Hossein Dabbagh's Essay “Marriage and Procreation: Morally Permissible or Impermissible?”

Christians may perhaps be considered the first explicit advocates of renouncing marriage. Although before them there were those who, relying on asceticism and renunciation of the world, defied marriage and procreation, “monasticism” advanced such a process in a systematic manner. Contemporaries, however, cite other reasons for withdrawing from marriage and procreation. Drawing upon ethical discussions, they endeavor to argue that marriage and procreation are morally impermissible. For instance, the esteemed thinker and respected scholar Mr. Malekian (hereafter Malekian), in a recent conversation in the virtual space, has placed “marriage” and “procreation” on the “scales of ethics”[1], and without timidity or “evasion,” has set forth normative premises and ultimately pronounced the moral impermissibility of both:

“...I consider marriage and procreation to be contrary to ethics. I have said it many times and I do not shy away from this statement. However, I know that not only I, but even if the greatest thinkers in the world were to say the same thing, the situation would still continue as it is. Not all human beings are ethical, such that once an ethical perspective becomes clear to them, they act according to its requirements... [Rather, it becomes possible] when love is not in the mold of marriage. I believe the authentic life is a far more important life. I make the ethical recommendation that such lives be dissolved. The institution of marriage is an unethical institution and one should not enter into it; if you have entered into it and encountered these ethical conflicts, you must dissolve it... In the humanities, we must see how things are in the vast majority of cases, and one cannot pay heed to the rare, different marriages that lack these conflicts. The rare is as nothing.”

One should express delight and satisfaction that our current thinkers are preoccupied with such issues. Such discussions and inquiries bespeak the maturity of Iran’s intellectual sphere, in the sense that it has distanced itself from philosophical abstraction and placed concrete matters before its eyes. The requirement of “intellectual work” is precisely that we go to the instances and determine their status, unlike “philosophizing,” which generally abandons matters at hand and prefers generalities, for: “The sage’s task is to go to the first principles.”

In the short essay that follows, I will attempt to raise a few points in critique of Malekian’s claims. I will try to at least cast another glance at these categories and not leave the opponent, in the words of J. L. Austin, the English philosopher of language, in a position of silence. The summary of Malekian’s argument regarding the moral impermissibility of marriage can be rewritten in the following premises:

1_ Our feelings and emotions are implicated in the formation of marriage—matters that belong to the non-voluntary domain of the human being.

2_ Basing an institution on non-voluntary matters is irrational.

3_ Marriage deprives human beings of their privacy and psychological well-being.

4_ Submitting to the phenomenon of marriage creates ethical conflict for the human being.

5_ Consequently, the act of marriage is a morally impermissible act.

First, contrary to what Malekian states in premise (1), our feelings and emotions may not fall within the involuntary domain of human beings; meaning that our emotions and feelings can have a close connection with cognitive faculties. For this reason, according to a number of philosophers of mind, cognitive scientists, moral psychologists, and specialists in the field of neuroethics, (moral) emotions and feelings cannot be considered entirely non-cognitive. Quite the opposite; without the existence and presence of emotions, it is difficult to make rational decisions. Antonio Damasio, the Portuguese cognitive scientist, for example, in his book Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, has shown well that emotions necessarily carry an element of cognition—and consequently, will. For this reason, if the prefrontal cortex, the frontal area responsible for human emotions and feelings, is damaged in an incident (for example, an accident), the individual can hardly demonstrate ability in their everyday rational decision-making (such as taking risks). This empirical evidence helps us to at least doubt premises (1) and (2): meaning that if emotions and feelings are in some way rational, then marriage, which is their fruit, can also be rational, and founding marriage on something non-rational is no longer relevant.

But does marriage deprive human beings of their privacy? Does the deprivation of privacy truly endanger a person's mental health? It seems the answers to these questions are not easy or simple. In the sense that one can easily cite examples of bonds and marriages that do not deprive individuals of their privacy. Furthermore, the presupposition that the deprivation of privacy causes the deprivation of mental health is a highly questionable presupposition. That is, in a mental laboratory, one can imagine people whose privacy could cause the deprivation of their mental health. In the sense that solitude causes them ennui, and they strive to escape from being private. The next point is that even if, as Malekian suggests, we do not enter the framework of marriage and pursue a purely amorous relationship, the issue of the deprivation of privacy still remains, because love is always a two-way affair. With this account, one can also doubt premise (3). If Malekian objects that such marriages are rare and scarce, and what is rare is as if non-existent, one can respond that such marriages are not anomalous and unnatural, and for this reason, they must be taken seriously. And in any case, they invalidate that general rule that marriage is something contrary to morality. Therefore, one must investigate why these marriages are rare and how they can be taken out of the exception and turned into the rule. Drawing a line of nullification over the nature of marriage is not a condition for investigation.

