A Critical Look at the Theory of 'Prophetic Dreams' from a Phenomenological and Hermeneutic Perspective

More than three years have passed since the publication of the highly controversial article “Muhammad (PBUH): The Narrator of Prophetic Dreams” by my esteemed teacher, Dr. Abdolkarim Soroush. During these years, many of my students and friends have asked me to enter the discussion surrounding his article. However, concern over the emergence of certain intellectual, moral, political, and social misunderstandings that have existed and continue to exist from all sides of the debate prevented me from participating in creating a kind of dialogue with our dear teacher. Yet an invitation from a social group on Telegram to hold a session for questions and answers regarding the article “Muhammad (PBUH): The Narrator of Prophetic Dreams” compelled me to blacken pages in critique and review of this article, though I had no desire to publish them. But the recent criticisms of my dear friend and brother, Dr. Soroush Dabbagh, in an article titled “Shariati and a Baseless Challenge” became a motivation for me to undertake its publication. It is hoped that the expansion and development of such discussions will aid the emergence of an authentic philosophical theoretical tradition in our land.

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A Critical Look at the Theory of 'Prophetic Dreams' from a Phenomenological and Hermeneutic Perspective

Bijan Abdolkarimi

Introduction:

More than three years have passed since the publication of the highly controversial article “Muhammad (PBUH): The Narrator of Prophetic Dreams” by my esteemed teacher, Dr. Abdolkarim Soroush. During these years, many of my students and friends have asked me to enter the discussion surrounding his article. However, concern over the emergence of certain intellectual, moral, political, and social misunderstandings that have existed and continue to exist from all sides of the debate prevented me from participating in creating a kind of dialogue with our dear teacher. Yet an invitation from a social group on Telegram to hold a session for questions and answers regarding the article “Muhammad (PBUH): The Narrator of Prophetic Dreams” compelled me to blacken pages in critique and review of this article, though I had no desire to publish them. But the recent criticisms of my dear friend and brother, Dr. Soroush Dabbagh, in an article titled “Shariati and a Baseless Challenge” became a motivation for me to undertake its publication. It is hoped that the expansion and development of such discussions will aid the emergence of an authentic philosophical theoretical tradition in our land.

1. The Necessity and Importance of Discussing the Category of Revelation

The human being is an inherently historical entity. This statement means that historicity, or the historical dimension, is one of the most fundamental characteristics of the mode of human existence and is the cause of a radical and fundamental distinction from the mode of existence of other entities. When we speak of the relationship between “human” and “history,” we must not understand the human’s relationship as that of an “independent” entity that is “in history,” as if their relationship were like that of a train car to the railway track or like that of river water to the riverbed; rather, the mode of human existence is a historical mode of existence, that is, a mode of existence that is rooted in the past, before it came to be, has presence and continuity in the present, and whose future, which is its projections, constitutes its present, which is related to its past. The implication of this statement that the human being is an inherently historical entity is that human understandings, interpretations, actions, and states are all related to their historical tradition and cultural horizon, and no human understanding or action can be independent of its tradition and historical and cultural horizon.

Now, when we reflect upon ourselves as an Iranian-Muslim subject, the Hebrew-Jewish-Semitic tradition—which, alongside the traditions of Greek metaphysics, Indian spiritual thought, or the Far East, is one of the greatest historical traditions of humanity and has offered the three great cognate religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam to humankind—is undoubtedly one of the most important traditions constituting our historical and cultural identity, a tradition that has influenced all our individual and social understandings and actions.

    Categories such as “revelation,” “prophet or messenger,” “prophetic mission,” “biʿtha (sending forth),” “sacred text,” “divine knowledge,” “wisdom,” “mysticism,” “tanzīl (sending down),” “taʾwīl (esoteric interpretation),” “the will of the Lawgiver,” and “jurisprudence” form some of the most fundamental key concepts and the central core of the historical Semitic-Jewish tradition, and the category of “revelation” holds such a foundational and pivotal position among these concepts that the other constitutive categories of this great historical theoretical tradition form a conceptual network whose central and foundational core is the category of “revelation” or “the possibility of human dialogue with the Sacred.” Therefore, any mode of thinking about the category of “revelation” and the question of the prophet’s foundational experience establishes a negative or positive relation and connection not only with the central core of the great historical Hebrew-Jewish tradition but also with a fundamental and essential concept of other Eastern traditions that share a horizon with the Hebrew-Jewish tradition (for other Eastern traditions have also been formed around the foundational axis of the possibility of human openness to the truth of the world and the possibility of a kind of call between the human being and the truth of the world).

    In my view, in the present age—that is, in the time of the expansion of metaphysical subjectivism and the dominance of modern scientific and technological rationality—the question of the possibility or impossibility of revelation, or, in the words of the pre-Socratic sages in the era before the emergence of Greek metaphysics, the human being’s dialogue with the Logos or the fundamental truth of this world, is the most important question facing Eastern thinkers, including intellectuals in the Islamic world. To put it more simply, according to metaphysical subjectivism, especially at its peak as manifested in modern Cartesian-Kantian subjectivism, the human being cannot attain a truth beyond his own consciousness. Based on the experience of the cogito, which provides a framework for many modern philosophies, “consciousness” is the first, most accessible, and most certain thing for consciousness, and whatever lies beyond consciousness is always subject to doubt, and fundamentally we have no path beyond consciousness and subjectivity. According to Kantian subjectivism as well, our knowledge is “phenomenal.” This means that we have access only to phenomena, that is, to what is constituted within the sphere of human consciousness, and we have no window onto the noumenon or the essence and truth of this world. In the contemporary world, where such a subjectivism has come to dominate, the category of revelation or speaking with the Logos—in the absence of which, as the experience of the modern lifeworld shows, a profound nihilism will overtake humanity—has been relegated to the realm of myths and legends. Thus, with the denial of the possibility of the category of revelation, or of human dialogue with the Logos or with the soul of this world, or its reduction to psychological and non-epistemic categories, all Eastern traditions and their philosophical foundations, including the entire Hebrew-Semitic-Jewish tradition of which Islam is also a child and a result, collapse, and the ground will be prepared for the total and complete dominance of Western metaphysics, which in its historical course has led to the expansion of secularism and nihilism.

    On the other hand, contrary to the perception of our traditional strata, mere belief in the category of revelation, without any philosophical and metaphysical support (in its non-Greek sense) on the basis of which it can be re-understood and reinterpreted in the current lifeworld and in the modern world, will reduce the category of revelation in our time to the level of a myth, or at best to a mere cultural category and belief, without any profound impact on the way of life of human beings, as we have been and are witnessing this process.

Therefore, as I have repeatedly stated, we need a paradigm shift in order to re-understand and reinterpret the fundamental categories of our historical tradition, including the categories of revelation, biʿtha, and the sacred text, so that we can bring these categories into our theoretical and cultural life on a new horizon and constitute our mode of being and living based on these categories as another possibility distinct from the secularism and nihilism of the contemporary world.

2. The Motivation Behind Proposing the Theory of Prophetic Dreams

It is precisely on account of this aforementioned importance and necessity of re-understanding and reinterpreting the foundational and central category of our historical tradition—namely, the category of revelation—for the purpose of making it possible for the new rationality of the human being of our time to understand and render it intelligible, that Dr. Soroush presents his theory of “Prophetic Dreams.” He explicitly states that, based on the theory of “revelation as dreaming,” one can achieve that very paradigm shift and fundamental change of model in the Islamic world: “Moving from exegesis to interpretation requires a paradigm shift and a fundamental change of model.”[1]

3. Method of Discussion

Here, before directly entering into a discussion of the theory of “Prophetic Dreams,” and in order to prevent any misunderstanding and also to help the reader clarify their views, I wish to elucidate, as far as possible in both a negative and positive manner, the theoretical position and “method” upon which I wish to base the discussion and dialogue concerning the nature and truth of revelation, as one of the most fundamental concepts of our historical tradition.

    In the course of this discussion, my method of thinking is not theological. This statement means that I do not attempt, by relying on certain beliefs latent in our historical tradition regarding the nature of revelation—such as an a priori belief in the divinity of the sacred texts—or by citing certain verses and themes from the sacred texts themselves that consider themselves to be divine and heavenly texts, to defend the sanctity of these texts. Likewise, I do not attempt, by relying on a kind of agnosticism that is a necessary component of many theological systems, to consider the nature and truth of revelation to be beyond the reach of human understanding, deeming research into it fundamentally impossible, or to confine the understanding of the category of revelation solely to the circle of absolute infallibility, which is beyond the reach of ordinary human beings. Rather, I wish to critique and examine the theory of “Prophetic Dreams” based on a thoroughly phenomenological and hermeneutic method.

    Unfortunately, many of the critiques that have been made of the theory of “Prophetic Dreams” are predominantly from a theological standpoint and perspective, which is heavily laden with unrefined presuppositions. Or at least, these presuppositions, in the same form they have existed in the theological systems present in our historical tradition, can no longer be acceptable based on metaphysical subjectivism and the logic resulting from modern scientific and empirical rationality, and considering the expansion of historical consciousness achieved in the new era. These are presuppositions such as: “all sciences are contained in the sacred text,” “many new scientific achievements have been predicted in the verses of the sacred text,” “the Creator of ‘nature’ is the same as the Revealer of ‘the Sharia,’ and the ontological verses and the legislative verses point to the same source, and the astonishing numerical order in the words and letters of the Quran, which is largely indebted to computer tools and the possibility of searching the digital text of this book, has revealed astonishing and undeniable truths that absolutely cannot be explained by the ‘dream-theory’ of the Quran,” and so on.

Relying on the verses of the Quran themselves as evidence refuting the theory of “Prophetic Dreams,” and emphasizing verses that explicitly consider the Quran to be the word, teaching, or descent of Gabriel and present his message as a divine message, like numerous arguments in many theological systems, represents circular reasoning. That is, something that must first be proven is itself taken as a reason to prove the claim, and the proof of a doctrinal belief becomes based on presuppositions that themselves require proof.

However, as the proponent of the “Prophetic Dreams” theory has correctly perceived, the doctrinal claims of fellow believers—at least within the sphere of the three great religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—regarding their sacred text being heavenly and divine, are not acceptable to the new rationality. Therefore, believers in the sacred books, including Muslims, are faced with this fundamental question: What truly real and comprehensible meaning can the “heavenly and divine nature” of the sacred texts have for human beings living in the current lifeworld, especially considering that the cultural, linguistic, educational, ethnic, and historical influences of the Prophet’s earthly living environment are entirely evident in these texts?

The fact of the matter is that the theory of prophetic dreams has unsettled and agitated many adherents and believers in theological systems, due to the collapse of many of their doctrinal and theological presuppositions. Fundamentally, "being polemical" and "possessing a will oriented toward preserving the system" are among the most important characteristics and features of theological thinking. I not only have no problem with the collapse of many presuppositions of historical theological systems, but I also welcome them, because I, like Dr. Soroush and unlike the proponents of theological thinking, believe that one can no longer defend spiritual thought in the contemporary world using the former presuppositions of the theological systems of the ancients, in an era marked by the collapse of all metaphysical and theological systems. This is a truth of which the proponents of theology must become aware. Therefore, by virtue of the effort to critique many of the unrefined presuppositions of previous theological systems in order to find a way to defend the possibility of religious and spiritual thought in the contemporary world, which is under the sway of modern rationality, I find myself in sympathy and alignment with my esteemed teacher, Dr. Soroush. Unlike the proponents of theological thinking, Dr. Soroush has rightly realized that one can no longer defend the category of revelation based on the metaphysical, theological, and linguistic systems of the ancients, many of whose components—such as belief in the existence of the World of Images, the existence of forms, the existence of purgatorial forms, and belief in the existence of a sense and perception that receives imaginal and imaginary forms—have become invalidated in our time.

