Which Philosophical Perspective Best Explains the Phenomenon of Religious Diversity?

Yaser Mirdamadi: What you are about to read is the transcribed text of a talk delivered in December 2016 at the “Iranian Association for Literature and Art” in London. In transcribing the text, its spoken tone has been more or less preserved. This article was published in the journal “Khusheh-ha,” the annual publication of the Iranian Association for Literature and Art, Issue 20 (2018), pp. 52-71.

Introduction

We are faced with a phenomenon called religious diversity, which is, of course, not a new phenomenon; in the medieval centuries—and, in general, in the ancient world—we have, more or less, encountered this phenomenon. In fact, many of the religious diversities we face in the modern world today have their roots in the ancient world. We witness religious diversity in both Eastern and Western religions, and in both ancient and newly emerged faiths. The result of these diversities is the formation of traditions such as Islam, the Baháʼí Faith, Daoism (or Taoism), Jainism, Shinto, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, and many other religions. However, it is in the modern world that, with the expansion of communications, the phenomenon of religious diversity has taken on different colors and dimensions.

One of the questions that the phenomenon of religious diversity has posed to researchers is: why has such diversity emerged in the realm of religions? Among the various types of explanations given for this phenomenon (such as psychological, sociological, anthropological explanations, etc.), my focus in this discussion will be on philosophical explanations, and specifically the philosophical explanations offered in the modern era for the phenomenon of religious diversity. In what follows, I will attempt to categorize the philosophical answers given to the phenomenon of religious diversity. I will then try to answer the question: among the diverse views presented in the philosophical explanation of the phenomenon of religious diversity, which one is philosophically a more defensible explanation?

My claim is that the major views presented in the philosophical explanation of religious diversity can be divided into at least 9 categories. These 9 categories are:

1- Religious Relativism

2- Religious Suspensionism

3- Militant Religious Exclusivism

4- Moderate Religious Exclusivism

5- Religious Inclusivism

6- Militant Atheism

7- Friendly Atheism

8- Agnosticism

9- Religious Pluralism

Among these views in the philosophical explanation of the phenomenon of religious diversity, which view is philosophically a more defensible explanation? In my claim, the ninth view is the most defensible of all. Accordingly, the outline of today’s discussion will be that, in what follows, I will briefly explain all 9 of these views. Since I am defending the ninth view, I will naturally critique the first eight views and will ultimately defend the ninth view.

My defense of the ninth view will be based on two premises. The first premise is that the major views expressed in the philosophical explanation of the phenomenon of religious diversity can be placed within these 9 categories. The second premise is that if eight views out of these 9 are not defensible, then the remaining view (the ninth) will be defensible. In other words, I will here defend the ninth view, or religious pluralism, only in a negative manner (that is, by critiquing the other rival views), and the time of the session does not permit me to address the objections raised against religious pluralism.

1- Religious Relativism

The first perspective is religious relativism. To put it simply and succinctly, religious relativists believe that: there exist various and incompatible conceptions of the sacred — now, the sacred can be anything, it can be Allah, it can be Yahweh, it can be the Trinity or the three hypostases in Christian theology, it can be Nirvana, or anything else. This is the first premise of religious relativists, which is a descriptive premise, and the history of religions testifies to its truth. However, relativists have another premise, which is a normative premise and constitutes the core of their claim, and it is this second premise that is controversial.

This premise is that: there is no way to adjudicate between these various and incompatible conceptions of the sacred. Then, by putting these two premises together, religious relativists conclude that, therefore, each group's conception is true for that group, and we do not, in fact, have a trans-group, trans-personal, or trans-tribal truth, and if one can speak of truth, one can only speak of it as qualified by a personal or group qualifier, or by a specific religion, sect, tribe, group, or creed. To put it another way, from the viewpoint of religious relativists, Islam is true for Muslims, Christianity is true for Christians, Judaism is true for Jews, and there is no comprehensive aspect or common ground among these religions, or there is no criterion for judging between these various religious claims.

