Hossein Dabbagh's Article “The Phenomenology of the Gamble of Procreation”

The Phenomenology of the Gamble of Procreation [1]

The world's work is a gamble

Mawlana Jalal al-Din Rumi

One. Frank Jackson, the renowned Australian philosopher of mind and epistemologist, in his classic and important article, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”[2], proposes a lasting thought experiment in the philosophy of mind.[3] This thought experiment, known as the “Mary’s Room” argument, is as follows:

Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and let us suppose that she acquires all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see, for example, a red tomato, or the blue sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. (...) What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a color television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? ... (1982, 130)

Our situation as humans regarding the phenomenon of procreation, I believe, is similar to Mary’s situation in the story above. Meaning that we have not experienced the new world in which we are to live “with a child,” and we only gain such experience directly, personally, and individually when we step into this new situation. It is as if a gamble is at play and the “far-sighted,” calculating reason leads to “madness”[4]; so one must, without experiencing the new situation, either embrace it or turn one’s back on it. But some, in contrast, believe that one can unveil such a mysterious situation and make a choice through rational calculations (cost-benefit decision-making).

As an example, consider the following situation. A situation that more or less everyone thinks about and goes through in the moments surrounding having a child:

Imagine that in your current state you do not have a child. But you are gradually approaching a stage in life where you see yourself as physically, financially, mentally, spiritually, etc., capable of having a child. You think to yourself that you would like to experience such a phenomenon. Naturally, you consult with your spouse about this. You try to carefully evaluate the matter to understand what new thing will happen to you when you have a child. Meaning, what will your situation resemble when you have a child, and what will the situation be like if you do not have a child and remain in your current state. In truth, you try to implement your decision based on picturing your future situation and making it resemble a previously known situation. The result is no more than one of two states: either you have a child or you do not.

My claim is that this rational method of decision-making does not apply to the phenomenon of procreation. In fact, below I try to argue that this method of decision-making is not a rational method. Because we have no epistemic access to the phenomenon of having a (first) child (for oneself). “Experiencing” and undergoing a “lived experience” turns a person’s epistemic situation “upside down.” That is, by experiencing something, because one touches and engages with it, one’s epistemic situation changes enormously. We cannot know what something is like and what it resembles until we experience it. For this reason, we cannot employ the cost-benefit calculation method in situations where we lack first-hand experience. As Thomas Nagel states:

“... the expression ‘what it is like’ is misleading. It does not mean ‘what (in our experience) it resembles,’ but rather ‘how it is for the subject himself.’^[5]

Second. The main argument of this essay is as follows: first, most of us humans think that before deciding to have children, we must think deeply about what the phenomenon of being a father or mother is like. We often think that becoming a parent is a gratifying thing; having a child gives meaning to life because it entails a kind of self-sacrifice. This conception we have of the phenomenon of procreation encompasses our inclinations, happiness, life satisfaction, and, in a word, our phenomenal beliefs.[6]

Second, these conceptions help us compare two situations: namely, what it is like to become a father or mother and what it is like to remain childless. In fact, by comparing these two situations, we want to choose the best outcome. This is what most rational agents do. By assigning a probability to the benefits and costs, we try to choose the greatest expected utility.

Finally, the experience of the phenomenon of having a (first) child is a strange, unique, and transformative experience. It can even be said that, besides altering one's very existence, it also brings about an epistemic upheaval. People who have a child for the first time undergo a massive phenomenological change. Like the change Mary underwent in Frank Jackson's thought experiment.

Third. The conclusions that can be drawn from the above premises are as follows:

Situations in which transformative experiences are involved and engage us personally and epistemically can pose a serious challenge to decision-making based on benefit and utility. In truth, in such cases, if we wish to choose rationally, we cannot employ the calculation of benefit and utility. Procreation is one of these cases. If we want to decide rationally and in terms of maximizing expected utility, we must be able to determine the outcomes of phenomenal beliefs (that is, beliefs that express "what it is like"). But just as we cannot know what the experience of colors (like the color blue) or musical notes (like the note G behind the bridge on the santur) is like unless we have experienced it, we cannot know what having a child is like when we have not experienced it. This means that before choosing, we cannot determine the benefit or harm of the outcomes of phenomenal beliefs. Therefore, regardless of which option you choose, it is impossible to employ the usual rational method.

Of course, this does not mean that one must forgo procreation. Other ways of examining this matter are also conceivable. For example, one can join voices with Søren Kierkegaard, the Danish philosopher, and consider the phenomenon of procreation akin to a "leap of faith": "When someone [intends] to leap, he must close his eyes and leap... This leap is his decision."[7] This means that rational choice leads nowhere; in the fine words of Hafez:

The asceticism of novice rogues is a path to a village,

I, who am infamous in the world, what expediency should I contemplate?

Given this, we must set aside "far-sighted reason" and, echoing Rumi, say: "wa ista'shiqū īmānakum" (Love your faith). That is, act based on your (psychological) belief and faith. In other words, it means surrendering oneself to the path of universal and historical ends and considering human presence in the world as a sign of an end predicated upon this universe. One can even, apart from these considerations and with regard to the discussion of the evolution of the species, look imitatively at various societies and take the prevalence of this act as a reason to undertake it:

Although your reason flies upward,

The bird of your imitation grazes in the lowlands.

