Hossein Dabbagh's article “From Kantian Contraction and Expansion to Quinean Contraction and Expansion”

A discourse on the epistemology, error theory, and hermeneutics of the theory of the evolution of religious knowledge

Hossein Dabbagh, “The Hermeneutical Contraction and Expansion of Religion: From the Kantian to the Quinian Interpretation of ‘The Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of Religion’,” Iran Nameh, 29:1 (Spring 2014)

But can [people] who are dogmatic become sensitive to the strange limitations of human understanding . . . David Hume

Introduction

The renowned German philosopher Schopenhauer once said that every truth passes through three stages: first, it is ridiculed; then, it is opposed; and finally, it is accepted as self-evident. The historical test of many scientific-philosophical theories proves this claim. The powerful hand of history deals with theories in such a way that the scholars of one era deem a theory self-evidently false, while the scholars of another era deem it self-evident—self-evidently true—and this is only due to the historical testing of theories. The story of the theory of the Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of the Sharia—hereafter Contraction and Expansion—is no exception to this rule. When it was born, arrows of criticism rained down upon its body from all sides, and opponents thought they had struck a fatal blow and ensured that Contraction and Expansion would emerge dead from the press, but this did not happen. Now that more than twenty years have passed since the theory of Contraction and Expansion was proposed, it is a good time for a reassessment and the discovery of its possibly hidden angles.

Abdolkarim Soroush, a prominent representative of late religious intellectualism after the Islamic Revolution of Iran, brought the theory of the evolution of religious knowledge to light in his series of articles from 1988 to 1990, a theory later published as The Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of the Sharia, which appeared in Kayhan-e Farhangi magazine during the fourth decade of Soroush's life. Precisely from the beginning of the proposal of this theory, a battle of opinions ensued and oppositions became apparent; one called it skeptical, another deemed it positivistically relativistic, and so on. But proponents did not relent and responded to the opponents. Summaries of the original theory were also presented, and finally, many sympathetic critiques were written about it. It can perhaps be boldly said that Contraction and Expansion is among the most important books that clerics, seminary scholars, and academics have critiqued and examined after the Islamic Revolution. Among the clerical critics, one can mention Makarem Shirazi, Jafar Sobhani, Mohammad Hossein Tehrani, Sadegh Larijani, and Javadi Amoli; and among non-clerics, Mostafa Malekian, Hossein Ghaffari, and Hamid Vahid Dastjerdi can be noted.

The Argument of the Theory of the Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of the Sharia

I will now take a look at the basic principles and the central argument of the theory of Contraction and Expansion. First, I will attempt to outline the Kantian view of Contraction and Expansion; that is, the common interpretation that has generally been given of Contraction and Expansion. Secondly, I will try to present another interpretation, which can be called the Quinean view. Finally, I will also make a reference to the error theory of Contraction and Expansion.

Kantian Contraction and Expansion

According to many commentators, the fundamental presupposition of Contraction and Expansion—that religion is distinct from religious knowledge—has a Kantian resonance; meaning that, epistemically, one can separate the noumenal (thing-in-itself) world from the phenomenal (appearance) world. We, as earthly human beings, have no epistemic access to the noumenal world; it is as if the noumenon sits somewhere in the shadows, watching us. It is silent and mute, having nothing to say for itself, and whatever we say epistemically about the noumenon, we are in truth putting words into the noumenon's mouth. In direct contrast, the phenomenal world is full of noise. It belongs to human beings, and everyone's epistemic access to it, each according to their rank, is commensurate with their human capacity. Whatever is found in the phenomenal world is human and destined by the measures of being human. And if being human has one attribute, it is limitation and deficiency. No one possesses complete, perfect, most correct, and noblest knowledge of matters; if they did, they would not be of the human race. All human beings sit at the same table and proclaim that error is their necessary characteristic, and everything earthly is limited, deficient, and erroneous, and this is nothing other than the meaning of "sophisticated realism" or "indirect realism" that philosophers, from John Locke to Karl Popper, have championed.

According to the Kantian reading of Contraction and Expansion, religion qua religion must be considered among the pillars of the noumenal world; a matter that has crept silently into a corner and complete epistemic access to it is impossible. But what exists in the meantime are matters about religion, and in fact, our knowledge of religion. Religion, meaning its requisites, appurtenances, and actors such as sacred books, narrations, prophets, etc., all belong to the domain of first-order knowledge. However, religious knowledge—meaning our knowledge about religion, such as the interpretation and commentary of sacred texts concerning religion—belongs to the phenomenal world and, in this respect, is human knowledge, with all the characteristics of being human. That is, it is not silent; it speaks and, as it happens, puts its words into the mouth of religion. Religious knowledges, insofar as they are "about" a matter, are considered second-order knowledges, and for this reason, they become susceptible to truth and falsehood, become controversial, and error may infiltrate and penetrate them.

