Some Possible Implications of Abdolkarim Soroush's Theory of 'Prophetic Dreams'

Introduction:

According to the common conception of the Quran and its revelation to the Prophet, this book contains the words of God, which the Prophet received through the process of revelation and was commanded to disseminate to the people. In a different approach to this issue, Abdolkarim Soroush has claimed that the Prophet is not the transmitter of God's words, because since God is a formless existence, devoid of mind and will, and indeed, in a sense, identical with the world, He cannot be the source of many of the acts attributed to Him, and among other things, He cannot speak. What is in the Quran is merely the expression of the Prophet's dreams and visions, which (in most cases) should be regarded as truthful dreams. On the other hand, understanding the reality of these dreams and grasping their essence requires dream interpreters who can convey their true message.

Soroush's "dream interpretation" approach can be discussed from various angles. One can seek historical or intra-religious evidence for and against it. One can examine, from the perspectives of logic and psychology, whether the sentences of the Quran, given their syntactic and semantic structures, could be derived from the Prophet's dream. This point is important because, on the one hand, the said sentences refer not only to sensible concepts but also to abstract and incorporeal concepts, and on the other hand, the syntactic structure of some of them (in the form of universal, conditional, and counterfactual conditional sentences) prevents them from having a counterpart in the dream-like and quasi-sensory imaginations of the Prophet. This point is automatically linked to another important issue about which Soroush has so far remained silent: the nature of dreams. It is by no means clear whether Soroush's theory is based on a specific psychological-philosophical theory of dreams or whether his conception of dreams is more or less the common, folk understanding people have of their dreams. It is clear that, given the role of the Quran and revealed speech in the genesis and emergence of Islamic civilization, Soroush's theory of the "prophetic dream" will be severely truncated and ineffective without acceptable scientific-philosophical backing regarding the nature of dreams and their epistemic-cognitive characteristics. This is exactly like someone speaking of the epistemic status of sensory beliefs without offering a theory or reason for the reliability of sensory perception. Just as sensory experience or perception is the context within which perceptual beliefs are born, the dream is also the context and process within which, according to Soroush, Quranic beliefs and sentences emerge and appear. One cannot speak of the epistemic validity of a belief while remaining indifferent to the context that leads to its emergence. However, in this brief essay, I will attempt, independently of the aforementioned aspects, to examine the implications of Soroush's theory solely from the perspective of the epistemic relationship between the dreamer (the Prophet) and the inner interpretation of that dream.

For ease of following the discussion, the Quran can be conceived as a collection of sentences, some descriptive and others prescriptive and imperative. The following examples can serve the purpose. There are countless verses in the Quran whose primary role is descriptive, such as the verses that describe the raising of people from their graves and the reckoning of their deeds on the Day of Judgment. On the other hand, there are many verses that invite and obligate people to believe in the Omniscient, Omnipotent, Forgiving God who will call to account on the Day of Recompense. As stated, Soroush considers the descriptive sentences of the Quran (which mostly have a metaphysical character) to be the expression of what the Prophet sees in a dream. Since he apparently considers God devoid of knowledge, power, etc., and also deems the Resurrection (in its common spiritual and bodily sense) impossible, then such descriptive sentences must be considered false in their apparent interpretation, but these same propositions will be true in an inner interpretation (which the dream interpreter must determine), because, in Soroush's view, the Prophet's dreams (at least in most cases) are truthful dreams.

In the Quran itself, at least two types of dreams are mentioned. What is common between these two types of dreams is that the sentences used to describe them are false or meaningless in their apparent interpretation but true in an inner interpretation (the identification of which requires a dream interpreter). On the other hand, what distinguishes these two types of dreams from each other is the epistemic position of God's Messenger (or chosen servant) regarding that dream. In the first type, the Messenger has no knowledge of the inner interpretation of the dream, but in the second type, he does.

Example:

Joseph₁: Dream: “The moon, the sun, and the stars prostrate themselves before Joseph…” But Joseph is unaware of the esoteric interpretation of this dream.

Joseph₂: Dream: “Seven lean cows devour seven fat cows…” Joseph possesses knowledge of the esoteric interpretation of this dream.

