Reza Zaman's article “Political Liberalism as an Advocate for the Most Disadvantaged: A Look at the Difference Principle”

1. Liberalism initially emerged and asserted itself to protect the affluent strata of society, whose freedom and security were being violated and stripped away by rulers. For this reason, it became linked with the concept of the bourgeoisie. But as it progressed, it came to rely on concepts that benefited all social groups. There was a reason for this. Liberalism's reliance on one class of society caused resistance from other strata against it, a situation that could not be to the advantage of this school of thought[1]. For this reason, it endeavored to consider the interests and welfare of all members and individuals of society and became universal in its outlook[2]. However, as liberalism aged, it also grew more robust, broader, and more extensive, and various interpretations and readings of it emerged, each with its own stance and attitude toward society and the strata and classes present within it. One of those narratives, which I will discuss in this article, is the narrative of the great twentieth-century philosopher John Rawls.

2. John Rawls is known for his book “A Theory of Justice” (which I will henceforth refer to as the theory of justice) [3], a theory that offered a new definition and interpretation of justice and, according to many, breathed new life into political philosophy. This book attracted the attention of most thinkers speaking in the field of political philosophy, and it is still discussed to this day. The author of this book was a liberal thinker who also expanded and developed his theory of justice in the book “Political Liberalism”[4].

In “A Theory of Justice,” John Rawls, in order to reach a social agreement and contract that is just and fair, first envisions a situation called the “original position”[5], in which human beings know nothing of their identity, their gender, their social and economic standing, their religion or beliefs; they do not know to which country and race they belong, whether they are women or men, heterosexual or homosexual, rich or poor, religious or irreligious. A state of ignorance that Rawls calls the “veil of ignorance”[6], in which everyone is absolutely equal. In Rawls's view, in this situation accompanied by ignorance and lack of information, we arrive at two principles, two principles of justice.

Liberalism, in John Rawls's reading and interpretation, rests on these two principles of justice that shape the theory of justice; that is, liberalism is narrated in such a way as to be compatible with the theory of justice. But the two principles of justice: the first principle, which takes precedence over the second, is the principle of equal liberty, according to which all citizens must equally enjoy basic liberties[7]. The second principle consists of two parts: the difference principle[8] and the principle of equality of opportunity. What I will discuss in this writing is the difference principle, that is, the first part of the second principle.

3. Rawls initially states the first part of the second principle as follows:

“Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage”[9].

Note that this is not the difference principle; we have not yet arrived at it. The phrase “to everyone’s advantage” in this sentence is vague and unclear. For this reason, Rawls states that it can be interpreted in three ways: the system of natural liberty, liberal equality, and democratic equality. Both the system of natural liberty and liberal equality, in interpreting the phrase “to everyone’s advantage,” arrive at the “principle of efficiency,” which is the theory of “Pareto optimality.”[10] Rawls defines this principle as follows: “A configuration is efficient whenever it is impossible to change it so as to make some persons (at least one) better off without at the same time making other persons (at least one) worse off…A distribution is efficient whenever there is no other distribution that would improve the circumstances of at least one person without worsening the circumstances of another.”[11] Thus, a mode of distribution is inefficient when there are possible ways to improve the situation of some without worsening the situation of others. But Rawls says that the principle of efficiency cannot serve alone as a principle of justice; constraints and rules must be considered for it. In this principle, the outcome must merely be efficient, but in the principle of justice, the outcome must also be just and fair.[12] And it is in this sense that he says “justice is prior to efficiency.”[13] But we arrive at the interpretation of democratic equality, which, from Rawls’s perspective, the further we move away from the system of natural liberty, we cannot be satisfied with anything other than this interpretation.[14] The “difference principle” is the result of the democratic equality interpretation of the first part of the second principle of justice. Democratic equality states that inequalities must be “to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged”; in fact, from the phrase “to everyone’s advantage,” we arrive at “to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.” Democratic equality, in Rawls’s words, is a strongly egalitarian conception.[15] Rawls ultimately chooses this interpretation and defends the difference principle.

