The Problem of Evil in Literary Works

The Book Examining the Problem of Evil in Literary Works

Introduction by Zohair Bagheri No’parast:

Our language is replete with images, metaphors, and symbols through which we describe phenomena. This characteristic of language is observable in the language of science, the language of religion, the language of philosophy, and even in everyday language. One of the greatest sources of misunderstanding in language is the failure to pay attention to these images, metaphors, and symbols and mistaking them for descriptions of reality. Wittgenstein held that our language inevitably possesses these characteristics, and as a result, he assigned two tasks to the philosopher: first, to identify the images whose nature as images we have become oblivious to, mistaking them for reality or descriptions of reality, so that we become attentive to the function of the images we employ. Second, to be aware that alternative images, metaphors, and symbols can be utilized, and sometimes employing these alternatives leads to a better understanding of issues. Both of these tasks lead to the reduction of misunderstanding and putting everything in its proper place.

The language of science deals with images that make scientific activity possible. For instance, among scientists after the Scientific Revolution, considering the world as a "machine" became prevalent. But a machine is merely an image and an analogy, and the world is not actually a machine. Becoming oblivious to this matter causes us to fall under the illusion that the world is truly a mechanical machine or a large clock. This neglect will lead to the formation of misunderstandings in our conceptions of the world. Moreover, it is not clear whether this image is the best possible image for practicing science or not. We do not have access to the totality of the world and reality to be able to discern which metaphor or image has the best efficacy for understanding it. Practicing science in the current era is largely indebted to the machine image of the world and has achieved many successes. However, it is quite possible that in the future, other images or metaphors will create greater capacity for practicing science. For example, in the future, scientists might consider the world not as a soulless mechanical machine, but as a living organism. Yet, that image too should not cause us to fall into the illusion that the world is truly a living organism. The same applies to the use of the image of the "atom" or very tiny particles to describe the fundamental reality studied in physics. In the past, individuals such as Epicurus utilized the image of the atom, even though they had no conception of what is discussed in the physics of our era. They used this image to gain an understanding of reality, and this image had the capacity to be employed in scientific language as well. However, humans' conception of the atom has undergone tremendous transformations, and of course, other images have been proposed to describe reality at the fundamental level, which can be thought of as alternative images (physical fields and numbers). The notion that reality is truly composed of tiny particles called atoms is a claim whose verification requires access to the essence of reality. But even if something called the "essence of reality" exists beyond the phenomenal world, through our metaphorical and symbolic language, we only provide ourselves with the possibility for activities like practicing science and do not gain access to the essence of reality. If we do not utilize metaphors like the atom and the machine and their like, we will be deprived of practicing science and will be without the scientific achievements that have been made possible in our world.

These images are valuable in that they enable scientific activity, but the notion that they unveil a hidden reality behind the phenomenal world and inform us of it requires the claimant to provide reasons. It must first be established that the world we see is a kind of illusion and that a reality lies behind it whose nature can be discovered through the natural sciences. The main issue here is that the language of science and our scientific imagination themselves rest upon our ordinary understanding of the world. We experience the world as colored and scented; we see tables, chairs, carpets, flowers, and trees, and we hear and feel the song of the nightingale and the spring breeze. These experiences are the starting point for all our activities in the world, including the practice of science. Are all these colors, scents, and sounds that we experience nothing more than a heap of particles? If someone wishes to claim that this is so, it is incumbent upon them to say how they have managed to peek behind the curtain at reality and inform us of it. If their explanations are convincing, it can be accepted, but even if such an unveiling were possible, it still would not eliminate the interweaving of our language with images and metaphors. Hence, we still have a duty to become aware of the presence of images in our language and to practice their correct usage.