These same two states may occur for the prophet in relation to his dreams: Prophet₁ is unaware of the esoteric interpretation of his dreams (like Joseph₁), but rather believes in their apparent interpretation; whereas Prophet₂, like Joseph₂, is informed of the esoteric interpretation of his dreams. However, such a distinction confronts Soroush’s theory with a dual dilemma: either the Prophet of Islam is of the Prophet₁ type or of the Prophet₂ type (of course, it is also possible that the prophet, while knowing his dreams have an esoteric interpretation, is not aware of those interpretations, but since, as a historical fact, such a point was never declared by the prophet, the problems with this assumption are more or less the same as the Prophet₂ assumption, which will follow). The problem is that in both cases, faith and religiosity are completely emptied of their meaning and transformed into their opposite.

Prophet₁:

Since Prophet₁ is not cognizant of the esoteric interpretation of his dreams, he naturally accepts them in their apparent meaning and interpretation. Thus, Prophet₁ will believe in a set of false propositions. Although the sentences of the Quran, according to an esoteric interpretation, are true, the prophet is not cognizant of those meanings. In other words, he has no knowledge of the “unseen” (ghayb) of these propositions or their unseen meanings. “Unseen” here is broader than what is “invisible” and, contrary to its conventional meaning, certainly cannot be constitutive of faith because, by the assumption of Prophet₁, he fundamentally does not know that these sentences also possess an esoteric meaning.

Prophet₁ believes, and indeed has faith, in these sentences only in their apparent meaning and invites people to accept them. He enters into battle and war with his opponents on account of these false propositions. Which opponents? Opponents who say these propositions are false (there is no resurrection, etc.). Because of the false beliefs the prophet holds, blood is shed, families are torn apart, and cities are destroyed. The mission of Prophet₁, considering these assumptions, is nothing but an invitation to a delusion. A delusion that takes the name of religion. On the other hand, people who refuse to accept this delusion (independent of their motives) are considered infidels, polytheists, and deserving of death. In the mission of Prophet₁, it seems the positions of believer and infidel are swapped: believers have faith in false propositions (the apparent interpretation of Quranic sentences), while infidels are aware of the falsehood of these propositions and do not deny or reject the truth.

It might be said that since the prophet’s Quranic utterances, in esoteric interpretations, are true, the prophet, in this sense, utters true statements. Such an interpretation, although it restores truth to the prophet’s words, deprives him of knowledge of the content of his beliefs. The prophet utters true statements but no longer knows what he is saying. From this perspective, the epistemic situation of Prophet₁ (at least regarding metaphysical Quranic propositions) is not unlike the situation of the inhabitants of the Matrix (in the film The Matrix). The inhabitants of the Matrix have beliefs whose truth-content is guaranteed by something completely different from the conception they themselves have of this content. They are unaware of these real interpretations and do not know that they are playthings of the machines and that their apparent world is nothing more than an illusion. What determines the real content of their beliefs is not the illusory external world but the giant computer that is the cause of those beliefs.

Considering the points above, it is clear that Prophet₁’s invitation to people to act upon these false sentences is just as reasonable as Joseph₁’s invitation to people to praise him (based on his dream of being prostrated to by the moon and the sun). Both actions go astray by relying on false premises. Only correct premises can guarantee the rationality of an individual’s practical inferences.

Prophet₂:

Prophet₂ (like Joseph₂) is aware of the esoteric interpretation of his dreams but, unlike Joseph₂, does not declare it. Nowhere do we find that the Prophet, in contrast to the apparent meanings of Quranic propositions, also expressed completely different esoteric interpretations of them. The Quran contains only one book. It is not accompanied by a guiding commentary (from the Prophet). The difference between Prophet₂ and Prophet₁ is that, although both call people to accept false propositions, Prophet₂ does so with knowledge of their falsity. Therefore, his intention is to deceive people and to lie. He is no different from false prophets who call people to accept their false statements. Prophet₂ wants to confine people within a metaphysical matrix.

On the other hand, God in both states (1) and (2) is a deceptive God. In model (1), everyone, including the Prophet, is deceived by God, but in model (2), God and the Prophet are partners in deception. In Soroush's approach, the disbeliever and the believer also swap places with each other. In both states (1) and (2), disbelievers and polytheists enjoy a higher epistemological rank than believers, because they refuse to accept false propositions.

Two Interpretations of Soroush's Approach to the Issue of Revelation

The main presupposition of Soroush's approach is the separation between the apparent and the esoteric (reality) meaning of Quranic sentences. What matters to him is that for sentences which, in their apparent interpretation, are false, an esoteric interpretation is also conceived in such a way that they are true in that interpretation. The important point is that multiple interpretations and models can exist in which the said sentences are true. This issue allows us to have two general realist and non-realist interpretations (from the perspective of the presence of the entity "God" in the interpretation) of Soroush's approach.