Therefore, the definition of the difference principle is as follows:

“Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged members of society.”[16]

What does the difference principle say? The first point that can be gleaned from it is that this principle accepts the existence of social and economic inequalities. In fact, it views inequalities as the result of the contingencies of social circumstances[17] and the natural distribution.[18] Therefore, Rawls does not attempt to deny the existing social and economic inequalities, but, as I will explain, he does not justify them either. He is an egalitarian, but in the words of Robert Talisse, he is not a pure egalitarian.[19] So Rawls tells us that we must accept that people’s levels of talent and their share of intelligence and memory are not the same. Their place of birth, the family, neighborhood, and city in which they grow up, their initial social and economic position, are by no means on the same level. There are those who have more talent and intelligence and a better memory, were born in a better place, and grew up in a family, neighborhood, and city that had favorable conditions. In contrast, there are also those who have less talent and intelligence and a weaker memory, were not born in a good place, and the family, neighborhood, and city in which they grew up did not have suitable conditions. These are inequalities that exist and cannot be eliminated.

But what stance and attitude should we humans adopt toward these natural facts? Should we surrender to inequalities? Can we do nothing in the face of these facts? Rawls tells us that the contingencies of social circumstances and the natural distribution, from which social and economic inequalities arise, are neither just nor unjust; they are simply natural and social facts. What is just or unjust is the way institutions deal with these facts[۲۰]. In his view, there is no necessity for us to submit to social and natural contingencies; our stance and our method of confronting inequalities must be just. As an example, consider the issue of earthquakes, which is a natural phenomenon. Have we surrendered to earthquakes? An earthquake is also a natural fact; at present, we do not have the knowledge or power to eliminate it. But we can deal with this phenomenon in such a way as to reduce the damages and destruction resulting from it. For instance, we can build cities in safe areas, construct sturdy and strong buildings, train ourselves on how to behave when an earthquake occurs, and so on. Consider the issue of theft, which is a human phenomenon. We have not surrendered to it, even though it is a social fact and cannot be completely eradicated. But it can be reduced in society through deterrent laws and by creating suitable conditions for citizens. Social and economic inequalities are likewise. They are a fact, but our manner and method of dealing with them can be just. This statement by Rawls is, in truth, contrary to the view of liberals such as Friedman, who say that we must come to terms with these facts and benefit from their advantages[۲۱].

At any rate, according to the difference principle, social and economic inequalities must be arranged so that they are to the benefit of justice. But what does it mean to arrange inequalities and for them to be just? It is here that the difference principle states that social and economic inequalities must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society; in that case, they are arranged and just. In fact, in the theory of justice, social and economic inequalities are divided into permissible and impermissible inequalities: justice deems inequalities permissible only if they provide the greatest benefit to the most disadvantaged. Otherwise, that is, if they do not provide the greatest benefit to the most disadvantaged, they are impermissible and unjust; for example, if they provide the greatest benefit to the more well-off, they are not permissible. Impermissible and unjust inequalities can also be called "discrimination."

But who are the most disadvantaged? Rawls says that the most disadvantaged are, in terms of their family and class origins, more deprived than others, their innate talents promise them less success compared to others, and fortune and luck are not much on their side in the course of life[۲۲]. This answer may seem general and vague. But Rawls has addressed this issue more precisely. He has provided a reasonable criterion for identifying the most disadvantaged. To clarify this matter, John Rawls first introduces the idea of primary goods[۲۳]. By primary goods, he means things that "citizens, as free and equal persons with a complete life, need"[۲۴]. The determination of primary goods, in turn, depends on "a political conception of the person, a conception that regards the person as free and equal, possessing innate moral powers and capable of full cooperation as a member of society"[۲۵], not merely on psychological, social, or historical facts.

Rawls has identified five primary goods[۲۶]:

a) Basic rights and liberties; such as freedom of conscience

b) Freedom of movement and freedom of choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities

c) The powers and special prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility in political and economic institutions

d) Income and wealth

e) The social bases of self-respect; such as the recognition of the fact that citizens have equal basic rights.

The strata and classes of society can be identified and determined based on the level of hope citizens have for primary goods over a complete life; a hope that reflects their life prospects from the standpoint of their social class[۲۷]. The more advantaged are those who have the greatest hope of attaining primary goods, and the most disadvantaged are those who have the lowest level of hope regarding primary goods. But in a well-ordered society (which I will discuss), where everyone equally enjoys basic liberties and their fair and equal opportunities are guaranteed, the most disadvantaged are those who have the least hope for greater income and wealth[۲۸]. This is the criterion that Rawls provides us for identifying the most disadvantaged.