The same considerations apply to the language of religion. In religious language, as in other parts of language, we make use of many metaphors and images. In religions, we are told how the world was made, how human beings were created, and what the ultimate fate of the world will be. Likewise, God is described in specific ways in religious literature. When encountering such descriptions, we must remember that religious language, like any other language, employs images, metaphors, and symbols. Forgetting this crucial point will lead us toward the claim that what is said about God in religious literature is, in fact, a description of Him. If we mistake the images used to understand God for descriptions of God's reality, then we will have posited a counterpart for God that bears no relation to God Himself. For example, the image of creation tells us that God first created the world and then settled upon the Throne, or that God's hand is above all hands, or that you do not shoot the arrow, but God shoots it, or that God is closer to you than your jugular vein. It is obvious that if we have no access behind the curtain of the material world, we will also have no access behind the far more mysterious curtain of the supernatural realm and God, and here the pictorial, metaphorical, and symbolic aspect of language is more active than anywhere else. For this reason, care in the use of language and avoidance of misunderstanding in this area is doubly important.

When we say that God is the Creator of the world, we make use of images related to creating that we deal with in our human world. For instance, we consider a carpenter, a builder, or the founder of a country. But none of us was present at the moment of creation, and we do not know what the quality of this creation was or how it differs from the kinds of creating we deal with. When we say that God is the Most Gracious and the Most Merciful, our understanding of God's graciousness or mercifulness is only metaphorical and pictorial, derived from the affection and love that exists among human beings. No one has access to God's reality to be able to discern the quality and form of God's affection and love. Therefore, we must always be aware that when we speak of God's affection and love, our language is metaphorical and employs images, and we are not actually describing God's graciousness and mercifulness. The same holds true when we speak of God's other attributes. When we say God is cunning, the matter is the same; we consider the cunning and deception of human beings and, using that, arrive at an understanding of God's cunning.

The Problem of Evil

One of the discussions in which neglecting the pictorial, metaphorical, and symbolic nature of language confronts us with many problems is the problem of evil. In the problem of evil, the main question is how it is possible that a benevolent God, who is capable of doing anything and is omniscient, does not prevent the pain and suffering of us human beings in this world. Of course, in some formulations of the problem of evil, instead of "benevolent," "omnibenevolent" or "generous" or other similar equivalents are used. But whichever of these equivalents we employ, the main question is how such words in describing God should be understood. When we use the word benevolent, we might imagine a kind father or mother. However kind fathers and mothers may be, they have limited human ability and knowledge and cannot protect us from all evils. Now, in order to understand the problem of evil, we might say: suppose a very kind father who is omnipotent and omniscient created you and the world, how could he allow you to suffer pain and agony? Such an anthropomorphic image of God can in no way be considered a true description of Him. No one knows what God's kindness and love are really like and what quality they possess. Just as we do not know what quality God's power and knowledge have. Our understanding of God's attributes is possible through images, metaphors, and symbols, and therefore, this understanding is always susceptible to anthropomorphizing Him. To understand God's omniscience, we might consider what types of knowledge we humans can have and what types of knowledge are possible, and then attribute all of them to God and imagine that we have thereby described God's omniscience. Or regarding God's omnipotence, we might think about the types of powers and abilities that humans and other living beings possess and, merely by increasing their extent, imagine that we have achieved an understanding of God's power and omnipotence.

If we do not have access to God as He is and only have access to Him through concepts mixed with images and metaphors, then the problem of evil cannot lead to the negation of God's existence and can only call into question our concepts and images of God and our metaphorical and symbolic understanding of Him. In other words, the problem of evil helps us set aside the incorrect and false images we have of God. The anthropomorphic images used to understand God's love and kindness, power, and knowledge lead us to conclude that the existence of God and evil in this world are incompatible. If we imagine our image of God as a very kind father who has unlimited power and knowledge, then justifying the problem of evil will become very difficult or impossible. Incidentally, the image of God as a heavenly father exists in Christianity and can lay the groundwork for misunderstanding in the problem of evil. The image of a kind heavenly father who shows no sign of wrath or anger and is nothing but absolute love is a childish image. If a person (God or human) is devoid of all emotions except love, they are a very strange person who suffers from emotional immaturity and is incapable of appropriate emotional reactions in different situations. But apart from this, individuals who use the image of a father for God sometimes also attempt to justify evil based on this image. For example, they will say that just like a father who desires his child's growth and knows that pain and suffering are necessary for their development, God also allows us to experience pain and suffering so that we may grow. In such cases, the person becomes engaged in defending an omniscient and omnipotent father and tries to find justifications for the existence of evil despite the existence of such a father. Forgetting the coordinates of this image involves us in a futile debate that leads neither to proving God's existence nor to negating it; rather, the debate is about the existence and actions of a myth that never existed, namely a father or human who is omnipotent and omniscient.