The first principle of Contraction and Expansion states that between religious knowledges on the one hand and non-religious knowledges on the other, there is a continuous connection, relationship, exchange, and dialogue. In other words, these two types of knowledge nourish each other. To justify this claim, Soroush resorts to numerous historical, philosophical, theological, and jurisprudential examples. In truth, he employs a kind of induction to prove his view, although the manner of its application must be explained to avoid misunderstanding.

The induction Soroush has in mind in Contraction and Expansion should not be equated with empirical induction, where, for example, upon seeing one hundred thousand five hundred and fifty white swans, we conclude that the one hundred thousand five hundred and fifty-first swan will also be white. This type of induction for justification was, of course, rendered sterile by the devastating critiques of the Scottish philosopher David Hume. Karl Popper, the Austrian philosopher of science, later tried, by accepting Hume's critiques, to introduce another concept to breathe new life into induction, which is generally referred to as falsificationism. However, the induction Soroush has in mind, which can be termed rational induction, intuitive induction, or "the particular in itself," is of a different kind. It has nothing to do with enumeration; adding more examples does not necessarily serve to better justify the claim, and diverse evidence does not strengthen the sinews of the argument. This conception of induction, first introduced in Aristotle's Metaphysics under the name "epagoge" and later made famous in the works of David Ross, the ethical intuitionist philosopher and commentator on Aristotle, as "intuitive induction," means that various evidence and examples help a person make a rational-intuitive leap and form a rule. For instance, when Bertrand Russell speaks about proving that the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees, he states that from proving this proposition in several instances of triangles, we arrive at the belief that this proposition holds true for triangularity, that is, for all triangles.

It seems that the induction Soroush has in mind in Contraction and Expansion is of the second kind. He explicitly uses the expression “essentially primary” (fard bil-dhāt) somewhere, meaning that in establishing and securing the aforementioned principle, i.e., the “principle of coherence (compatibility),” historical instances play an admonitory role, rather than providing the premises of an argument. In truth, these instances propel us toward the very truth of the matter and the essence and core of this principle. For this reason, Soroush can claim that he has not resorted to enumerative induction.

The second principle Soroush mentions, and which he regards as self-evident, is the principle of evolution: that non-religious human knowledge undergoes historical evolution. In other words, Soroush argues that since non-religious sciences such as physics, chemistry, economics, psychology, and the like are all epochal and dependent on the context in which they emerge and grow, all these sciences are in a state of evolution. This claim of Soroush also has a historical flavor, meaning that by searching through the history of science, it becomes evident how these sciences have abruptly changed character from one period to another, and all the hypotheses that appeared entirely true in one period appear entirely false in another. This judgment is not only applicable to the empirical sciences but also holds true for non-empirical sciences such as mathematics and philosophy. For example, there was a time when Euclidean geometry enjoyed great prestige, and its five postulates, with various interpretations, sat enthroned. Around 1830, this geometry was overthrown, and non-Euclidean geometry emerged as its rival and alternative. These examples indicate that empirical and non-empirical sciences, by virtue of being human and epochal, are in a state of evolution and do not cease from this process.

Now Soroush’s argument can be reconstructed and cast in the logical form of “modus ponens.” Soroush has so far stated that, firstly, religion is separate from religious knowledge; secondly, religion in the noumenal sense of the word is silent and mute, but religious knowledge, which belongs to the category of human knowledge, is full of sound and fury and belongs to the phenomenal world. Thirdly, there is a continuous exchange and dialogue between religious and non-religious human knowledge, and these two types of knowledge nourish one another. And finally, since non-religious human knowledge is in a state of evolution, religious knowledge necessarily undergoes contraction and expansion. Soroush’s argument for establishing the theory of the evolution of religious knowledge consists of the two principles of coherence and evolution.

First premise or the principle of coherence: There is a continuous exchange and dialogue between religious and non-religious human knowledge. Second premise or the principle of evolution: Non-religious human knowledge, i.e., science and philosophy, undergoes historical evolution and contraction and expansion. Conclusion: Religious human knowledge, or our understanding of the Sharia, also evolves.

