اندیشهفلسفهخردگفتگوحکمتمعناپرسشفرهنگ
Religion
The Hiddenness of God: Reflections on the Theology of Absence
The absence of God does not mean He does not exist, but rather the loss of the experience of His presence. Yet while traditional mystics attributed this to human veiling, modern theologians speak of the age of God's silence, His hiddenness, and even religious atheism.
"Occultation" does not mean "God's non-existence" or "His withdrawal from the stage of being" (in whatever sense this expression might be taken), but rather "the absence of the experience of presence." For example, according to the picture some traditional mystics offer in explaining the absence of the experience of divine presence among human beings, God's presence shines incessantly like the manifest sun in the sky of meaning, but human beings sometimes close their eyes to the sun, or plunge their heads into a well, or take up residence in the heart of a cave—that is, they do not place themselves in a "position of vision," and thus are deprived of the experience of the sun's presence.۱ Therefore, according to this view, "occultation" or "the absence of the experience of presence" is largely caused by human veiledness. Hence, the primary responsibility for this occultation lies more with the human being than with God. If human beings, for example, remove the rust from the mirror of their hearts, turn it in the proper direction toward the sun, and remove some of the veils interposed between themselves and the sun shining in the sky, then there is hope that the reflection of the sun will shine back in the mirror of their hearts.
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Mystical wayfaring (at least in its traditional accounts) rests upon two important presuppositions: first, that a God exists; second, that this God is (even if temporarily) absent from the realm of the wayfarer's experience. The ultimate goal of the wayfarer on the path is to transform that "occultation" into "presence." Of course, the concept of "occultation" was not traditionally understood to mean the "existential absence" of God. According to the traditional view, God is always and everywhere present, and in this sense, the world of existence is not empty of His overflowing presence for a single moment. This "occultation" was largely understood to mean that, despite God's eternal and all-encompassing presence, human beings sometimes, under certain conditions, become incapable and deficient in perceiving and experiencing His presence. God is present, but the human perceptual apparatus sometimes fails to perceive His presence. Therefore, here, "occultation" does not mean "God's non-existence" or "His withdrawal from the stage of being" (in whatever sense this expression might be taken), but rather "the absence of the experience of presence." For example, according to the picture some traditional mystics offer in explaining the absence of the experience of divine presence among human beings, God's presence shines incessantly like the manifest sun in the sky of meaning, but human beings sometimes close their eyes to the sun, or plunge their heads into a well, or take up residence in the heart of a cave—that is, they do not place themselves in a "position of vision," and thus are deprived of the experience of the sun's presence.۱ Therefore, according to this view, "occultation" or "the absence of the experience of presence" is largely caused by human veiledness. Hence, the primary responsibility for this occultation lies more with the human being than with God. If human beings, for example, remove the rust from the mirror of their hearts, turn it in the proper direction toward the sun, and remove some of the veils interposed between themselves and the sun shining in the sky, then there is hope that the reflection of the sun will shine back in the mirror of their hearts.۲
Thus, the traditional view in explaining the "absence of the experience of presence" can be more or less summarized in these two central claims: the human being is in the "age of presence" (the first claim); but sometimes (at least temporarily) finds themselves in the "situation of occultation" (the second claim).
But it seems that the type of mystical experiences in the modern world has undergone a significant transformation compared to the type of experiences of earlier mystics. More precisely, it seems that the experience of the absence of the divine presence has acquired a meaning and content for the modern human being that was unknown to earlier mystics. This profound turn has revealed itself in that strange and enigmatic phrase of Nietzsche: "God is dead." But what is the meaning of this enigmatic phrase, and what connection exists between this astonishing "proclamation" and mystical experiences in the modern world?
A number of modern theologians, such as Martin Buber, believe that this phrase can be interpreted to mean that God previously spoke with us, but has now fallen silent, as if the living God no longer reveals Himself to us, and moreover, as if He hides Himself from us. Contemporary humanity dwells in the age of God's silence. Thus, according to this view, the silence or absence of God should not be attributed to the veiledness of humanity or any kind of deficiency in human subjectivity and existence. This absence or silence stems from a transformation that has occurred in "Being itself."3 It is as if this time God Himself has gone into occultation; we are living in the age of the eclipse of the divine. If we wish to borrow an allegory from the mystics of old, we can express the difference between the new situation and the former one in this way: in the modern age, even if the wayfarer emerges triumphant and successful from his spiritual strivings, and is able to open the eye of the heart, lift his head from the bottom of the well, or emerge from the heart of the cave, he still will not see the light of the sun. For an eclipse has occurred in the sky. The sun no longer shines openly in the heavens. Therefore, the "loss of the experience of presence" in the new world cannot be attributed solely to the fact that modern humanity, like the wayfarers of old, finds itself in a "situation of absence," but moreover, it must be attributed to the fact that humanity in the modern age also lives in the "epoch of absence." According to this picture, God is "hidden" from us in a more profound sense. Now, even if the human being arrives at the appointed place of vision, he will not find God present at the tryst. Thus, according to this view, God exists but hides Himself from us. Yet God's absence, even in this new sense, does not necessarily mean that spiritual wayfaring and the search for God is a futile and fruitless endeavor. The wayfarer can experience God's presence in the very midst of His absence. "Silence is full of unspoken things."
