Abbas-Ali Mansouri's “Mohsen Kadivar's Critique of Abdolkarim Soroush: A Reflection on the Nature of the Critique and the Point of Disagreement”

Mohsen Kadivar's Critique of Abdolkarim Soroush: A Reflection on the Nature of the Critique and the Point of Disagreement

Abbas-Ali Mansouri

Faculty Member, Razi University

This note is an attempt to examine the question:

Is Mohsen Kadivar's critique of Abdolkarim Soroush's religious studies of the type belonging to religious intellectualism, or of the type that uses the cudgel of takfir (excommunication)?

Or rather, to put it better, the real question is:

What is the main issue over which Soroush and Kadivar disagree?

Preliminary question: Why is it necessary to speak and write more about the disagreement in religious studies between Mohsen Kadivar and Abdolkarim Soroush?

Some of those who, in terms of religious studies, are attached to the current of religious intellectualism and new-thinking, consider these kinds of writings and addressing this disagreement to be detrimental to religious intellectualism, to the extent that they even refrain from publishing such writings. However, I do not see the matter this way and believe that such concerns are closer to the expediency considerations of traditional thought than to the truth-seeking of religious intellectualism. Therefore, worries such as the sharp tongues of the traditional current, the downfall of the religious intellectualism current, political exploitation of this intellectual disagreement, damage to the scholarly reputation of Dr. Soroush or Kadivar, etc., should not cause us to abandon truth-seeking.

The Summary and Appearance of the Matter:

The matter is that Mohsen Kadivar critiques Soroush's religious studies and believes that Soroush's work is not an instance of the reform and reconstruction of religious knowledge, nor an instance of structural ijtihad in foundations and principles, but rather an instance of revising Islam itself and presenting a new religion, because Soroush has revised the Islamic fundamentals (revelation, prophethood, the Quran, and God) and has left no hard core for Islam. The path of his religious studies leads to the gradual dissolution of the subject of religion, God, prophethood, revelation, and the Quran, and its result is a trans-religious spiritualism, commitment to trans-religious and trans-denominational concerns, and a lack of commitment to any specific religious or denominational identity.

Dr. Kadivar, at the same time, explicitly states and emphasizes that this statement does not mean takfir, because the criterion for leaving Islam is the individual's own confession. Therefore, as long as the individual does not confess to leaving Islam, they remain a Muslim, even if we consider their understanding of Islam to be incorrect or even in contradiction with Islam. In the article "New Islamic Spectrums in Contemporary Iran," Kadivar refers to Soroush and his like-minded thinkers as "Revisionist Muslims" and clarifies that: "One cannot silence someone under the pretext of revisionism. Everyone is permitted to express whatever comes to their mind, and no one has the right to restrict another's expression of opinion, even if they consider it wrong. In other words, freedom of expression, especially in expressing unorthodox religious views, is inviolable under any pretext. Any restriction, under any pretext, in this area will be to the detriment of the growth and flourishing of religious thought. I wholeheartedly defend the right to 'freedom of expression' of Iranian Revisionist Muslims, as well as other revisionists and critics of Islam. A Revisionist Muslim is permitted to say that Islam is as they have understood it, and a critic also has the right to say that, for these reasons, presenting Islam in this way is incorrect and leads to the dissolution of Islam."

In contrast, Abdolkarim Soroush believes that Kadivar's critique is not of a scholarly nature but rather of the type that uses the cudgel of takfir to silence critics. He recently, in response to a question from an audience member (which was also published on Dr. Soroush's Telegram channel), said: "It seems that once again, instead of fair and scholarly critique, we must witness the raising of the cudgel of takfir and the accusation of 'leaving Islam, dissolving Islam, and bringing a new religion.' I myself have given scholarly answers to scholarly critiques in the past, but what is to be said about a cleric who has not yet understood the alphabet of religious new-thinking and, like some of his fellow and senior traditional seminary colleagues, still insists on the existence of a 'real and fixed Islam,' considers himself its guardian, and taunts others with the charge of leaving the fold of Islam?"

The Truth of the Matter and the Main Point of Disagreement

It is clear to the discerning and astute reader that the main issue in this disagreement, although it appears to involve questions such as: What is Islam? Where is the hard core of Islam, and does Islam even have a hard core? Is there a criterion for distinguishing a correct from an incorrect interpretation of Islam?

But the reality of the matter is that what has placed Soroush and Kadivar in opposition and separated their paths is not their differing answers to these questions. For their fundamental disagreement does not, in essence, stem from these questions.

In fact, and at its heart, the main issue and the point of disagreement between Soroush and Kadivar (and the like-minded of each of these two thinkers) is whether, in the modern world and within modern rationality, spiritual wayfaring within a specific religion is possible and desirable or not? Does modern man need to continue wayfaring within a specific religion, or is wayfaring within a specific religion no longer possible or desirable?

Mohsen Kadivar's answer to this question is affirmative. He defends both the necessity of wayfaring within a specific religion called Islam and the Shi'a denomination (although his understanding of Shi'ism differs significantly from the traditional understanding).

But it seems that Abdolkarim Soroush's answer is negative. For this reason, he presents a meaning of Islam and being a Muslim which, in Kadivar's view, whatever that meaning may be, is not Islam. But Soroush is reluctant to present the issue in its original and authentic form. Understanding why he is reluctant to do so is comprehensible. However, labeling the likes of Kadivar as naive, superficial, and unacquainted with the ABCs of intellectualism is a matter for serious reflection and critique. It is fitting that Soroush speak to the likes of Kadivar in the language of proof and reasoning.

Therefore, in reality, Kadivar's main critique of Soroush is that, just as the Shi'a/Muslim binary has become meaningless for Soroush, the Muslim/non-Muslim binary has also become meaningless for him, and his religious studies lack a clear boundary with non-religious theism. Dr. Soroush must explain how his religious studies differ from trans-religious spiritualism, and what distinguishes him from the likes of Mostafa Malekian?

With this description, the reality of the matter is that the issue between Soroush and Kadivar has nothing to do with excommunication (the explicitness of Kadivar's words on excommunication has also closed the file on this discussion), and we should not give a wrong address. Before Soroush needs to clarify his position with Kadivar, he must clarify his position with the likes of Mostafa Malekian, because now it is not only Kadivar who is a critic of Soroush's religious studies, but it can perhaps be said that the majority of religious intellectuals (including Mahmoud Sadri, Arash Naraghi, Ahmad Sadri, Abolghasem Fanaei, etc.) are critics of his religious studies.

Of course, the fact that many religious intellectuals have become critics of Soroush's religious studies, or that Soroush has drawn closer to Mostafa Malekian, does not mean that Soroush's discourse on religion is therefore incorrect or that his work is not intellectual. On the contrary, I suspect that in the not-too-distant future, the tables will turn in Soroush's favor. Just as Malekian's discourse is now more audible to modern man than that of Kadivar and Soroush. Perhaps if Soroush speaks more openly and explicitly on this subject, he will render a greater service to knowledge, to religion, and to the intellectual movement. Even if he may lose some of his audience. But it seems that Soroush's audience is more future generations than current ones.