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In his critique of Mostafa Malekian's *In the Wind's Path and the Guardian of the Tulip*, Amir Saemi not only highlights structural shortcomings but also examines the idea of rationality and spirituality, finding Malekian's arguments about the incompatibility of traditional religion with rationality and the coherence of spirituality insufficient.

The article “Which Tulip in the Wind’s Path? Amir Saemi’s Critique of the Book ‘In the Wind’s Path and the Guardian of the Tulip’ by Mostafa Malekian” has been published in the second issue of the “Specialized Quarterly of Book Review on Ethics, Educational Sciences, and Psychology.”
One of the noteworthy writings in the second issue of the Quarterly of Book Review on Ethics, Educational Sciences, and Psychology, which was recently published, is a critique that Dr. Saemi has written on the book In the Wind’s Path and the Guardian of the Tulip, authored by Professor Malekian. This critique consists of two general parts; in the first part, a series of structural points are addressed, and in the second part, Malekian’s main idea, namely rationality and spirituality, is critiqued and analyzed.
First, let us briefly review the main points of the first part:
1_ The most important problem with this book is that it is the transcribed text of a series of lectures and is not a book that the author wrote from beginning to end with a concern for consistency, coherence, precision, and eloquence.
2_ The positions presented in two different lectures are apparently in tension with each other, and since, unfortunately, the dates of most of the lectures are not specified, it is unclear whether these tensions are due to a change in the author’s position in two different lectures or are merely apparent tensions?
3_ Sometimes the classification of a subject presented in one lecture differs from another classification of the same subject presented in another lecture, and it is difficult to attribute a coherent theory to Malekian based on this book.
4_ A significant portion of the book’s content is repeated over and over again.
5_ Some of the philosophical points raised are not precise.
The second and main part of this writing consists of criticisms directed at the core of the rationality and spirituality project. One of the problems of traditional religion, according to Malekian, which he repeatedly points out, is that traditional religiosity, due to its dogmatic nature, is incompatible with rationality. In this section, Saemi first argues that Malekian’s argument to show that traditional religiosity suffers from this problem a priori is insufficient, and his view on this matter, based on contemporary epistemological perspectives, is incorrect. He then goes on to state what Malekian means by “spirituality” as an alternative to religiosity and argues that the concept of “spirituality” in Malekian’s thought is not a coherent concept.
According to Malekian, traditional religiosity is inevitably based on a challenge of dogmatism. In his view, an unavoidable characteristic of modernity is that dogmatism has no place in it. Therefore, he considers the rejection of dogmatism a requisite of “spirituality” and the “authentic life.” Saemi presents two interpretations of this claim by Malekian and considers both to be incorrect. He argues that if the unavoidable component of modernity is that all of a modern person’s reasonings must be logically valid, then the implication of this statement would be that the modern person must consider all empirical sciences, which are based on probabilistic, inductive, and inference to the best explanation reasonings, to be fallacious and unreasonable, and even doubt the existence of the external world. But since this claim is not acceptable or reasonable, the rationality intended by Malekian must necessarily be understood broadly enough to encompass other reasonings, including probabilistic, inductive, and those based on the best explanation. That is, we should say: the belief that “A is B” cannot gain its rationality through the belief that “X says A is B.” However, nowhere in the book does Malekian provide an acceptable argument in its favor. Saemi then critiques this claim and asserts that such a belief is not accepted by the majority of epistemologists in modern epistemology. Therefore, it seems that the book’s only argument for the irrationality of dogmatism, namely the argument based on the badness of “being other-directed,” is not a complete argument.
Saemi finds it difficult to understand Malekian's intended meaning of spirituality. Spirituality in Malekian's view is as follows: Spirituality is a process whose goal is to acquire psychological traits such as peace, hope, happiness, and contentment. A spiritual person, that is, a person who participates in this process, believes in the minimum possible number of supernatural propositions. The process of spirituality is carried out through (1) striving to live authentically (i.e., living solely based on one's own understanding and reasoning), (2) striving to be aware of one's psychological state and improve it, and (3) striving to live ethically. After specifying the characteristics of the spiritual person, Saemi argues that the concept of spirituality, as intended by Malekian, is an incoherent concept. He first claims, by referring to passages from the book, that in Malekian's belief, the goal and end of spirituality is happiness and peace. Then, by presenting examples, he shows that being ethical and rational is not always concomitant with peace and happiness, and in many cases, commitment to ethics and rationality will cause suffering to the individual. Therefore, we must either say that rationality and spirituality are incompatible concepts, or claim that the concept of spirituality in Malekian's view is not a coherent concept.
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