Azam Pouya's Critique of 'The Challenge of Islam and Power': A Critique of Kadivar's Critique of Soroush

A Critique of 'The Challenge of Islam and Power'

A Critique of Kadivar's Critique of Soroush

Azam Pouya

Abdolkarim Soroush, in two lectures entitled "Religion and Power" (lecture one and two), examined the historical and sociological dimensions of Islam and, as he himself says, expanded upon the idea in his article "Belief and Trial"[1], which he had published about three decades ago, highlighting another facet of the studies of "religious intellectualism"; historical and sociological studies. These two lectures, under the title "The Theory of Religion and Power," drew the attention of proponents and opponents and provoked numerous critiques and opinions. Mohsen Kadivar also critiqued that theory in two sessions. The present writing, regardless of the correctness or incorrectness of Soroush's claims, critiques Kadivar's method and reasoning. But before that, I will refer to my initial impression of this theory. When I heard the "Religion and Power" lecture, I felt a heavy burden had been lifted from the shoulders of Muslim revivalists; the burden of whitewashing religion, a task that Muslim reformers have been painfully engaged in over the past century, but an engagement without peace of mind. I recalled the conversation of Darwin's grandson—as an atheist—with a modernist Christian priest and scholar. In defense of Darwin's theory and refutation of belief in the existence of God, he challenged that Christian modernist, saying that you religious reformers deal with religious texts selectively and empty them of their meaning. You take some verses from the Bible and set aside others. And years later, I heard this same critique from the mouth of Mostafa Malekian against religious intellectuals in Iran. Upon hearing the "Religion and Power" theory, I felt as if, with this theory, the era of this critique was about to come to an end.

And what will follow is a critique of Mohsen Kadivar's material in his critique of the "Religion and Power" theory, in his two writings entitled "Response to Dr. Soroush's Written Critique; Clarification of the Challenge of Islam and Power" and "The Challenge of Islam and Power; A Critique of Soroush".

Religious Modernism and Religious Intellectualism

For several years now, debates have arisen over replacing the term "religious modernism" with "religious intellectualism." Many were inclined, and indeed insisted, that for the religious reform movement in Iran, instead of religious intellectualism, which had been proposed by Soroush, religious modernism be used, and each had their own reason. And some, like Mahmoud Sadri, spoke of separating two poles of religious modernism. Sadri, in describing these two poles, used the duality "reconstruction/reformation" and considered the slogan of the reformation pole to be "attaining prosperity and freedom at the lowest cost" and the slogan of the reconstruction pole to be "truth in all its vastness," and deemed the exchange between the two as necessary (Mahmoud Sadri, The Discourse of Reconstruction and Reformation). This description, more than anything, concerns the reform of the religious community. Sadri stated that "in cases where religious or traditional beliefs do not align with the goals of reform, the interpretation of the interpreters is criticized as much as possible, not the essence and core of the religion and tradition" (ibid). At any rate, Kadivar, who according to Sadri's view falls among the reformers, in the introduction to his critique of the "Religion and Power" theory, has elevated the dispute over replacing these two terms to a separation between them; a separation that, it seems, can make the differences between the two spectrums of religious reformers in this era more meaningful and in the future lead to serious discussions on this matter so that the rift between these two spectrums becomes more illuminated: "Another result of this new step is the publicizing of the complete separation of religious modernism (proponents of reforming religious knowledge) from religious intellectualism (figures engaged in reforming the essence of religion)" (Kadivar, second session, 15).

"The time has come for intellectual ranks in contemporary Islamic thought to be clearly distinguished from one another; modernists who consider the ceiling of reform to be 'religious thought and Islamic sciences'—which are entirely human—from intellectuals who consider 'the essence of Islam'—the authentic Book and Tradition—to also be subject to reform and have made the critique of the Quran their prime objective" (Kadivar, From the Word of God to Ahmad and the Word of God).

Kadivar, while enumerating the steps of Soroush's project, says: Soroush "from the third step entered into the reform of religion." And then he adds, "Dr. Abdolkarim Soroush took his fifth step in implementing the research program of the reform of religion."