If we take non-religious human knowledge as equivalent to P and religious knowledge as equivalent to Q, it can be said that Soroush’s argument is a valid form of the following logical model:

That is, if non-religious human knowledge evolves, then religious knowledge also evolves. Non-religious human knowledge has evolved, therefore religious knowledge also evolves. Soroush’s argument is a form of a logically “valid” argument. Moreover, as I mentioned, the content of the premises is also justified. In this respect, the above argument also possesses “soundness.”

Although Soroush’s argument appears justified under a Kantian reading, the Kantian presupposition embedded in this argument may not seem very defensible to some. Another reading of Contraction and Expansion can be offered that possesses greater strength.

Quinean Contraction and Expansion

In my view, the Kantian interpretation of Contraction and Expansion, despite all the generality and acceptance it has gained, does not appear justified. In the sense that at least a more faithful interpretation of Contraction and Expansion can be presented. I do not intend here to set aside one interpretation in favor of another. I will leave judgment and arbitration on this matter for another time. For this reason, I will only attempt in this section to provide an alternative interpretation, namely a Quinean interpretation of Contraction and Expansion.

Willard Quine, the contemporary American philosopher, in his book The Web of Belief sets out a series of topics in the philosophy of science that have influenced discussions in epistemology and semantics. According to his view, what holds the upper hand in justifying scientific beliefs is a network of connected and interrelated beliefs. In other words, what is of greater importance is, first, the existence of such a network, which Quine takes for granted, and second, that within this network, beliefs interact and exchange, correcting and refining one another, and form a dynamic web.

Also, in the article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Quine overturns the famous view of classical and modern philosophers. From Hume to Leibniz and Kant and the Vienna Circle, all believed that propositions could be divided into two categories: analytic and synthetic. Analytic propositions are those whose meaning and truth are contained and implicit within themselves, and for this reason experience cannot help in finding their truth, such as the statement “a bicycle has two wheels.” But synthetic propositions have a dimension in the external world, and experience can change the truth of the statement. Quine, against these philosophers, held the view that there is no boundary or middle ground between synthetic and analytic propositions, and this belief of the empiricists is a dogma. The second dogma, however, concerns the possibility of translating sensory-experiential data. According to the view of empiricists, especially the Vienna Circle, meaningful propositions are those that can be translated into the language of the senses. Quine's argument against this was that propositions do not come before the senses singly and in isolation. Every proposition drags along with it various proofs and other propositions, and they are so intertwined and knotted together that to understand and comprehend one, one must scrutinize the other propositions as well. By this account, there is no longer any analytic matter isolated from experience that remains immutable. Experience affects all propositions, and its dust settles upon all propositions. In Quine's terms, henceforth we must consider the whole of science as a single meaningful unit. When non-empirical propositions have such a status for Quine, it is clear what becomes of empirical propositions. He believes that empirical propositions about the external world also do not present themselves to the mind individually, but appear collectively and along with a chain of other propositions. Thus, according to his view, to understand scientific theories in a particular science, one must not neglect propositions from other sciences, because a single proposition alone cannot be the source of the problem. This view of Quine, which is influenced by Pierre Duhem, is generally called holism. As it happens, Soroush, in Contraction and Expansion, refers to Duhem in several places to provide support for his claims.

Another point in Quine's record is the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. In the book Word and Object, Quine brings to light the view that there is no final, definitive, and correct translation. But this does not mean that translation is impossible; rather, the point is that the definitive meaning of words and statements is not determinate. For this reason, it must be said that there is always more than one correct translation.

Now, after understanding the essentials of Quine's claims, it is time to turn to Contraction and Expansion. It seems that the theory of Contraction and Expansion can also be read and interpreted under Quine's doctrines. In the sense that the Kantian separation of religion from religious knowledge as noumenon and phenomenon no longer appears justified, and what holds the upper hand is the “interpretation of religion.” That is, religion is nothing but the interpretation of religion, and for this reason, in encountering the phenomenon of religion, we are faced with various religious beliefs, knowledge, and interpretations that form a network of beliefs. To understand any religious proposition, one must also delve into the remaining religious and non-religious propositions. In this sense, what becomes important in this interpretation and reading is the whole of religion or the whole of religious knowledge. In this web of beliefs, as mentioned above, beliefs confront one another and drive each other from the field, and all this depends on the era in which other sciences have developed. This holistic view of religion, of course, also affects our semantic interpretation of religion.