Another group of theologians made Nietzsche's "proclamation" the foundation of a kind of "religious atheism." Simone Weil can perhaps be considered the best representative of this view.4 In the literature of these theologians, "atheism" or "godlessness" is regarded as the religious experience of the death of God. "Religious atheism" differs from "secular or profane atheism." In religious atheism, the natural world is viewed and experienced insofar as it is utterly emptied of divine grace and presence. This "emptying" is considered theologically very significant and meaningful. Wayfarers and seekers of God do not find God in the world, and they suffer profoundly from His silence and non-existence. Those who experience this suffering still live in a religious world, a world whose ultimate and final meaning is God, even though the avalanche of contradictions and paradoxes has torn that meaning to shreds. The wayfarer lives in an absurd world, and this absurdity signifies God for him. Simone Weil seeks and finds the reality of God in phenomena that emphatically pronounce judgment against God's existence: in the meaningless suffering of the mass extermination camps, in the futility of exhausting manual labor, in the deterministic necessity of matter, in the mechanical behaviorism of the human psyche, and in short, in the very midst of all manner of destructive and meaningless evils. Her God is conceived apophatically, and explains the world apophatically. "God is dead" is the discovery of the fact that God does not exist. And the wayfarer realizes the "reality of God" precisely after discovering His "non-existence." God can only become present in us in the form of His absence. Simone Weil expresses the central doctrine of "religious atheism" thus: "The existence of God can be denied without denying His reality." Here the concept of God's "hiddenness" or "absence" takes on a more radical meaning. Here, God's "absence" means "God's non-existence." Simone Weil's mystical experience is the discovery of God's "reality" through the experience of His "non-existence," and the experience of God's non-existence means for her the profoundly painful experience of an absurd world in which no glimmer of divine grace and presence shines.
But some existentialist philosophers, such as Sartre, have interpreted that Nietzschean phrase in a wholly atheistic sense. According to Sartre, the proposition that “God is dead” does not mean that God once existed but will no longer exist. Rather, it should be understood to mean that in the past, human beings believed they had heard the voice of God, but now they can no longer hold such a belief. According to Sartre, “the silence of the transcendent” and “the survival and persistence of modern man’s religious needs” were among the most important concerns and dilemmas that afflicted Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Jaspers. But “existentialism must have courage; it must abandon the search for God once and for all. God must be ‘forgotten.’”⁵ This position can be seen as a clear example of “secular or ordinary atheism.” According to this view, Nietzsche’s declaration must be taken seriously: there is no God; there is no sign or verse in the world; life is utterly devoid of any preordained meaning, and the task of bestowing meaning falls entirely upon me, and value is nothing other than the meaning I myself choose for myself.⁶ The search for God was an illusion that must finally be overcome.
As can be observed, the phenomenon of divine hiddenness has had two important consequences:
Firstly—it has been the source of some of the deepest existential anxieties and worries in human beings. The existential problem often manifests itself as a crisis of faith, a crisis that casts doubt upon the very existence of the human being and especially the value and purpose of his being, and sometimes shakes or destroys his trust in God. According to the teachings of monotheistic theology, human flourishing and existential fulfillment depend on a personal and social relationship with God. But when many believers find their lives empty of such a personal relationship, sooner or later they think to themselves that if a God exists, He must not care much for us human beings. This belief makes the world appear to them as an alien and even hostile place. Disenchantment with life is the natural result of God’s hiddenness for these believers. (Let us call this consequence the “existential problem.”)
Secondly—but the phenomenon of God’s hiddenness does not necessarily end in a crisis of faith and existential anxieties. In the view of some philosophers and sages, this phenomenon can be considered evidence for the non-existence of God. (Let us call this consequence the “theoretical problem.”)
As we have seen, within the framework of traditional mysticism, and also for some contemporary theologians such as Buber, the “existential problem” is seriously raised, but its scope does not extend to the “theoretical problem.” However, from the perspective of proponents of “religious atheism” and “secular or ordinary atheism,” the consequences of the phenomenon of divine hiddenness go far beyond the “existential problem,” and sooner or later lead to the “theoretical problem.” From the perspective of these sages, under certain conditions, a rational individual must necessarily consider the phenomenon of divine hiddenness as evidence for the non-existence of God.