A Critique of Religious Relativism

The Loss of the Normative Aspect

Many criticisms can be leveled against relativism in general and religious relativism in particular. The first criticism is the loss of the normative aspect. To better understand this critique, it is helpful to explain the difference between the "normative" aspect and the "descriptive" aspect. When we say, "Hasan came yesterday," we are reporting a fact; this has a descriptive aspect. But when we say, "It would have been better if Hasan had come yesterday," we are making a value judgment. This judgment has a normative aspect. I mentioned above that relativists say there are various conceptions of the sacred, or of truth in general. Each group also considers its own conception to be the truth and other conceptions to be false. The religious relativist does not say that we should abandon speaking of truth altogether, but rather says we should abandon speaking of absolute truth and speak of relative truth; in this way, that from the perspective of Muslims, Islam is the truth, from the perspective of Jews, the Jewish faith is the truth, and so on.

But there is an important point here. Our dispute was fundamentally over truth (it was a normative dispute), not over which group considers what to be true (it was not a descriptive dispute). The dispute was not over our description of which group considers what to be true, but rather over which group is correct. The dispute was over which group possesses the truth, not which group considers what to be true. This point can be better understood here: when relativists say Muslims consider Islam to be the truth and Jews consider Judaism to be the truth, if you present this proposition even to a person who is anti-Islam and anti-Judaism, they will accept it and say, yes, Muslims consider Islam to be the truth, but the question remains open: is the claim to possess the truth by any religion a correct claim or not? This question from the anti-Islam individual is, in fact, asking from the normative aspect, the aspect concerning how things ought to be, not how they are in practice. Relativists strip truth of its normative aspect while still speaking of truth. They reduce truth to its descriptive aspect. This is while concepts like truth, justice, and beauty possess a normative aspect, meaning that by invoking these concepts, we speak of how things ought to be, not how they are. On this basis, instead of solving the problem, relativists actually eliminate the problem statement, by stripping truth of its normative aspect, which seems inseparable from it.

Closing the Door to Dialogue

A second criticism leveled at relativism is that it necessarily shuts down dialogue. When we engage in dialogue with one another, the very nature of this dialogue is such that we seem to be seeking a truth that is supposed to be common to all of us. Attaining such a truth is difficult and perhaps even impossible, but our effort is to at least draw closer to this truth and, in a manner of speaking, to run "in pursuit of the song of truth." But when relativists say that truth for each group is whatever an individual or a group considers to be true, we in fact no longer have a dialogue, because each group has already discovered the truth for itself beforehand. I, as an individual or as a member of a group that possesses the truth, have my own truth; you, as an individual or as a member of a group that possesses the truth, have your own truth. We no longer have a dialogue. Dialogue is about the pursuit of truth, but we are possessors of truth, so dialogue is meaningless.

But what is wrong with relativism leading to the end of dialogue? The problem with shutting down dialogue is that if you close the path of dialogue, your alternatives are either violence or deception. We have, in fact, no more than three ways to convey our opinion to others. We must either convince them, the path to which is dialogue and reasoning, or we must resort to violence, or to deception. Of course, there is a fourth way, which is a subtle appeal to feelings and emotions without deception. A subtle appeal to feelings and emotions is, of course, not necessarily morally wrong, but violence and deception are necessarily morally wrong.

If a subtle appeal to feelings and emotions is to avoid being an instance of deception, it must have a rational basis; consequently, this option also reverts to the option of rational persuasion. Relativism closes the path of rational persuasion and thereby opens the path to deception and violence. Relativism, therefore, has dangerous moral consequences, and insofar as a phenomenon has unwarranted, dangerous moral consequences, relativism is also unwarranted.¹

2- Religious Suspensionism

The second view is "Religious Suspensionism." This is, of course, a title I have coined, and you will not see a view under this title in the literature on this subject, but I believe a category of views must certainly be named under this title, because there are views that can be designated in this way. Religious suspensionism is in some respects similar to religious relativism, but there are also differences. This view holds that, historically, many people have killed and eliminated one another in the name of truth (sacred truth, God, the Prophet, and the like). From this premise, religious suspensionists conclude: let us abandon the discussion of truth. The discussion of which God is true and which God is fabricated, which prophet is true and which one is fabricated or, as they say, a false prophet, which religion's book is truly divine and which one's was made by humans—they say, abandon these discussions; this debate cannot be resolved. This view gained currency, particularly in the West during the Enlightenment, after several centuries of religious conflict between Catholics and Protestants and after several centuries of Crusades between Muslims and Christians. For proponents of this view, nothing emerges from the discussion of religious and doctrinal truth but blood and violence. So, let us suspend this discussion.