There is another alignment between myself and my esteemed teacher, and that is that neither he nor I seek the destruction and radical critique of theological systems from the standpoint of a reason opposed to the Enlightenment tradition, but rather, on the contrary, from the standpoint of providing a ground for the possibility of defending a spiritual thought in the contemporary world—theological systems that have themselves become a major obstacle to the possibility of the emergence of faith and a new horizon in the present day.

Contrary to the perception of many believers in theological systems, thinking is not merely the issuing of indictments and declarations of belief and relying on conclusions; rather, genuine and true thinking occurs where the thinker reveals, step by step, the path they have traversed to reach those conclusions for others.

In any case, this writing intends, solely by relying on certain phenomenological and hermeneutic insights—which, in this context, must be understood in their unity and identity—to engage in critical reflections on the article "Muhammad (PBUH): The Narrator of Prophetic Dreams."

4. The Main Theoretical Axes of Prophetic Dreams

The following axes and aspects can be enumerated as among the most important components and dimensions of the theory of prophetic dreams:

4. 1. Revelation is a human, not divine, matter and is the product of the prophetic consciousness, soul, and experience, not the speech of God: Dr. Soroush explicitly states: "The language of the Quran is human and mortal, and the Quran is directly and without intermediary the composition, experience, effervescence, and growth of the soul of Muhammad (PBUH) and his language and expression." "We have said that those grand achievements [the Quran] arose in the Arabic, conventional, and human language... from the source of the Prophet's consciousness, ... meaning God did not speak and did not write a book, but rather a historical human being spoke and wrote a book in His place, and his speech was precisely His speech." Therefore, revelation is the same as the prophetic experience.
5. 2. Revelation is a human category, and since the human being is a cultural and historical being, revelation is also a cultural and historical category, meaning that the substance and content of revelation or sacred texts have been influenced by the spiritual conditions and personal states of the Prophet and the cultural characteristics and the climatic and historical conditions of his time, and have reflected these states and characteristics. According to Dr. Soroush, in the category of revelation or sacred texts, "even in the stage of genesis, the personal states, mental images, environmental events, geographical situation, and tribal life of the Prophet shaped his experiences." "God did not speak and did not write a book, but rather a historical human being spoke and wrote a book in His place, and his speech was precisely His speech." "The Quran is directly and without intermediary the composition, experience, effervescence, and growth of the soul of Muhammad (PBUH) and his language and expression, a Muhammad who is historical and on the path of evolution."
6. 3. The prophet is not the hearer of a divine call, but merely the reporter of dreams he has seen in his sleep. According to Dr. Soroush, “Muhammad (PBUH) is a narrator, meaning he is not an addressee or a reporter of news. It is not the case that he was the addressee of voices, that words were spoken into his inner ear, and that he was commanded to convey them. Rather, Muhammad (PBUH) is the narrator of experiences and the observer of scenes he himself has witnessed, and there is a great difference between an observing narrator and the addressee of a report. He was not told, ‘Go and tell the people that God is One.’” “Instead of the proposition that in the Quran, Allah is the speaker and Muhammad (PBUH) is the listener, the proposition now sits that in the Quran, Muhammad (PBUH) is the observer and Muhammad (PBUH) is the narrator. There is no addresser and addressee, no reporting and reporter, no speaker and speech; rather, it is all observation and narration. It is not from that realm, but from this realm!”
7. 4. Thus, sacred texts like the Quran are nothing more than a “book of dreams.” According to the theory of prophetic dreams, the entire Quran was revealed to the Prophet of Islam in the world of dreams. “Therefore, the language of the Quran is not the language of wakefulness, but rather the language of sleep, symbolic, and of course, a conventional and human language. To equate the language of the Quran with the language of wakefulness is a fatal and immense error and a dream-interpreting fallacy.” Dr. Soroush considers “dream” the most suitable word to describe the nature of sacred texts and believes the nature and truth of these texts must be sought in their being dream-books.
8. 5. Prophetic dreams are not an expression of a kind of wisdom and consciousness of the world but the product of the prophet’s faculty of imagination. In the view of the theorist of prophetic dreams, “the prophet had a strong imagination,” which he interprets as the “creative imagination of the prophet.”
9. 6. Thus, interpretation (tafsir) must give way to dream interpretation (khabguzari), and this substitution is the very paradigm shift and fundamental change of model of which the proponent of the theory of prophetic dreams boasts. According to Dr. Soroush, “All commentators and interpreters over the past 14 centuries have erred and understood the allusions of the dream with the language of wakefulness instead of interpretation (ta’wil). ... Through dream interpretation, one can resolve difficulties and metaphors more easily than by relying on theological and philosophical solutions.” “Moving from exegesis (tafsir) to dream interpretation (ta’bir) requires a paradigm shift and a fundamental change of model.”
10. 7. According to the view of the theorist of prophetic dreams, the dream also plays an ontological role. This role is that the dream is an entryway into the “other world.” He explicitly states: “The entryway to the other world is precisely the dream.”
11. 8. In Dr. Soroush’s view, if believers in the prophet consider his revelation as authoritative proof, then they must also consider his dreams as authoritative proof.
12. 9. Why do believers consider a human and historical text—which, in the view of the theorist of prophetic dreams, is nothing more than a book of dreams—as sacred and heavenly? According to the theorist, believers consider the Quran a heavenly book based on a presupposition. We have decided about the heavenly nature of the Quran from outside the text and have assumed its bearer, i.e., the prophet, to be infallible and inerrant.
13. 10. According to Dr. Soroush, the sciences that are supposed to help us in understanding sacred texts, and in his terms, in the dream interpretation of prophetic dreams, are: a. History b. Anthropology c. Psychoanalysis.

5. Convergences with the Theory of “Prophetic Dreams”

Before I begin my critical discussions regarding the theory of “Prophetic Dreams,” in order to make the path of the discussion as clear as possible, I would like to first outline some of my own intellectual coordinates and state up to what point and to which stations I am in agreement and companionship with Dr. Soroush’s movement, and from where onward I consider my path distinct from his. The points raised in this section can help make the path of conversation and dialogue more transparent. Here, I deem it necessary to outline the following points:

5. 1. An Effort to Achieve a Non-Theological–Non-Secular Thought

As I indicated in the section on "Method of Discussion," the author of this piece is in no way seeking to preserve or defend certain theological theoretical systems that are historically institutionalized sets of beliefs and convictions. On the other hand, however, I do not believe that the possibilities before us are limited to the two options of theological thought and secular thought; on the contrary, I strongly defend the openness of this path for contemporary humanity, which allows one to reject the dominance of any theological theoretical system over thought while simultaneously refusing to submit to the secularism and nihilism of the modern era. It is therefore clear that my criticisms of the theory of prophetic dreams are by no means from the perspective of theological thought, in the sense of defending one of the theoretical, human-made systems that have formed around each religion based on certain historically institutionalized beliefs.

5. 2. The Necessity of Reinterpreting Tradition

An unrevived tradition is not a tradition but a dead and putrefying corpse of a tradition. Therefore, as long as the ontological, epistemological, and anthropological conceptual and assertoric principles that constitute our historical tradition are not reflected upon and do not enter the sphere of our contemporary self-consciousness, the worldview and values latent in our historical tradition cannot play a living and effective role in the current lifeworld. Hence, I wholeheartedly defend the very effort of thinkers such as Dr. Soroush, Professor Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, Hamed Nasr Abu Zayd, and others who seek to rethink, re-understand, and reinterpret the categories present in our historical and religious tradition, including the categories of revelation and the sacred text, in order to redefine them within the epistemic geometry of the modern era. I consider these efforts far more valuable and worthwhile than the deep slumber of neglect of those traditionalists who have no understanding of the change in the worldhood of the world and the turning of the chapter in the book of history, and who wish to engage in intellectual and theoretical exchange with the world and new generations in our marketplace using the coinage of the conceptions and assertions of the age of the Seven Sleepers. Thus, my critical view of the theoretical efforts of these esteemed individuals in no way signifies opposition to the very essence of their endeavor.

5. 3. The Necessity of a Paradigm Shift

I too believe the only way to revive the historical tradition lies in a paradigm shift, that is, rethinking, re-understanding, and reinterpreting the fundamental concepts and categories of the historical tradition based on the epistemic geometry of the modern age, in dialogue with this geometry, and on the horizon of future thought. I by no means believe, as the theological proponents do, that the answers to our theoretical and cultural crises exist as a ready-made package in the past, and that it suffices to reach out and take these ready-made answers. The path of thought is a winding and rugged path that must be trodden and smoothed by thinkers, and our path passes through a paradigm shift (in the sense of ijtihad in the principles and not merely in the branches, and a change in the foundations of the greater jurisprudence [fiqh al-akbar] and not merely in the domain of the lesser jurisprudence [fiqh al-asghar]). However, it must be noted that this paradigm shift should not lead to the complete dissolution of the fundamental components of our historical tradition within the heart of new philosophies, thereby rendering the spirit of this tradition fundamentally meaningless.

5. 4. Considering the Category of Revelation as Human

Undoubtedly, the categories of religion and revelation are related to the human being, and without the existence of the human being, speaking of religion, the sacred's conversation with humanity, and hearing the divine word through a human would be fundamentally meaningless. In this respect, religion and revelation are certainly human categories. Numerous verses in the Quran also emphasize the human aspect of the Prophet: "Say, 'I am only a human being like you, to whom it is revealed...'" (Al-Kahf/ 110; also Fussilat/ 6)

Precisely this point—namely, treating the categories of religion and revelation as human, in the sense that religion and revelation relate to one of the diverse spheres of the specific mode of human existence—is a very worthy point of departure for re-understanding and reinterpreting the fundamental components of our historical tradition in order to revive its spirit in accordance with the contemporary lifeworld. However, the danger here is that we humanize the categories of religion, revelation, and the sacred text in such a way that their sacred and suprahuman aspect is completely dissolved, and consequently sacred matters become entirely profane and mundane.

5. 5. Treating the Person of the Prophet and Revelation as Historical

If we take the human attribute of the prophet seriously, and if we accept that the human being is an inherently historical entity and that historicity is one of the most fundamental attributes of the human mode of being, then we have no choice but to also accept the historicity of the prophet and the historicity of the categories of revelation and the sacred text. That is, we must accept that the category of revelation, since it relates and connects to the specific mode of human existence which is inherently historical, can in no way—like any other human understanding or action—be independent of the prophet's tradition and historical and cultural horizon. Here too lies precisely another very worthy point of departure that can liberate the degenerated Muslim community and culture from many of their crises, including captivity in the clutches of fundamentalism and Daeshism. Yet here again there is another danger, which consists in our lacking, within our ontological, epistemological, and anthropological system, a basis for "meta-historicity," and by thoroughly historicizing the human being and categories such as revelation and sacred texts, we deliver the human being into the captivity of historicism. By historicizing revelation and sacred texts, we render them entirely mundane, historical, and secular, thereby paving the way for the ever-greater dominance of secularism, nihilism, and the historical relativism of the modern age.

