani, up to this point—that is, in one-third of the chapter—has said nothing about “the radiance of the thoughts of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd in the philosophers of the Western Middle Ages,” which is the title of the chapter. The only thing mentioned as the result of this lengthy, yet at the same time vacuous and superficial, discussion is that translation is not the effect of a single factor but depends on many factors. Incidentally, this very point is quoted verbatim on the second page of this chapter from the book “Greek Thought, Arabic Culture.” The exact phrase from that book which Mr. Dinani quoted is this: the translation of the works of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd into Latin in the twelfth century AD “is the result of the emergence of events, the most important of which is considered to be the rise of a new, middle class of lay teachers.” Indeed, one-third of the chapter is without substance and, at the same time, irrelevant to the main issue! ‏Dinani himself has apparently realized this irrelevance, as he says on this page (Dinani: 50): “We are not now speaking about the causes and factors of this historical phenomenon, but examining its results and consequences is by no means irrelevant to the subject of this article.” But unfortunately, there is no discussion of the consequences either, so that at least the relevance of those consequences might become clear. ‏Although Mr. Dinani seemingly realizes he has not entered the main discussion, he nonetheless goes off on a tangent again, writing in broad generalities about the unkindness of Western thinkers and Jewish intellectuals in ignoring the role of Muslim philosophers (Dinani: 50–51). Then he turns to Ibn Rushd’s attention to Ghazali! Then he speaks of Ibn Rushd and Ibn Arabi’s familiarity with the thoughts of Ibn Sina (ibid.: 52), only to this extent and in the form of generalities! Then he quotes from an Arabic magazine that some Westerners have acknowledged the role of Muslims in the Middle Ages (ibid.: 53), and also quotes from that magazine that Ibn Rushd was excommunicated! (Dinani: 54).

Then, without citing a source, they have said that those familiar with Averroes's thought believed he had humanized the intellect. They then doubt the correctness of attributing this view to Averroes. Moreover, they consider the view of those who have introduced Averroes as paving the way for looking forward rather than backward to be an unjust attribution, "and such attributions originate from their own atheistic and positivistic way of thinking" (Dinani: 55). They then state the reason for their claim as follows: "Truth is not limited within the vessel of time, and its relation to the past and the future is the same" (ibid.). Mr. Dinani has overlooked the point that "Truth" differs from "humans' understanding of the truth"! Dinani, who himself has not grasped this matter due to unfamiliarity with modern Western thought, has accused Westerners of not having correctly understood Averroes! (ibid.: 55-56). We will explain this point further in the future. Mr. Dinani, like rambling speakers, occasionally remembers the main topic of his discussion and says something about it! On page 56, he says: At the beginning of the 13th century AD, the major works of Averroes were translated into Latin and dominated all European universities, and for several centuries Averroes was the epitome of philosophical rationality. Thus, the Islamic world became the intermediary for medieval Europe's acquaintance with Aristotle (Dinani: 56). Well, everyone knows this much! But based on which reason and citing which source? He refers to a second-rate source! (ibid.: 57) which contains nothing more than a general report. Namely, that Siger of Brabant, who was a follower of Averroes, was criticized by Aquinas, and that Aquinas discredits Averroes's interpretation of Aristotle's words! But nothing is mentioned about what Aristotle said, what Averroes understood, and what Aquinas says. Mr. Dinani quotes all these matters from the Persian translation of a book called Thought in the Middle Ages (Dinani: 57). He then enters into a discussion of Averroes's students and names a few of his students. Including his son, Judge Ahmad. He then adds that none of these were theorists (ibid.: 59). He then names Maimonides and Joseph ben Judah, who were influenced by Averroes (ibid.: 60). He then discusses Boethius, who lived six centuries before Averroes! Then he lumps all of these together as not having considered religion and philosophy separate; he considers them one, as if all of them were influenced by Averroes! He then presents Averroes's view on the function of the intellect with universals (which, as it happens, is exactly the opposite of his view)! (ibid.: 61–62). He then discusses the difference between rational and intuitive knowledge, noting that in some religions, religion and philosophy are not separate, such as Indian religions. And his source is Dr. Shayegan's book Mental Idols and Primordial Memory (ibid.: 63–64). He then notes that in ancient Iran, too, there was no gap between religion and philosophy. Suhrawardi considers Zoroaster both a sage and a prophet! And finally, he offers an opinion or quotes from somewhere, of course, without citing a source! He then continues that the peak of this matter, i.e., the unity of reason and myth, has emerged in Suhrawardi's numerous