But it must be said that although this distinction is important, Kadivar's explanation and description of it is not illuminating.

Reform of Religion and Reform of Religious Knowledge

Kadivar, in his recent writings, including the piece under discussion, has accepted the distinction between "religion and religious knowledge," and the "human nature of religious knowledge," which are among the results of the Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of the Sharia. And he has made reform in those two the criterion for distinguishing religious intellectualism from religious new-thinking. He believes that "reform of the essence of religion" is the characteristic of the religious intellectual, and "reform of religious knowledge" is the characteristic of religious new-thinking. But the said criterion is so fraught with ambiguity that it cannot fulfill his purpose. To prove this criterion, Kadivar must first provide a clear definition of "religion," the "essence of religion," and the "reform of the essence of religion." If he defines "religion" as "religious texts" (as was defined in Contraction and Expansion) and considers the Islamic texts to be "the Quran and the Sunnah," which he does, he must explain what "reform of the Quran" and "reform of the Sunnah" mean? Whether we consider the Quran to be the direct word of God or the indirect word of God (the word of the Prophet (PBUH)), and consider the existing Quran to be that very word, how can they be reformed? Whatever we do regarding it, we have done "about religion," not "in religion." Even if we examine the authority of the existing Quran using methods of historical criticism, and, for example, conclude that additions and omissions have found their way into the Quran, what remains after removing the additions and adding the omissions is "religion," and reform in it is meaningless. And if we conclude that no additions or omissions have found their way into the existing Quran, what remains is "religion," and reform in it is meaningless. But regarding the "Sunnah" as well, which seems to be the main focus of Kadivar's discussion, the matter is the same. If we consider the "Sunnah" to be the collection of authentic hadiths; that is, hadiths whose attribution to the Prophet has been proven after using historical methods of authentication, does the religious intellectual deny its attribution to the Prophet and, conversely, does the religious new-thinker accept it? And in that case, what would be the difference between the religious intellectual and the religious new-thinker? This question will find its answer by moving on to the second discussion.

Although this piece does not allow for a detailed answer to the aforementioned question, a posteriori, two major differences between the religious intellectual and the religious new-thinker can be pointed out; one is the "second-order perspective" and the other is "epistemological religiosity" in its full sense, which is concomitant with a concern for truth. These two are among the characteristics of religious intellectualism.

Epistemological Religiosity

Religious intellectuals have not set pre-established boundaries for reasoning. In his writing “Critique of Religion and Power,” Kadivar states that “the wounding of the religious conscience of believers arises from the fact that they have heard the words of the enemy from the tongue of a friend, and that with such a description of God, the Quran, Islam, and the Prophet, what preference remains for believing in them or for persisting in that belief?” (Second Session, 5). Apparently, religious neo-thinkers are more concerned about the conscience of believers than they are about rationality or the pursuit of discovering the truth. In fact, Kadivar believes that reason must be applied to the text: “Whatever the products of religious intellectualism may be, if they conflict with the definitive verses of the Glorious Word of God and, secondarily, with the authentic tradition of Muhammad ibn Abdullah (PBUH), they are unsupported subjective tastes that will vanish like foam on water in Islamic culture” (Kadivar, From the Word of God to Ahmad and the Word of God). That is, the limit of reasoning is the text, and it is here that discussions concerning “text and appearance” and “independent reasoning against the text” arise, and when the matter of understanding and interpreting the text comes into play, disagreements over determining the text reach their peak. It seems the religious neo-thinker has boundaries within which rethinking is not permitted and only recognizes any new perspective within the confines of these boundaries. It is for this reason that he sometimes inadvertently approaches the discourse of excommunication and demands that the religious intellectual clarify his position and declare whether he is a Muslim or not: “Has religious intellectualism transcended Islam and being a Muslim? ... In any case, he is morally obliged to specify how he thinks about Islam and Shiism,” and “Religious intellectuals with this conception of religious pluralism (the equality of all religions in truth and salvation) have no Islamic or Shia concerns” (Kadivar, A Reflection on Religious Neo-Thinking in Contemporary Iran).