The important point here is that suspension differs from denial. The difference between suspension and denial is that in both denial and affirmation, you are not suspending judgment; rather, you are making a judgment. But in suspension, you neither affirm nor reject; you simply say, let Moses follow his religion and Jesus follow his. Whoever is religious, and to whichever religion they are inclined, let them have their own religious inclination. And the one who has, so to speak, adopted irreligion, let them also go their own way.

The suspensionist can even bring to bear an analysis drawn from the views of the French philosopher Michel Foucault in favor of their own perspective and say that when the dispute is over truth, only the name of truth is at stake, but behind it lies power. In fact, I who want to say I am right, want to eliminate you. And you who say you are right, want to eliminate me. The result is that we should simply abandon the discussion about truth and place it in a state of permanent suspension, not necessarily denying it, but rather, in my private solitude, I hold to my own truth.

A Critique of Religious Suspensionism

I must confess that this view seems very attractive and at first glance might even appear defensible. Part of the appeal of this view is that it makes way for tolerance. However, a critique that seems applicable to this view is that we have two types of suspension of judgment. One is permanent theoretical suspension, which is agnosticism, and I will address it later. The second type of suspension of judgment is permanent practical suspensionism; that is, we fundamentally never pass judgment on the truth of religions, on whether between religiosity and non-religiosity, between theism and atheism, between naturalism and supernaturalism, and in practice we always set judgment aside.

It seems that suspensionism in this sense (that is, in the sense of permanent practical suspensionism) is contrary to truth-seeking. One who is a truth-seeker may very well, in setting aside the suspension of judgment, be right at least in some cases. It is true that truth-seeking, at least in some cases—if not always—requires that we begin with the suspension of judgment, meaning when we want to seek the truth, we initially neither endorse nor reject any school or viewpoint, but rather place each before us as a viewpoint that is possibly true or false, but then as we proceed we may pass judgment.

If someone says that you must fundamentally set aside judgment permanently, because as soon as you pass judgment, this leads to violence, the response that can be given to them is that this view does not seem defensible. Yes, it is true that historically speaking, speaking of truth has often been bloody, but this does not entail that speaking of truth is inherently and entirely bloody. What history shows us is that bloodiness is a mistake, but even you, in order to critique that violence, must pass judgment. If you suspend all judgments, how do you know violence is condemnable? The decree for the permanent suspension of judgment entails that you also suspend judgment on violence.

On this basis, the permanent suspension of judgment in practice is not possible at all, and moreover—even supposing it were possible—it is contrary to truth-seeking and, specifically, contrary to anti-violence and the expansion of tolerance. Because for the expansion of tolerance and anti-violence, you need to pass judgment, you need to critique some of the judgments that are violence-oriented. You cannot be a suspensionist towards those violence-oriented judgments; you cannot say, "I have nothing to do with whether killing the followers of other religions is right or not." Suspensionism here is unjustified, because these violence-oriented and violence-spreading judgments must be critiqued; on this basis, permanent practical suspensionism is not defensible.

      Nevertheless, a temporary, practical suspension of judgment is sometimes expedient. Let me give an example. Among my own researcher friends, I have those who are critics of the Baháʼí Faith, yet they never express it. Why? Because they say that in Iran and large parts of the Islamic world, the followers of this faith are under pressure and subjected to violence. If we were to criticize them, they cannot respond; even supposing they could respond, they would still be silenced. On this basis, fairness dictates that fair-minded critics should not criticize them now; supposing that one day they emerge from under the burden of this violence imposed upon them and are able to secure their rights, then critics too can criticize them in a calm atmosphere based on mutual respect and enter into critical dialogue with them. This is also a kind of suspension of judgment. But this is a temporary, practical suspension of judgment, not a permanent theoretical suspension or a permanent practical suspension. In any case, the wholesale and permanent practical suspension of judgment is contrary to the pursuit of truth.