Therefore, it now becomes clear that the expression “hiddenness of God” is used in two different senses:
According to the first sense, “hiddenness of God” means that God truly exists, but for some reasons has hidden Himself from us human beings.
According to the second sense, “hiddenness of God” means that there is no sufficient and convincing evidence for the existence of God. More specifically, the human being, in searching for God, does not attain positive empirical results.
My main question in this article is this: Can the hiddenness of God be considered a reason for the non-existence of God? In other words, can the “experience” of the absence of God’s presence be considered evidence for the “theory” of metaphysical naturalism that “God does not exist”? Given the phenomenon of divine hiddenness, is the probability of the truth of the theory of atheism greater than the probability of the truth of the theory of theism? (It is clear that if we take “hiddenness of God” here in the first sense, the answer to those questions will be analytically negative. Therefore, to avoid begging the question, we must necessarily take the concept of “divine hiddenness” in the questions raised in its second sense.)
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But before discussing these questions, I would like to point out two preliminary points:
The first point is that the problem of “divine hiddenness” is in important respects related to the traditional problem of evil. The structure of the argument from “divine hiddenness” is in important ways similar to the structure of the argument from evil. But the problem of evil and the problem of divine hiddenness must be regarded as independent of one another. For one can conceive of a possible world in which the problem of divine hiddenness clearly does not exist (that is, God has revealed Himself unambiguously), yet in that possible world the problem of evil is present with the same force as in the actual world. For example, suppose that in the Holocaust, a week before the victims’ deaths, an angel whose language and characteristics fully matched the descriptions of the Old Testament appeared to each one of them, and recited passages from the Scriptures to them. But nothing else happened besides this: none of those innocent people were saved from death, and everything proceeded exactly as it actually did in the Holocaust, with the exception of that revelatory vision. Now suppose that all human beings who have been victims of devastating and terrible evils in this world experienced unambiguous “signs” of God’s existence shortly before their final suffering and death, and easily recognized those signs. It seems that in this possible world the problem of evil exists with the same force as in the actual world, but the problem of divine hiddenness no longer arises. In this possible world, one might well complain of “God’s inaction,” but not of His “hiddenness.”
On the other hand, one can suppose another possible world in which the problem of evil does not exist, but God is hidden. For example, imagine a world that is in every other respect like our present world, with the difference that there is no pain or suffering in it. Let us call this world a “secular utopia.” In this utopia, human beings are by nature kind and benevolent. Physical pain and suffering either do not exist, or their extent is very slight. In this world there is no premature death, disease, or violence. No one suffers from physical or mental disability, racial prejudices and the like do not exist, everyone can adequately provide for their material needs, and so on. Now suppose that in this world some people believe in the existence of God, and some deny His existence. It seems that in this possible world, some (for instance, those who do not believe in God) could raise the problem of divine hiddenness, and a lively debate on this matter could ensue between them and the theists. Yet in this context, neither side has any knowledge or conception of terrible and devastating evils. They can discuss the problem of divine hiddenness without the problem of evil ever being raised for them. Therefore, the problem of evil and the problem of divine hiddenness should not be conflated.7
The second point is that the argument from evil, as well as the argument from divine hiddenness, are arguments for the non-existence of the God of theistic religions, that is, a personal God who is, among other things, omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good. Here, “personal God” means (at least) a God who can enter into a personal relationship with human beings. As soon as one denies one of these attributes in God, or considers the divine to be fundamentally impersonal, those arguments lose their force and significance.
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Can God’s absence be taken as a sign of His non-existence? How can one move from the “experience” of absence to the “belief” that God does not exist?