The Second-Order Perspective

Among the characteristics of religious intellectualism is the “second-order perspective,” extracting oneself from the fortress of religion and looking at it from the outside; a perspective upon which the theoretical contraction and expansion of Sharia was formed. The religious intellectual makes the religious text and religious knowledge themselves the subject of free rational and scientific inquiry and examines them from an epistemological, sociological, or historical standpoint, like a neutral scholar of religion. But apparently, religious neo-thinkers have no serious concern for entering the second-order perspective and exiting the first-order perspective and theological, jurisprudential, hadith-based, or at most metaphysical discussions.

The Negation of History and the Quest for a New Historical Discovery

Although Kadivar explicitly states that he does not negate history, the path he takes to reach a non-authoritarian Islam leads to the negation of Islamic history. He declares his agreement with three propositions of Soroush: “a. The existing religious texts (from Quranic exegesis, hadith collections, the Prophet’s biography, jurisprudence, theology, and mysticism) have a domineering and power-seeking orientation. b. These texts have also presented a picture of the Prophet as authoritarian, domineering, and that very armed mystic. c. The practice of Muslims, especially when they have been in power, shows this same tendency. (Kadivar, Second Session, 5). However, he sees his point of contention with Soroush in that “the prevalent Islamic sciences and the history of Muslim life bore no proportion to the orientation of the Quran, the way and method of the Prophet, and the attributes of their God, and other factors were involved in their formation that have remained hidden from the esteemed friend’s eyes” (Kadivar, Response to Soroush’s Written Critique, 11). That is, Kadivar, firstly, considers all existing religious sciences, hadith collections, biographies, etc., to be distorted. Secondly, he cites narrative evidence from these very existing hadith collections among Shia and Sunni to support his view. Including:

“Today I recognize nothing of what we were upon in the era of the Messenger of God.”

“The teachings of the Messenger of God after his passing (at least after the transformation of the caliphate into monarchy by Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan in the year 41 AH) were so consigned to oblivion that nothing remains but the verbal utterance of ‘There is no god but God’ and congregational prayer.”

Thirdly, he identifies the cause of this distortion as “the interference of political power in the metamorphosis of the social standards of Islam.”

The aforementioned points indicate various ambiguities and contradictions in Mr. Kadivar’s statements, to which I will refer:

a) If the existing religious texts have an authoritarian orientation, which religious texts do not have this orientation? Which are those non-existent religious texts? Kadivar's answer is, in fact, that there are no other texts; rather, these very texts have been distorted. But the question is: if these texts have been distorted, why does he cite these same texts to support his view? How can one be sure that these very narrations have not also been distorted? And the texts he cites indicate that nothing remains of the Prophet's teachings. Later in his writing, he refers to the industry of hadith forgery, stating: "A group of extremists launched the industry of hadith forgery and produced narrations, sometimes to the extent of tawatur (mass-transmission), about the distortion of the Quran and the superhuman character of the Imams of Guidance, attributing them to the Imams, such that uncovering the real face of the Imams from beneath heaps of fabricated and forged narrations is a very difficult task." The picture Kadivar presents of the existing religious texts suggests texts so transformed that it is unlikely one could, over a span of time as long as the history passed, wipe away the dust of distortion from them. When distortion advances to the point where mutawatir narrations about the distortion of the Quran and the character of the Prophet are forged, what hope remains of attaining the Prophet's teachings?

b) Kadivar considers the interference of political powers after the Prophet to be the major cause of these distortions and the dominance of the authoritarian aspect in mainstream religious sciences. Yet he does not consider political power effective in those interpretations that strive to show the merciful and libertarian face of Islam. To prove the invalidity of the narrations concerning the ruling on killing an apostate, he cites the opinion of Sheikh Shaltut and Mohamed Talbi regarding the forged nature of those narrations (Vol. II, 3). Quranic commentators in the twentieth century earnestly endeavored to portray the merciful and libertarian face of the Quran. The domination of Western colonialism and the ascendancy of scientific advancements in that era led to the emergence of such interpretations. That is, in fact, interpretation in that era was a political interpretation of the Quran, as figures like Stefan Wild say.