6. A Critical Examination of the Theory of Prophetic Dreams

6. 1. The Secularization of the Category of Revelation

As stated in the preceding passages, one of the main components (both as a foundation and as a consequence) of the theory of prophetic dreams is the "humanization" of the category of revelation. From this author's perspective as well, the categories of religion and revelation are undoubtedly related to the human being, and without the existence of the human being, speaking of religion, the sacred's dialogue with humankind, and hearing the divine word through a human being would be fundamentally meaningless. The Quranic verses themselves also express this human aspect with complete clarity, and all theological conceptions that have so far attempted to present a "non-human and entirely divine" image of the phenomenon of revelation stand entirely opposed to the Quranic insight, which repeatedly emphasizes the "human aspect of the prophet." (See: Quran, Al-Kahf/110; also Fussilat/6)

In the sphere of religious thought, and in understanding the category of revelation, we face two major dangers. On the one hand, we face the danger that many of our traditional theological thoughts confront us with—namely, the danger of considering all the various aspects of the categories of religion, revelation, and the sacred text as entirely divine, eternal, pre-eternal, and sacred, to the point where we might even regard, for instance, the language, the syntax of the verses' arrangement, the orthography, or the binding of the sacred text as divine and sacred matters. In this mode of conception, no human, historical, or cultural attribute is seen in any of the aspects of the aforementioned categories. This entirely divine conception of the category of revelation and other related phenomena confronts us with the danger of an ahistorical and fundamentalist understanding—like that of Daesh—of matters, realities, and the age. It is in reaction to this very danger that many intellectuals in the Islamic world, such as Hamed Nasr Abu Zayd, Dr. Soroush, and Professor Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, have emphasized the human, historical, and cultural aspect of the category of revelation and the sacred text, rendering these two categories entirely human and historical matters. In this case, it is true that we are delivered from the danger of fundamentalism and captivity in Daesh-like thoughts, but such efforts confront us with another danger: the secularization of the religious matter and a lapse into the secularism and nihilism of the modern age.

    To put it more simply, the categories of religion, revelation, and sacred scripture are undoubtedly connected to one of the diverse realms of the specific mode of human existence; however, in re-understanding and reinterpreting these categories, we must not render them so completely and entirely human that their sacred and suprahuman aspect is utterly dissolved, and consequently, sacred matters are wholly transformed into profane and worldly ones.

    In other words, just as categories such as thought, knowledge, modern empirical science, technology, art, and truth are human categories—in the sense that if humans did not exist, none of these categories would have meaning, and each of them is connected to a realm of the diverse realms of the specific mode of human existence—yet they are not entirely and completely human matters, and a non-human aspect exists within them, and it is precisely this non-human aspect that determines the content and substance of each, the category of revelation, although a human matter—that is, it is connected to the human being and the human mode of existence—is likewise not an entirely human matter, and a non-human, that is, divine, aspect is concealed within it. For example, just as "truth" is a human matter in that it is disclosed to the human being, and it is the human being who stands as the discloser of truth, yet at the same time, truth is not a human matter, in the sense that truth is not an arbitrary, capricious, and subjective matter dependent on human desire and will, and it is not the human being who determines the content and substance of truth; rather, it is a more transcendental and fundamental matter (Being, the world, reality, or objectivity) that constitutes the truthfulness of truth, the phenomenon of revelation is also a human matter and, at the same time, a non-human, that is, divine, matter.

    Therefore, although the motivations and concerns of the theorist of the Prophetic Dreams are clearly and fully evident in confronting the fundamentalism of traditional theological systems—where he states, "The language of the Quran is human and mortal, and the Quran is directly and without mediation the composition, experience, effusion, and growth of Muhammad's (PBUH) soul, and his own tongue and expression," or "We have said that those grand achievements [the Quran] arose in Arabic, vernacular, and human language... from the source of the Prophet's inner self, ... meaning God did not speak and did not write a book, but a historical human being spoke and wrote a book in His place, and his speech was His speech"—and reveals a part of the truth, yet, at the same time, it confronts us with the danger of secularizing and profaning sacred scriptures.

Dr. Soroush believes that the Prophet had complete and total involvement in the process of revelation. Regarding this theory that the Prophet had involvement in the process of revelation—in combating those schools of thought that grant no involvement whatsoever to the person of the Prophet, a thought that confronts us with the danger of fundamentalism and Daeshism—I stand on Dr. Soroush's side, but where this involvement is considered "complete and total," and the possibility of any transcendent and sacred truth manifesting in the process of revelation is not accepted, I distinguish my path from his.

From Dr. Soroush's perspective, revelation is the same as prophetic experience, and the personal experience of the Prophet, which was also influenced by the Prophet's prior experiences, constitutes the category of revelation. This statement is part of the truth (a truth that many traditional theological systems avoid accepting because it dismantles many of their beliefs), but it is not the whole story. The fundamental question here is: besides human experiences, what constitutes the "prophetic nature" of the prophetic experience? What distinguishes "prophetic experience" from other "human experiences" and grants it a prophetic aspect? What separates the categories of religion, spiritual thought, sacred knowledge, and revelation—which can also be contemplated in their unity and identity—from other human experiences? These are questions that have been left unreflected upon, or have not found a fitting answer, in the theory of the Prophetic Dreams.

Dr. Soroush tells us that the word "Qul" (Say) in the Quran "does not at all mean that someone is speaking to someone." According to his theory, the Prophet is the author of the Quran, and revelation is the Prophet's composition. This statement, that is, the denial of the possibility of the human being's call from the sacred, means ignoring the very great truth that constitutes the nature of all traditions of Eastern thought, the spirit of all religions, and the religious and spiritual aspect of all spiritual wisdoms, and the result of this denial is nothing but acquiescence to the very subjectivism, secularism, and nihilism of the modern era.

Of course, the esteemed reader may object: what necessity is there for the categories of revelation and the sacred text not to be rendered entirely human, secular, and profane, and why should we strive to offer an interpretation of these categories that preserves their divine and sacred aspect?

    The answer to this question is: there is no necessity for us to offer a divine and sacred interpretation of the categories of revelation or sacred texts, and we are entirely within our rights, like many adherents and devotees of modern rationality and like many intellectuals attached to the values and worldview of the Enlightenment era, to offer a wholly human, historical, and secular interpretation of the categories of revelation and sacred texts. However, in that case, firstly, we have no right to drag the attribute "religious" alongside "intellectualism" and from their combination form a metaphysically contradictory construct called "religious intellectualism."[2] Secondly, by eliminating the sacred and spiritual element, that is, by eliminating the possibility of the human being's invocation by the Sacred, first from revelation and sacred texts and then from the entire world, we must submit entirely to the secularism and nihilism of the contemporary world.

 

6. 2. The Historicization of the Category of Revelation

According to the theorist of prophetic dreams, once revelation becomes a human category, and since the human being is a cultural and historical entity, it is therefore natural that revelation is also considered a cultural and historical category, and it is said that in the genesis of revelation and the sacred text, "the personal states, mental images, environmental events, geographical situation, and tribal life of the Prophet gave form to his experiences"; "God did not speak and did not write a book, but rather a historical human being spoke in His place," and "the Quran is directly and without mediation the composition, experience, effusion, and growth of the soul of Muhammad (PBUH) and his language and expression—a Muhammad who is historical and on the path of evolution."

Regarding the historicization of revelation, just as with its humanization, Dr. Soroush's motives and concerns are entirely clear. A non-historical understanding and an eternal, pre-eternal comprehension of many historical, cultural, and geographical rulings of sacred texts is one of the most important theoretical reasons for the incompatibility of historical religious traditions with the modern lifeworld and the cause of religious stagnation, petrification, and reaction in societies such as Muslim ones, and any thinker who seeks to defend religious traditions in the modern age cannot avoid arriving at a historical understanding and interpretation of sacred texts. However, here too, just as in the discussion of humanizing the category of revelation, the question is whether the historical dimension of the category of revelation and the description of sacred texts as historical and cultural accounts for all of their attributes. It is true that emphasizing the historical dimension of revelation and sacred texts largely saves us from the danger of fundamentalism, but on the other hand, does a wholly historical understanding of revelation and sacred texts not confront us with the danger of secularizing and profaning sacred texts? To put it more simply, can we not also speak of a "meta-historical" (meta-history) aspect in sacred texts, and is not this very "meta-historicity" (meta-historicity) the same "sacredness" that constitutes the sacredness of sacred texts? By this "meta-historicity," I in no way mean a set of doctrinal or ethical propositions for which we accord a meta-historical value and validity, for every proposition is a linguistic matter, and language is in itself a historical matter. What I mean by the meta-historical is an ontological truth, indescribable by language and meta-language, whose appearance within the propositional and linguistic text constitutes the sacredness of the sacred text.

    For a long time, including in the Islamic world, one of the most important theological problems has been explaining the relationship between history and meta-history, particularly within the framework of apophatic theology. The question of how the nature of the Divine Word, given the description of the Divine Essence and Attributes as pre-eternal (meta-historical), can be compatible with the temporality of His speaking to humanity at a specific time and place, or, in other terms, how God's intervention (meta-history) in history and the relationship between the pre-eternal (meta-history) and the contingent (the historical matter) can be explained?

The discussion of the relationship between the contingent and the eternal (history and meta-history) has existed among Muslims themselves from the very beginning, within the domain of reflection on the nature and essence of the Divine Word. As I stated in one of my articles, “The Mu'tazila held that the Divine Word (the Holy Book or the Quran) is contingent, because each of the Quran's verses had an occasion of revelation, having been revealed in accordance with specific social and historical conditions. The meaning of the Mu'tazilite position was that the Word of God is a historical matter. In contrast, the Ash'arites believed that the Quran or the Divine Word is eternal, and since the Divine Essence is not a contingent (historical) matter, therefore the attribute of His Speech is also a non-contingent and eternal (non-historical) matter. However, the Ash'arites could not easily ignore the revelation of verses according to their occasions of revelation, that is, the very historical aspect of the verses; hence, relying on the concepts of the ‘Preserved Tablet’ and ‘Interior Speech,’ they sought theological justifications to prove the Quran's eternal (non-historical) nature. The fact that the Mu'tazila believed the Divine Word is contingent and that, depending on the conditions and occasion of revelation of the verses, the Divine Word became contingent, precisely signifies the historicity of the Divine verses and the existence of a firm link between the verses and political, social, etc. conditions (in a word, historical). For instance, during the times of the Prophet's battles and military campaigns, verses pertaining to campaigns and combat were revealed, and in times of peace, verses concerning peace were revealed; or when the ignorant Arabs spoke loudly and rudely to the Prophet, verses concerning the manner of speaking to the Prophet were revealed, and so on. The ‘contingency and having an occasion of revelation’ of the verses, in another sense, means their ‘historicity.’”[3]

In our time, Dr. Soroush, as a neo-Mu'tazilite, rightly emphasizes the historical (contingent) aspect of the sacred text. But if we, following modern rationality and the emergence of historical thinking from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries onward, consider sacred texts to be entirely historical and arising from historical conditions, then no room remains for their sanctity, and considering them sacred itself becomes a cultural and historical matter, stemming from the individual's subjectivity and not from the text itself. This statement means that the Quran is sacred for Muslims, the Torah for Jews, the Bible for Christians, and the Upanishads for Hindus and Buddhists; not that these texts are sacred in themselves, regardless of the individual's faith and belief. This kind of encounter and this kind of belief in the sanctity of sacred texts provides us with no theoretical or metaphysical (in the ontological sense) basis for defending the sanctity of sacred texts and transforms the belief in the sanctity of these texts into a psychological, indoctrinated, and cultural matter. Therefore, if we, like Dr. Soroush and following the Mu'tazila or the historical thinking of the new era, consider sacred texts to be entirely contingent or historical, this opinion leads to the secularization and mundanization of these texts, as cultural products of a particular people, a particular geography, and a particular historical period, and no room remains for the description of these texts as meta-historical and sacred. To put it more simply, with the historicization of sacred texts, their manifestation as revelation, the Divine Word, or a heavenly matter is negated; these texts will be considered the product of the Prophet's mentality and subjectivity, and this mentality itself will be the product of family, people, tribe, culture, society, language, education and upbringing, social conditions, class relations, and so on—in a word, an echo of historical conditions. Hence, if we accept the historical view of sacred texts, its natural consequence is the desacralization of sacred texts, and they can no longer be considered sacred within the framework of prevailing theological systems. Thus, everything that was hitherto considered heavenly becomes earthly and mundane, which itself reinforces the process of secularism and the mundanization of everything, and the dominance of the nihilism that has engulfed our current world.