But why does the difference principle select the most disadvantaged? Are they more deserving? Do they have a special privilege? Is their blood redder for Rawls, or does he bear a grudge against the more advantaged? Why shouldn't inequalities benefit the more advantaged? Isn't this discrimination and inequality?

Consider two persons named Mohammad and Ehsan. Ehsan is more talented and intelligent, and also has a better memory. He grew up in an affluent and wealthy family, in a large city with abundant facilities. Mohammad, however, lived in a poorer and weaker family, in a village with fewer and lower facilities. So it is clear that there is inequality between Mohammad and Ehsan; Ehsan represents the advantaged class and Mohammad represents the disadvantaged stratum of society. Who has suffered the most harm from this inequality? Mohammad. Who has derived the most benefit from this inequality? Ehsan. Did these two play a role in their own harm and benefit? No, it is clear that Mohammad and Ehsan were harmed and benefited beforehand. Where did this inequality come from? From the natural distribution and contingencies of social circumstances. Thus, neither is entitled to what nature and social circumstances (in which they grew up) have imposed upon them. Now suppose that both are employed today. Mohammad's monthly salary, however, is two million tomans, and Ehsan's monthly salary is twenty million tomans. So, Ehsan has a better livelihood and Mohammad a harder life. Are both deserving and entitled to this livelihood and life? Part of their present conditions can, of course, be the result of their effort or negligence, but another part is rooted in natural and social contingencies. So, it cannot be said that Ehsan's better livelihood and Mohammad's hard life are entirely the result of their own actions and behavior. Well, if our concern is equality, why can't we accept that Mohammad needs more support from the beginning?

Therefore, we choose the difference principle because:

First, the most disadvantaged have suffered the most harm and loss from social and economic inequalities. Not only have these inequalities brought them no benefit, but they have also caused them harm.

Second, the more advantaged have derived the most gain and benefit from inequalities; they have benefited beforehand from the natural distribution and contingencies of social circumstances. No harm from inequalities has reached them, and benefit has reached them.

Third, it cannot be shown that human beings are entirely deserving and entitled to the rank and position they hold today. In other words, neither is the affluence of the more advantaged entirely the result of their own effort and endeavor, nor is the deprivation of the more disadvantaged entirely the product of their laziness and negligence. In truth, the more advantaged have been more fortunate and luckier, and the more disadvantaged have been more unfortunate and unluckier. The position and status they hold today also has roots in natural and social contingencies. Neither the more advantaged nor the more disadvantaged are deserving and entitled to what they have and do not have from social and natural contingencies.

So Rawls bears no grudge against the more advantaged, nor is he in love with the face and features of the more disadvantaged. He says that justice and fairness do not permit social and economic inequalities to benefit everyone. Because in that case, the more advantaged would have benefited twice[۲۹]. It is clear that inequalities cannot have the greatest benefit for the more advantaged, such that the more disadvantaged are harmed twice and the more advantaged benefit twice; in that case, inequality would also be intensified. So, such a thing must not be acquiesced to.

The difference principle seeks to compensate for the harm and deprivation caused by inequalities that are not based on individuals' desert[30]. Therefore, the most disadvantaged—those who have either benefited less from natural endowments, or have grown up in harsher conditions, or both—must be supported. In other words, it seeks to redress the bias of natural and social contingencies in the direction of equality[31]. In this respect, the difference principle resembles the principle of redress[32]. Of course, Rawls notes that the difference principle is not identical to the principle of redress, but it fulfills part of its purpose. Well, with this principle, one can hope that Mohammad's deprivation and harm will also be compensated, and he will not be harmed twice.

In what sense do the most disadvantaged derive the "greatest benefit" from inequalities? What does Rawls mean by the greatest benefit? We said that social strata and classes should be identified based on their expectations of primary goods (basic rights and liberties, freedom of movement and free choice of occupation, the powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect) and the level of their expectation of attaining these goods. However, in a well-ordered society, since basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity are guaranteed, it is citizens' expectations of income and wealth that determine social classes and strata. On this basis, it can be said that the greatest benefit, in a well-ordered society, means an increase in the level of individuals' expectations and hopes; that is, the greatest benefit for the persons whose expectations of income and wealth are higher. Thus, the difference principle seeks to increase the level of the most disadvantaged's hope of acquiring income and wealth. But the difference principle has a more precise meaning. Rawls brings in the more advantaged and, in explaining this principle, says: "the higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society"[33]. In fact, Rawls's point is that the increase in the expectations of the more advantaged regarding income and wealth is just and justified only when it is part of a scheme; a scheme that improves the expectations of the more disadvantaged. So, the greatest benefit for the most disadvantaged means that the ultimate contribution of human beings is in line with improving the level of hope of disadvantaged persons for acquiring income and wealth and organizing their expectation of this primary good[34]. To put it more simply, with the difference principle, the condition of the most disadvantaged individuals will improve[35]. This issue will become clearer in the next section.