3 and 4 – Religious Exclusivism

The third and fourth perspectives are religious exclusivism. Religious exclusivism itself has two models:

A – Combative religious exclusivism

B – Friendly religious exclusivism.

When religious exclusivism is mentioned, usually only Islam comes to mind, whereas religious exclusivism is neither unique to Islam, nor are all Muslims religious exclusivists. Historically, we also have Christian, Jewish, and even Buddhist religious exclusivism. Religious exclusivism, in general, holds that God or the sacred has manifested in only one of the religions, and other religions are deprived of the manifestation of the sacred or the divine manifestation and, consequently, of salvation. Naturally, Jewish, Christian, and Islamic exclusivism are the most well-known models of exclusivism, but as I mentioned, we also have, for example, Buddhist and Hindu exclusivism.

A Critique of Religious Exclusivism

One of the most important criticisms that can be leveled against religious exclusivism is that religious exclusivism, especially in the monotheistic religions—that is, in single-deity faiths like Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—is incompatible with the transcendence of God. The transcendence of God entails that God is not one of the mundane, everyday truths. That it is, for example, twelve thirty-eight in the afternoon is very useful to us, but at the same time, it is a mundane belief indicative of a mundane truth. In contrast, if God exists, according to the theistic view, God is a transcendental truth. But religious exclusivists confine God to one religion and denomination. If you confine God to one religion and denomination, then it is as if you have turned God into a mundane truth and stripped away His transcendence.

But if God is confined and restricted to one religion and denomination, why is God's transcendence stripped from Him? Because one of the central attributes of God is that God is "omnipresent." In monotheistic religions, God is not only in the heavens but is present everywhere, and the corollary of God's omnipresence is that He is not present in only one religion and denomination. This is while religious exclusivists say that God is present in only one religion; this, however—as noted—is incompatible with the transcendence and omnipresence of God.

Note that in my critique of religious exclusivism, I have not stepped outside the realm of theism. Someone who steps outside the realm of theism could perhaps level other criticisms against religious exclusivists; for instance, they could say that God does not exist at all, let alone manifest or not manifest in only one religion. I did not enter into that critique, because in my view, firstly, atheism is not defensible, and secondly, even if atheism were defensible, theists, if they take God's attributes such as transcendence and omnipresence seriously, cannot be religious exclusivists, because God is too transcendent to manifest solely in one religion and denomination.

Religious exclusivists are divided into two categories, and this distinction is very important: militant religious exclusivists and friendly religious exclusivists. What is the difference between these two categories, and what is the significance of this distinction? The difference between these two types of religious exclusivism is particularly important because, in contemporary Christian philosophical theology and philosophy of religion, religious exclusivism has prominent advocates among philosophers of religion. An example is William Alston; two other examples are Alvin Plantinga and David Basinger. These are very strong philosophers of religion and are advocates of (Christian) religious exclusivism. However, these individuals are friendly religious exclusivists. In what sense? In the sense that they say only Christianity is the true religion, but if someone is a Muslim, a Jew, or a Baha'i, we tolerate them. That is, they grant individuals, so to speak, the "right to be wrong." That is, they say, you have the right to err. From the perspective of a friendly Christian exclusivist, if someone is a Baha'i or a Muslim, they have erred, because God has manifested only in Jesus Christ, and God the Son put on human flesh, dove into history, and became incarnate (incarnation). Yet, at the same time, if someone is a Muslim, they are in error, but they have the right to be in error. Of course, Christianity has not always been so tolerant throughout its history, but now many Christian exclusivists believe in the "right to be wrong."