works. He then names Suhrawardi's treatises and addresses his allegorical works! (ibid.: 66–67). And there is no one to say: Sir, your discussion is about the reflection of the thoughts of Averroes and Avicenna in the philosophical works of the Middle Ages! Now, whether reason and myth are one or not, what does it have to do with your discussion? And then, is there anyone at all who would say: The result of rational proofs is the same as the content of myths? Does Suhrawardi hold such a belief?! Does expressing a matter through allegory and simile mean "the unity of reason and myth"?! Then, regarding the difference between the esoteric interpretation (ta'wil) of Averroes and Suhrawardi, he says that Averroes's ta'wil is based on reason. That is, the esoteric and interpretive meaning of the Quran also pertains to the domain of reason (ibid.: 67). Of course, this view is not exclusive to Averroes. Rather, the view of the Mu'tazila, al-Farabi, and Avicenna is nothing other than this. And, as it happens, Suhrawardi's view is also the same! As Dinani himself has also stated, the effort to reconcile reason and revelation is not a novel or unprecedented issue. "This issue has been raised since the time of al-Farabi and even long before him." And certainly, even before Islam, Jewish thinkers and others also addressed it!

He then points to the continuation of such efforts and their failure in the West, and thereafter provides a general and incomplete account of the conflict between Islamic philosophers and religious scholars. He then introduces the method of esoteric or symbolic discussion, stating that the religion of Islam is not incompatible with reason and its rulings; rather, it has always invited people to reflect! (Dinani: 70) Such vague statements are, firstly, things that anyone familiar with the basics of the discussion is already aware of, and discussing them is akin to stating the obvious! Secondly, they have absolutely no relevance to the subject of this chapter, namely Ibn Rushd's influence on medieval philosophy! Mr. Dinani then adds that a prerequisite for thinking and contemplating the beings of the world is knowing logic (ibid.: 70), and therefore learning a portion of the sciences of the ancients is essential and necessary (70). Dinani's reasoning is more interesting than his claim; expressed as follows: "Because if the gateway to the world of knowledge and the experience of the ancients is closed to man, he will forever remain in the abyss of ignorance and the pit of nescience"! (70) He then adds that Islam does not speak only through demonstration (burhan) but also uses rhetoric and dialectic. (70) This, too, is the content of verse 125 of Surah An-Nahl, which, besides being obvious and well-known, also has no relevance to Ibn Rushd's influence in the West! In any case, after reviewing the scattered, irrelevant, and fruitless contents of the first chapter piece by piece—which is also a sample of the other chapters—it is better to read the summary and conclusion of this chapter in Dinani's own words. For this reason, we reproduce the last page of this chapter verbatim: "Based on the preliminary principles mentioned here, Ibn Rushd stepped onto the path of reconciling philosophy and religion, believing that wisdom (hikma) and divine law (shari'a) are in harmony and concord with one another, and their origin is nothing other than the Truth. By virtue of being a jurist and familiar with the method of deriving legal rulings, and considering a series of conditions, he deemed it necessary and essential to examine and reflect upon the books of the ancients. The degree of this Islamic philosopher's interest in and attention to science and philosophy is such that some thinkers have interpreted and justified his words as signifying the 'worship of knowledge.' Ibn Rushd believes that for the common people, whatever is most beneficial in the realm of action and conduct is more worthy than anything else. But for the people of thought and reflection, just as beneficial action is necessary, knowledge and awareness are also recognized as essential. It is in such stances that some thinkers have said that Ibn Rushd is a philosopher with the people of reason and speculation, speaking as a rationalist, whereas he is different with the masses and presents himself in another way. Many other individuals have also concluded from Ibn Rushd's stance on esoteric interpretation (ta'wil) that this philosopher prioritized philosophy over religion and always sought to reach their rational and inner meanings from the outward aspects and explicit texts of the Shari'a. In any case, what Ibn Rushd has expressed regarding the difference and distinction between the elite and the common people is by no means deniable, and it is this very assertion of a difference between the elite and the non-elite that has led him to be recognized as a staunch proponent of the 'double truth' theory. The 'dual or double truth' is a theory attributed to this philosopher and has gained considerable fame in the history of thought." (Dinani: 70). Again, without citing a source! Reminder: Do not forget the subject of this chapter, which appears at the top of the page (The Radiance of the Thought of Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina in the Medieval Philosophy of the West), and read the final page of the chapter and the professor's conclusion again to enjoy it even more!

