Hossein Hooshmand in Conversation with Sedanet: “Beyond Laïcité and Political Religion: A Look at John Rawls’s Political Liberalism”

In Political Liberalism, John Rawls begins with a less controversial point about modern social life: “Modern societies are characterized by a plurality of reasonable yet conflicting moral and religious traditions.” This, known as “the fact of reasonable pluralism,” is a description of the condition of life in modern societies, where even reasonable and sound-minded individuals hold serious disagreements about the most fundamental questions of life—namely, God, the meaning of life, death, happiness, and so on. This fact is a natural outcome of the free exercise of reason under liberal democratic regimes. The plurality of reasonable comprehensive moral, religious, and philosophical doctrines in modern democratic societies is not merely a historical condition that will soon pass; rather, it is a permanent feature of the public culture of democracy. In today’s democratic societies, neither a secular intellectual framework nor a religion can gain the acceptance of all citizens and serve as the basis of social solidarity and the foundation of the political system. Hence, Rawls asks whether the stability of a just democratic system is possible in modern pluralistic societies. If so, how? This is the most important question in modern and contemporary political philosophy.

Pluralism, or the multiplicity of religious and philosophical traditions, has a long history in human civilization. Ancient Greece, Rome, and Persia were thoroughly familiar with this phenomenon. Diverse philosophical traditions and religions existed in those societies, but they did not enjoy equal status and standing. Political power drew inspiration solely from a particular religious or philosophical doctrine, and followers of other traditions, as minorities, were often oppressed or, rarely, tolerated. Throughout the history of Christianity and Islam, the story is much the same, although the history of Islam possesses a better record of tolerance toward different religions.

In pre-modern societies, religion was regarded as an ultimate solution. Even in the seventeenth century, to put an end to religious conflicts and civil wars in Europe, a fundamental principle was adopted in the Peace of Westphalia (1648): “Cuius regio, eius religio”—that is, the religion of the majority of the people in each region must be the religion of the ruler (or the state religion) of that region. In our own historical tradition, this very theory has always been the regulating principle of the relationship between the people and the government. After the 1979 revolution in Iran, the question of the relationship between religion and government—which emerged as one of society’s most important questions—compelled many intellectuals, especially religious intellectuals, to answer this complex problem. More than thirty years ago, in articles on the relationship between religion and democracy, Dr. Soroush put forward an argument similar to the Westphalian settlement. He stated that in a religious society, everything is religious, including its government (for example, in a society where the majority are Muslims, the government must also be Islamic). It was obvious that this theory would face reasonable criticisms, and later he himself found this view unacceptable.

Such a solution is neither just nor effective in today’s pluralistic societies, for, at the very least, it constitutes a manifest injustice against the rights of minorities, or so-called dissidents. Moreover, in these societies, not only do fundamental differences exist between the followers of various belief systems (whether religious or secular), but even individuals faithful to a single religion or philosophical tradition hold serious disagreements with one another. Therefore, this solution leads to a temporary balance of power and cannot bring about what Rawls calls “stability for the right reasons.”

In modern societies, attempts have been made to resolve this issue in different ways. These solutions are often based on two different interpretations of laïcité: radical French laïcité and moderate American laïcité. Ernst Cassirer states that the philosophy of the Enlightenment in France, on the one hand, and in England, Germany, and America, on the other, differ fundamentally: the French model is anti-religious, whereas the Anglo-American model is compatible with religion. Tocqueville, too, in Democracy in America, says that in France, religion and liberty are enemies, but in America, the two sit side by side. In any case, today both the radical and moderate models of laïcité face serious challenges and tensions.

In France, a strict state policy is implemented to ban the wearing of religious symbols in schools and public workplaces. Although these policies appear fair on the surface, considering that no specific religious covering is obligatory for Christians, whereas a particular type of covering is deemed obligatory for Muslim and Jewish women, as well as Sikh men (such as the hijab for Muslims, the yarmulke for Jews, and the turban for Sikhs), the imposition of this law has led to clear discrimination against them. In America, despite a strong constitutional tradition guaranteeing the right to religious freedom and the equality of citizens, the persistent and powerful presence of Christian beliefs, particularly those of Evangelicals (or followers of the Evangelical Church), in political power is such that the inequality between Christian and non-Christian citizens is undeniable.