Many atheists regard the absence or silence of the God of theistic religions as a clear indication of His non-existence. Nietzsche asked boldly and in a spirit of denial: Can a God who is omniscient and omnipotent, yet for whom it matters not at all whether His creatures understand His purposes and intentions, be considered a good and benevolent God? Would a good and benevolent God allow the agonizing doubts of human beings concerning the great matters that pertain to their salvation to persist for thousands of years, while at the same time decreeing terrible punishments for any error that occurs in the quest for truth? Should not a being who (by hypothesis) possesses the truth, and sees the degrading suffering of human beings in their quest for truth, yet does not assist them, be considered a cruel and hard-hearted being? In Nietzsche’s view, religions are the fruit of uncultivated and crude human reason. Religions have a surprisingly light regard for the duty of expressing the truth, as if it does not matter to them that God must be truthful with human beings, and clear and unambiguous in His communication with them.8
It is evident that for Nietzsche, acknowledging the reality of divine hiddenness means denying God's goodness. And since, according to monotheistic theology, God is
Are the premises of the argument based on the "phenomenon of hiddenness" necessarily true? Propositions (1), (2), and (3) can be considered necessarily true by definition. Therefore, the entire force and validity of this argument depends on proposition (4) being necessarily true. Is proposition (4) necessarily true? I think the answer is clearly negative. If this proposition were necessarily true, then there would be no possible world in which the antecedent of that conditional proposition is true and the consequent is false. But one can clearly conceive of such a world. That is, one can conceive of a world in which God is pure goodness, but in that world God, for some reasons, prefers not to reveal Himself to His eager seekers. For example, God may have hidden Himself so that His servants might realize the futility of life without God, or His hiddenness might be because if He revealed Himself without any ambiguity, the sense of risk-taking necessary for passionate faith would be significantly diminished, or perhaps divine hiddenness causes humanity to engage in a struggle to experience the divine presence, which ultimately leads to their spiritual perfection and the flourishing of their personality. What matters here is not how probable these reasons are. What matters is the possibility of these scenarios, not their degree of probability. The possibility of these scenarios means that there are possible worlds in which God is pure goodness, yet at the same time does not reveal Himself to His eager seekers. In other words, in those possible worlds, proposition (4) is false. And this means that proposition (4) is not necessarily true.9 But if proposition (4) is not necessarily true, then one cannot claim that the phenomenon of divine hiddenness is incompatible with the assumption of the existence of the God of theistic religions.
The Inductive Reading (1):
According to the inductive reading of Nietzsche's argument, perhaps the phenomenon of divine hiddenness and the existence of God are not logically incompatible, but the reality of divine hiddenness (in its second sense) makes belief in the existence of God highly improbable.
A common form of the inductive reading can be called the "analogical argument."10 The analogical argument first tries to show that situation (A) clearly possesses attribute (B) in a certain respect. In the second step, it tries to show that situation (C) is similar to situation (A) in that certain respect. And in the third step, it concludes that situation (C), like situation (A), possesses attribute (B) in that certain respect. Let us examine these three steps in the case of the hiddenness argument:
First Step:
First Scenario: Suppose you are a child playing hide-and-seek with your mother in the heart of a forest. Suppose it is now your turn to hide so your mother can find you. You hide behind a tree and wait. Some time passes, but there is no sign of your mother. The sun sets, and bedtime arrives. But still, there is no sign of your mother. No noise is heard in the surrounding environment either. You gradually become worried and terrified. You come out from behind the tree. Terrified, you shout your mother's name. But there is no sign of her. Many hours pass. You search everywhere, your voice becomes hoarse from shouting, but you find no sign of her presence. Is she around here? If she were really around here, would she give no answer to her child's terrified cries?
Second Scenario: Suppose you are a child who, for some reason, has amnesia, and as a result can only remember the last few days, and therefore, does not even remember whether you have a mother or not. You see other children with their mothers, and you think to yourself how good it would be if you also had a mother. Hence, you ask everyone about your mother, and you poke into every nook and cranny to find her. And every day, you tirelessly resume your search. Even when those around you assure you that your mother must be dead, you do not despair. In this situation, if your mother were really alive, and lived nearby, and was aware of your restless search, shouldn't she answer your call?
Third scenario: Suppose you are a child who, for some reason, has lost your memory. But this time you are trapped in the middle of a dense and dangerous forest. You have now been wandering terrified in the heart of that forest for days, wrestling with yourself to understand who you are and where you came from. You have absolutely no recollection of whether you ever had a mother. Yet, in the bitterest and most painful moments of despair, out of desperation you cry out to her. But you receive no answer. Finally, suddenly, from the darkness of the forest, a predatory tiger leaps toward you. For the last time, you call out to your mother. But again, you hear no answer. In that final moment of death, what passes through your mind? Do you still think that you have a kind mother who loves you with all her heart, who has heard your cry, and who could have come to your aid, but has decided to sit silently by and watch your wretched state?
It seems that in such a situation, you would take one of the following two possibilities more seriously:
First, that your mother is somewhere nearby, but your condition is of no importance to her.
Second, that something beyond her control has prevented her presence.
In any case, one conclusion seems certain: you cannot say that in such a situation, a truly loving mother who is concerned for her child and can come to her child's aid would deliberately hide herself from him. Therefore, regarding the relationship between a mother and her child, the following claim can be made (let us call this claim the "Doctrine of the Requisites of Love"):
The Doctrine of the Requisites of Love: A loving mother, in circumstances where she can come to the aid of her child who is trapped in a difficult and perilous situation, does not hide herself from him.