This issue can also arise for many other concrete cases in life: for example, when we want to make a deaf person hear using technology; or to return an autistic (disabled) individual to the normal world; or when we decide to participate in a war; or when we choose to become a cleric or a priest; or when we decide to change our religion; or when we intend to change our gender.[8]

Fourth. However, one might object that the claim “we cannot know what something is like or what it resembles until we experience it” is unwarranted. For everyday life teaches us that in many matters people take the experiences of others as their guide and proceed accordingly. For instance, the fact that a couple has undergone a positive experience of procreation makes it prima facie or pro-tanto justified for others to be optimistic about such an experience. Moreover, even if the experience of others is not relevant, one can draw on the power of imagination and conception (through the tool of metaphor) and simulate matters. For example, in a world where space travel has not yet occurred[9], the first astronaut was necessarily able to conceive of a similar situation using scientific instruments and equipment in order to undertake such an action. Finally, if we do not accept the rule that human beings generally undergo more or less the same experiences and can therefore be of help to one another, we will fall into the trap of a bizarre anthropology that historical experience does not confirm, namely that there are no intersubjective experiences.

The answer is that even if metaphors, conceptions, imaginations, and the testimony of others all work hand in hand, human beings still need to step into the realm of “risk” or “gamble” at the decision-making stage—for themselves. For every human being has a unique and particular psycho-mental situation. In other words, in phenomena that people intend to enter for the first time, gambling is one of its requisites. And who would not acknowledge that gambling and taking risks is not an entirely rational-cognitive activity? Rather, the mental state and the phenomenon of “gambling” can be seen as a kind of affective-emotional leap. Various empirical sciences (such as cognitive science, neuroscience, brain sciences, experimental-cognitive psychology, and moral neuroscience) also confirm such a claim.

Scholars of empirical sciences and philosophers such as Peter Singer, Antonio Damasio, Shaun Nichols, Jesse Prinz, Jonathan Haidt, Joshua Greene, Keith Frankish, and Janet Kennett are unanimous that our (moral) decision-making is not possible without the presence and existence of emotions. In other words, emotions are considered essential elements in decision-making. For example, the condition of the majority of Antonio Damasio’s patients who have suffered damage to the prefrontal cortex proves this hypothesis. The frontal area of the brain is responsible for our emotions, feelings, and personality. Experiments show that patients who have suffered damage to the frontal area as a result of an accident are unable to make decisions easily. The reason is that decision-making requires risk and gambling, and because the emotional part of their brain is impaired, they are prevented from performing this important task.

The famous example of Phineas Gage better illustrates this issue. He was a railroad worker who installed train tracks. In 1848, when he was 25 years old, during a horrific accident, an iron rod entered his head from under his jaw, pierced one of his eyes, and exited diagonally from the top of his forehead. Miraculously, he survived and was even able to walk and speak. After the recovery period, however, an important event occurred: Phineas Gage was no longer Phineas Gage. His behavior, personality, and conduct changed completely. His colleagues stated that he had become a very angry and cruel person. He was fired from his job. His family relationships were affected until he died at the age of 37.

The important point that cognitive scientists—especially Damasio—have made is that Gage was able to perform his intellectual-cognitive activity well. But because the front part of his brain was damaged, his emotions had undergone a serious change, and performing everyday life decisions was difficult for him. All of this was because the element of risk or gamble had vanished from his life.

Fifth. If this article succeeds in its aim, it has argued that in many of their everyday affairs, when people intend to make decisions about novel and previously unexperienced matters, they lack epistemic access to that phenomenon, and their phenomenal beliefs cannot justify rational decision-making. On the other hand, stepping into a foggy space requires gambling, and it is natural that gambling itself is born of a psycho-emotional state.

Procreation is a key instance of this type of decision-making. Before people have children, they have no personal experience of that phenomenon. At most, their phenomenal beliefs assist them. Yet, to step into this unexperienced realm, they must commit to risk and gamble. And this is the beginning of setting aside rational decision-making. It was not without reason that Rumi would sometimes cry out: "I am a man of the gambling house, I am a boundless world."

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[1] This article, more than it can express, acknowledges its debt to L.A. Paul. At the 2013 joint session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association in England, held at the University of Exeter, I benefited greatly from her comments and discussions.

[2] Epiphenomenal Qualia

[3] Jackson presents this thought experiment to refute the physicalist view.

[4] Rumi also said: I have tested far-sighted reason / Henceforth I shall make myself mad

[5] Mortal Questions, p. 170

[6] phenomenal belief

It refers to experiential beliefs in which the "what-it-is-like-ness" is reflected.

[7] Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, p. 11-12

[8] L.A. Paul reminded me of some of these examples. I am grateful to her for this.

[9] It has been reported that some people have signed up to go to Mars with no return journey. Truly, it is a terrifying and unrepeatable experience. It resembles death:

http://www.space.com/22238-mars-one-private-colony-volunteers-meeting.html

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Article: The Phenomenology of the Gamble of Procreation by Hossein Dabbagh

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