We are not aware of the details of God's mercy to be able to correctly discern which image is suitable for understanding it. In the Quran it is repeatedly stated that God is the Most Compassionate and the Most Merciful, and commentators and exegetes, with the help of hadiths, have provided us with definitions and descriptions of these two attributes of God. But no one can tell us how the quality of God being the Most Compassionate and the Most Merciful should be measured or understood in a specific human suffering in this world. We are not aware of the details and quality of God's knowledge and power in such a way that we could say His knowledge or power should have prevented such-and-such pain and suffering that such-and-such human endured. This is while we know that a kind human, with their human knowledge and power, would certainly save a child who is about to be thrown from a height. The image that often ensnares us in the problem of evil is that we assume God to be a very kind, very powerful, and very knowledgeable human, and with this magnitude of human love, power, and knowledge that we attribute to Him, we begin to complain about why such a good and kind being, with such knowledge and power, does not prevent our pain, suffering, and misery. We know that if a human is kind, when a child is suffering, they help them, and we expect that when a human is in hardship and suffering, another human will rush to their aid. But on what basis can we claim that God's love is of the same kind as this human love and have the same expectation of Him? Or on what basis can we reduce God's existence to the limitations of human existence and merely make the three human-like attributes of knowledge, power, and love infinite in Him, and therefore expect Him to act in a specific way in a specific case?

It goes without saying that when we say God is Merciful, Knowledgeable, and Powerful, and such expressions also appear in religious books, we expect these expressions not to be merely mysterious and enigmatic words for us. We expect that when someone speaks of God's love, knowledge, and power, it is meaningful to us in some way so that through it we can make meaningful our existence in this world and the pain and suffering imposed upon us. It seems that the believer must be content with understanding an image of God and cannot expect anything more than that. Just as the scientist must also be content with a pictorial and metaphorical understanding of the natural world. On this path, the believer has no choice but to try to select images of God that yield the least misunderstanding. Some images presented of God cannot help us make our pain and suffering meaningful. Presenting an image of God that is free from misunderstanding and has the capacity to give meaning to the believer's pain and suffering can turn the problem of evil into an advantage for them. But this depends on the believer being able to present such an image. One of the fields of human knowledge in which multiple images of God are presented is literature. In each of the literary works in which authors address the problem of evil, an image of God is presented, and each of these images provides the opportunity to measure the relationship between pain and suffering and its meaning with that specific God. In fact, in each literary work, the author, with the image they have of God, is trying to achieve an understanding of human pain and suffering in this world. But among the literary works that present an image of God and the place of pain and suffering in the world created by Him, the holy books of religions hold a special place. Referring to these books as literary works will, of course, be a matter of dispute, but since the believers in these books consider them to have a heavenly origin, the image of God presented in them and the type of understanding of pain and suffering they give us is the very one that the believer must pay attention to more than any other image and understanding.