We arrive at the fourth premise. Can the fact that marriage creates a conflict between two moral duties be a reason for its being immoral? Moreover, when we say something is contrary to morality, which morality do we mean? That is, which normative ethical theory (deontology, act- or rule-consequentialism, virtue ethics, contractualism, and expressivism[2]) is intended here? Perhaps according to act-consequentialist moral philosophers[3], the act of marriage is immoral, but according to rule-consequentialist[4] (like Parfit and Hooker), contractualist[5] (like Scanlon), virtue ethicist[6] (like Foot, Hursthouse, and Nussbaum), and intuitionist[7] (like Ross and Stratton-Lake) moralists, it is difficult to say the phenomenon of marriage is immoral. Setting aside this disagreement among moral philosophers, can the fact that something is potentially conflict-ridden be a reason for abandoning it? I think this argument is weak. Many instances can be found in life where entering into them is conflict-ridden, but there is no sufficient reason to abandon that act. For example, one could trace this question back to the "principle of life" itself and claim that since life inherently creates conflict, it should be abandoned (and perhaps suicide committed!). And if being born is involuntary, suicide is voluntary, so it can be acted upon!!! In the same vein, one could say that even the practice and knowledge of philosophy should be shut down because it brings intellectual conflicts to the fore. And what a pity if that happens, for it would leave many philosophers without their bread! These and other examples all demonstrate the counter-intuitiveness of Malekian's judgment.

A final point is that moral conflicts can even be fruitful in an individual's existential equilibrium. It is not the case that moral conflicts are undesirable in every respect, for they sometimes cause a person to flourish and become more sensitive in solving moral problems. In Isaiah Berlin's eloquent phrase, "Morality without conflict is not morality."

Malekian also attempts, on a more or less identical basis, to subject the phenomenon of procreation to moral critique. The details of his argument in the moral critique of procreation can be summarized and formulated as follows:

6_ The world around us is entangled in repeated calamities, suffering, and pain.

7_ Forcibly bringing someone into such an environment is unfair.

8_ Even assuming we bring our children into this world, we do not know according to which school of thought to raise them.

9_ Finally, the phenomenon of procreation can bring moral conflict with it, because it hinders the growth and flourishing of the parents.

10_ Therefore, by this account, the act of procreation is contrary to morality.

There is no doubt that the world around us is full of natural and human calamities. The existential sufferings of human beings are part of their daily lives. Conversely, there is also no doubt that pleasures and joys are found in this world. The whole question is which one prevails over and is superior to the other? Malekian, with the facts he brings forth (war, water scarcity, etc.), concludes that the sufferings of this world are greater in volume than its joys. But can such a claim be proven in an objective manner? It seems the competing interpretations are dialectically opposed, and both can subjectively provide a conception of the surrounding world that suits their purpose. For this reason, investing in premise (6) is somewhat dubious. Furthermore, as existentialist philosophers have argued, relying on the phenomenon of the "flight from death," despite the existence of suffering in the surrounding world, human beings still strive by all sorts of means and artifices to prolong their lives.

The seventh premise also bears a relation to the sixth premise. If one imagines that the amount of pleasure in the world around us exceeds the amount of pain and suffering, then naturally, inviting someone to enter this world does not seem unfair. It could even be formulated thus: the person who invites others into this world does so out of grace and with the intention of serving those invited. For this reason, premise (7) cannot be entirely reasoned and fair.

What can be said about premise (8)? Can the multiplicity of educational and psychological theories and doctrines be a reason for us to become entirely pessimistic about the phenomenon of procreation? Does the existence of various moral theories lead Malekian to the conclusion that he should set aside moral judgment and verdict? Apparently, he has not done so, for he has issued a moral verdict on marriage and procreation (and of course, it is good that he has not suspended ethics). A kind of indefensible relativism surges within this premise, which must be set aside. Does the fact that we have various physical theories (Newtonian and Einsteinian) or geometric ones (Euclidean and non-Euclidean) become a reason to abandon physics?! Does the existence of a multiplicity in moral theories, which is perhaps irreducible to unity, become a reason to justify pouring oil on a cat and setting it on fire?! For this reason, the plurality of psychological theories for raising children does not provide a cogent reason for the claim that procreation is morally impermissible. On this account, premise (8) must also be set aside.

Premise (9), and the last; once again, it brings up the issue of moral conflicts. Malekian argues that procreation can prevent parents from achieving their goals. In the sense that, on the one hand, they bear the duty of raising and nurturing children, and on the other hand, they harbor the duty of self-actualization, and these two sometimes come into conflict. As mentioned before, the presupposition that every conflict must be set aside is incorrect. One can cite examples of conflicts that cause a person's (metaphysical) growth and transcendence. The fundamental and structural idea of the Abrahamic religions (in John Hick's interpretation), Eastern-religious mysticisms, and modern psychology can be summarized in this proposition: "A human being, throughout their life, must incline and transcend from selfishness towards selflessness." Conflicts can bring us such a gift; they can direct a person's gaze from the self towards the "other" (in this case, children). An "other" who, in the words of prominent moral philosophers such as Emmanuel Levinas, Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, and Tim Scanlon, is the point of departure for being moral and for the "discovery" of ethics.

In short, Malekian's argument is flawed. Although his premises formally lead to such a conclusion, they do not materially lead to it. He must either abandon his argument or reduce its generality and write: "Sometimes and in some cases, marriage and procreation fall into conflict with moral rationality," which is, of course, a self-evident proposition for which one can hardly find opponents.

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[1]  From what appears in the interview, the interviewer (Sadiq Qotbi) paraphrased from memory. For this reason, Mr. Malekian may object to the precision of the wording used. In this article, I too have preempted such objections and have not invested heavily in the exact phrases. The core of his claim is what is under consideration.

[2] expressivism

[3] act-utilitarianism

[4] rule-utilitarianism

[5] contractualism

[6] virtue ethics

[7] intuitionism

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Marriage and Procreation: Morally Permissible or Impermissible?

Author: Hossein Dabbagh – April 2, 2016

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