But why should the "Doctrine of the Requisites of Love" be accepted? Several reasons can be offered to affirm this doctrine, for example:
(1) A loving mother considers her child's critical needs and requests to be important and serious, and strives to respond to them in the shortest possible time.
(2) A loving mother does not consent to her child suffering affliction and calamity without cause; rather, she strives to secure her child's physical health and spiritual well-being as far as she is able.
(3) A loving mother does not consent to her child harboring incorrect notions about her, the nature of their relationship, and the extent of her love and affection for her child.
(4) A loving mother cherishes personal contact and communication with her child and seizes every opportunity to establish such contact and communication. For her, the very act of communicating with her child is delightful and pleasant.
(5) A loving mother misses her child when separated from him.
Step Two:
The second step is to show that in the actual world, there are instances of divine hiddenness that closely resemble the situation of the mother and child in the three scenarios above. The point of similarity between these two situations is that in the aforementioned scenarios, the child sought the mother and could not find her, and in the situation of divine hiddenness, many human beings seek God restlessly and out of desperation, and cannot find Him.
For example, many people once firmly believed that they experienced the power and presence of God in their lives, but later lost that experience and belief entirely (because, for instance, they encountered reasons and evidence that cast serious doubt on the foundations of their religious beliefs). The situation of these individuals resembles that of the child in the first scenario. On the other hand, many people have been deprived of what is called a personal relationship with God, yet have earnestly striven to attain such a relationship. These individuals have been completely open and receptive to such an experience, and have struggled on the spiritual path for many long years, but have not found such a relationship in their lives. The situation of these individuals resembles that of the child in the second scenario. And finally, many people have floundered in the vortex of life's difficulties and afflictions, and not only, like other seekers of the path, have they yearned for a vision of the divine, but in addition, they have deeply needed such a relationship. These afflicted seekers have called upon God for help time and again and have never received a clear and fitting response from Him. The situation of these individuals resembles that of the child in the third scenario.
Step Three:
What was said about maternal love and affection also holds true for the love of God. For according to the teachings of the monotheistic religions, as we have seen, God is pure goodness, and it seems that one of the most important manifestations of the goodness of the monotheistic God is His kindness and mercy. Of course, the monotheistic God is not only merciful and kind, but possesses mercy and love to the utmost degree of perfection. Therefore, it seems that what was previously attributed to maternal love in the form of propositions (1) through (5) can, a fortiori, be applied to God as well. Of course, proponents of the analogical argument do not claim that God should be regarded as a
What can be said about this argument? It seems that critics of this argument can, in various ways, cast doubt on its validity.
First approach: Some critics consider premise (2) in the analogical argument to be false. According to their view, the argument from hiddenness derives much of its force and validity from the kind of expectations and anticipations we have of God. In particular, our conception of how a loving being would reveal its love plays a very important role here. It seems that different analogies lead to different expectations and results. In the scenarios mentioned, God's love for human beings is depicted as similar to the love of parents who are concerned for their children and want to deliver them from suffering and sorrow as soon as possible. But it is entirely possible to interpret God's love for human beings based on another model. For example, some might conceive of God's love on the analogy of the loving relationship between a teacher and a student. In this kind of loving relationship, the teacher's goal is not limited to merely teaching the student a set of true propositions. The teacher's primary task is also to cultivate a particular spirit and character in the student; that is, alongside teaching true propositions, and sometimes even prior to it, to cultivate moral-characterological capabilities, as well as the spirit and attitude befitting scholarly inquiry, in the student. Therefore, it is entirely possible that under certain conditions, the teacher would prefer to postpone the task of teaching true propositions for a time so that the student might acquire the necessary qualifications for gaining that knowledge, or even under certain conditions, might find the student so lacking in the necessary qualifications as to refrain from teaching him certain knowledge. If divine love is understood based on this model, then from the divine perspective, the human being's mere belief in God is not as important as the kind of outlook, approach, and motivations accompanying that belief. Belief in God comes after that transformation in attitude and character. Therefore, it is entirely possible that God hides Himself from some human beings and does not establish a personal relationship with them, in order to thereby motivate them to seek Him with greater earnestness and sincerity, and consequently attain a more fitting growth and perfection.
In any case, the main point is that the force of arguments based on analogy depends to a large extent on the analogy that is taken as the basis. The type of analogy has a definite effect on the conclusion of the reasoning, and it is entirely possible that by changing the analogy, completely different results are obtained.
Second approach: Some theologians consider premise (8) in the analogical argument to be false. This group of theologians doubts the claim that God has not revealed Himself in a clear and unambiguous manner. According to the belief of this group of theologians, God has sufficiently revealed Himself in His creation.
