Arash Naraghi's Article: “Liberalism: Individualism or Self-Centeredness?”

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Many critics of liberalism have found this school worthy of criticism on the grounds that it is based on “individualism.” From the perspective of these critics, “individualism” has at least two major ethical flaws:

First, individualism is incompatible with a spirit of altruism and self-sacrifice, meaning the liberal individual, insofar as they are individualistic, is “self-centered” and “egoistic”; and second, individualism ultimately leads to the disregard of “collective rights,” meaning that within the framework of the liberal view’s assumptions, only “individual rights” are recognized, and the concept of “collective rights” finds no clear and defensible meaning.

My aim in this essay is to show that: first, liberalism does not necessarily lead to “ethical egoism,” and second, one can have an understanding of “collective rights” that is compatible with the basic assumptions of liberalism.

In this essay, by “liberalism” I mean, first and foremost, a view according to which the primary role of the state is to secure and guarantee the fundamental political and civil rights of the members of society. These fundamental rights are considered to be in the category of individual rights, and some of their most important instances include the right to freedom of expression, the right to freedom of belief and religion, the right to freedom of assembly, the right to effective political participation, the right to a fair trial, and the right to equality of opportunity.

Liberalism in this sense is based on a kind of “ethical individualism,” meaning the liberal individual ultimately, from an ethical standpoint, considers the individual to be important and the cornerstone of the moral world. According to this view, ethically, our most important concern should be the support and protection of the human individual and their inherent dignity. Liberalism does not necessarily have any relation to “metaphysical or existential individualism.” Metaphysical or existential individualism is a view that adheres to at least one of the following two doctrines: (a) there is no such thing as a “group” or “collective” with external existence; rather, all that exists are the individual persons who, alongside one another, bring the “group” or “collective” into being; and (b) all the characteristics and attributes of a “group” or “collective” can be reduced to the characteristics and attributes of the individuals constituting that group or collective. The liberal individual, insofar as they are liberal, does not need to assume (a) and (b) to be true. The requirement of their view is merely that they make the “individual” the main focus of their ethical attention and concern.

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But does the “ethical individualism” of liberalism necessarily lead to “ethical egoism”?

In answering this question, it is first worth noting that “ethical individualism” and “ethical egoism” are two distinct concepts. Ethical individualism, as we have seen, is a view according to which the most important focus of ethical attention and concern is the human individual. But ethical egoism is a view according to which the human individual has only one moral duty, and that is to always pursue their own personal interests and to try to secure the greatest possible benefits for themselves.

Therefore, the main question is whether affirming “ethical individualism” entails affirming “ethical egoism”? As far as I can discern, there is absolutely no such entailment relationship between these two concepts, and, as it happens, in the most important narratives of liberalism, ethical individualism has been considered a basis for negating ethical egoism. Therefore, I wish to defend the following two claims here: First, ethical egoism is an incorrect view; Second, the ethical individualism presupposed in liberalism can be perfectly compatible with a spirit of altruism.

But why is “ethical egoism” not a defensible view?

First, “ethical egoism” cannot offer a rationally acceptable basis for resolving conflicts and clashes between interests. For example, suppose that Mr. A and Mr. B are both candidates for the presidency. And suppose that the interest of each requires that he himself be elected president. But of course only one of the two can win the election. Therefore, Mr. A's victory is in his interest and to Mr. B's detriment, and Mr. B's victory is in his interest and to Mr. A's detriment. In these circumstances, for example, Mr. A's interest requires that, if necessary, he eliminate Mr. B (especially if he knows he can escape the adverse consequences of his action). Therefore, according to the “ethical egoism” view, his moral duty is to do this if necessary, and if he refrains from doing so, he has violated his moral duty and committed a reprehensible act. A similar argument can be made in favor of Mr. B. But this conclusion seems incorrect: a morality that, in the event of a conflict of interests, permits and even obligates both parties to eliminate their rival if necessary, is not far removed from immorality.

Second, “ethical egoism,” as we have seen, draws a distinction between “self” and “others,” and then prioritizes the interests of the self over the interests of others. But to what extent is this distinction defensible from a moral perspective? Any distinction between human beings, and the prioritization of the interests of one group over another, is morally justified only if it is not made arbitrarily and without a justified rational basis. For example, racism is morally wrong because human beings are distinguished from one another based on their race or skin color, and on that basis the interests of one race are prioritized over another. But drawing a moral distinction between human beings based on race or skin color is not rationally defensible. In other words, it seems that our moral intuition finds the following moral principle acceptable (let us call it the “principle of moral equality of human beings”):

Principle of Moral Equality of Human Beings: Human beings should be treated equally unless it can be shown that there is a real and morally relevant difference between them by virtue of which a difference in treatment can be justified.