But militant exclusivism is, as a rule, not like this. A militant Muslim exclusivist does not grant anyone the right to be a Baha'i; they do not grant the right to religious conversion (conversion), meaning, in their view, a Muslim does not have the right to leave their religion and become a Christian or a Baha'i. However, friendly religious exclusivism grants such a right to individuals. Nevertheless, from a philosophical standpoint, the situation of friendly religious exclusivism is no better than that of militant religious exclusivism, although it is better from a social and moral standpoint. Militant exclusivism actually has two errors: one due to its exclusivism (in which error there is no difference between friendly and militant exclusivism) and the other due to its militancy.²

5- Religious Inclusivism

The fifth view is religious inclusivism. Religious inclusivism has similarities with religious exclusivism and, of course, also has differences. The similarity between these two groups is that inclusivists, just like religious exclusivists, believe that God has manifested completely and perfectly in one religion. So, one religion is pure truth. Up to this point, they share common ground with religious exclusivists. However, the difference with inclusivists is that they say other religions, to the extent that they resemble the perfect religion, possess lower degrees of truth.

A Critique of Religious Inclusivism

If the critique I leveled above against religious exclusivism is defensible, religious inclusivism will also be subject to the same critique. More precisely, the exclusivist part of religious inclusivism will be subject to the same critique above. This critique is that God's transcendence, as well as God's omnipresence, necessitates that God be more or less present in all religions and have a pervasive manifestation. Consequently, salvation, which is the most important promise of religions, must also be pervasive.³

6 and 7- Atheism

The sixth and seventh perspectives are atheism (friendly and antagonistic). Atheism can be explained through various models. The model I have chosen is based on the concept of consciousness. From the atheist's viewpoint, the universe lacks consciousness. Consciousness exists only among humans and perhaps some animals, but other beings and every particle of the universe lack consciousness. What is consciousness? According to one conception, anything that possesses "intentionality" (حیث التفاتی), meaning it is about or directed at something, has consciousness. What is the difference between the human mind and a stone? It seems that the stone is in itself, not directed at another, not attentive to another. But my mind and yours are directed at another, aware of another. In fact, I, standing here, am speaking directed at you; you, sitting there, are listening to me, and this means you are directed at another. This is consciousness. But a stone, at least at first glance, does not seem to be so. Now the question is: Is consciousness limited only to humans and some advanced animals like apes and whales, or do the rest of the universe's components also possess consciousness? Theists say yes, all parts of the universe possess consciousness to varying degrees, and of course, in their view, the peak and perfection of consciousness is in God. Atheists, or naturalists in general, say the universe lacks consciousness.

The question that arises is: if, from the atheist's perspective, the universe lacks consciousness, then what explanation do they have for human consciousness? In this universe devoid of consciousness, where did human consciousness emerge from? Atheists say that human consciousness can be reduced to something that is not of the nature of consciousness (a material thing, for example, brain neurons). That is to say, the mind is the brain. On this basis, even human consciousness is an advanced form of a natural or material thing that is not of the nature of consciousness.

According to a conception that I believe is more defensible, atheism is linked with naturalism, although they are not equivalent. On this basis, what explanation do atheists offer for religions? They say all religions are false, because cosmic consciousness, transcendent consciousness in the form and guise of God, or the sacred, does not exist.

Critique of Atheism

It seems that atheism has not yet been able to provide a satisfactory philosophical explanation for the phenomenon of consciousness. A very compelling example of a critique of naturalism from this perspective has been presented by Thomas Nagel. Thomas Nagel is a very important American philosopher and is among the few philosophers who still produce important works in five or six branches of philosophy. The interesting point here is that Thomas Nagel is himself an atheist.⁴

At the same time, when it comes to consciousness, Nagel says that the naturalism to which atheists generally appeal to defend their atheistic view has failed to explain the phenomenon of consciousness. In his view, the claim by naturalist philosophers of mind that the world is merely a natural thing, limited only to matter and energy, has failed. Why? In a famous article titled "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", which is a classic and influential paper in the philosophy of mind, Nagel argues that consciousness has a phenomenal aspect and a subjective quality that cannot be reduced to the functions of consciousness (problem-solving, reacting to stimuli, etc.).⁵

Now, if naturalism cannot explain the phenomenon of consciousness, what is Nagel's alternative theory? Nagel later defends the idea of "panpsychism" (همه‌روان‌مند‌انگاری). His idea is that all components of existence possess a degree of consciousness. If you recall, earlier, by way of example, I said the difference between a human and a stone is that the stone seemingly lacks consciousness, whereas a human has it. But in fact, Nagel says, even that stone possesses weak degrees of consciousness. If you are interested in this discussion, see Nagel's relatively recent book titled Mind and Cosmos, published by Oxford University Press in 2012, which has also been translated into Persian.⁶