But in that case, these theologians must explain why many people do not believe in the existence of God. A traditional answer to this question is that human beings, because of their sins, cannot see the evidence present in the fabric of creation and history, or hear the inner voice of their conscience. In other words, if someone cannot see the divine signs and verses in the world, they should be suspicious of themselves. The root of that failure to see is a shortcoming or fault that originates from the human being.
Third approach: A group of theologians accepts that there are no clear and unambiguous indications of God's existence. The world is ambiguous in terms of signifying the divine. The unbelief of all human beings cannot be attributed to their sinfulness. Therefore, the existence of "honest deniers" must be recognized. What is meant by "honest deniers" are those who have earnestly and sincerely striven to discover God and connect with Him, but have found no clear and unambiguous evidence indicating His existence. Therefore, their unbelief and denial is not out of stubbornness or obstinacy; it stems from the lack of sufficient and convincing evidence. But these theologians must explain why God has permitted this "non-culpable denial."
According to these theologians, premise (4) in the analogical argument is false. They try to show that the hiddenness of God is not a bad phenomenon, and that it entails benefits that cannot be obtained through an easy-belief in God's existence. It is worth mentioning here some of the benefits they have enumerated for the phenomenon of divine hiddenness:
(1) God's hiddenness gives human beings the opportunity to freely love, believe in, and follow Him. Love and faith are fundamentally incompatible with compulsion and force.
(2) God's hiddenness prevents human beings from responding to Him based on unworthy motives (such as fear of punishment).
(3) God's hiddenness places us in a situation where we realize the absurdity of life without Him, and thus seek Him more humbly and eagerly.
(4) If God revealed Himself to human beings without any ambiguity, then belief in God would occur in a non-voluntary manner, and the sense of risk-taking necessary for passionate faith would be significantly diminished.
(5) If God were revealed to everyone without any ambiguity, then His existence would be beyond any doubt, and thus religious diversity would be significantly reduced, and believers would not have much opportunity to help one another in establishing a personal relationship with God.
(6) If God were not hidden, human beings could not cultivate many of the characteristics necessary for establishing a fitting and worthy relationship with God.
In fact, the gist of all these criticisms can be expressed as follows:
First, those who believe in the monotheistic religions' picture of God do not find God's hiddenness unexpected. Within that picture, divine hiddenness is a completely predictable phenomenon.
Second, God's hiddenness does not entail that God always remains hidden, or that human beings never find any evidence of His reality.
Third, God's hiddenness has two main reasons: (1) either this hiddenness is God's response to human rebellion and disobedience; (2) or it is a method God has adopted to bring humanity to greater perfection and flourishing. For example, perhaps God is trying in this way to stimulate humanity to a deeper and more serious striving on the divine path, and to confront them with the deepest level of their human capabilities and also incapacities. It is as if the human experience of God's absence can more effectively reveal to them the supreme value of God's presence.
I do not know to what extent the defenders of the analogical argument find these responses convincing. Judging the strengths and weaknesses of the analogical argument and the responses of its critics depends to a large extent on the disputants' conceptions of the nature of "divine mercy and love" and also God's purposes in this world. The truth is that judging these matters is very difficult.
But perhaps if we examine the inductive argument from another angle, we will arrive at more illuminating results. Therefore, it is worth presenting another formulation of the problem here; perhaps in this way we can judge the argument more clearly.
Inductive Reading (2):
The gist of the inductive reading of the divine hiddenness argument is that, assuming the reality of the phenomenon of divine hiddenness, the probability of the truth of theism is less than the probability of the truth of non-belief in God. Let us formulate this claim more precisely:
Suppose that H is the only evidence we have:
H: The phenomenon of divine hiddenness is a reality.
Suppose that we have only the following two rival theories compatible with H:
T: There exists a supremely loving God who, for sufficiently justified reasons, has hidden Himself from us human beings.
Q: A supremely loving God does not exist.
It now seems that the probability of H given Q is greater than the probability of H given T. In other words, in a world where Q is true (i.e., where there is no God), H is exactly what we would expect. But in a world where T is true (i.e., where God exists), H is not exactly what we would expect. This claim can be represented as follows:
(1) P(H/Q) > P(H/T)
(Here, P(H/Q) means "the probability of H given Q," and P(H/T) means "the probability of H given T.")