As I have previously stated, “Theologians are rightly terrified by the historicization of sacred texts. Because they feel deeply—consciously or unconsciously, and more often unconsciously—that historicizing sacred texts means secularizing, humanizing, and earthlyizing these texts, and consequently, the destruction of the last possible strongholds against secularism, nihilism, and the meaninglessness of the world in the present age.

But on the other hand, if we wish to regard sacred texts, as the Ash'arites and the proponents of theology in their own day did, in a simplistic manner as entirely pre-eternal and transhistorical, and ignore the historical, geographical, and cultural aspects of these texts to the extent of claiming that sacred texts are wholly celestial, i.e., transhistorical, and that no earthly, i.e., historical, aspect can be seen in them—and even that the script, letters, binding, and everything about these texts came from the heavens and the unseen realm, i.e., from the transhistorical sphere—this view, especially in our time, is in no way defensible. The presence of historical and cultural elements and aspects in sacred texts is entirely evident, obvious, and undeniable; and the unjustified, failed theological defenses of such Ash'arite attitudes, and the pointless, meaningless resistance to accepting the historical aspects of sacred texts, are themselves a fundamental factor in creating a rift, and even a sense of hatred and aversion, toward the world of tradition and sacred texts, and in leading to complete surrender to the new rationality and the secularism and nihilism latent within it.

But in this discussion, are only two possibilities open before human beings? Must one either be a Mu'tazilite and consider the sacred text as something entirely and completely created (hādith), or be an Ash'arite and consider the sacred text as entirely and completely pre-eternal (qadīm)? Must one either submit to the inherently secular new rationality and the historical thinking of the new era, considering sacred texts as human, historical, and cultural texts, and surrender completely to the secularism and nihilism of the modern period, or consider sacred texts in a simplistic and unrealistic manner as non-historical and non-cultural texts, thereby confronting oneself with very serious theoretical and practical afflictions and challenges in the new world and the era of the dominance of scientific and technological rationality? Is a third way not open before us? Can a dialectic not be created between the Mu'tazilite mode of viewing and the Ash'arite mode of understanding? Can sacred texts not be considered as simultaneously possessing both the aspect of being created (hudūth) and being pre-eternal (qidam)? Can sacred texts not be regarded as “historical texts,” yet “not merely historical”—that is, can we not ascribe to them both a “historical dimension” and a “transhistorical dimension”? Can sacred texts not be considered—like any other text—the product of a dialectic and mutual relationship between “earth and heaven” and “history and transhistory”?

The reality of the matter is that we can in no way ignore the historical dimension of sacred texts. And if we take the verse “I am but a mortal like you” seriously, and in our prophetology accept the “human and mortal description of the prophet,” and do not understand this statement merely in the very simple and trivial sense that the prophet ate, walked, and had children like other human beings, but rather understand the human and mortal description of the prophet in the deepest characteristics of the existential (existential) and ontological structures of the human being, and consider the “historicity” of the human being as one of the most important existential characteristics of every human, including the prophet, then we must necessarily also accept the historical dimension of sacred scriptures.

However, since the human being is a historical being, yet not a merely historical being, and the possibility of establishing a relation with transhistory—that is, the sacred truth itself—is one of the most fundamental possibilities facing human existence, therefore the prophet, by virtue of his human and mortal description, possesses a historical characteristic, and at the same time, again by virtue of that same human description, possesses the capacity to establish a relation with transhistory. Based on this anthropology, and the corresponding prophetology that follows from it, and based on the simultaneous acceptance of both historical and transhistorical characteristics for the human being, and consequently for the prophet, and due to recognizing both historical and transhistorical characteristics in our prophetology, we can ascribe both historical and transhistorical aspects to sacred texts. Sacred texts are historical, cultural texts and the product of a specific human historical tradition (primarily the Hebrew-Semitic-Jewish tradition) or traditions similar to them, which at the same time reveal a transhistorical characteristic from within themselves. Accepting this view of sacred texts paves the way for the emergence of a fundamental, paradigmatic transformation in our conception of religion, the religious matter, prophetology, and the hermeneutics of sacred texts. Although this transformation leads to a kind of deconstruction of traditional and common theological understandings, it nonetheless assists us in understanding many of our theoretical and practical issues in the present day and in confronting the new scientific and technological rationality.

Now, the most important hermeneutic question facing our historical tradition in general, and our exegetical tradition in particular, is this: Is there a mode of thinking that can help us accept the historical description of religions and sacred texts while at the same time ensuring that the sanctity of religions and sacred texts does not become profane and perish? How can the views of the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites be reconciled? How can one maintain that a text is historical and, at the same time, transhistorical? It must be noted that the point is by no means to say that, for instance, some verses of the holy books are abrogated, while other verses express eternal and everlasting truths. The discussion is not about abrogating and abrogated verses, for the abrogating verses, just like the abrogated ones, are historical verses.

We repeat our fundamental question: In what does the sacredness of a sacred text consist? What makes a sacred text sacred? What distinguishes a sacred text from a non-sacred text?

The sacredness of a sacred text is not, and cannot be, due to its letters, words, and propositions, because, as I have pointed out, words and propositions are, in themselves, linguistic matters, and therefore historical and cultural. The sanctity of the text cannot be sought in the phrases of the text. So, if the sanctity of the text cannot be sought in the words and phrases of sacred texts, insofar as they are historical and cultural matters, then in what matter should it be pursued?

To answer this question, we pose a more fundamental question: What do we fundamentally consider sacred and what do we consider non-sacred? In other words, what is the foundation and basis of the sanctity of a thing? In popular cultures and in theological systems that have a close connection and long-standing bond with popular culture, the attribute of sanctity and "being sacred" is ascribed to many matters, objects, personalities, and beliefs. But the question is: Upon what does the sacredness of these matters, beliefs, and personalities itself depend? What is that element whose presence in a thing makes it sacred and whose absence makes it non-sacred and profane? Is there an authentic, fundamental, and ontological criterion regarding sanctity and non-sanctity?

Ordinary people and theologians ascribe sanctity to many objects (such as certain stones, shrines, tombs, or books), matters (such as praying, fasting, and going on pilgrimage), or personalities (such as prophets, saints, and holy men). But the question is: Are these stones, tombs, books, actions (such as enduring hunger or certain physical movements as prayer), or persons sacred in themselves and regardless of any other truth, or are they considered sacred in relation to an "other truth"? Every sacred matter derives its attribute of sanctity by virtue of its relation to another matter. But is there a matter whose sanctity is not due to another matter but, in itself and by virtue of itself? In other words, is there a matter or truth in this world that is itself sacred in itself and regardless of any other matter? If such a sacred matter and truth exists, we consider it the "sole sacred matter," that is, the "essentially sacred matter," and therefore the "sole source of sanctity." In the history of human life and thought, and in many historical traditions, and in all religions, from the most primitive and elementary human religions to the most developed, a matter has always manifested itself as the sacred matter, and every object, activity, or human being is considered sacred solely in relation to it. The sacred object, action, or person is not sacred in itself but becomes sacred in relation to the "sacred matter." Therefore, the presence and manifestation of the sacred matter in any thing is the sole authentic source that causes its sanctity. Hence, what distinguishes sacred books from non-sacred books is the powerful presence of the sole sacred truth that reveals itself in these texts. Therefore, it is this presence itself, and by this presence, that a thing, including certain texts, becomes sacred.

The sacred, in itself, is a trans-historical truth—that is, trans-linguistic and trans-cultural—but when it enters language and is recounted through language, which is itself a historical category, it undergoes a descent and reveals itself in a historical expression. This is precisely the point where the dialectic of the sacred on one hand and language and culture on the other—that is, the dialectic of heaven and earth, or the dialectic of trans-history and history—is realized. Hence, the sanctity of the sacred text is due to a “presence” that occurs through the medium of the “recitation of sacred texts”—which is profoundly different from the “mere reading of texts”—a presence that is the result of the transcendental structure of the human mode of being toward the sacred. Without this presence, the sacred text loses the authentic authority of its sanctity and is transformed into a merely secular, historical, and cultural text. All texts, including sacred texts, possess two kinds of lines: white lines and black lines. The white lines exist in the interstices of the black lines of the text. The black lines, namely the words, phrases, and propositions, by virtue of their linguistic description, possess a historical dimension and are subject to all the hermeneutical rules that also apply to human and non-sacred texts. But within the interstices of these linguistic and historical black lines, amidst the white lines of the text, something reveals itself to the believer that is in itself and in a self-subsistent manner sacred, the sole sacred, and the sole authority for everything that presents itself as sacred. Therefore, the sanctity of the sacred text is not derived from its words nor does it revert to its words; rather, these very secular, historical, and cultural words of a historical people can, solely by making the presence of the sacred present, elevate and transcend a text from the level of a merely historical and cultural text to the threshold of a sacred text. However, this should not lead us into the error—just as it has often led our commentators, theologians, and practitioners of theology in our historical tradition into error—that the words of the sacred text are in themselves sacred. According to this view, this very “presence of the sacred” is an ontological—and not psychological, sociological, or cultural—criterion for the sanctity of the sacred text. This view will bring about very significant consequences for us, because, firstly, sacred texts are not limited to a small number of texts; any text that can make the sacred present is a sacred text; secondly, the sanctity of a text will be a matter of degrees, and among texts, some will possess greater sanctity and others lesser sanctity. But in those works of human life that have been regarded as sacred texts, the presence of the sacred reveals itself in a more authentic and powerful manner.”[4]

Dr. Soroush rightly considers sacred texts, including the Quran, to be a historical matter, and I am in complete agreement with this, and in this respect, in confronting the non-historical ideas of traditional theologies and the non-historical understanding of sacred texts—which is a very dangerous and harmful matter for society and human life, confronting us with the danger of fundamentalism, petrification, and the freezing of thought—I stand on his front. But my criticism of my esteemed teacher is that sacred texts are not merely historical texts; rather, they reveal the trans-historical within themselves, yet he, based on Cartesian-Kantian intellectual foundations and modern subjectivism, and within the framework of analytical philosophies that think within that same Cartesian-Kantian subjectivist tradition, has no opening to the trans-historical.

My great teacher is well aware and cognizant that he cannot set aside the framework of Kantian thought, because his entire theory of the theoretical contraction and expansion of Sharia is based on the distinction between “religion” and “religious knowledge,” and this distinction is itself a repetition of and based on the Kantian distinction between “noumenon” and “phenomenon.” This fundamental principle and the very foundation of the theory of the theoretical contraction and expansion of Sharia—that we have access not to religion itself but merely to religious knowledge—is a repetition of Kant’s statement that our knowledge is phenomenal and that we have access not to the noumenon but merely to what appears in the mind. Within the framework of Cartesian-Kantian subjectivism, we have no opening to what lies beyond the subject’s consciousness and no path toward the noumenon (the trans-historical), and our consciousness is always within the boundaries of our historical consciousness of phenomena.

To put it more simply, I must say that, unfortunately, the thought of the great master from whom I have learned so much, and to whose ideas my homeland is deeply indebted, cannot provide us with any adequate metaphysical and ontological foundation for the ontological distinction between “history and meta-history.” Consequently, by historicizing the sacred texts entirely, it renders them wholly mundane and secular, and this very process aids the further expansion of secularism and nihilism in the world and in Muslim societies.