The persistence of these challenges and tensions shows how difficult it is to resolve this issue. Reflecting on the experiences of laïcité in contemporary history, Michael Walzer, in his book The Paradox of Liberation: Secular Revolutions and Religious Counterrevolutions, addresses the fundamental question of why secular revolutions in India, Algeria, and Israel failed (one could add the Pahlavi era in Iran to the above examples). They faced serious challenges from three different religious traditions: Hindu extremism, Islamic radicalism, and ultra-Orthodox Judaism. (In the case of India—as Martha Nussbaum has shown in her book The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence, and India's Future—the fundamentalist government led by Narendra Modi has endangered India's secular democracy with destruction). Walzer explains that the secular leaders of these revolutions were educated and imbued with an alien culture and mentality (namely, the liberal West or the communist East): Jawaharlal Nehru said he was the last Englishman to rule India; unlike Gandhi, he was a full-fledged secular liberal and said that religion calls its followers to submit to the institutions of power. Ben Bella (the leader of the Algerian liberation movement) was far more attached to and familiar with Marx, Lenin, and Stalin than with the Quran and Islamic tradition. The leftist Zionist guerrillas who played a key role in the formation of Israel had little connection to the Jewish tradition. Thus, Walzer shows that there was a vast distance and gap between the views of these founders and the traditional beliefs of the people; the people whose freedom and liberation they sought (and this is what he calls the paradox of liberation). These leaders had no interest in or effort to bridge this gap; they neglected the principle that a traditional worldview cannot be denied, banned, or destroyed, but must be engaged with the challenges of the age. The problem with the secular leaders was that they did not even open a dialogue with religious reformers, and therefore, they ultimately faced radical religious movements. Walzer does not address the fact that religious revolutions, if they do not recognize the independence of the secular sphere, will also face radical secular reactions (such as what we are witnessing in Iran). In this way, Michael Walzer demonstrates the necessity of an alternative political theory to laïcité.

There is no doubt that religion and secularism are two valuable legacies in human history, and the elimination of either is neither possible nor desirable. In his book An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-secular Age, Habermas says that in the post-secular era, the long-standing tradition of dialogue between reason and faith, or dialogue between secular and religious people, has fallen into oblivion (not, of course, dialogue about and against one another, which they are often engaged in). He adds that for a useful and fruitful dialogue, certain conditions must be observed by both sides: religious people must accept scientific findings (which are indisputable) and also affirm the fundamental principles of egalitarianism in ethics and law. On the other hand, secular people should not position themselves as judges and arbiters of the truths of faith, despite the fact that they only consider a belief reasonable if it can be translated into their language (or the logic of rationality), that is, a universal discourse. Habermas says that secular intellectuals should undertake the task of absorbing the rich contents and materials within religious texts. He adds that absorbing religious materials and concepts and translating them into secular language is a task that many religious thinkers, from Kierkegaard to Derrida, perform. Does Habermas mean that religious people should engage in a simulation of religion with secularism? No! He says that "from an epistemic perspective, faith will always remain shrouded in opacity; it can neither be denied nor simply accepted." Habermas has tried to offer an alternative to radical Enlightenment, which denied any valuable content in religion. He shows why we need a new philosophy of Enlightenment that can create reconciliation and coexistence between religion and secularism.

The most prominent contemporary political philosopher who has proposed a new and alternative view on the relationship between religion and politics (or religion and laïcité) is John Rawls. His philosophical subtleties and nuances in the book Political Liberalism have led to the production of a vast body of literature in this field. Just as his book A Theory of Justice led to the revival of political philosophy during the dominance of logical positivism, Marxism, and utilitarianism, Political Liberalism also promises the continued life of liberal political philosophy in the current state of the world, which is, on the one hand, grappling with poverty and vast economic inequalities resulting from the unbridled globalization of the neoliberal economy, and on the other hand, facing the challenge of the moral relativism of postmodernism, neo-Darwinism, and communitarianism. Rawls has explained that one of his fundamental concerns is the complex problem of the relationship between democracy and philosophical and religious doctrines (comprehensive doctrines). Rawls's discussion is not a discussion in political theology, but is based on his deep reflections in contemporary political philosophy.