Now, according to Bayes' Theorem, we will have:
(2) P(Q/H)/P(T/H) = (P(Q) ×P(H/Q))/ (P(T) ×P(H/T))
Now, if we assume that (at least prima facie) the probability of Q and T being true is roughly equal, at 50/50, we can eliminate P(Q) and P(T) from the numerator and denominator of the second side of the above equation. Consequently, we will have:
(3) P(Q/H)/P(T/H) = P(H/Q)/P(H/T)
Here, since on the second side of equation (3), according to proposition (1), the probability of H given Q is greater than the probability of H given T, we can then conclude that on the first side of equation (3), the probability of Q given H must necessarily be greater than the probability of T given H. In other words:
(4) P(Q/H) > P(T/H)
And therefore, based on proposition (4), we can claim that if the reality of the phenomenon of divine hiddenness is the only relevant evidence available, then we have found a reason or piece of evidence on the basis of which to prefer Q over T. In other words, we can claim that:
(5) P(Q) > P(T)
Proposition (5) is, in fact, the desired conclusion of the inductive reading of the argument from hiddenness. For according to the above reasoning, if we accept the reality of divine hiddenness, then we must necessarily acknowledge that the probability that an all-loving God does not exist is greater than the probability that such a God exists. In other words, we must acknowledge that the probability of the non-existence of the God of theistic religions is greater than the probability of His existence.
What can be said about this argument?
The truth is that proposition H is ambiguous in some respects. As previously mentioned, the concept of "divine hiddenness" in this proposition should be understood in its second sense. Therefore, we can formulate the content of that proposition as follows:
H: There is insufficient and unconvincing evidence to affirm God.
But here, several important questions arise regarding this proposition:
First, let us assume that the set of relevant evidence available at a given time t is insufficient to affirm the existence of God. But does this mean that matters will remain the same in the future? Is it not possible that new evidence will be found in the future that clearly indicates the existence of God? From the fact that at time t, there is insufficient evidence for proposition P, one cannot conclude that at a future time t', there will also be no sufficient and convincing evidence. Therefore, it seems that proposition H should be rewritten as follows:
H1: From the perspective of observer S, at time t, there is insufficient and unconvincing evidence to affirm God.
Second. But now another question arises: On what basis does observer S believe that at time t, they had access to all the relevant evidence and took it into account in their assessment?
One possible answer is to say: (a) S cannot find any other evidence at time t, therefore (b) no other evidence exists. But it is, of course, obvious that proposition (b) does not follow from proposition (a). Therefore, it seems that proposition H1 should be rewritten as follows:
H2: From the perspective of observer S, as far as they know, at time t, there is no sufficient and convincing evidence to affirm the existence of God.
But it is entirely possible that the set of evidence S has taken into account in their assessment does not, in fact, include all the existing and relevant evidence.
Third. But proposition H2 harbors another ambiguity. The absence of which kind of evidence is it that places the wayfarer in the situation of God's hiddenness? It seems that the set of evidences that may indicate the existence of God can be divided into two general groups: āfāqī (horizonal) evidences, and anfusī (inward) evidences. By āfāqī signs, I mean the signs and evidences that an individual can discover and observe from the position of a neutral, disinterested observer. For example, many theologians consider the order of nature, or the existence of contingent beings, as a sign indicating the existence of God. These signs can be considered āfāqī signs. Āfāqī knowledge is knowledge based on āfāqī signs, like the knowledge we gain from studying the physical properties of a stone. In examining a stone, or the physical characteristics of a human being, we can quite disinterestedly sit in the position of an observer and examine the subject of our research. But anfusī signs are signs that deal with the existence and inner constitution of the human being as a subject. Observing and discovering these signs requires personal involvement and participation in the context of a personal relationship. When we set out to know a personal being, we must move from the position of an observer to that of an actor, and establish a personal relationship with that being. According to the conception of monotheistic religions, God is a personal being, meaning He can enter into a personal relationship with us and thereby reveal Himself to us in the most expressive way. Indeed, it seems that the
If we take H4 as our basis, what can we then say about the inductive argument?
It seems to me that this form of the argument is not without its problems either:
First—even this reading suffers from the previous difficulty. That is, while it is true that the external and internal evidence, by hypothesis, encompasses all the evidence indicating God's existence, the phenomenon of divine hiddenness (according to the H4 reading) is not the only relevant piece of evidence. In other words, certain other matters also play a role in the probability calculation in question. For example, suppose there is sufficient evidence (both external and internal) indicating God's existence, but the observer S, due to their own incapacity or negligence, or in any case due to certain mental or existential characteristics, is unable to perceive or observe that evidence. In this case, too, observer S is in a state of hiddenness, but for reasons other than
Again, in my opinion, the mere fact that all the reasons we humans are aware of cannot adequately explain divine hiddenness does not show that God (assuming He exists) does not have good reasons for His hiddenness. For example, suppose a highly distinguished chess master is playing a game of chess, and we are spectators of that game. The spectators, of course, have some knowledge of chess, more or less, but none approaches the skill and mastery of that chess player. Now suppose the chess master makes a move that, from the spectators' perspective, is incomprehensible and even incorrect. In other words, the spectators absolutely cannot grasp the secret of that move. Does the mere fact that we spectators have not understood the reason for that move necessarily indicate that the chess master also had no reason for his move? As it happens, if we truly believe that he is a master and distinguished in his work, the most likely interpretation that comes to our mind is that he probably has a game in mind that is completely hidden from us, and we can only judge that move and its reason at the end of the game, that is, when his entire plan unfolds before us. By the same analogy, if someone truly believes that the God he believes in is omniscient, omnipotent, and pure goodness, then when he encounters the phenomenon of divine hiddenness and cannot find a convincing reason for it, it is entirely reasonable for him to claim that God necessarily has a reason or reasons for this act that are hidden from me. 11
(4)
The result is that theists can accept the phenomenon of divine hiddenness as a reality within the realm of their religious experiences, and even deeply grapple with the existential crises arising from that experience. But it seems that the religious experience of God's absence cannot provide a solid basis for believing in the non-existence of the God of the monotheistic religions.