(See. Political interpretation of the Quran, Stefan Wild )

Now the question is: why is the interference of political power in the metamorphosis of Islam's social standards acceptable in one period and not in another? The efforts of figures like Muhammad Abduh and Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in showing the merciful and rationalist face of Islam could just as much be due to the dominance of power in their own time as showing the authoritarian face of the Quran. Kadivar does not ask himself why the narrations on killing an apostate have been deemed weak in the last hundred years, or why, in this era, narrations rejecting the killing of an apostate have surfaced.

Of course, Mr. Kadivar clarifies that he is not seeking to negate history, but rather to engage in a measured critique of history. However, his arguments and statements lead to the negation of history. It is as if there are two histories: the existing history and the ideal history, the mental blueprint of which we already possess.

Mr. Kadivar has repeatedly spoken of the "historical Prophet," "the reality of Islam, what has occurred in history," and "historical reality." But the question is: how can this reality be obtained? Is this reality available to us before entering history? His answer to such questions is that through the impartial criteria of historical criticism, one can attain the real history. He claims to have taken this path, at least in the case of killing an apostate.

Criteria for Evaluating Historical Propositions

Kadivar sets out criteria for evaluating the accounts found in the prophetic biography (sīra), hadith collections, and exegetical works, and he draws on some of them in assessing the traditions concerning the killing of the apostate and offensive jihad. In his view, “according to these rigorous scholarly criteria, the sources that are reliable are: a. the Holy Qur’an, b. the sayings and practical conduct (sīra) of the Prophet in accordance with established historical standards and after applying the critical method.” Regarding the Qur’an, he believes that traditions must be measured against the clear and decisive verses (muḥkamāt) of the Qur’an. He even adds that traditions for which mass transmission (tawātur) is claimed are not acceptable without a complete historical investigation and critical study. He emphasizes impartial historical research: “Impartial historical research shows that, firstly, no one was killed for apostasy during the Prophet’s time” (Second Session, 2). He stresses that applying the “modern critical method” to all historical documents is essential (Second Session, 6).

Regarding isolated traditions (khabar al-wāḥid), he states that a solitary report, being of uncertain provenance (ẓannī al-ṣudūr), is absolutely not authoritative in matters of belief. Consequently, he must consider the isolated tradition as authoritative in practical rulings. Yet it seems he does not deem it authoritative even in rulings unless it is accompanied by reliable rational and historical indications: “The sound scholarly basis is the authority of a report accompanied by reliable rational and historical indications (whether traditional solitary or mass-transmitted reports or others) (Second Session, 6).” Indeed, Shi‘i traditionists, including Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Shaykh al-Mufīd, ‘Allāma Nā’īnī, and the contemporary Qur’anic exegete ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, do not consider the isolated tradition authoritative in exegesis and beliefs, but only in the rulings of religious law. Their reasoning is that an isolated tradition ultimately yields only conjecture (ẓann), whereas in beliefs, certainty (‘ilm) is authoritative, not conjecture. In practical rulings, however, conjecture suffices. Of course, they too do not consider every isolated tradition authoritative unless it is validated by supporting evidence. Kadivar has adopted this same position. Naturally, this view has opponents, including Ayatollah Khoei, who considers a reliable tradition authoritative even in exegesis and beliefs. Thus, Muslim scholars differ on this matter. So if Mr. Kadivar adopts the position of the first group, he must present his reasons for doing so and demonstrate that the view of figures like Ayatollah Khoei is indefensible.

It is true that the criteria Kadivar has in mind are, as he himself says, very rigorous, but two problems exist here: one is the lack of clarity in those criteria, and the other is that wherever he has reached definitive conclusions, there is no sign of these rigorous criteria, including in the ruling on killing the apostate.

Impartial Historical Research

Kadivar believes: “Impartial historical research shows that no one was killed for apostasy during the Prophet’s time” (First Session, 14). But it is not entirely clear what Kadivar means by impartial historical research. Does he mean research conducted by historians using historical methods and non-theological documents and sources? And does “history” mean the history of historians or religious history? And in general, what is meant by “impartial” here?