Almost certainly, the great Rumi scholar and undisputed master of the Masnavi in our land, as has been repeatedly heard from his students, will respond that what his former, present, and future student says about the connection with meta-history pertains to the domain of mysticism and lies outside philosophical and metaphysical thought, resulting from a confusion of mysticism and philosophy. He will say that a great part of his life has been devoted to teaching Rumi’s Masnavi in order to prepare the ground for a connection with the formless, that is, the meta-historical.

But the question is precisely here: How can Eastern religious and spiritual thought in general, and Rumi’s mysticism in particular, be reconciled “intellectually and theoretically” with the Cartesian-Kantian subjectivist philosophical foundations?

My question in no way concerns how Rumi’s mysticism is combined with Kantian thought in the specific personality and psychology of Dr. Soroush; rather, my question pertains to the philosophical and metaphysical level of the discussion. Dr. Soroush is well aware that the human being is a strange compound in which many contradictory things may be gathered within a single individual, but the history of thought and the trajectory of a society’s cultural life do not follow specific psychologies, intentions, aspirations, wishes, decisions, and plans of individuals. Therefore, I have absolutely no doubt about my master’s religiosity, his practice of night prayers, and his intimacy and affection for the great Rumi, but my point is that, in society and among his students, religious and spiritual thought cannot be reconciled with Cartesian-Kantian subjectivist thought, and a religion and mysticism that lack the necessary ontological and epistemological supports ultimately slide into secularism and nihilism, as indeed they have.

Another point is that, despite Dr. Soroush speaking of the “historicity” of revelation and the sacred text, and in the book “The Expansion of the Prophetic Experience,” of the historicity of the Prophet’s personality, he has not yet attained a deep understanding of “historical thinking.” His understanding of historical thinking is limited to the notion that “the personal circumstances, mental images, environmental events, geographical situation, and tribal life of the Prophet shaped his experiences.” But my question is this: Is the meaning of the Prophet’s historicity confined solely to the influence of these very factors, namely “the personal circumstances, mental images, environmental events, geographical situation, and tribal life of the Prophet” on the prophetic experience? Or should one have a deeper understanding of the meaning and concept of “historicity”? To put it more simply, must we not accept that the prophetic experience and the content of the sacred texts, precisely because of their historicity, could not have been outside the “historical horizons” and “intellectual and theoretical traditions” in which they were formed? That is, could, for instance, the verses concerning the heavens, the earth, the stars, and the sun in the prophetic experience and in the sacred texts have been outside the framework of the ancient science of astronomy?

    Undoubtedly, the author of the book “The Expansion of the Prophetic Experience,” who has attained an understanding of the Prophet’s historicity, cannot answer this last question of mine in the negative. Thus, he too accepts that historicity is not merely limited to “personal circumstances, mental images, environmental events, geographical situation, and tribal life,” but also encompasses the great intellectual and cultural traditions and mental paradigms.

    If Dr. Soroush agrees with me—and he cannot but agree—that the historicity of a person is not merely a psychological matter expressing the influence of “personal states, mental images, environmental events, geographical situation, and tribal life,” but also encompasses the influence of the great intellectual and cultural traditions and the dominant mental and theoretical paradigms of their era, then I will elevate my question to another level: Is it only prophets and figures such as Jesus and Muhammad Mustafa [PBUH] who, by virtue of their humanity, are historical and cultural beings, or are philosophers such as Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant also “human” and, by virtue of this very humanity, historical and cultural beings? To put it more simply, is it only prophets and figures such as Jesus and Muhammad Mustafa [PBUH] whose resulting thoughts and texts are, by virtue of their humanity, influenced by the great historical traditions and the dominant mental and theoretical paradigms of their era, or are the thoughts and texts of philosophers such as Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant also, by virtue of their humanity, influenced by the great historical traditions and the dominant mental and theoretical paradigms of their era?

    My other question is this: Is it only prophets and figures such as Jesus and Muhammad Mustafa [PBUH] who are historical and cultural beings, or is Dr. Soroush himself, by virtue of his humanity, a historical being and, by virtue of this very human—that is, historical—characteristic, does he think within a specific intellectual tradition and mental and theoretical paradigm?

    To put it more simply, in my belief, Dr. Soroush, who rightly emphasizes the historical nature of the Prophet and sacred texts, lacks a correct and deep understanding of human historicity and, in his research and hermeneutics concerning the Quran, has limited and confined this historicity to the Prophet and the sacred text, paying no attention to the “historicity of the reader” and the “historicity of meaning.” This very lack of attention is the Achilles’ heel of the hermeneutic theory of “Prophetic Dreams.”

    In much simpler terms, Dr. Soroush’s encounter with “historical thinking” in his hermeneutics of the sacred text is shaped by the logic of double standards. On the one hand, based on historical thinking, he rightly considers the person of the Prophet and the sacred text to be historical matters, influenced by the historical conditions, traditions, and paradigms of the Prophet’s era; but on the other hand, due to being captive to Aristotelian non-historical (essentialist) thinking, he presents a non-historical understanding of the frameworks of modern rationality and the intellectual and cultural traditions under whose sway the modern reader encounters sacred texts.

    In other words, if we accept the historical dimension of the human being and, consequently, the historical dimension of the Prophet and sacred texts, we must accept that the Prophet and sacred texts, on the one hand, and a modern reader like Dr. Soroush, on the other, each belong to two different theoretical and cultural traditions, paradigms, and historical worlds that are also, in Thomas Kuhn’s terms, completely incommensurable. In my belief, Dr. Soroush’s theory of Prophetic Dreams is the result of a lack of deep understanding of the historical dimension of humankind, and a lack of attention to the historicity of meaning and reading, alongside the historicity of the text, and therefore a lack of attention to the major hermeneutic obstacle of the incommensurability of different paradigms, including the incommensurability of the paradigm of sacred texts with the paradigm of modern rationality.

6. 3. Revelation as a Prophetic Dream

It has been said that in the theory of Prophetic Dreams, the Prophet is not the hearer of a divine voice, but merely the reporter of dreams he has seen in his sleep. Dr. Soroush explicitly states: “Muhammad (PBUH) is a narrator, meaning he is not an addressee or an informant. It is not the case that he was the addressee of voices, that words were recited into his inner ear, and that he was commanded to convey them; rather, Muhammad (PBUH) is the narrator of experiences and the observer of scenes he himself has seen, and there is a great difference between an observing narrator and the addressee of a report. He was not told, ‘Go and tell the people that God is One.’” “Instead of the proposition that in the Quran, Allah is the speaker and Muhammad (PBUH) is the listener, this proposition now takes its place: that in the Quran, Muhammad (PBUH) is the observer and Muhammad (PBUH) is the narrator. There is no address, no addressee, no report, no informant, no speaker, and no speech; it is all observation and narration. It is not from that world, but from this world!” Therefore, according to the theory of Prophetic Dreams, prophetic revelation was identical to the prophetic dream.

But why does Dr. Soroush employ the concept of "dream" to describe and explain revelation? He himself answers this question: "The reader may use, in place of the word dream, terms such as unveiling (mukāshafa), spiritual occurrence (wāqiʿa), imaginal realm (mithāl), discontinuous and continuous imagination (khayāl-i munfaṣil wa muttaṣil), the Eighth Clime, Jābalqā and Jābarsā, and the Earth of the Kingdom (arḍ-i malakūt) (as others have done), but the author, without opposing those terms, has deliberately chosen the word dream in order to ... avoid the cumbersome ambiguities of those ancient concepts and their terrifying metaphysics."

But my question to Dr. Soroush is this: Is it merely "terms such as unveiling, spiritual occurrence, imaginal realm, discontinuous and continuous imagination, the Eighth Clime, Jābalqā and Jābarsā, and the Earth of the Kingdom" that carry a metaphysical charge, while the concept of "dream" carries no metaphysical charge whatsoever?

In my belief, the great thinker who rightly emphasizes the historical aspect of the Prophet and the sacred text should be familiar with this hermeneutic alphabet: concepts are historical and contextualized, and every concept, within its historical context, entails a specific meaning and metaphysics. "Dream" in our time is a "psychological" matter, and by conflating the historical category of revelation—which was formed in a different tradition, paradigm, and historical context—with the category of dream in its contemporary historical context, an unforgivable hermeneutic error has been committed. By calling the Prophet's connection with God a dream, the category of revelation is reduced to a psychological matter; its ontological, epistemological, and anthropological foundations are entirely lost behind the veil of the modern metaphysical foundations of the concept of dream, and thus the spirit of the entire spiritual tradition of Eastern thought in general, including Islam, is extinguished, and the modern form of thought dominates the substance of Eastern religious and spiritual culture and thought, secularizing the tradition.

Another point is that when we speak of the category of "revelation," we are not merely speaking about a single individual, say the person of Muhammad [PBUH], and we are not simply faced with a single person but with a historical tradition. I have also previously pointed out that the historical aspect of the Prophet, contrary to the view of the theorist of Prophetic Dreams, is not limited to the influence of the "personal states, mental images, environmental events, geographical situation, and tribal life of the Prophet" on the prophetic experience, but also encompasses the historical tradition to which the Prophet belonged, that is, the entire Hebraic-Semitic-Judaic historical tradition. Concepts such as "revelation," "prophetic mission (biʿtha)," "messenger," "one spoken to by God (kalīm Allāh)," "being the Son of God," or "being anointed by the Lord" are fundamental concepts within the specific epistemic system of this historical tradition, and by conflating the concept of "revelation" with the concept of "dream," a multitude of other concepts that have a firm connection and a networked, intertwined relationship with the concept of revelation become meaningless. Even speaking of the possibility of being addressed by a transcendental truth was not unique to the Hebraic-Semitic-Judaic tradition and can be observed in other historical traditions, even in the pre-metaphysical Greek tradition of thought. The early Greeks, in the pre-metaphysical age, spoke of the possibility of human attunement with the universal reason (Logos), and Heraclitus explicitly said: "Listen not to my speech, but to the speech of the Logos [from my tongue]." Even Socrates considered himself a listener to an unseen voice. Therefore, we are not faced merely with a personality named Muhammad [PBUH] or with a single concept called revelation, but with a historical tradition and its specific epistemic system. Understanding the meaning of the concept of revelation without attention to this entire tradition and its epistemic system, and without regard to its ontological, anthropological, and epistemological foundations, is a gross hermeneutic and phenomenological error. Any theory, such as the theory of Prophetic Dreams, that seeks to explain any of the concepts of this semantic network and epistemological paradigm must be able to cover the other fundamental concepts and categories of this semantic network as well. Yet, reducing revelation to a dream and the Prophet to a dream-interpreter stands in opposition to and negates other key and fundamental concepts in the Hebraic-Semitic-Judaic tradition, such as the Unseen (ghayb), tidings (nabaʾ), announcements (anbāʾ), prophetic mission (biʿtha), messenger, messengership, salvation, believer, guidance, gratitude, disbeliever, prosperity (falāḥ), and loss (khusrān). It is not without reason that throughout the history of the tradition, no one has regarded the sacred text as a dream and the Prophet as a dream-interpreter, and has strongly resisted, and will continue to resist, such an interpretation.

    Dr. Soroush explicitly tells us that the word "qul" (say) in the Quran "does not at all mean that someone is speaking to someone else." According to his theory, the Prophet is the author of the Quran, and revelation is the Prophet's composition. This statement—that is, the denial of the possibility of a human being addressed by the sacred—whether in the Semitic-Judaic tradition or in the intellectual tradition of the pre-Socratic Greeks, amounts to ignoring that great truth which constitutes the nature of all Eastern traditions of thought, the spirit of all religions, and the religious and spiritual aspect of all spiritual thought. The result of this denial is nothing but acquiescence to the subjectivism, secularism, and nihilism of the modern era.