4. Society as a "fair system of cooperation"[36] is one of the fundamental ideas of political liberalism. That is, society is a system whose members cooperate and participate with one another and seek to benefit and gain from this cooperation and participation. But cooperation among the citizens of a society must be fair and just. This cooperation and participation is, of course, not temporary or short-term but long-term and transmissible from one generation to the next. The idea of a fair system of cooperation is linked with two other ideas[37]: the idea of citizens as free and equal persons and the idea of a well-ordered society[38]. In fact, fair cooperation will not be possible except through the realization of these two ideas.

Drawing on the democratic tradition, citizens are regarded as free and equal[39]. In a democratic society, human beings define themselves as free and equal beings. This definition is formed not on the basis of metaphysical doctrines but on the basis of a political conception of the person. Persons are free and equal in that they possess two moral powers[40]: The first power is the sense of justice[41], which enables the person "to understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice which characterizes the fair terms of social cooperation." The second power is the capacity for a conception of the good; that is, "a conception of the ends and purposes worthy of our devoted pursuit, together with an ordering of those elements to guide us over a complete life"[42]. In other words, the sense of justice is a desire that acts in the direction of applying and complying with the principles of justice[43] and also has a social and political dimension, while the capacity for a conception of the good is for organizing the individual's life.

But we arrive at the idea of a well-ordered society, which for Rawls is a society in which a conception of justice plays an important role in its governance[44]. Yet such a definition is certainly ambiguous for us. For this reason, Rawls sets out three features of a well-ordered society: first, in such a society everyone accepts principles of justice and knows that everyone else also accepts these principles. Second, the basic institutions of society and how they participate with one another to form a system of cooperation are consistent with these principles. Third, citizens have a share of the sense of justice and their activity is based on the basic institutions of society[45]. Such a concept may even seem idealistic. But this is not the end of the matter. Rawls says that any conception of justice must regulate a constitutional democracy. Since democracy is linked with reasonable pluralism[46], the public conception of justice must be such that diverse and varied comprehensive doctrines accept it[47].

So we learned that a fair system of cooperation is made possible by the idea of citizens as free and equal persons and the idea of a well-ordered society. But this social cooperation and participation must accept fair terms. Here the idea of "reciprocity"[48] comes into play, which means "a relation between citizens expressed by principles of justice that regulate a society in which everyone benefits according to an 'appropriate standard of equality,' defined in relation to that society"[49]. Rawls says this concept lies between the idea of impartiality (which is altruistic) and the idea of mutual advantage.

But what role does the difference principle play in a fair system of cooperation? (a) It was mentioned that the idea of citizens as free and equal persons, who participate with one another, is linked to this system. The difference principle, in a way, along with the other principles of justice (liberty and equality of opportunity), strives to defend the freedom and equality of citizens. For this to happen, the obstacles that prevent individuals from being free and equal and from manifesting themselves in fair cooperation must be removed. One of these obstacles pertains to the deprivation rooted in the economic and social position in which the individual lives. The pressure of deprivation on the most disadvantaged is such that they cannot, as they ought, regard themselves as free and equal, and with self-respect, have the capacity to be present in social cooperation and participation. The difference principle removes this obstacle and causes the most disadvantaged to be freed from the pressure of deprivation. (b) It was mentioned that to have a fair system of cooperation, a well-ordered society is needed, where a conception of justice regulates its affairs, individuals accept principles of justice, and the basic institutions are consistent with these principles. It is clear that a conception of justice is prepared to accept a specific set of principles of justice. It was mentioned that the difference principle is one part of the principles of justice. Therefore, this principle can make its own contribution to the construction of a well-ordered society. The well-ordered society in its ideal form has accepted the difference principle. (c) We arrive at the concept of reciprocity, which represents the condition of fair cooperation. Rawls says that the difference principle expresses the idea of reciprocity[50]. The difference principle, along with the other principles of justice, proposes an appropriate standard for equality (which reciprocity seeks) so that, based on it, citizens can benefit in a fair cooperation. Based on this standard, for groups and individuals to participate with one another under fair conditions, besides enjoying liberty and the guarantee of equality of opportunity, the most disadvantaged must derive the greatest benefit from inequalities. Rawls points out that in this case, the most disadvantaged do not need our kindness or compassion but are persons with whom we must practice reciprocity[51].