This too is a leaf of green, a dervish's gift! For the best gift from one friend to another, according to the guidance of the Infallible (PBUH), is the reminder of shortcomings. I hope there is no offense, for: you and I have no business in between! The aim is the problem of the intellectual and cultural confusion of society. It is evident that an incorrect method of research and writing, besides being a clear sign of the ignorance and indifference of the academic community, also inflicts the greatest harm on the knowledge and understanding of society. For example, this very book, as a book written by a professor with half a century of engagement with philosophy and introduced as the national book of the year, damages the thought and culture of society in various ways, of which we will only mention a few: 1— As you observe, we brought all the contents of this twenty-five-page chapter into this article and saw that they have no connection whatsoever to the issue of "The Radiance of Averroes' Thought in Medieval Philosophy." And because the contents are scattered and irrelevant, neither does the reader gain any specialized knowledge, nor can the critic offer any useful point. If, instead of this rambling, he had raised a few cases from the primary and reliable sources of the Middle Ages and proven the influence of Averroes and Avicenna on them with evidence, then even if a critique were written, that critique would be beneficial. For it would either refute the evidence or find fault with the understanding of those texts, which in itself would be as beneficial as the original work. But in the way Professor Dinani has entered the discussion, neither the original book is useful nor its recounting. The only thing gained from the critique is this alertness, to be a little more careful in such cases! We must truly seek to produce knowledge and solve our intellectual and philosophical problems, and whoever works in this direction should be appreciated. Undoubtedly, such works and such appreciations of these works! not only do not aid the production of science, the growth of knowledge, and the solving of problems, but they also make the situation more chaotic! 2— This book, which has been introduced as the book of the year, occupies a number of people who do not have much information about the matter. But these people usually assume that it is due to their own lack of knowledge that they have gained nothing! Therefore, such works not only do not help the production of science and the increase of specialized knowledge, but they also take up the time of a number of non-specialists and ultimately contribute to their "inferiority complex." 3— Averroes has been presented in the West as a movement-creating and path-breaking thinker, and this is not without reason. But Mr. Dinani's weak understanding and scattered report not only gives the reader of his book nothing in this regard, but it is also misleading in various ways, some of which we will point out: a) The issue of the emergence of non-clerical teachers in paving the way for the translation of Averroes' works is an important matter that Dinani quotes from the book "Greek Thought, Arabic Culture" by Dimitri Gutas. But he disparages this statement and considers such words to be the result of being influenced by Marx! (Dinani: 45) Mr. Dinani ignores this important principle, which is a well-known Peripatetic principle that the emergence of no phenomenon is possible without the necessary ground and time (matter and duration), and also, due to his lack of knowledge of the process of Western developments, Mr. Dinani does not know that if it were not for these "non-clericals," the clerics would not have allowed people to do anything in the realm of thought! Let alone the translation of the works of a Muslim philosopher! b) He has not even correctly understood the issue of the "humanization of reason," even based on the teachings of Farabi and Avicenna, as to what it is! He has not realized that sense and reason are, in their very nature, human, and it is with this very human sense and reason that they become divine or atheist! It is not that from the beginning, one group considers reason to be divine and engages in philosophical thinking with divine reason and becomes believers at the end of the work, and another group considers reason to be human and ultimately becomes atheists! Because Mr. Dinani has fallen into such a delusion, he has fiercely attacked those who consider Averroes to be among those who humanize reason and lead people to atheism, and has accused them of not having understood Averroes correctly! Unaware that from ancient times in the Islamic world as well, reason is considered independent, and reason is not inherently divided into divine and human. And never, in any book, has a student been instructed to think with divine reason, not human reason! But in philosophical thinking, the independence and non-commitment of thought and reason have been considered a condition, and this very condition has been cited as the factor distinguishing theology from philosophy. It is the Church that considers understanding to be the reward of faith, not the philosophers of Islam, who do not consider philosophical thinking to have any prior commitment to a specific outcome.