From a semiotic perspective, another reading of Contraction and Expansion can be offered. In this sense, we are faced with a network of multiple interpretations of religious texts, which in fact constitutes a network of religious beliefs. These multiple interpretations influence one another and bring forth something new. In short, if we consider and call the interpretations of religious texts hermeneutics, then we can speak of the theoretical contraction and expansion of Sharia as the hermeneutic contraction and expansion of Sharia, and all of this is through a Quinean lens. Soroush himself acknowledges this in the book's introduction: "Thus it is that the theory of Contraction and Expansion . . . is originally an interpretive-epistemological theory . . . In light of this interpretive theory, the reason for the inevitable presence of the clear and the ambiguous (muhkam and mutashabih) in the Book and the Tradition . . . becomes clearly apparent . . ."

The Audi-Rawlsian Epistemology of the Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of Sharia

Regarding which theory of justification Soroush employs for epistemology in the theory of Contraction and Expansion, various interpretations have been offered so far. It seems that Soroush, in the book Contraction and Expansion, did not explicitly state which theory of justification he had in mind, or one could even say he did not see a necessity for it. For this reason, some consider the theory of Contraction and Expansion to be foundationalist, while others consider it coherentist. Classical foundationalism is a theory in contemporary epistemology that provides a model for justifying beliefs. According to this model, we have two types of beliefs: basic and non-basic. Basic beliefs are generally those justified immediately and without inference from anything else, whereas non-basic beliefs are those derived from basic beliefs. Naturally, according to this model, basic beliefs have a fixed state, while non-basic beliefs are in flux and change, and may be discarded through reasoning. In fact, non-basic beliefs are nourished by basic beliefs, and not vice versa.

The coherentist model for justification, however, is of a different kind; it does not resort to basic beliefs for justifying beliefs and considers all beliefs to be of one kind, equal in rank and weight. All this model insists upon is that beliefs must be coherently connected as a network and that there should be no conflict or contradiction among them.

The theory of Contraction and Expansion can be explained under both of these models of justification. By considering the Kantian reading, since Contraction and Expansion separates two types of beliefs, one fixed and the other variable, one can say the author's chosen model of justification was classical foundationalism. In truth, in Contraction and Expansion, religion is fixed, and there exists a set of fixed religious beliefs according to it, such as belief in God, prophethood, and the like. However, religious beliefs of another kind are also found, which, being epochal and in relation to other sciences and knowledge, are in a state of transformation and movement. These non-basic beliefs are, of course, nourished by basic beliefs, but the basic beliefs are fixed and are not nourished from anywhere.

Conversely, Contraction and Expansion can also be understood under the coherentist model. In this sense, the author's emphasis on the evolution and the relationship of harmony between religious and non-religious sciences can be taken as an indication of the coherence model. In this coherentist interpretation, the entire focus is on religious knowledge, which the author has separated from religion. Furthermore, epochal religious knowledge is in a state of evolution and in continuous dialogue and relationship with other sciences, and this constructs a network of beliefs that must be proportionate and coherent. In this conception, the consonance and compatibility between religious knowledge and other human knowledge is more important.

In my view, with a holistic look at Soroush's works, especially The Expansion of the Prophetic Experience, it can be argued that both of these interpretations cannot be justified, and one must seek another model of justification. I will leave the critique of the two previous models of justification for another time. The proposed model of justification in this paper, based on Contraction and Expansion and The Expansion of the Prophetic Experience, is the model of modest foundationalism (or moderate foundationalism), which has been discussed in contemporary epistemological theory for some time. The designer of this epistemological model is Robert Audi. In this model, he has attempted to establish a link between foundationalism and coherentism, although traces of this epistemology can also be found earlier in the works of Rawls.

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls defends a kind of intuitionist epistemology, meaning that one can speak of the justification of propositions that are perceived and understood directly and immediately and are, in a sense, self-evident. Naturally, these propositions, which require no other propositions for their justification, form the foundations of human knowledge. But it is not the case that other propositions have no effect on these foundational propositions. Sometimes, upon reflection, some foundational propositions that were thought to be self-evident turn out to be incorrect. For this mode of reflection, which leads us to revise foundational propositions, Rawls proposes a method called reflective equilibrium. According to this method, foundational propositions are modified and refined in their interplay with other propositions. That is, a balance and equilibrium is established between foundational and non-foundational beliefs through reflection and thought. This method can be found in a hidden form in Contraction and Expansion as well: that religious beliefs, in their encounter with the beliefs of other sciences, seek a solution to save themselves from the predicament of contradiction.