By consulting the sacred scriptures of any religion, we will realize what place pain and suffering hold in that religion. For example, by consulting the Quran, we find that pain and suffering are recognized as an important part of life in this world. In fact, by consulting the Quran, we understand that from the perspective of this book, there is no such thing as the “problem of evil.” God is the source of all natural disasters, which in philosophy we call “natural evils,” and some of these natural disasters are mentioned in the Quran as the punishment of a rebellious and sinful people. In the monotheistic view of Islam, no other source can be considered for natural evils, just as no other source can be considered for the order and beauty existing in nature. Moral evils are also the result of the actions of human beings who will see the consequences of their deeds in this world or in another world. Moral evils exist as a category because human beings in this world are to be tested and, through their actions, determine what fate awaits them after death. Therefore, in the midst of this, they sometimes commit moral evils. While the Quran speaks of the punishment of some evil human beings in this very world, regarding others, it is said that God has left them to their own devices to eat and sleep in this world, and their deeds will be dealt with in another world. But pain and suffering in the Quran do not have a single function in our human lives; sometimes they descend upon evil people in the form of calamity and punishment, and sometimes they are a trial and test for the most virtuous human beings. The prophets in the Quran, from the Quran’s own perspective, are the best people in the world, and yet, by reading their stories, we realize that they endured tremendous pain and suffering. However, a reason or justification cannot be enumerated for all these pains and sufferings, nor has the reason for the infliction of pain and suffering upon them been examined in all these cases. For example, by reading the story of Joseph in the Quran, we find that an innocent and blameless child is thrown into a well due to his brothers’ envy, and thereafter endures a great deal of pain and suffering, such as imprisonment and being falsely accused. By reading the story of Jonah and Moses, we encounter the pains and sufferings they endured individually, and by reading the story of Lot and the people of Thamud, we realize the pains and sufferings that a number of human beings experience collectively. But pain and suffering in the Quran are not merely trial or punishment. For example, one of the sufferings that we human beings experience, and which is among the most intense, is the state of desperation and helplessness in the worst situations, such as when we realize our ship is sinking in the middle of the sea and we will soon die. Such suffering is mentioned as a punitive suffering for human beings, and it is as if this type of suffering is imposed upon humans so that they may come to faith. At the same time, it is said in the Quran that some pain and suffering lead to human despair. In another instance, the pain and suffering of evildoers in the Hereafter is pointed out to humans as a deterrent. Since no human being wishes to endure the pains and sufferings of Hell, the description of which is given in the Quran, the function of this type of pain and suffering is deterrence and avoidance. This brief examination shows that pain and suffering in the Quran have different functions, reasons, and justifications, and one cannot simply prescribe a single formula for all instances of pain and suffering within it. In other words, if we wish to look at pain and suffering from the perspective of the Quran, we cannot say, as John Hick does, that pain and suffering are for soul-making. It is true that some sufferings play such a role, but some of them are mentioned in the Quran for the destruction of evildoers. Incidentally, one of the fundamental objections to John Hick’s view is that many pains and sufferings destroy the human soul and psyche to such an extent that they cannot play a nurturing role. On the other hand, one cannot claim that every pain and suffering that befalls human beings is divine punishment. Therefore, wherever an earthquake or flood occurs or any other calamity descends, it cannot be considered divine punishment, because some pains and sufferings in the Quran have other functions as well. A person who claims to know that a specific earthquake or a specific natural disaster is the result of divine punishment, or that this specific pain is for soul-making, is in fact claiming to have knowledge of the unseen and to benefit from divine knowledge.