Proponents of “ethical egoism” must explain on what rationally defensible basis they violate the “principle of moral equality of human beings” and always, under all circumstances, prioritize the interests of “me” over the interests of “others.” As far as I can discern, there is no rationally defensible basis for such a preference. In any case, the burden of proof here lies with the proponents of the “ethical egoism” view.

If we accept that the (absolute and perpetual) prioritization of the interests of the “self” over “others” has no rationally defensible basis, then we must necessarily acknowledge that “ethical egoism” violates the “principle of moral equality of human beings” and is incompatible with it. On the other hand, however, “ethical individualism” is entirely compatible with the “principle of moral equality of human beings.” That is, the liberal individual can, while considering the individual human being as the focus of moral attention and concern, accord equal moral worth to each and every human being, and permit differences in conduct toward human beings only when there is a justified rational basis for it.

Before addressing the second claim regarding the relationship between “ethical individualism” and “altruism,” I would like to emphasize two points:

First, a distinction must be drawn between “selfish behaviors” and “efforts to secure personal interests.” Not every effort to secure personal interests can be considered an instance of selfish behavior. For example, when I consult a doctor to treat my illness, I am indeed striving to secure a personal interest, but it would be difficult to consider this act a “selfish” one. My behavior is “selfish” only if, in performing it, I disregard the interests of others (in circumstances where observing those interests is incumbent upon me).

Second, having regard for oneself does not necessarily mean that the individual cannot also have regard for others. An individual can, while pursuing their own interests, also respect the interests of others and consider the well-being of others as important and worthy of respect alongside their own well-being. It is true that in some cases a conflict arises between our interests and those of others, and the individual must choose one over the other. But it is not the case that we are always forced to choose between our own interests and those of others. Sometimes there is no conflict between our interests and those of others, and the individual can, in addition to securing their personal interests, also strive to secure the interests of others. Sometimes we can secure the interests of others without this necessarily having a positive or negative effect on our personal interests. In many cases, we also willingly prefer the interests of others over our own, especially when these “others” are our friends and family members.

But can “ethical individualism” be compatible with a spirit of “altruism”?

In my view, within the framework of liberalism’s assumptions, “ethical individualism” plus the “principle of the moral equality of human beings” can provide a reasonable basis for “altruism.” More precisely, within the framework of liberalism’s assumptions, one can argue for “altruism” as follows:

1- From the perspective of “ethical individualism,” the needs, interests, and welfare of the human individual are of primary importance. Therefore, “I,” as a human individual, have the right to strive to secure my needs, interests, and welfare (as long as my actions do not impose unjustified harm on another).

2- According to the “principle of the moral equality of human beings,” all human beings (including “me” and “others”) must be treated equally unless there is a justified reason to the contrary. In other words, according to that principle, there is, in principle, no real and morally relevant difference between “me” and “others” (unless proven otherwise).

3- Therefore, to the same extent that the individual needs, interests, and welfare of “me” are important, the needs, interests, and welfare of “others” must also be considered important (provided there is no justified reason to the contrary). In other words, on the same basis that “I” attach importance to my own needs, interests, and welfare, I must also consider the needs, interests, and welfare of “others” as important (unless there is a reason to the contrary).

For example, we might ask why, within the framework of liberalism’s assumptions, I should have regard for the hungry and consider myself obligated to help them to the best of my ability? In my view, within the framework of liberalism’s assumptions, the individual can answer that if I myself were hungry, I would knock on almost every door to find food. That is, under those conditions, I would believe that my need for food must be met. But is there a difference between my hunger and that of others? Does hunger cause less suffering for others? Are others less deserving than I am of being relieved from the suffering of hunger? If there is no morally relevant difference between “me” and “them,” then on the same basis that my need for food must be met, their need for food must also be met. In other words, to the same extent that I am deserving of enjoying the right to a livelihood, others are also deserving of enjoying this right, and to the same extent that others have a duty to assist me when I am hungry, I also have a duty to help when others are hungry. Therefore, within the framework of liberalism, “ethical individualism” along with the “principle of the moral equality of human beings” can morally oblige me to consider the pain and suffering of other human beings as important, and to consider myself morally obligated to strive to alleviate the pains of others.

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Can the concept of “collective rights” be recognized within the framework of the basic assumptions of liberalism?