Thus, we see that the difference principle manifests itself in the fair system of cooperation and plays its special role. For society to be a fair system of cooperation, it needs the difference principle, alongside the other principles of justice.

۴. Rawls reminds us that the political convention of democratic societies is to appeal to the common good. Democratic law, too, cannot be to the detriment of a particular group or social stratum. A law that explicitly takes a stance against a class present in society is certainly not democratic. One might say that this convention could be the principle of efficiency, as defined earlier. But the author of A Theory of Justice rejects this. He says that maximizing from more than one perspective is not possible, so it is natural, given the characteristics of a democratic society, to choose the perspective of the least advantaged members of society—that is, to strive to improve their prospects, since they have suffered the greatest harms. Thus, the difference principle is also the political convention of a democratic society[۵۲].

One of the merits of the difference principle is that it brings in the principle of fraternity[۵۳]. Rawls rightly observes that fraternity plays a lesser role in democratic theory. In that famous slogan “liberty, equality, fraternity,” it seems fraternity receives the least attention. It is also thought that fraternity is not a distinct and important political concept, does not define democratic rights, and expresses no specific duty. Or there is a suspicion that fraternity, understood as an emotional bond among citizens, does not seem realistic. But Rawls says that the difference principle is an interpretation of the concept of fraternity; in the sense that we should not desire greater gains unless this works to the benefit of others who are not as well off as we are[۵۴]. He also gives the example of the family, whose members do not wish to gain unless it advances the interests of other family members. The result of linking fraternity and the difference principle is that fraternity finds its role in democracy and also imposes a specific duty upon society[۵۵].

But what is the relationship of the difference principle to civil liberties? Can it restrict people’s freedom? Does it pose no danger to liberty? It must be noted that the difference principle alone does not support justice. It was mentioned that justice as fairness rests on two principles. The first principle is the principle of equal liberty, which takes priority over the second principle. The difference principle, too, is subordinate to the principle of liberty[۵۶]. In fact, Rawls defends the priority of basic liberties, which everyone must enjoy equally. Political liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of conscience, and freedom of thought are among the most important basic liberties of citizens[۵۷]. Rawls’s general description of liberty is as follows: “this or that person (or persons) is free (or not free) from this or that constraint (or set of constraints) to do (or not to do) so and so”[۵۸]. It is clear that he also considers positive liberty but places greater emphasis on negative liberty, that is, freedom from. The priority of liberty, in Rawls’s view, means that liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty itself[۵۹].

The difference principle does not mean depriving the more advantaged of their liberty. It is not the case that, in order for the least advantaged to gain the greatest benefit from inequalities, the basic liberties of other citizens who are better off are taken away. Basic liberties are among the primary goods that must be distributed equally and fairly. Rawls fully accepts that the more advantaged, in a fair system of cooperation, “are entitled to benefit from their better situation”[۶۰] and “like everyone else, are entitled to benefit from their natural assets”[۶۱], and the first principle of justice defends this entitlement. The difference principle, too, cannot contribute to justice without the realization of the principle of liberty. Thus, the status of liberty and its place in the theory of justice, despite the difference principle, is not a cause for concern. Both advocates of liberty will achieve their aspiration, which is the realization of freedom, and the more advantaged will gain their benefit, albeit within a fair system of cooperation.

So, it can be said that the difference principle, in relation to the slogan “liberty, equality, fraternity,” is subordinate to liberty, demands equality, and interprets fraternity.