ازآنجاکه درد و رنج‌ها در قرآن کارکرد یکسانی ندارد، هر درد و رنجی که رخ دهد ممکن است تبیینی متفاوت داشته باشد و ازآنجاکه در نگاه خداباورانه، کارکرد هر درد و رنج مشخص تنها بر خود خدا معلوم است، گفتن انسان‌ها از قصد خداوند از هر درد و رنجی تنها نتیجۀ حدس و ظن آن‌هاست. هیچ‌گاه نمی‌توانیم مدعی باشیم که می‌دانیم دلیل وقوع زلزلۀ بم یا زلزلۀ رودبار از منظر خدا چه بوده است، همان‌طورکه نمی‌توانیم بگوییم درد و رنجی که فلان کودک در فلان مورد خاص متحمل شد از منظر خداوند چه کارکردی دارد. بنا به آنچه پیش‌تر گفتیم، ما نمی‌توانیم بگوییم از مهر و محبت خداوند در هر درد و رنج مشخص بشری که رخ می‌دهد چه توقعی باید داشت. واکنش نشان دادن ما انسان‌ها به درد و رنج البته امری طبیعی است و در کتاب‌های مقدس حتی پیامبران نیز به‌خاطر برخی درد و رنج‌ها به درگاه خداوند گلایه می‌کنند، طلب کمک می‌کنند، دعا می‌کنند که از آن در امان بمانند یا حتی با خداوند چانه می‌زنند که از درد و رنج خود یا قومشان بکاهد. اما آنچه عقلانی نیست تلاش انسان است برای اینکه نشان دهد «می‌داند» هر درد و رنجی که در زندگی خود یا دیگری رخ می‌دهد چه حکمت و تبیین خداباورانه‌ای دارد. انسان نیازمند است درد و رنج خود را به‌شکلی معنادار کند و انسان خداباور نیاز دارد درد و رنج خود را به‌شکلی در ارتباط با خداوند بفهمد. او مایل است بداند فلان درد مشخصی که تجربه می‌کند عذاب است یا امتحان یا چیز دیگری. در این مسیر، انسان خداباور باید آگاه باشد که هر توجیه و دلیلی که برای درد و رنج‌های خود ارائه کند حدس و گمانی بیش نیست و بیش از آنکه توصیف واقعیت باشد، معنابخشی به درد و رنجش است.

Considering that pain, suffering, and the attribution of meaning to them are central to the problem of evil, we cannot pretend that this issue is like a mathematical formula requiring a solution. There was once a mistaken belief common among philosophers that reason and emotions are entirely separate from one another, whereas the two are intertwined, and rationality without emotions is a kind of psychosis, while emotions without reason are immaturity. In matters concerning human pain and suffering, a formulaic approach that disregards the feelings of sentient beings will lead us to unpleasant conclusions. Just as ignoring the rational dimension in these discussions and allowing emotions to dominate them can lead us toward being agitated and deceived. In most philosophical articles and books, it is impossible to portray the emotional dimension of the problem of evil. This is because philosophers usually content themselves with saying that there are evils in our world that cause pain and suffering. In literary works, however, there is an opportunity to elaborate upon and examine these pains and sufferings. Some literary works owe their value to the subtle and precise recounting of the multilayered emotions of humanity. Conversely, literary works also have the weakness that, through the powerful pen of their authors, they can allow emotions to dominate the discussion and diminish the role of reason. To create a balance between emotions and reason, and to give each its due weight in the problem of evil, it is necessary to study literary and philosophical works on this issue side by side. Therefore, following the publication of the books “On the Problem of Evil” and “The Problem of Evil: Selected Essays in Analytic Philosophy”, we present the present volume, entitled “The Problem of Evil in Literary Works”, to those interested in the philosophy of religion.

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In the book Examining the Problem of Evil in Literary Works, essays that explore the problem of evil in the works of literary figures such as Dostoevsky, Albert Camus, and Herman Melville have been translated into Persian.

Introduction Zohair Bagheri No’parast

The Problem of Evil in Literature Shalom J. Kahn / Mehrdad Bidgoli

Pastoral Literature and the Plague: Proving the Fundamental Problem of Evil in Ian McEwan’s Novel Black Dogs Judith Seaboyer / Ahmad Hosseini

The Problem of Evil in Paradise Lost Allan H. Gilbert / Mohammad Hadi Forouzeshnia

The Disputation of Ivan Karamazov Richard Harris / Leila Bakhtiari

Herman Melville and the Problem of Evil William S. Dix / Masoumeh Rezaei

Job and the Problem of Evil Kenneth Seeskin / Ahmad Fekri Helabad

Suffering and the Problem of Evil in the Novels of Shusaku Endo Mineko Honda / Mohammad Yousefloui

Camus and the Problem of Evil Ben Mijuskovic / Sheida Rasekh

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