Dr. Soroush speaks of the "Prophet's creative imagination." In his view, "the Prophet had a powerful imagination," and revelation is not an expression of a kind of wisdom and consciousness of the world but the product of the dreamings of the Prophet's powerful and creative imaginative faculty. Our predecessors also tried to make the phenomenon of revelation comprehensible. Interpretations such as illuminative reception, unveiling, supersensory perception, relation with the Active Intellect, the relation of the rational soul with the world of detached imagination, and so on, were all in this direction. However, none of these concepts reduced revelation to a psychological matter; rather, they ultimately tried to show how the Prophet's language becomes the language of God.

    Likewise, as many others have also said, sacred scriptures cannot be reduced merely to a set of scenes related to otherworldly visions in order to consider them the product of dreams. In the verses of sacred scriptures, including the Quran, many verses pertain to ordinary, everyday life, rulings, relations, wars, conflicts, and challenges of this very world. Therefore, the theory of prophetic dreams, by considering all the verses of sacred scriptures as dreamlike, succumbs to a kind of reductionism and ignores a vast portion of the verses of sacred scriptures.

    On the other hand, the mythical expression of sacred scriptures does not necessarily mean they are dreams. As it happens, if the proponent of the theory of prophetic dreams had pursued their historical perspective more persistently and deeply, and had paid attention to the point that myths were part of the intellectual and historical horizon of the ancients, and that the Prophet, in his human and historical aspect, could not have thought outside the historical and cultural horizon of his time, then, through this path, the interpretation of many myths in sacred scriptures would have been carried out with greater ease compared to reading them as dreams.

Dr. Soroush believes that the theory of prophetic dreams is a theory concerning the language of revelation, not its nature and truth. However, my question to him is this: Is such a thing possible? Can one speak merely of the "language of revelation" without any presupposition regarding the "nature and quiddity of revelation"? Neither speaking about revelation nor reading it, whether in a believer's or non-believer's manner, can be without being based on specific metaphysical foundations. Phenomenologically speaking, the reduction or epoché of metaphysical presuppositions in order to speak about any phenomenon, including the phenomenon of revelation, is fundamentally impossible. In my opinion, the reason Dr. Soroush says that the theory of prophetic dreams is a theory concerning the language of revelation and not its nature and truth, stems from the fact that he, like many others, either lacks clear metaphysical foundations for explaining the categories of revelation and sacred texts, or cannot consistently articulate them within his Cartesian-Kantian subjectivist philosophical framework—that is, within this philosophy that consciousness cannot attain a truth beyond consciousness. The reason for this must also be sought in what I pointed to in the preceding passage: "the lack of a historical perspective" or "the lack of a deep understanding of the historical perspective."

Those dear colleagues who, like Dr. Soroush, think within the intellectual tradition of Cartesian-Kantian philosophies—including our traditionalists and seminary scholars who think within the Aristotelian framework of Avicennan and Sadrian philosophies—due to a lack of historical perspective and captivity in the prison of Aristotelian essentialism, attribute a single essence, truth, and meaning to all concepts and categories, and are incapable of grasping the historicity of concepts and categories. Aristotle, Avicenna, Mulla Sadra, Descartes, Kant, and the vast majority of pre-Hegelian philosophers and thinkers, when speaking of categories such as reason, knowledge, truth, the human being, etc., attributed a single meaning and concept to them and believed that with the change of these meanings, these concepts would also transform into other things. When Descartes spoke of "the right method of employing reason" or when Kant wrote the "Critique of Pure Reason," they attributed a fixed, universal, global, transtemporal, transpatial, transgeographical, transcultural, and in a word, transhistorical meaning to "reason." Hence, they fundamentally did not comprehend that concepts and categories are cultural and historical matters and acquire meaning within a historical and cultural horizon. "Reason" in the sense understood by Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant is in no way identical with the meaning of reason for Abraham, Christ, and Muhammad [PBUH]; not that, as Dr. Soroush believes, their "intelligibles" differ but their "reason" is the same.[5] Not at all. "Science" in the meaning and concept we understand from it today and which is taught, say, in science faculties and in disciplines like physics, mechanics, and thermodynamics, is in no way identical with what Muhammad Mustafa understood as "knowledge," in the sense of "a light that God casts into the heart of whomever He wills."[6]

Therefore, as long as we, due to the non-acceptance of the historical perspective, remain captive to essentialism and a non-historical outlook, and lack a metaphysical understanding of the existence of various worldlinesses, different horizons of meaning, and diverse historical rationalities, and following Aristotelian, Cartesian, and Kantian thought, are familiar only with one epistemic system, namely the metaphysical epistemic system, we will inevitably submit to epistemological monism[7] and will translate other epistemic systems into the language of the metaphysical epistemic system, and this is precisely what has occurred in Dr. Soroush's interpretation of the category of revelation as dream.

To put it more simply, due to the lack of a historical perspective and captivity in Cartesian-Kantian essentialism, he is only familiar with the metaphysical epistemic and knowledge paradigm and system (and that within the Aristotelian tradition, not the Platonic one); hence, he attempts to translate the category of "revelation," which belongs to another paradigm, epistemic system, and historical rationality, into the language of the paradigm and epistemic system of modern rationality, and the word or category he has found in modern rationality for translating the category of revelation is the category of "dream." Now, my criticism of Dr. Soroush is: why has he not considered the untranslatability of categories belonging to two different historical traditions and two paradigms or two epistemic systems?

To clarify the discussion, one can draw upon Wittgenstein's theory of language games. The epistemic system implicit in the historical Semitic-Jewish tradition and the epistemic system resulting from the tradition of Greek metaphysics and modern rationality are like two different games, such as chess and football, each possessing its own specific concepts, principles, rules, and methods. Translating any of the categories or the principles, rules, and methods of each game into the other game is, by way of example, like saying that "check" in the game of chess is the same as "offside" in the game of football. Such a translation amounts to the destruction and ruination of the matter being translated. Such a hermeneutic and phenomenological error is precisely the profound error seen in the theory of prophetic dreams and in the translation of the category of revelation into the category of dream. When I speak of so-called religious intellectualism or point to the fact that in the current of so-called religious intellectualism, the modern form is imposed upon the matter of historical tradition, my intent is precisely to point to such a hermeneutic and phenomenological error.

It will certainly be asked how it is possible that the great Rumi scholar and distinguished professor of the Masnavi, as well as the holder of a chair and the founder of the philosophy of science in our land, could be unfamiliar with various epistemic systems—such as religious, mystical, and scientific systems of knowledge—and their fundamental and essential distinctions? My answer is this: what is seen in Dr. Soroush and many others, for instance in many of our seminary scholars or in figures like Engineer Bazargan, is a psychological and personal, rather than a social-ontological and epistemological, conflation of different epistemic systems. The fact that many of our traditionalists and seminary scholars use the latest scientific and technological achievements while still adhering to our traditional principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), or that figures like Engineer Bazargan or Dr. Yadollah Sahabi were both men of modern science and people of religion, in no way means that they have been able to arrive at a clear and coherent ontological and epistemological system in which the relationship between modern sciences and religion is fully explicated and the epistemological status of modern sciences within their religious knowledge system is clarified. By the same analogy, I believe that in Dr. Soroush's thought and in the project he calls "religious intellectualism," firstly, the ontological, epistemological, and anthropological foundations of religious thought and life lack clarity and definition, and it is for this very reason that in his theory of prophetic dreams he has not ventured to discuss the nature and truth of revelation. Not that he did not want to, but rather he could not. Secondly, religious, spiritual, and mystical thought in his thinking stands in complete contradiction with the subjectivist foundations of Cartesian-Kantian philosophies and analytic philosophies. Thirdly, religious, spiritual, and mystical thought in his thinking remains, alongside the subjectivist foundations of Cartesian-Kantian philosophies and analytic philosophies, in a collage-like manner, without achieving unity within a single, clear ontological and epistemological system, and in a state that, to use Dr. Shayegan's term, is schizophrenic and multi-personality[8].

The final point in this passage is that Dr. Soroush, in his article "Muhammad (PBUH): The Narrator of Prophetic Dreams," considers his revelationology to be phenomenological, yet he pays no attention to the logic and method of phenomenological understanding (whether in the sense of Husserl's phenomenology of essence, Kierkegaard's existential phenomenology, or Heidegger's historical and hermeneutic phenomenology) in encountering the phenomena of revelation and sacred texts, nor does he attend to the data of sacred texts, including the Quran, regarding their own language and origin. When Dr. Soroush states, "The space of revelation is a dreamlike space; there should be no doubt that the language of the Quran is also entirely the language of dreams, and besides the imaginative origin of this language (which itself is the main and solid proof of this claim), there are so many clear signs in the narrative structure of the Quran that dispel other suspicions from the mind and establish the dreamlike nature of its language upon the seat of acceptance," it is here that the essential core of the category of revelation—namely, the openness of the mode of human existence towards the sacred and humanity's dwelling in a transcendental truth and calling out to this truth—falls into the abyss of neglect under the shadow of modern subjectivism, and, in allegorical terms, the modern form is imposed and injected upon the substance of tradition, and the phenomenon of revelation, in the phenomenological sense, is lost due to the imposition of the presuppositions of modern rationality.

The theory of prophetic dreams leaves unanswered the question, "What constitutes the sacredness of sacred texts?" and does not tell us why some "dream-books" are sacred and others are not. This theory, based on various political, social, ideological, and historical motives—namely, the struggle against intellectual ossification and stagnation and the emergence of fundamentalist violence, which is entirely understandable—concludes that sacred texts are "not from that world, but from this world!" "God did not speak and did not write a book, but rather a historical human being spoke and wrote a book in His place, and his speech was indeed His speech." However, although this is part of the story, phenomenologically speaking, it is not the whole story. This conclusion leads us toward the secularization of sacred texts and a nihilistic interpretation of them, which, from a phenomenological and hermeneutic standpoint, stands in clear contradiction to the nature and truth of these texts and the historical tradition formed around them.

6. 4. Paradigm Shift or Destroying the Spirit of Tradition?

It was said that one of the main motivations of the theorist of "Prophetic Dreams" in proposing it is the re-understanding and reinterpretation of the category of revelation as one of the most fundamental concepts in our historical tradition, in order to make it possible for the reason of the human being of our time to understand and rationalize it. He has explicitly stated that based on the theory of "revelation being a dream," one can achieve that very paradigm shift and fundamental change of model in the Islamic world: "Moving from exegesis (tafsīr) to interpretation (ta'bīr) requires a paradigm shift and a fundamental change of model." However, based on the explanations given in the preceding passages regarding the secularization of tradition and the imposition of a modern form upon the content of historical tradition by the theory of Prophetic Dreams, it must be concluded that this theory leads not to a paradigm shift towards providing the possibility for modern humans to understand and rationalize pre-modern historical theoretical traditions, but to the death of the spirit of tradition and the domination and prevalence of a secularism and nihilism that, precisely because we are fighting against them, we seek to revive Eastern historical traditions and return to their fundamental insights.

6. 5. Dream as a Window to the "Other World"?

According to the view of the theorist of Prophetic Dreams, the dream also plays an ontological role. This role consists in the dream being an entryway into the "other world." He explicitly states: "The entryway to the other world is none other than the dream."