In the moderate foundationalist model, an attempt has been made to preserve the merits of both previous models, namely classical foundationalism and coherentism, and to avoid their shortcomings. Based on this model, one can still speak of two types of belief: foundational belief and non-foundational belief. Foundational beliefs no longer necessarily possess the character of immediate justification; rather, these beliefs are justified to the extent possible (prima facie or pro-tanto justification). In fact, with this assumption, it can be said that these beliefs are not always true and may one day become false. But how is such a thing possible, since this type of belief is fixed? The answer is that, according to this model, there is, in fact, an exchange between foundational and non-foundational beliefs, and both types of belief nourish each other. It is not the case that only non-foundational beliefs are derived from foundational beliefs; rather, foundational beliefs can also change under the influence of non-foundational beliefs.

This model of justification can be better understood clearly by considering the Expansion of Prophetic Experience. In Contraction and Expansion, Soroush sees the dust of historicity only on religious knowledge, but gradually elevates his claim, and in the Expansion of Prophetic Experience, the dust of historicity settles on religion itself. Not only is religious knowledge historical and subject to evolution, but religion itself also becomes historical and evolving. With this in mind, it can be understood that in Kantian Contraction and Expansion, religion stands as a firm and solid foundational belief in a corner, beyond the reach of any reform, because no relationship exists between religion and other forms of knowledge. But in the Expansion of Prophetic Experience, religion itself enters into dialogue with other forms of knowledge and evolves, meaning that a dialogue is established between foundational religious beliefs and non-foundational beliefs, and both nourish each other. This is the secret of why the religion that was silent in Contraction and Expansion, and into whose mouth we put words, now begins to speak and talk, defends its own justification, and inevitably alters its accidentals, sometimes modifying one in accordance with another as circumstances require.

The Error Theory of the Theotic Contraction and Expansion of Sharia

Knowledge and error are two sides of the same coin. Every attempt to find a theory in the field of understanding knowledge is, in a way, an attempt to understand error, or an error theory. The gist of the matter is that epistemology corresponds to error theory. For this reason, the theory of Contraction and Expansion can be considered a kind of error theory alongside epistemology; something Soroush explicitly believes in and acknowledges. The emphasis that we humans are fallible and intoxicated, and that, like Hafez, we must confess our sinfulness and grasp only a part of the truth, all points to the fact that our knowledge is incomplete and deficient, and in David Hume's terms, we humans suffer from the limitation of understanding. In Soroush's belief, "We humans are now expelled from paradise and bereft of revelation. We are fallible, drowsy beings. We have a demon-afflicted livelihood and error-ridden knowledge." Our epistemic task in this world, for this very reason, is the correction and repair of various forms of knowledge. The task of the religious is nothing but solving the problems that these epistemic deficiencies create, which is, of course, a collective endeavor and cannot be accomplished by an individual alone.

The hidden foundation of Contraction and Expansion must be considered a wholehearted defense of epistemic liberalism, in the sense that it recognizes the right of human beings to be fallible and stamps it with approval, seats all human beings at one table and proclaims with one voice that we are all fallible and have theoretical and epistemic shortcomings, and “whatever there is, is from the ill-fitting stature of our being.” Highlighting the element of error in the theory of Contraction and Expansion has at least two merits: it makes it more compatible and harmonious with modern components such as liberalism, and it more readily embraces and welcomes a Quinean interpretation.

Final Word

This article sought to explain two matters: first, that alongside the common Kantian interpretation of Contraction and Expansion, one can also speak of a Quinean interpretation, which perhaps even enjoys higher epistemological authority. The Kantian interpretation splits the world of Contraction and Expansion in two: religion and religious knowledge; it also labels religion and relegates it to a corner, considering religious knowledge as one of the limited human sciences. The Quinean interpretation, however, makes the world of Contraction and Expansion unified and monolithic, emphasizing the clash of sciences with one another. Second, that the epistemology of Contraction and Expansion must be understood alongside the concept of error. In other words, the discussion of error theory must also be considered and understood under epistemology.

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From Kantian Contraction and Expansion to Quinean Contraction and Expansion

A Discourse on the Epistemology, Error Theory, and Hermeneutics of the Theory of the Evolution of Religious Knowledge

Hossein Dabbagh | Khordad 1395

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