5. The theory of justice falls within the liberal tradition. It can rightly be said that John Rawls's political thought is also a liberal political thought. It carries with it the main pillars and components of liberalism: it believes in the primacy of the individual, is rights-based and defends the priority of the right over the good, safeguards the basic liberties of citizens and believes that persons should enjoy these liberties equally, considers the government neutral towards comprehensive religious doctrines, and accepts diversity and pluralism of opinions and beliefs. He himself also emphasized the term political liberalism. But in liberalism as read by Rawls, justice as fairness is central; a justice that, as mentioned, rests on two principles, one of which is the difference principle. So, it can be said that Rawls's liberalism is also an advocate and supporter of the most disadvantaged. It considers all strata of society and serves all groups, including the most disadvantaged. This group in society can be quite hopeful of being supported and backed under the shelter of political liberalism.

Rawls's defense of the most disadvantaged is neither tainted by sloganizing nor by superficial, primal emotions. Not with slogans, but with a coherent theory and doctrine, he tries to improve their situation. Also, he does not call anyone to revolutionary struggle, nor does he create the notion that deprivation is necessarily the product of the mischief or sabotage of the more well-off; rather, he takes the role of luck and chance seriously. He does not tell the deprived class of society that others have usurped their rights and that they must prepare themselves for revenge.

Considering the current situation in Iran, where the deprived strata bear the most pressure and, unfortunately, the most disadvantaged are growing in number, and on the other hand, are also deprived of many basic and primary liberties, we are in need of a liberalism as narrated by John Rawls. Although there is no hope for today's Iranian government, which is a despotic and ideological regime, with rulers who live in another world and have no ear to hear the words of thinkers and philosophers, considering themselves self-sufficient, it is good that future generations, in a democratic and free government, also benefit from Rawls's theory.

I would like, at the end of this article, to also remember Mir Hossein Mousavi, a noble and honest human being who has always sought justice and been concerned about the situation and livelihood of the most disadvantaged; it is a pity that the enemies of freedom and justice have deprived us of his presence for many years and have further disgraced themselves.

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1. The nineteenth-century revolutions that also led to the emergence of Marxism and Communism

2. See the book "In Defense of Politics; The Authoritative Liberal Democracy," the article "In Defense of the State," Morteza Mardiha, Ney Publishing

۳. A Theory of Justice

۴. Political Liberalism

۵. Original position

۶. Veil of ignorance

۷. Basic liberties

۸. Difference principle

9. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, translated by Morteza Nouri, Markaz Publishing, p. 93

۱۰. Pareto optimality

11. A Theory of Justice, p. 98

12. Ibid., p. 103

13. Ibid., p. 110

14. Ibid., p. 105

15. Ibid., p. 106

16. Ibid., p. 113

۱۷. Contingencies of social circumstances

18. A Theory of Justice, p. 131

19. Robert Talisse, The Philosophy of Rawls, translated by Khashayar Deyhimi, Farhang-e Nashr-e Now, p. 72

20. A Theory of Justice, p. 131

21. Life is not fair. One is tempted to imagine that government can correct what nature has brought about. We can benefit from the very injustice we condemn (Milton Friedman, Free to Choose, pp 136-137)

22. A Theory of Justice, pp. 126 and 127

23. Primary goods

24. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, translated by Erfan Sabeti, Phoenix Publications, p. 104

25. Ibid., p. 105

26. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, translated by Musa Akrami, Sales Publications, p. 282

27. A Theory of Justice, p. 96

28. Justice as Fairness, pp. 105 and 106

29. A Theory of Justice, p. 132

30. Ibid., p. 129

31. Ibid., p. 130

32. principle of redress

33. A Theory of Justice, p. 106

34. Ibid., p. 133

35. Ibid., p. 106

36. fair system of cooperation

37. Political Liberalism, p. 94

38. well-ordered society

39. Political Liberalism, p. 99

40. Moral power

41. Sense of justice

42. Political Liberalism, p. 195

43. A Theory of Justice, p. 494

44. Ibid., p. 45

45. Political Liberalism, p. 118

46. Reasonable pluralism

47. Political Liberalism, p. 121

48. Reciprocity

49. Political Liberalism, p. 97

50. A Theory of Justice, p. 131

51. Justice as Fairness, p. 233

52. A Theory of Justice, p. 331

53. Principle of fraternity

54. A Theory of Justice, p. 134

55. Ibid., p. 135

56. Justice as Fairness, p. 109

57. A Theory of Justice, p. 93

58. Ibid., p. 255

59. Ibid., p. 265

60. Ibid., p. 132

61. Ibid., p. 133

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Political Liberalism as an Advocate for the Most Disadvantaged: A Look at the Difference Principle

Author: Reza Zaman

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