Weighing Epistemic Autonomy Against Testimony: A Reconciliation Proposal

Is trusting the words of others a sign of epistemic immaturity? If autonomy is a virtue and a rational obligation, what place does the “testimony of others” hold in the system of human beliefs?

An article titled “Weighing Epistemic Autonomy Against Testimony: A Reconciliation Proposal,” written by Omid Keshmiri with the collaboration of Mohammad Reza Amini, addresses this important issue. The article tackles one of the significant tensions in contemporary epistemology: the relationship between autonomy and reliance on the opinions of others. According to certain established interpretations, trusting the words of others is considered a form of dogmatic deference, incompatible with the dignity of an autonomous person, thereby calling into question the role of testimony in the formation of justified knowledge.

Through a careful examination of these views, the article demonstrates that this opposition is not necessarily real. It argues that critiques based on autonomy are insufficient to negate the validity of testimony, and that a considered recourse to the opinions of others can be part of the very rationality and autonomy that is being championed. A reconciliatory reading can be offered between these two important concepts, one that preserves the value of autonomy while also explaining the fundamental place of testimony in human epistemic life.

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This article on the Philosophical Meditations website

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