Reliable Sources for Accepting Historical Propositions

Kadivar considers reliable sources to be the Holy Qur'an and the reports and sayings of the Prophet (PBUH) that have been proven by the standards of the historical-critical method. But he provides no reason as to why the historical-critical method should not be applied to the Holy Qur'an, and is the Qur'an itself not a historical document? He does not explain how he presents one historical document to another historical document. The relationship between these two historical documents (the Qur'an and the narrations) is not explored in his statements, nor is the methodology of this presentation addressed. Is this presentation a presentation of content or of wording? If it is a presentation of content, by which hermeneutical method are both texts first analyzed for meaning? Another ambiguity here is that it is not clear what the critical method and the historical-critical method are, which Kadivar repeatedly speaks of, and even believes that mutawatir narrations must be examined by this method. He makes no reference to this matter, although his writing is replete with traditional terminology related to the examination of hadiths, including khabar al-wahid, khabar al-mutawatir, and a report that leads to conjecture, knowledge, or doubt. Is the historical-critical method this? In examining the narrations of apostasy and offensive jihad, he does not step beyond this circle. And in his arguments, he does not use any of the critical methods such as textual criticism, source criticism, form criticism, historical criticism, tradition criticism, redaction criticism, structural criticism, linguistic criticism, and other criticisms. There is much to be said here, but I will suffice with this amount and refer the reader to the scholarly writing of Amir Maziar (“Kadivar and the Claim of Historical Criticism,” Sedanet)[2].

Presenting Narrations to the Clear Decrees of the Qur'an

Kadivar, both in his two recent writings and in the writing “The Word of God to Ahmad and the Word of God,” has considered one of the most important conditions for the authenticity of a report to be its presentation to the clear decrees (muhkamat) of the Qur'an, without clarifying his position on the clear and ambiguous (mutashabihat) verses of the Qur'an. Which verses are clear and which are ambiguous? The criterion for determining clear and ambiguous verses is a matter of dispute among scholars of Qur'anic sciences and exegetes. Just as, apart from verse 7 of Surah Al-Imran, which divides the verses into clear and ambiguous, another verse considers the entire Qur'an to be clear: “its verses are made precise” (Hud:1), and another verse considers the entire Qur'an to be ambiguous: “a Book whose verses are alike” (Zumar:23), and exegetes have offered various opinions in reconciling these two sets of verses. And these differences are such that some contemporary scholars of Qur'anic sciences have considered the conceptual duality of clear and ambiguous to be a construct of theologians so that in their theological debates they could give superiority to one over the other (for example, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd), and another contemporary scholar has considered all verses to be clear from one perspective and ambiguous from another (Abdolkarim Soroush). Given this situation, it is incumbent upon any researcher to first clarify their own view on this matter and then make presentation to the clear verses the criterion for rejecting or accepting narrations.

On the subject of offensive jihad, Kadivar considers the narration “Verily, I have only been commanded to fight...” to be khabar al-wahid and in conflict with the clear decrees of the Qur'an (Second Session, 10) and asks, “According to which verse of the Qur'an was the Prophet commanded to offensive jihad with such a meaning...?”. Now the question is, is the criterion of presenting to the clear decrees of the Qur'an always decisive, if it is decisive at all? For example, we Muslims perform our daily prayers according to a narration from the Prophet (PBUH), “Pray as you have seen me praying,” which is a practical, not a verbal, narration. If we want to assess the validity of this narration, to which clear decrees of the Qur'an should we refer it? In which verses of the Qur'an is the method of performing prayer mentioned?

From what has been said, it follows that Mr. Kadivar's critique of “Religion and Power” contains ambiguous concepts, flawed arguments, and is both unspecified and invalid. Therefore, as an academic researcher, it is incumbent upon him, firstly, to endeavor to clarify the concepts he uses, and secondly, to introduce his intended historical-critical method and show where and in which of his arguments he has utilized it.

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[1] Belief and Trial / Abdolkarim Soroush / Kiyan, Year 2, Mordad and Shahrivar 1371, No. 8 / Download PDF of the article

[2] Text, Power, and the Sociology of the Religious Text / Amir Maziar / Sedanet / Read the article

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