But my question to my esteemed teacher, Dr. Soroush, is this: What does "other world" mean? He is certainly aware that this question does not pertain to a nominal definition and the literal and lexical meaning of the expression "other world"; rather, the question is directed at the philosophical and ontological level of the discussion. To elaborate further, according to the new Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian scientific rationality, the world consists of a system of matter in motion. Based on Kantian thought as well, our world is the phenomenal world, and we have no path to the "other world," that is, the non-phenomenal world, the supra-sensible realm, and the noumenal world, and we merely assume its existence without having any opening onto it. However, when, under the influence of and following the ontology of the ancients, we speak of various ontological levels, such as "this world" and the "other world," or the "Visible World" ('ālam al-shahāda) and the "Unseen World" ('ālam al-ghayb), or the "World of the Material Realm" ('ālam al-nāsūt) and the "World of the Divine Realm" ('ālam al-lāhūt), or the "higher world" and the "lower world," or "heaven" and "earth" (many of these concepts being metaphors and figurative expressions for the existence of various ontological levels), we are referring to a kind of ontology that is incompatible with the ontology resulting from the new rationality, such as an ontology of the Cartesian and Kantian type, according to which the world is single-leveled and single-tiered.

If we accept this writer's premise regarding the distinction between the ontologies of the ancients (belief in the existence of various ontological levels in the world) and the scientific and technological ontology resulting from the new rationality and philosophies (belief in the world being ontologically one-dimensional and single-tiered), then my three critical questions for the theorist of Prophetic Dreams will become understandable:

a. Can the ontological systems of the ancients (specifically the ontology implicit in the tradition of the Semitic-Jewish religions and in the Holy Scriptures) be placed alongside the new epistemological systems (specifically the Cartesian-Kantian epistemological system)?

b. If we ontologically believe in the existence of various ontological levels and, in the words of the theorist of Prophetic Dreams, in the existence of an "other world" distinct from "this world," should we not also epistemologically believe in the existence of various epistemological levels (a level of consciousness that belongs to this world, the sensible world, or the Visible World, and another level of consciousness that pertains to the other world, the supra-sensible world, or the Unseen World)?

C. If we accept, ontologically, the existence of various ontological levels and, epistemologically, the existence of various levels of consciousness, can we extend the principles of one level of consciousness to another? That is, can we, for instance, regard the principles of the modern sciences and the rules of knowledge of the sensible world as the same principles and rules of knowledge of the "other world" (which itself must be clarified ontologically as to what it is)? Do "scientific consciousness" and "religious self-consciousness" follow the same epistemological rules and principles, or does each follow specific principles, rules, and regulations appropriate to the ontological level of its object?

Let me state my point more plainly. Dr. Soroush, in his highly controversial article, has stated that the theory of prophetic dreams is a theory about the language of revelation, not its nature and essence. He himself has explicitly acknowledged: "What is pursued in this article is not the ontology of imagination... but the phenomenology of imagination and the description of the characteristics of the narration of dreams." The simple meaning of this statement is that he has not addressed the metaphysical foundations, i.e., the ontological and epistemological foundations of the category of revelation, but has merely sought to address the phenomenology of the mode of expression and narration of revelation in the Quran. He has also stated: "The entryway to the other world is none other than dreams."

Now, let us place these two premises side by side: First premise: He has not addressed the metaphysical principles of the category of revelation. Second premise: The entryway to the "other world," which is one of the metaphysical foundations of belief in the category of revelation, is none other than dreams.

The conclusion of these two premises is that he has also not addressed the metaphysical principles of the category of the "other world."

To put it more simply, my criticisms of Dr. Soroush in this passage are explicitly as follows:

A. Dr. Soroush, just like many of the figures and personalities known as religious intellectuals, and also like their rivals, i.e., like the vast majority of traditional individuals and our seminary scholars, possesses no clear ontological and epistemological principles for a metaphysical (and not theological-doctrinal) explanation of the "other world" and the category of revelation in the current lifeworld and in dialogue with modern rationality.

B. The ontological and epistemological foundations necessary for religious consciousness and the category of revelation are in no way compatible with the metaphysical foundations of modern rationality and Cartesian-Kantian philosophical systems.

C. Interpreting revelation as a dream is the result of translating the category of revelation, which is a concept belonging to another tradition, lifeworld, historical paradigm, and ontological and epistemological system, into the psychological matter of dreams, which is a concept arising from another tradition, lifeworld, historical paradigm, and ontological and epistemic system. This amounts to ignoring the logic of the phenomenological and hermeneutic method; which itself leads to the secularization and nihilization of the category of revelation, and thus the death of the religious and spiritual soul of Eastern historical traditions.

6. 6. The Non-Authoritativeness of Dreams

I believe Dr. Soroush himself has become somewhat and implicitly aware of the consequences and implications of the theory of prophetic dreams and the interpretation of revelation as a dream, and the consideration of the prophet as a dreamer (in the sense of one who sleeps, not an interpreter of dreams). Therefore, in response to an anticipated criticism as to why one should have faith in the prophet's dreams, he himself answers: "If believers in the prophet consider the prophet's revelation as authoritative, then they must also consider his dreams as authoritative."

But my critical question is: Where does this "must" in the aforementioned phrase come from, and from where has it derived its necessity? Why must the dreams of an individual be authoritative?

The reality of the matter is that in our time, when, due to the expansion and dominance of the subjectivism of Western metaphysics, even those who consider sacred texts to be the product of the wakefulness, consciousness, and knowledge of figures like Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad [PBUH] do not believe in them as sacred texts, how is it that the proponent of the theory of prophetic dreams expects that "believers in the prophet... must also consider his dreams as authoritative"?

The question is: why should one have faith in the sanctity of sacred texts, which, according to the theory of prophetic dreams, are nothing more than a dream-book? The answer of this theory is as follows: “We have decided, from outside the text, that the Qur’an is heavenly, and we have assumed its bearer, i.e., the Prophet, to be infallible and inerrant.” That is, believers in sacred texts consider them to be heavenly books based on a doctrinal presupposition, and there is no sign of this within the text itself. The necessary implication of this statement, in the first stage, is: if someone does not believe in the sanctity of heavenly texts or the infallibility of the Prophet from outside the text and does not take them as given, there is no sign within the text itself for the text’s sanctity, and one must conclude, like the author of The Expansion of the Prophetic Experience, that “the language of the Qur’an is human and this-worldly, and the Qur’an is directly and without mediation the composition, experience, effusion, and growth of the soul of Muhammad (PBUH) …”; “that is, God did not speak and did not write a book, but a historical human being spoke and wrote a book in His place, and his speech was the very speech of God. … He was not told, ‘Go and tell the people God is one.’” “The Qur’an … is not from the other world, but from this world!”

In the next stage, when believers realize that sacred texts are nothing more than a dream-book, they will gradually join the first group, and these texts will carry no authority for them. Therefore, the “must” that Dr. Soroush speaks of in the proposition that “believers in the Prophet … must also consider his dreams as authoritative,” is, due to the very lack of the necessary and proper philosophical and metaphysical foundations mentioned in the preceding lines, an extravagant, arbitrary, and groundless obligation. In other words, the secularism and nihilism resulting from it are the inevitable outcome of the theory of prophetic dreams. The conclusion I wish to emphasize here is that neither the understanding, interpretation, and explanation of the categories of revelation and sacred texts, nor the reading and recitation of sacred texts and a conscious faith—and not merely a belief dictated by historical thrownness as a cultural matter and an inherited faith—is possible except through the adoption of specific ontological, epistemological, anthropological, and hermeneutical foundations, which most of our traditionalists and intellectuals generally, including Dr. Soroush, lack.

6. 7. Interpreting Sacred Texts by Means of Modern Sciences

According to Dr. Soroush, the sciences that are supposed to help us in understanding sacred texts and, in his terms, in the dream interpretation of prophetic dreams, are: “a. History b. Anthropology c. Psychoanalysis.” In his view, the scholars of these three branches of modern science will be the dream interpreters and expounders of our future, i.e., the exegetes of sacred texts.

The noteworthy point here is that all three of these sciences are modern sciences and among the achievements of modern rationality. Even the “science of history” spoken of here is not history in the mythical sense, or the philosophical and existential history that existed in myths or in sacred texts or in the culture of the ancients, but history in the chronological and modern sense of the word. To put it more simply, Dr. Soroush believes that with the help of “three branches of modern science,” which have been formed based on the metaphysics of the modern era and within the historical worldliness and life-world of modernity, we can achieve an understanding of the phenomena of “revelation and sacred texts,” which are based on the metaphysics of the ancient world and belong to another historical worldliness and life-world. In other words, the thinker who believes that revelation, prophethood, and the prophet are human, and therefore historical, matters, does not pay attention to the fact that the modern sciences themselves are not universal and trans-historical truths but are the product of a specific culture, horizon of meaning, and metaphysical foundations that have taken shape in recent centuries. Therefore, using these sciences to understand categories that are based on other metaphysical foundations can lead to enormous chronological fallacies and phenomenological and hermeneutical obstacles. For example, if we were to assess the story of the sacrifice of Ishmael/Isaac by Abraham, one of the founders of the great historical Hebrew-Semitic-Jewish tradition who played a very great and astonishing role in the presentation of three major religions in human history and in the awakening of humanity, based on modern psychoanalysis, the result would be very regrettable and non-phenomenological, and based on the achievements of modern psychoanalysis, one of the greatest figures and awakening teachers of human history, who played a tremendous role in profound cultural creation, would have to be regarded as bordering on a psychopath and child abuser, in its most severe form, to the point where he was prepared to slaughter his own child with his own hands!

    Dr. Soroush, owing to his captivity within the metaphysical subjectivism of Cartesian-Kantian philosophies—that is, because of conceiving the human being, first and foremost, as a subject (knowing agent and mind), and also understanding the human being as a substance enclosed upon itself, cut off from any truth beyond consciousness, and based on the belief that consciousness cannot attain a truth beyond consciousness or the noumenon (the ground of the world), to the point where proving the existence of the world and that there is fundamentally a world outside the sphere of consciousness itself becomes an insoluble problem,[9]—cannot conceive of the human being's transcendence toward Being-in-itself, nor of the human being's standing and presence within the Sacred and the unification of the human being and the Sacred in a realm beyond the subject-object relation, to the point where another truth speaks through the human tongue. Due to a conceptual and proposition-centered understanding of human knowledge, he regards the possibility of any existential, non-conceptual, and non-propositional reception as something outside the sphere of consciousness and belonging to the realm of feelings, emotions, and dreams. He considers conceptual and propositional dialectics—that is, movement from known concepts toward unknown concepts or from known propositions toward unknown propositions—as the sole dialectic of the human mode of being, and overlooks existential and non-conceptual dialectics. Consequently, he cannot have a reception of the "hermeneutics of presence," that is, the reception of the meaning of works such as sacred texts outside the sphere of concepts and propositions, or he cannot find a suitable place for such presential and non-conceptual forms of awareness within his own epistemic system and geometry. Hence, he proposes sciences for understanding sacred texts that can, at most, turn sacred texts into a dead and lifeless object of research, without gaining access to their true meaning, namely, the encounter with the unique presence of sacred truth in the world.

 

6. 8. Prophetic Dreams and Vacillating Secularism

The proponent of the theory of prophetic dreams exhibits vacillation in their theoretical orientation. On the one hand, they believe that "Muhammad (PBUH) ... is not an addressee and a reporter. It is not as if he was addressed by voices and words were recited into his inner ear, and he was commanded to convey them. ... He was not told, 'Go and tell the people that God is One'." "There is no address and addressee, report and reporter, speaker and speech in the matter. ... It is not from that end; rather, it is from this end!" Up to this point, it is entirely clear that the theory seeks the "secularization and humanization" of the categories of revelation and sacred texts. But the proponent of the theory adds to the preceding statement: "Of course, all is by God's eye and by God's permission." Now, my question is this: What does this sentence, "all is by God's eye and by God's permission," mean in this context? I do not mean what the expression "by God's eye and by God's permission" means lexically; rather, my question is: Metaphysically speaking, within the epistemic system of the theory's proponent, especially considering their Cartesian-Kantian theoretical framework, what standing does "by God's eye and by God's permission" have?