With these preliminaries stated, let me return to the main question in modern political philosophy: How is the establishment of a just democratic system and its stability in new pluralistic societies (or in the context of the fact of reasonable pluralism) possible?

1- Comprehensive Liberalism or Enlightenment Liberalism

As we previously mentioned, the answer that is very common and a dominant belief in the present era is the answer based on laïcité, in other words, inspired by Enlightenment liberalism or exclusivist liberalism, which is strongly opposed to the presence of religious teachings in the political sphere. From this perspective, religions are a poison for democracy and must be absolutely banished from the public sphere.

Enlightenment liberalism, or comprehensive liberalism, is regarded as a philosophy of life that possesses moral, epistemological, and ontological doctrines and, in competition with religion, claims to answer all of the social, political, moral, and spiritual questions of human life. The dominant view in the comprehensive liberal tradition holds that religion is an irrational phenomenon and that in the modern age—an era of demythologization, rationality, and the scientific worldview—religion must be confined to the personal and private sphere; for the socio-political presence of religion (as a phenomenon belonging to pre-modern periods or, at best, a phenomenon limited to the psychological realm of human beings) kindles the flames of religious strife and wars. Proponents of comprehensive liberalism cite the bloody religious conflicts and struggles of the seventeenth century in the West, which stemmed from the powerful and full-fledged presence of religion in political power, as evidence for their claim. In their view, to avoid the dangers and harms of this irrational and untamable monster, it is better to keep it in the privacy of the home and prevent it from roaming in society. They believe that the public sphere must always remain secular and that any move toward de-secularizing this sphere will lead to religious violence.

Thus, Enlightenment liberalism does not accept that religion might be one of the epistemic sources that can be drawn upon in political discourse. Within the context of Enlightenment liberalism, a militant secularism has emerged and gradually come to dominate the cultural, political, and social life of modern human beings. One of the historical causes for the emergence and dominance of this conception of secularism must be sought in earlier centuries, that is, the era of the unchallenged sovereignty of the Catholic Church over all dimensions and corners of people's lives. In those historical junctures, the Church was not only the authoritative reference and source for interpreting religious texts, but was also considered the basis of political legitimacy and the criterion for the validity of philosophical and scientific theories. In other words, the absolute power of the Church cast a shadow over politics, economics, education, and culture, and did not concede the independence of these domains from religion.

2- Political Liberalism as a Political Philosophy for Liberal Democratic Societies

Political liberalism (which can be called inclusivist liberalism) is an entirely new approach in the history of political philosophy. Just as Enlightenment-era liberalism rejects religious traditions as a common moral and political principle, Rawls also says that the tradition of comprehensive liberalism (or laïcité) does not possess sufficient general appeal in the present age; that is, given the fact of reasonable pluralism, this intellectual tradition cannot serve as a fundamental principle subject to general agreement. In contrast to Enlightenment liberalism—which, due to the serious blows inflicted upon it in the twentieth century, he does not consider defensible—Rawls puts forward the theory of “political liberalism.”

Unlike Enlightenment liberalism, which places the critique of religion at the center of attention, in political liberalism, the critique of religion or secularism is not central; rather, its main subject is the legitimacy and stability of democracy in a pluralistic society. If comprehensive liberalism was in the position of controlling and restraining religion, political liberalism seeks the reasonable management and ordering of moral-religious pluralism. This model, although it imposes certain restrictions on religious citizens, also encompasses non-religious (or secular) citizens.

