Fasting and the Subject (A Reflection on Fasting from the Perspective of Levinas's Philosophy)

The dominant current in the pre-modern philosophical tradition, and even in modern philosophy up until the twentieth century, held a negative view of feelings and emotions. The overwhelming majority of philosophers were not very optimistic about feelings and emotions. One indication of this pessimism is that feelings and emotions were always placed in a position inferior to thought and consciousness. For this reason, they were set aside in comparison with various forms of consciousness. Contrary to this tradition, some contemporary philosophers – for example, Heidegger – adopted a completely different view on this matter. In their view, feelings and emotions are very fundamental and foundational, and pertain to the nature of our relationship with truth; because, for them, our encounter with truth is not of the nature of subjective consciousness, but rather of the kind of feelings and emotions. It is in feelings and emotions that truth is disclosed to us and our relationship with it is determined. In the thought of Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) as well, feeling holds a completely foundational position and is by no means subsumed under consciousness. In his view, feeling neither arises from knowledge nor is a means to knowledge. Fundamentally, feeling is in no way reducible to consciousness and is therefore self-subsistent; it is itself and nothing else, nor for anything else, nor even arising from anything other than itself, such as knowledge and cognition. Even more than that, feeling plays a very important role in the subject; for it has a high status in its constitution. Feeling is constitutive of the subject. Levinas refers to feeling as the "subjectivity of the subject." For this reason, the subject is primarily and essentially a sensitive subject, and not a conscious and knowing subject. Hence, any change and transformation in its feeling overturns its very foundation. This same feeling also plays a key role regarding the world and the "Other." In Levinas's view, the world that appears to us in feeling is not a general and extended object. And the world is not constituted by the subject, but is rather fundamentally itself the condition for the constitution of the subject. Also, the connection with the "Other" is not a cognitive and epistemological relationship but is of the nature of feeling. For this reason, Levinas insists that we must accept that we do not know the "Other," and cannot know, and should not know. The ethical nature of the subject also resides in this very feeling of it. That is, feeling provides the ground for connection with the "Other," and this very connection with the "Other" becomes the condition of possibility for ethics. It is for this reason that the feeling of the subject clarifies the duty of its being ethical. Levinas considers hunger to be one of the instances of such a feeling; for the ethical subject, in his view, is an embodied human being who has flesh and skin and bones. In his view, the subject is not something like the transcendental ego of Kant or Husserl. For this reason, the subject becomes hungry and tastes the flavor of thirst. On this basis, Levinas is completely opposed to his teacher Heidegger, who said that for the subject, before anything else, Being becomes a problem. He says: "What seems to have escaped Heidegger's view – if it is true that anything at all in these matters could escape Heidegger's view – is that the world, before being a system of tools for work, is a collection of food." Hence, he believes that the subject, before Being becomes a problem for it, has the concern of eating and food; food that provides it with the ability to think about Being. He clearly says: "The subject is not Dasein, which never becomes hungry." From an ethical perspective as well, this very matter is highly influential. In Levinas's own words, "The ethical experience of sacrificing one's own bread is meaningful only for a subject who knows bread and tastes its flavor with full enjoyment." Fasting is also a specific and distinguished instance of hunger. Fasting, which is also the feeling of thirst and hunger, brings the human being into a world that was not previously disclosed to them. That is, it makes the world appear to them in a different way. Also, fasting provides the ground for a profound and deep connection with the "Other," and in this way causes the subject to become richer and more fruitful. Considering this matter, it can be said that from this perspective, the hungry subject and the sated subject are not two individuals of one type, but rather two completely different types. And naturally, they will have two completely different worlds, and also their connection with the "Other" will be completely different. Therefore, because fasting transforms the manner of the subject's encounter and connection with the "Other," it is very effective in the conditions of possibility for being ethical for the subject. Hunger and thirst return the subject to its roots and remind it of its origin. And therefore, it is also a kind of self-knowledge, self-awareness, and knowledge of the self. I, in essence, am hungry and thirsty. The "Other" is also hungry and thirsty, and I am also another person who is hungry and thirsty.

در یک کلام، من در اصل سوژه گرسنه‌ای هستم همانند "دیگری" و مثل او. از همین روی، من و "دیگری" در گرسنگی و تشنگی به هم نزدیک می‌شویم، با هم ارتباط برقرار می‌کنیم و به هم گره می‌خوریم و متحول می‌شویم. و این‌گونه، روزه تولد دیگری است برای سوژه.

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Fasting and the Subject (A Reflection on Fasting from the Perspective of Levinas's Philosophy)

Author: Dr. Ali Ghazalifar

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