Let me first clarify my understanding of the concept of “collective rights.” The most important distinction between “individual rights” and “collective rights” is that individual rights are attributed to the individual, and the individual can, in principle, independently benefit from that right, whereas collective rights are attributed not to a specific individual but to a group of individuals, and can only be realized and exercised collectively, or at least on behalf of the collective. On the other hand, a collective right is meant to secure and guarantee a collective benefit or interest—that is, a benefit or interest whose good, if secured and guaranteed, reaches all or the majority of the members of the collective. For example, the right of the Iranian people to ownership of oil reserves is among their “collective rights.” That is, no single individual can benefit from this right alone, and no individual or group can seize this national asset unless they have secured the genuine representation of the people in this regard. Of course, when the people’s right to this national asset is realized, it is assumed that all or the majority of the people will benefit from it.

Does the “ethical individualism” presupposed in liberalism necessitate the denial of the existence of “collective rights”? Critics of liberalism claim that if we accept the doctrine of “individualism,” we must necessarily acknowledge that primacy belongs to the individual, and that no entity called “the collective” exists independently and beyond individuals. Therefore, within the framework of liberalism, “collective rights” cannot be attributed to anything other than individuals. Thus, only three paths remain open to a liberal individual here: either (a) they must ultimately reduce collective rights to a set of individual rights, or (b) they must deny the existence of “collective rights,” or (c) they must abandon liberalism. From the perspective of these critics, denying the existence of “collective rights” and reducing them to a set of individual rights is not possible, and therefore, the existence of “collective rights” must necessarily be considered as invalidating liberalism.

Let us assume that these critics are right that the existence of collective rights is undeniable, and that these rights cannot be reduced to a set of individual rights (that is, let us assume their argument in these two cases, whatever it may be, is valid). But does acknowledging these two claims necessarily lead to the negation of liberalism? I think the answer is no.

The first reason is that this argument only leads to the desired conclusion if we consider the “individualism” presupposed in liberalism to be of the “metaphysical or ontological individualism” type, not “ethical individualism.” As I mentioned earlier, “metaphysical or ontological individualism” is incompatible with the assumption of an entity called “the collective,” independent and beyond individuals, but “ethical individualism” is not necessarily committed to such a metaphysical presupposition. And the requirement of liberalism is merely the acknowledgment of “ethical individualism,” not “metaphysical or ontological individualism.”

The second reason, however, is more important. It seems the presupposition of those critics has been that: (firstly) individual rights can only be justified in an “individualistic” manner, meaning these rights are only justified if they secure and guarantee an individual benefit or interest; and (secondly) “individualism” cannot consistently recognize the existence of collective rights, in other words, collective rights cannot be justified in an individualistic manner. Both of these presuppositions appear to be false, because:

First, many important individual rights can also be justified in a “non-individualistic” manner. Consider, for example, the right to freedom of expression. It is true that realizing this right can secure and guarantee the individual benefits and interests of society’s members, but in addition, observing that right can protect the benefits and interests of groups that have gathered around shared values. From a historical perspective, securing and guaranteeing fundamental political and civil rights has led to the survival and continuity of groups and communities that have been in the minority, or situated at the base of the political society’s power pyramid. Therefore, one can perfectly justify the right to freedom of expression based on the service it renders in securing and guaranteeing the interests of those groups (insofar as they are groups). Thus, liberalism does not need to be committed to an “individualistic” justification even in the case of individual rights, let alone in the case of collective rights.

Second, collective rights can also be justified in an “individualistic” manner. For example, different ethnic groups have the right to preserve their own specific culture. The right of an ethnic group to preserve its specific culture is among collective rights. However, preserving a culture is important and valuable particularly because of the significance and value that culture holds for each and every one of its members. Therefore, the right of an ethnic group to preserve its culture can be justified on the basis of the important role that culture plays in the individual lives of its members. In other words, none of the fundamental pillars of liberalism makes an individualistic justification of collective rights impossible.

Thus, the liberal individual, insofar as they are liberal, can in principle, while adhering to “ethical individualism,” justify “individual rights” on the basis of collective considerations, or “collective rights” on the basis of individual considerations. Therefore, the liberal individual can in principle, without denying the existence of collective rights or ultimately reducing them to a set of individual rights, justify those rights on the basis of individual considerations. The “ethical individualism” presupposed in liberalism is entirely open to this possibility.

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The result is that, if the arguments of this writing are valid, we must necessarily accept that the ethical individualism presupposed in liberalism is both compatible with a spirit of “altruism” and can, in principle, recognize “collective rights.”

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Liberalism: Individualism or Self-Centeredness?

Author: Arash Naraghi | California, Santa Barbara | 28 December 2007

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