Political liberalism does not seek to devise a comprehensive philosophy for all the affairs and dimensions of human life (a philosophy of life) but is limited and confined to the philosophy of politics. Rawls presents the theory of liberalism not as an abstract matter, but as a political and practical one. He offered a justification of liberalism that better secures and guarantees democratic norms and values (such as freedom, equality, mutual respect, and the right to self-determination). Political liberalism takes neither an affirmative nor a negative stance on the meaning and different styles of life; rather, it examines the question of whether, taking into account the fact of reasonable pluralism, the consolidation and stabilization of a just political system based on social cooperation and respect for equal rights and freedoms is possible in principle.

To answer this question, Rawls has proposed three basic ideas: the idea of a political conception of justice, the idea of overlapping consensus, and the idea of public reason, which will be briefly outlined.

a) The Political Conception of Justice

Given the plurality of philosophical-ethical and religious traditions in democratic societies, a formulation of the theory of justice must necessarily be presented in such a way as to secure the general agreement of citizens committed to different intellectual traditions and lifestyles. This formulation, which Rawls calls a “political conception of justice,” comprises three aspects:

First, this conception of justice applies solely to the basic structure of society. Unlike metaphysical and ethical theories of justice, which are extended to the category of divine justice and individual conduct or character, the scope of the political conception of justice is limited to the basic structure of society (i.e., political, judicial, and economic institutions). Therefore, it is not so broad as to encompass norms governing individual behavior or ideals of life. From this perspective, justice is a practical, social task rather than a metaphysical or epistemological issue.

Second, this conception of justice is freestanding; that is, it is independent of any comprehensive secular or religious moral system. In other words, the political conception of justice is independent of philosophical and religious systems in terms of its content and substance, as well as its justification. And finally, such a conception of justice is derived from the political culture of a democratic society, whose citizens are familiar with its ideas (such as freedom and equality).

b) The Idea of Overlapping Consensus

The idea of a “political conception of justice” as the moral foundation of democracy is based on the virtue of social cooperation grounded in mutual respect. Commitment to the principles of justice and the effort to realize them requires social cooperation and reciprocity among citizens. Rawls calls this the virtue of civility or the virtue of a good citizen. The most important component for stabilizing a just system in political liberalism is that the defense of the principles of justice and the virtue of social cooperation is not confined to a specific epistemic system; rather, by reflecting on their own intellectual traditions, adherents of different reasonable moral and religious systems can, in principle, endorse and affirm the principles of justice and the political virtue of social cooperation for various reasons. For example, secularists can explain these principles based on autonomy, the individual as an end in itself, individualism, or human flourishing, and religious thinkers can interpret them based on the doctrine that God created human beings free and equal. In this way, an “overlapping consensus” on the political conception of justice becomes possible between secularists and the religious, which is something beyond a “temporary modus vivendi” and can lead to the stabilization of a democratic system “for the right reasons.” A historical instance Rawls had in mind for overlapping consensus was the agreement between Catholics and Protestants on religious toleration in the seventeenth century. Each of these sects sought to offer different moral reasons to defend the principles of toleration. Rawls believes that an overlapping consensus on justice can also become possible in this way. In any society, there may be individuals committed to unreasonable traditions, but it is hoped that, by enjoying the benefits of a democratic system, they can gradually acquire the political grounds for accepting the principles of justice and the virtue of social cooperation based on mutual respect.

c) The Idea of Public Reason

Liberals generally believe that the justification of political power depends on taking the criteria of public judgment seriously. In other words, it requires that we take into account the beliefs and values of the general populace. In our personal and political lives, we act solely according to reasons we ourselves accept; but the idea of public reason morally obliges us, when we step into the political sphere, to ensure that our fundamental political reasons and views are also reasonable to others. The theory of public reason states that the justification of political power requires taking the reasons of others seriously, or looking from the perspective of the other. The principle of looking from another's perspective, or respecting the reasons and beliefs of others, has played a fundamental role in the political thought of liberalism in the modern era. This requires a transition from justifying political power on the basis of religious or secular truth to justifying it based on reason or public reason.