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Notes:
1 For example, consider these verses by Rumi:
Though the world be filled with sun and light,
If you go into a darkness like the grave,
You shall be deprived of that immense light,
If your window is shut to the generous moon.
You have gone inside a well from the palace,
What fault is it of the vast worlds? (Masnavi, Book Three, verses 2828-2830)
2 For example, see Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali, Ihya' 'Ulum al-Din, Vol. 3, The Quarter of the Destructive Vices, Book of Explaining the Wonders of the Heart, pp. 28-34 (translated by Mu'ayyid al-Din Muhammad Khwarazmi, edited by Hossein Khadivjam, Scientific and Cultural Publishing Company)
3 To become acquainted with Buber's view, see.
Martin Buber, Eclipse of God, Humanity Books, 1999, esp. Ch. V " Religion and Modern Thinking", pp. 65-92.
4 To become acquainted with the thoughts of Simone Weil, for example, see.
Susan A. Taubes, " The Absent God", The Journal of Religion, January 1955, reprinted in Toward a New Christianity (Reading in the Death of God Theology), ed. By Thomas J.J. Altizer, Harcourt, Brace& World, INC. 1967, pp. 107-119.
5. Jean- Paul Sartre, Situations I, Section "New Mysticism", Schoenhofs Foreign Books, 1989, p. 154.
6 For example, see.
Jean- Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, Citadel Press, 1957, p.22.
7 For an illuminating discussion on this, see.
Peter Van Inwagen, " What is the problem of the hiddenness of God?", in: Divine Hiddenness, ed. By Daniel Howard- Snyder and Paul K. Moser, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 24-32.
8 Nietzsche, Daybreak, Trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 89-90.
9 The fact is that proposition (4) is not only not necessarily true, but does not even appear to be true at all. But here, for critics to show that this argument does not lead to the claimed conclusion, it is sufficient merely to show that proposition (4) is not “necessarily” true; nothing more is needed for this purpose.
10 Among contemporary analytic philosophers, J. L. Schellenberg can perhaps be considered the best and most persistent defender of the argument from divine hiddenness in its inductive reading. For an introduction to Schellenberg’s analyses and formulations of this argument, see.
J. L. Schellenberg, " Does divine hiddenness justify atheism?", and "Hiddenness concealed: a reply to Moser", both in Contemporary debates in philosophy of religion, ed. By Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. Vanarragon, Blackwell Publishing, 2004, pp.30-41; and "What the hiddenness of God reveals: a collaborative discussion" in Divine Hiddenness, ed. By D. Howard- Snyder and P. Moser, 2002, pp. 33- 61; and finally his book: Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, Cornell University Press, 1993.
Schellenberg, particularly in the first article, has discussed a form of the “analogical argument” (see that article, pp. 31-39).
11. Here I would like to thank my dear friend Mr. Amir Saemi, who read this section of the article with careful attention and shared useful observations with me.
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Arash Naraghi
California – Santa Barbara
29 August 2006
* This article was written at the request of the organizers of the “Religion and Modernity” seminar, which was held through the efforts of the Institute for Interreligious Dialogue in Tehran in August 2006.
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Discussion1 comments
بسیار زیبا. ترجمه ای روان و شیوا. به نظر من جایی که عرفان سنتی زیر سوال برده شده است از یک ضعف رنج میبرد و آن اینست که واضحا گفته نشده چرا تجربه حضور خداوندی در زمانهای دور با امروز متفاوت است. آیا قدیما مردم خداوند را وقتی در میافتند که فرشته ای بر آنها نمایان میشد؟ واضح است که خیر. این پیشفرض غلط است. اما در مورد سایر انتقادات مخصوصا برهان شر نویسنده عالی عمل کرده است.