Atheism has two versions: friendly atheism and militant atheism. Friendly atheism has many proponents among atheists. Friendly atheists say that theists of any religion hold a philosophically indefensible view, but they have the right to be in error, because they possess the "right to be wrong." Theists are deluded; they think this world possesses an inner consciousness, but let them be happy in their delusion and superstition. We have no quarrel with them. They have the right to their own lifestyle, communities, and schools, provided, of course, that they do not harm others. We only engage in intellectual critique of them. But those who are militant atheists say no, theism is a virus, and this virus must be eradicated.

A very famous and recent example of militant atheists is Richard Dawkins. Dawkins believes that all religions are viruses. Dawkins says you should not raise your children to be theists. He is a professor at Oxford University, and one of his criticisms is why there is a Faculty of Theology at Oxford University. What is this "nonsense" being taught at one of the best universities in the world? It seems that Dawkins's thinking has a completely militant aspect and, in fact, seeks to eliminate religious education—whether for children or adults—in any religion. They actually consider religion to be a virus and a cancer.⁷

8- Agnosticism

The eighth perspective is agnosticism. Above, in the section on religious suspension of judgment, I mentioned that permanent theoretical suspension of judgment is, in fact, agnosticism. Agnostics say that the supernatural realm, even if it hypothetically exists, is fundamentally unknowable, and we have no information even about the very existence of this realm, let alone its nature and details. Agnostics say that, unlike physical truths, metaphysical truths are not identifiable. Distinguishing between physical and metaphysical truths is not simple at all, but a simple expression of it is as follows: Consider it a fact that I see you now. This fact becomes a basis for my belief that you are present here now. This is a physical belief, or at least a belief rooted in physical reality. But is "God exists" like this belief? It does not seem so; this is a metaphysical belief. Agnostics or La-Adris—one of the most famous of whom in our tradition is Khayyam—say that as far as physical truths are concerned, yes, we have knowledge. Our domain of knowledge is limited to physical truths, but when it comes to metaphysical truths, "our hands are too short and the dates are on the palm tree." In fact, metaphysical truths, if they exist, are unknowable, and naturally, something that is unknowable is also unteachable, meaning it cannot be imparted to others either.

Now, what explanation do agnostics give for the phenomenon of religious diversity? They turn to naturalistic explanations such as sociological, psychological, anthropological, and other explanations. In their view, a metaphysical philosophical explanation of the phenomenon of religious diversity cannot be provided. In their view, as far as metaphysical explanations are concerned, one must adopt a stance of permanent theoretical suspension of judgment.

At least according to one conception, agnostics are not atheists. The difference between an atheist and an agnostic is that the atheist says we can attain knowledge of metaphysical truths, but when we go to verify these truths, we see that the claim made under the heading "God exists" is indefensible. Agnostics, however, say that our sack of metaphysical truths has a blind knot that cannot be untied, and right and wrong cannot be distinguished from one another. In other words, we do not have the possibility of evaluating the truth or falsehood of metaphysical claims.

Critique of Agnosticism

It is worth noting that agnosticism has two versions: strong or maximal agnosticism and weak or minimal agnosticism. Maximal agnostics believe that metaphysical knowledge in the domain of religion is fundamentally impossible. This is the version we have been discussing so far. However, there is a weaker version of agnosticism that does not rule out the possibility of metaphysical knowledge in the domain of religion entirely, but holds that the evidence for theism or atheism has so far been more or less equal, and consequently, as far as the evidence guides us, we ought to adopt agnosticism. My critique in what follows will pertain solely to the maximal version of agnosticism.

A critique that can be leveled against (maximal) agnosticism is that philosophers of science—especially after the failure of positivism—have clearly shown that empirical science is also built upon metaphysical beliefs. At least two examples of the very important metaphysical beliefs upon which science is built are the principle of causality and the principle of induction.