In a modern pluralistic society, when we speak about issues concerning the basic structure of our society, we must set aside comprehensive secular or religious doctrines about how to live. We have fundamental disagreements about such doctrines, and there is no reason to suppose these disagreements will one day be resolved; Rawls believes that reason inevitably leads to different religious and philosophical doctrines. Therefore, these doctrines cannot be the source of reasons upon which we all agree. Hence, we should not base public policy, which compels other citizens to accept it, on reasons that others do not share with us. This renders the use of religious doctrines, as well as secular doctrines, as a basis for political decisions (regarding the type of political system, the constitution, and general principles of justice) unjustified. The importance of public reason lies in the fact that state policies and actions, or political power, are backed by coercive force; if these actions are not based on shared reasons that are publicly acceptable, those whose freedom is restricted by such action have the right to consider it an unjust application of power. Decision-making on fundamental political issues of society must be limited and based on reasons that are independent of comprehensive philosophical, moral, and religious doctrines and rely solely on the ideas and concepts that shape the political domain. Thus, individuals who believe in different comprehensive philosophical-religious doctrines can live together respectfully and peacefully. Contemporary political philosophy, especially Rawls's political liberalism, has shown that moving beyond laïcité and religious rule is not only possible but desirable.

Reasonable Faith in the Realization of a Just Society

Throughout his life, Rawls sought to answer the question: "Is it possible for our lives—individually and collectively—to proceed in a way that makes them worth living?" or, as Kant puts it: "Does our life on this earth have any value at all?" We often spend much time and energy on our personal goals and interests, many of which are ultimately meaningless and worthless because they play no role in the moral growth and elevation of humanity. Kierkegaard—another Kantian thinker—said that the source of our anxieties is a deceptive self-infatuation, and its cure is humility. Humility not in the sense of thinking less of ourselves or ignoring our positive traits, but in the sense of paying attention and focusing on others and valuable resources outside of us. In other words, not thinking less about ourselves, but thinking about ourselves less. It is with attention to this principle of other-directedness that Rawls poses the question: "What fundamentally makes human life valuable?" The great lesson he teaches is that democratic justice is compatible both with human institutions and with reasonable philosophical-religious doctrines.

Political liberalism expresses this reasonable faith in the possibility of realizing a just political system here and now. The central idea in political liberalism is that regardless of agreement or disagreement on a single belief system, an overlapping consensus (or agreement) on a reasonable conception of justice can be achieved. But this conception of justice cannot be based on a comprehensive system (or thick concept) of moral good. For various philosophical and religious systems have different conceptions of moral ideals.

Hence, political philosophy must seek common grounds accessible to the public of citizens. In accordance with the principle of mutual respect, citizens of a democratic society strive, for the sake of shared political and civic goals, not to let their deep differences in metaphysical, epistemological, and moral beliefs interfere in political life. It is hoped that they can affirm and endorse the most important political and civic virtues, such as social cooperation based on mutual respect for each other's rights and freedoms, in light of their own moral-religious system (or as an element and component of it).

Such an effort does not necessarily mean there is a guarantee of achieving this goal; we all bear a heavy moral responsibility in this regard, especially intellectuals. Among the most important responsibilities of intellectuals is the moral defense of democracy and democratic ideals. To be active in the political sphere, citizens must learn fundamental concepts and ideals from the culture of civil society. The work of intellectuals is to produce the necessary resources to enrich democratic political culture (such as John Locke's treatises on government and toleration, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's The Social Contract, Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws, John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, and so on). Rawls says one of the intellectual reasons that the Weimar Republic failed and led to the rise of Hitler was that prominent intellectual figures in Germany, such as Thomas Mann and Martin Heidegger, were not prepared to defend that republic—which was based on a democratic constitution.

Have our intellectuals provided the necessary resources for the moral defense of democracy? Are their personal interests and projects, in principle, prepared to defend democracy?

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Beyond Laïcité and Political Religion: A Look at John Rawls's Political Liberalism

Hossein Hooshmand in Conversation with Sedanet

Host: Omid Ghaempanah

Friday, March 12, 2021

Held on Sedanet's Instagram

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