In the writings presented by Dr. Soroush for the purpose of advancing the theory of prophetic dreams, this dual, "neither here nor there," vacillating, and contradictory stance is seen in numerous expressions and in his manner of speaking about the category of revelation—precisely the same vacillation and contradiction that metaphysically manifests itself to people of philosophy in the expression "religious intellectualism." In a passage from the article "Muhammad (PBUH): The Narrator of Prophetic Dreams," he states: "The discussion concerns the phenomenon of revelation and its dreamlike language and its enigmatic, misty atmosphere. A divine dream in which the soul of the Noble Messenger, may God's blessings and peace be upon him, had such proximity and relation with the Eternal Beloved that whatever God thought, he knew, indeed he saw—and is revelation and dream anything but this?" Again, in these expressions, on the one hand, there is talk of revelation being a dream and its dreamlike language, but immediately following that, there is "talk of the proximity and relation of the soul of the Noble Messenger [?!] with the Eternal Beloved" and that "whatever God thought, he [the Prophet] knew, indeed he saw." Throughout his article, Dr. Soroush refers to Jalal al-Din Muhammad Balkhi as "that Throne-dwelling Beloved," and through his tongue, in opposition to the "interpretation of the Mu'tazilites," speaks of the "light of the state" of the people of faith, of "entering the world of the soul," of the "senses of the prophets," and of "reading the Quran, one from the realm of the Unseen and the other from the realm of the Visible." He states that "not only was God in the Prophet, but the Prophet was also in God."

But truly, what do expressions such as “messenger,” “enthronement,” “the soul’s nearness to the eternal Beloved,” “light of spiritual state,” “entry into the world of the soul,” “possessing the senses of the prophets,” “reciting the Qur’an from the unseen,” “God being in the Prophet,” and “the Prophet being in God” mean, and what place do they hold, within Dr. Soroush’s metaphysical system? Has he, who is himself one of the most important progenitors and elaborators of analytic philosophies in our land, taken refuge in the language of poetry when it comes to the philosophy, thought, and metaphysical explanation of revelation? Are the aforementioned expressions merely figurative and poetic concepts, or do they bespeak a kind of outlook and insight concerning the human being and the human being’s relationship with the world? Where, apart from their poetic language, do these outlooks and insights manifest themselves in his ontological and epistemological system? If these expressions are not used figuratively and bespeak a kind of insight and vision regarding the human being and his relationship with the world, where do they show themselves in the theory of prophetic dreams and the conception of revelation as a dream? What kind of being is the human, after all, that he can be in God and God can be in him? Is such a thing—that is, such an understanding of the human being and his relationship with God, wherein the human dwells in God and God dwells in the human—possible on the basis of modern metaphysical subjectivism and within the framework of Cartesian and Kantian epistemology? If not, then by what metaphysical warrant does Dr. Soroush employ these expressions in his writings? And if so, then how is it that in The Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of the Sharia, on the basis of the Kantian duality of noumenon and phenomenon, he declares that we have access not to the essence (noumenon) of religion but solely to religious knowledge (to the phenomenon of religion, i.e., solely to that which is disclosed in the realm of human consciousness)? Within the framework of Kantian subjectivism, how can a human being who has no access to the noumenon (the being/foundation of the world) be filled with the noumenon (the foundation of the world) and dwell in the noumenon (the foundation of the world) like a prophet?

To put it more simply, a quite evident kind of metaphysical and epistemological rift is visible in the theory of prophetic dreams: on the one hand, he emphasizes mysticism and religious and spiritual thought, and on the other hand, for example, in light of the framework of the book The Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of the Sharia and the distinction between religion and religious knowledge in that work, he submits to the Kantian duality and dichotomy of noumenon and phenomenon. In his defense, he will probably answer that religion, mysticism, and philosophy are each independent domains that we must not mix together. But the question here is: on the basis of which domain should the individual, as a “unitary identity,” organize his thinking about the world, himself, and his relation to the world? Does this duality and rift not abandon the individual in the midst of an abyss, and does this abyss not ultimately lead to the domination of one domain over another and, largely, given the hegemony of metaphysical thought, in the direction of the domination of secularism? In my belief, this very metaphysical rift and duality in the current known as religious intellectualism has ultimately led to secularism and the domination of metaphysical rationality.

In his youth, Dr. Soroush considered both the essence of religion and religious teachings to be sacred matters. But in his middle age, with the theory of the theoretical contraction and expansion of the Sharia, a great transformation took place in his thought—a transformation that was a very remarkable achievement for our Iranian society, yet, in comparison with the achievements of hermeneutics in the West, was very belated. On the basis of the Kantian duality of noumenon and phenomenon, in the theory of the theoretical contraction and expansion of the Sharia, he held the noumenon and essence of religion to be a sacred truth that, in the context of believers’ understanding, became a human, historical, and therefore customary and secular matter—an understanding and knowledge that underwent a historical contraction and expansion in the context of time and space and within the context of the totality of human knowledge. In the next step of the evolution of his thought, Dr. Soroush gradually distanced himself from the theory of the theoretical contraction and expansion of the Sharia, and in the book The Expansion of the Prophetic Experience, he substituted “human, earthly religious experience” for “sacred religion” and “historical prophetic experience” for “revelation.” In the next stage, in the article “Muhammad (PBUH): Prophetic Dreams,” revelation and the sacred text are transformed into human dreams. All of these are various stages in the process of the ever-increasing secularization of religious and spiritual thought in his thinking.[10] Only one step remains to arrive at a thoroughly secular and nihilistic thought, and that is the conception of prophetic revelation as “prophetic delusions.” If it is this psychology and historical subjectivity of the Prophet’s personality that creates the dreamlike forms of revelation, then even the “idea of God” will be nothing but soliloquy and a creation of the human mind.

Dr. Soroush may, for educational, personal, and psychological reasons, be unable to take this final step, but his audience in the present and future generations will certainly take it with ever-increasing speed, owing to metaphysical reasons, the lack of adequate ontological and epistemological foundations in the thought of their great teacher, and the vast gaps in his thinking mentioned above. Dr. Soroush knows better than anyone that the history of thought and culture is not subject to our desires, decisions, psychologies, intentions, plans, wishes, and wishful thinking. The implications and consequences of any thought are its necessary and inevitable results.

For us and for thinkers like Dr. Soroush, who are concerned with religious and spiritual thought and who look to the re-emergence of the sun of truth from the horizon of the Eastern spiritual tradition to find a way to confront the crisis of nihilism and the meaninglessness of the contemporary world, the most important question is this: Is the emergence and manifestation of the sacred in human thought, feeling, speech, and action possible?

Neither the proponents of traditional theological systems nor our so-called religious intellectuals have so far been able to provide the philosophical and metaphysical foundations for such a possibility.

Dr. Soroush must inevitably either submit to the consequences and implications of the secularism and nihilism latent and hidden in his own thought, or not limit the attribute of historicity solely to the Prophet and the sacred text, but also apply and extend this attribute to all texts and the entire history of human thought, including his own reading of the sacred text, as well as to Western metaphysics and modern rationality, including the theory of prophetic dreams. In that case, Dr. Soroush is compelled to submit to a paradigm shift from the ahistorical Cartesian-Kantian subject to the historical Hegelian-Heideggerian subject, and to a radical and fundamental critique of his own ahistorical epistemic system, striving to attain a new epistemic system—one in which, based on its ontological and epistemological foundations, he can speak of the possibility of the historical human being's openness to a transcendental, sacred, and transhistorical truth, not in the realm of dreams, but in a sphere beyond the subject-object relation.[11]

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Notes:

1. All direct and indirect quotations from Dr. Soroush are from the following two sources:

a. Soroush, Abdolkarim, "Muhammad (PBUH): The Narrator of Prophetic Dreams," Jaras website, 7 June 2013 (online article).

b. Debate between Abdolkarim Soroush and Abdolali Bazargan, Pargar program, BBC Persian Television, Parts One and Two, May 2016.

2. Within the existence of every human individual, highly contradictory possibilities sometimes come together. The fact that contradictory possibilities such as "intellectualism and religiosity," "scientism and being a Muslim," "positivism and being a mystic," "being religious and being a terrorist," or "loving someone and throwing acid in their face" are psychologically combinable in a person or persons, or that a group or movement in society has been sociologically labeled "religious intellectual," does not necessarily mean that these contradictory possibilities are also philosophically and metaphysically combinable. Over time and in the course of intellectual, cultural, and historical developments, metaphysical contradictions reveal themselves. This is why philosophical, metaphysical, and sapiential discussions are of fundamental importance.
3. Abdolkarimi, Bijan, article "Questioning and the Sacred" in the book "The End of Theology 1 (Theology, Modern Rationality, and the New Humanities)," Naqd-e Farhang Publishing, forthcoming, pp. 311–312.
4. Abdolkarimi, Bijan, article "Hermeneutics of the Sacred Text" in the book "The End of Theology 2 (Theology and History)," Naqd-e Farhang Publishing, forthcoming, pp. 61–67.
5. Once, during one of Dr. Soroush's lecture series at the Isa Khan Vazir Mosque (Tehran, Vahdat-e Eslami Street, across from Shahr Park), after Maghrib and Isha prayers, in the 1990s, as a student I inquired about the professor's view on "the historicity of rationality" and the existence of "multiple rationalities." He replied: "Reason is one, but the objects of reason are different."
6. Knowledge is a light that God casts into the heart of whomsoever He wills. (Prophetic Hadith)
7. In the context of this discussion, by "epistemological pluralism," in contrast to "epistemological monism," I do not at all mean a belief in the existence of various intellectual and philosophical systems such as empiricism and rationalism, or the existence of diverse philosophical systems like Aristotelian, Platonic, Cartesian, Kantian, or Hegelian philosophies, nor a belief in the existence of scientific, philosophical, mystical, and other epistemic systems. Rather, I mean the recognition of great historical theoretical traditions, such as the Hebrew-Semitic-Judaic tradition, the tradition of Greek metaphysics, the tradition of Hindu-Iranian wisdom, and so on, each of which possesses its own epistemic system.
8. Here, by using the expression "schizophrenic and multiple-personality situation," I do not at all intend a personal or psychological meaning, nor, God forbid, do I intend to insult any individual, particularly my esteemed teacher. Rather, like Dr. Shayegan, I am referring to our own historical, cultural, and civilizational situation.
9. After Descartes and within the framework of Cartesian subjectivism, proving the existence of the world remained a problem, and Kant's transcendental philosophy, despite its initial intention to answer the Cartesian problem and solve the issue of human transcendence toward the external world, could not find a suitable solution. Kant himself says regarding the problem of proving the existence of the external world: "It still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the belief in the external world... is accepted merely on faith [and not on a rational proof (added by this author to Kant's statement)], and if anyone thinks good to doubt it, we have no satisfactory answer to give him."

Kant, Imanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, (Second Edition),. Translated from German to English by Norman Kemp Smith, ST Martin’s Press (INC), New York, 1961, XI, note a.

10. These criticisms are not and have never been a defense of the inherently secular ideas of many traditional and theological currents, which themselves, from a philosophical and wisdom-based perspective, are another form of "hidden secularism," a matter I have addressed in some of my drafts.
11. My recent draft, titled "Spiritual Thought and Metaphysical Subjectivism," can be considered another step in the continuation of this dialogue.

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