Causality means that every phenomenon has a cause that necessarily brings about that effect. That is, no phenomenon is without a cause. The second principle upon which all natural-empirical sciences are built is the principle of induction. For example, we repeatedly bring water to a boil in various environments; in all these instances, water boils at one hundred degrees. We then conclude that water always boils at one hundred degrees. This belief has a physical root, as it is based on numerous instances of experimentation. But when we make a generalization, we go beyond the empirical evidence at our disposal, and this is where metaphysical assumptions come into play. One of these assumptions is that the world is uniform. Consequently, the cases we have tested are representative of the cases we have not tested, and therefore these cases are generalizable. However, the principle of the uniformity of nature itself is not testable and is thus a metaphysical principle.

On this basis, if agnostics believe that any kind of metaphysical claim is unknowable, then it seems that modern science would also become unknowable, because modern science is also built upon metaphysical beliefs. Established scientific beliefs such as "the Earth is round," "the principle of gravity," "the Earth revolves around the sun"—beliefs on the basis of which we build airplanes and manage our lives—are all built upon metaphysical beliefs. If metaphysical beliefs are unevaluable, science will also become unevaluable.

Of course, agnostics might respond by saying that scientific metaphysical beliefs are accepted, but religious metaphysical beliefs are not. Their reason for this distinction could be that we can somehow attain knowledge of the principle of causality and the principle of induction, but we cannot attain knowledge of God and the transcendent realms. However, it seems that in terms of their metaphysical characteristic, there is no difference between religious metaphysical propositions and scientific metaphysical propositions. It might be said in response that these two categories of metaphysical beliefs are not equal, because, for example, induction is rooted in thousands of observed instances, which provides at least an empirical basis for the principle of induction, whereas theism is not like this and is a purely metaphysical belief. In reply, it can be said that theism is also rooted in the religious experiences of individuals throughout history. Many human beings throughout history have had religious experiences and have sensed the presence of the divine in their lives. On this basis, it seems there is no fundamental difference between religious metaphysical beliefs and non-religious metaphysical beliefs. If non-religious (especially scientific) metaphysical beliefs appear to be reasonable and acceptable beliefs, then there is in principle no obstacle to religious metaphysical beliefs also being reasonable and acceptable.⁸

9- Religious Pluralism

The ninth perspective is religious pluralism. As I said at the beginning of the discussion, I believe this perspective philosophically offers the best explanation of the phenomenon of religious diversity. From the viewpoint of religious pluralists, the great religions of the world are all manifestations of the Truth and bring salvation. The most important contemporary pluralist philosopher is John Hick. John Hick's argument is that the universe is inherently ambiguous (though this ambiguity is not to the extent of agnosticism, according to which one cannot have any justified metaphysical belief at all). The ambiguity of the universe, as it appears, allows human beings to offer both a religious explanation of the world and a non-religious one.

Hick argues that all the great religions of the world share a common soteriological pattern. For Hick, religious experience justifies religious belief. Let me explain this point a little further. Many of us who are perhaps religious (religious in any faith) are not so merely because our parents and family were religious, and so we became religious too; rather, we have also had doubts throughout our lives. The persistence of our religiosity can, among other reasons, be because events have occurred in our lives where we felt we sensed the presence of the divine. The opposite, of course, also happens. Crises have occurred in our lives that have led us to the experience that, as a poet says, "I swear there is no God on earth / Other than you and your suffering, there is nothing on earth." This is also a kind of experience, but a non-religious experience. A non-religious experience can justify an individual who turns to atheism in their belief. A religious experience can, conversely, do the same. If I have felt the presence of the divine somewhere in my life, my belief in theism will gain, at least as philosophers say, prima facie justification.

But the idea that religious experience can justify, or at least make reasonable, religious belief is something that religious exclusivists also accept. It is from this point onward that Hick's path diverges from that of religious exclusivists. Religious exclusivists say, yes, we have experienced Christ, therefore Christianity alone is the true religion. Hick says, the religious experience that justifies you in your religious belief has a universal characteristic, such that it either justifies all religions or justifies no religion. This is because an experience similar to your religious experience is also found among the adherents of other religions, especially the mystics of other religions, and the religious experience of the adherents of other religions has both a similar structure to your religious experience and similar consequences to the consequences of your religious experience.