1- Realist Interpretation: In this interpretation, which apparently Soroush himself also accepts, the existence of God is assumed in both states (1) and (2). For this purpose, the word 'Allah' must be esoterically interpreted in such a way that it sufficiently overlaps with its conventional meaning. But at least two issues make achieving this difficult. The first issue has an ontological aspect and the second has an epistemological character. From the totality of Soroush's statements, it seems that he inclines towards a completely unorthodox conception of God. In that case, it is unclear how much this conception overlaps with the conventional conception of God, such that it could be considered a continuation of the conventional approach or a complete break from it. The second issue has an epistemological aspect. As we saw, neither in state (1) nor in state (2) is the real interpretation of Quranic sentences, whose subject is God and the manner of His relationship with humanity and the world, ever made available to mankind. Prophet₁ is unaware of these interpretations and Prophet₂ refuses to express them. Thus, God, within the framework of the theory of the "Prophetic Dream," becomes something unknowable. Here the question arises: if God is to remain an unknowable entity, what need is there fundamentally to assume it? If our affairs are to be conducted by resorting to the apparent interpretations of Quranic sentences (and indeed, Islamic civilization has been formed on this basis), what need is there to assume a separate entity called 'Allah' beyond these appearances? In the history of philosophy, a similar thing occurred regarding the entity of the "external world." Empiricist tendencies, by their nature, had no need for anything beyond sense data and their relations. From their perspective, everything could be expressed based on these data and sensory appearances, and the only things that were knowable were the relations among these very sense data. Thus, the unknowable "external world" was considered superfluous by them and was naturally eliminated from their conceptual structures. It was from such reflections that the phenomenalism of Russell and Carnap stepped into the arena of philosophical thought.

2- The non-realist interpretation: Whereas in the realist interpretation of Soroush's theory, God appears as a superfluous entity, in the non-realist interpretation of this approach He is naturally eliminated. Soroush's approach is also compatible with the non-existence of God. For, as was said, what matters in his approach is the assumption of correct esoteric interpretations as opposed to false exoteric interpretations of Quranic sentences. But for these propositions to have a correct esoteric interpretation, it is not necessary to assume the existence of God. In other words, it is not necessary to assume that the word 'Allah' refers to a single entity in both its exoteric and esoteric interpretations (just as 'Joseph' in the exoteric and esoteric interpretation of Joseph's dream about the sun and moon prostrating to him refers to himself). The word 'Allah' can be interpreted in such a way that, on the one hand, the truth of the Quranic sentences containing that word (in that interpretation) is guaranteed, and on the other hand, it turns God into an entity that is far removed from the conventional understanding of this entity (just as in Joseph's dream, 'the moon' and 'the sun' signify Joseph's mother and father). It should be clear that if the ontological distance between the conventional and esoteric interpretations of a word is sufficiently great, then the process of interpretation leads to the elimination of the conventional entity. In philosophical literature, we sometimes see some who consider God to be the very "moral conscience" of humanity or identical with "natural laws." It is clear that such interpretations of 'God' first and foremost lead to the complete elimination of the conventional referent of this word. This trend is also pursued more specifically in some recent naturalistic neuroscientific interpretations of the phenomenon of revelation, which consider it to be the result of brain disorders in individuals claiming prophethood.

Which of these two interpretations of Soroush's approach is more acceptable? The realist interpretation, in addition to its internal problems, is very costly. To establish it, many questions must be answered: Why should God mislead people by sending prophets? How can this be considered an instance of guidance from God? And so on. But in the non-realist model, none of these costs need to be incurred; for, fundamentally, God is eliminated in this interpretation. Interpretations can be assumed in which Quranic propositions are true without needing to be committed to the existence of God (in its conventional sense), which is, of course, what secularism has been declaring for a long time: God is dead, and humanity, in its progress, gradually overcomes the myths it has itself created. In this minimal metaphysics, humanity is the master of its own destiny, whereas Soroush's metaphysics summons it to captivity in an illusory metaphysical matrix and the worship of a deceptive being. If the latter is to contain the message of religion and the prophets, the transition from tradition to atheism will be not only reasonable but unavoidable. The heralds of secularism can only be grateful to Soroush for exposing the nature of religiosity.

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Some Possible Implications of Abdolkarim Soroush's Theory of 'Prophetic Dreams'

Author: Dr. Hamid Vahid Dastjerdi

Source: Radio Zamaneh - 18 July 2016

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