On this basis, for Hick, if religious experience yields epistemic justification, which in his view it does, it yields epistemic justification for all religions. Hick discusses the epistemic justification that religious experience yields in his first book, titled Faith and Knowledge, which is a classic and influential work.⁹

But he discusses the second point (that the epistemic justification yielded by religious experience is a universal justification) in his most famous book, An Interpretation of Religion, which is one of the most influential books in the analytic tradition of philosophy of religion in the second half of the twentieth century.¹⁰

For Hick, different religions are different responses to the divine reality. All great religions are, consequently, salvific. Why? Because they all possess the necessary ethical framework for bringing about salvation. That ethical framework is: "the transformation of human existence from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness." This is the most important thing that religions do. Any religion that does this possesses truth.

Conclusion: Religious pluralists of the world, unite!

Religious pluralism is philosophically the most defensible option for the philosophical explanation of the phenomenon of religious diversity. For, firstly, all eight alternative options I enumerated have problems that seem more serious compared to the problems of religious pluralism. Therefore, since religious pluralism has fewer problems, it is more defensible. The second reason is that religious pluralism has a broad connection with the most defensible part of the theological traditions of theistic religions, which is apophatic theology or negative theology. I do not, of course, have time to explain this point, but this indication suffices.

The final practical conclusion I wish to draw from this discussion, I would like to express in the form of a slogan: "Religious pluralists of the world, unite." You might say that John Hick and other pluralist philosophers have come and paved the way. Of course, their contribution has been very prominent, and we are indeed standing on their shoulders, but their path needs to be continued, especially since, after the death of John Hick, there are now very prominent Christian philosophers of religion who are religious exclusivists. Three prominent Christian philosophers of religion, whom I named earlier and all three are in some way religious exclusivists, are William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and David Basinger.

On this basis, religious pluralists need to recruit allies. A number of people must come forward for the philosophical defense of religious pluralism. My suggestion is that if this discussion has been convincing or at least interesting to you, and you have philosophical interests, then you can either make philosophy your field or, in your private time, certainly familiarize yourself with the philosophical literature on this subject. Muslim, Baháʼí, Jewish, Christian, Hindu, Daoist, Jain, Zoroastrian, and other religious pluralists must enter a philosophical arena to defend religious pluralism. In my view, in this way, the world will benefit more from the presence of the divine, and the vile violence perpetrated in the name of God, the sacred, and religions will be reduced.

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Notes

1- For a defense of religious relativism, see:

Runzo, Joseph, Reason, Relativism and God. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1986.

For a critique of relativism in general, see: Boghossian, Paul, Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism, translated by Mirdamadi, Yaser, Tehran: Kargadan, 1395 [2016].

2- For a defense of religious exclusivism, see:

Kim, Joseph, Reformed Epistemology and the Problem of Religious Diversity: Proper Function, Epistemic Disagreement, and Christian Exclusivism. Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2011.

3- For a Buddhist defense of religious inclusivism, see:

Kiblinger, Kristin Beise, Buddhist Inclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others. London/New York: Routledge, 2005.

4- Nagel is not only an atheist, but one could say he is a full-fledged atheist. In fact, we have two models of atheism. One model of atheism says there is no God, but wishes there were. The other model of atheism says there is no God, and it is better that there isn't. Thomas Nagel is of this second model. For this reason, I called him a full-fledged atheist.

5- Nagel, Thomas, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (1974): 435–50.

6- Nagel, Thomas, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

7- Dawkins, Richard, The God Delusion. London: Black Swan, 2007.

For a brief critique of the views of Dawkins and other New Atheists, see this book, which is apparently being translated into Persian:

Poole, Michael, The “New” Atheism: 10 Arguments That Don’t Hold Water? Oxford/Chicago: Lion Books, 2009.

8- For a defense of agnosticism, see:

Kenny, Anthony, The Unknown God: Agnostic Essays. London/New York: Continnuum, 2004.

9 -Hick, John, Faith and Knowledge. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan, 1988.

10 -Hick, John, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.

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Which Philosophical Perspective Best Explains the Phenomenon of Religious Diversity?

Yaser Mirdamadi

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