Arash Naraghi's article “Ethical Considerations on Infidelity in Marital Relationships”

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The question is: Is infidelity in marital relationships morally impermissible?

By "infidelity in marital relationships," I mean a married man or woman engaging in sexual relations with someone other than their spouse (i.e., outside the bounds of marriage). Of course, the term "infidelity" here is somewhat misleading. For this term is conceptually applied to a morally impermissible act, and in that case, "infidelity" in marital relationships would be impermissible by definition. But this answer is not very satisfactory. For although sexual relations of married couples outside the bounds of marriage may always and under all circumstances be morally impermissible, it is still important to know why this judgment holds true. Therefore, in this discussion, I assume that we do not know in advance whether "infidelity in marital relationships" is morally impermissible. Of course, if it ultimately turns out that all types of these relations are morally impermissible, then we can easily apply the term "infidelity" to all those forms, and if it turns out that some of those relations are morally permissible, then we will use the term "infidelity" only for those relations that are morally objectionable.

But why are sexual relations of married couples outside the bounds of marriage considered morally impermissible? As far as I know, three important arguments have been put forward to substantiate this claim. It is good to examine these arguments one by one.

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The First Argument: This argument can be expressed in the following simplified form:

(1) A married individual who engages in sexual relations outside the bounds of marriage, in fact, violates the covenant they made with their spouse at the time of marriage. (2) Violating a covenant is morally impermissible. (3) Therefore, a married individual who engages in sexual relations outside the bounds of marriage commits a morally impermissible act.

Proposition (1) is true for almost all conventional marriages that take place in contemporary societies. It seems that when two people enter into a marriage covenant with each other, they commit not to have sexual relations with a third party after marriage. And by virtue of this explicit or implicit covenant, married couples are rightfully expectant that their life partner will adhere to the requirements of this covenant. Therefore, when one of the parties to the marital relationship has sexual relations with someone other than their spouse, they violate the pledge they made to the other during marriage. But we must note that proposition (2) is not necessarily true. In some cases, we can justifiably violate a covenant. For example, suppose I have an appointment with a friend. But on the way, I encounter the scene of an accident. The injured of that accident are in urgent need of help, and I am the only person present at the scene. In this case, it seems that I have the right to violate the appointment I have with my friend and rush to the aid of the injured of that incident. Here, violating the covenant is morally permissible. Therefore, proposition (2) should be understood as follows:

(2′) Violating a covenant is morally impermissible unless the individual has a truly justified reason for it.

In other words, from a moral perspective, breaking a covenant is always wrong unless the contrary is proven. Therefore, if someone breaks a pledge, the onus is on them to justify their action, meaning the burden of proof rests with them. And if the individual cannot provide justified reasons for their action, their behavior must inevitably be considered morally blameworthy.

Of course, one might challenge the truth of proposition (2′) in a more fundamental way, and ask why, essentially, breaking a promise is considered morally reprehensible in the first place? In my opinion, as far as the violation of a vow in marital relationships is concerned, the reason for its condemnation is clear: the violation of a vow in marital relationships is, in most cases, a very painful and harmful event for the spouse who has been betrayed. The spouse who has been betrayed has remained faithful and committed to their marital vow, but their life partner has not remained faithful to the commitment and responsibility they had in this relationship and has unilaterally abused their trust. In this situation, the individual feels they have not been treated fairly. On the other hand, the individual who has been betrayed will perceive that breach of promise as a sign of their life partner's discouragement and lack of interest in them and their shared life. And this sense of failure becomes a source of heartbreak for them. And finally, the individual may well consider their spouse's sexual relations with a third party as a sign of their love and affection for that person, and thus feel that the love and affection they themselves have lavished upon their spouse was deemed cheap and insufficient in their eyes. This feeling can severely damage their sense of self-confidence.

But what can be said about this argument?

A) It seems the only opening left in this argument is that the individual can actually provide a truly justified reason or reasons for violating their marital vow. For example, consider a woman who is informed that her husband has been killed on the war front. After a period of waiting, the woman eventually marries another man (or, under certain circumstances, engages in sexual relations with that man), but after some time, it turns out that her husband is alive and is being held in enemy captivity. In this situation, of course, the woman has had sexual relations with a man other than her husband. But it seems that in this situation, she had a sufficiently justified and convincing reason for her action, and therefore, it would be difficult to consider her behavior an instance of “infidelity.” But as we can see, such cases are very specific, and in most cases, a married man or woman who violates their marital vow and has sexual relations with someone other than their spouse does not have a truly convincing and justified reason for their breach of promise. But how can a reason be considered truly convincing and justified? In my opinion, there is a simple test to discover this point: the promise-breaker can put themselves in their spouse's place, present that reason to themselves, and judge fairly whether they themselves would accept that reason from their spouse or not.

B) Someone might accept the validity of this argument but, in contrast, propose a new form of marital relationship in which the problem of promise-breaking does not exist. For example, suppose that the woman or the man (or both) make it clear before marriage that they permit sexual relations outside the marital bond, and they marry on the condition that the freedom of sexual relations outside the marital bond is preserved for them. If the man and woman enter into a shared life based on such an agreement, then it seems that sexual relations outside the marital bond do not entail promise-breaking, and therefore, that type of relationship can no longer be morally condemned based on the moral repugnance of promise-breaking. Thus, it seems that “open marriages” fall outside the scope of the first argument.

Can the idea of “open marriage” justify sexual relations outside the marital bond?

The answer to this question is not easy. If by “open marriage” we mean that both the man and the woman make unconditional sexual relations with individuals other than their spouse a precondition of marriage, then it seems that within the framework of many existing cultures, “open marriage” is fundamentally not an instance of “marriage.” Within the classical conception of marriage, “the confinement of sexual relations to the marital sphere” is considered a necessary condition of “marriage.” If we remove this confinement from the concept of marriage, what remains, whatever it may be, is not considered “marriage.” In other words, the marriage bond, according to the classical conception, conceptually entails that the spouses commit to not having sexual relations with anyone other than their spouse, even if they may not be able to fully adhere to that commitment throughout their shared life. Therefore, if the condition within the marriage contract is “freedom of sexual relations outside the marital sphere,” the resulting bond can no longer be called “marriage” in the true sense of the word, unless the classical conception of marriage undergoes significant transformation.

Of course, a specific type of “open marriage” has existed in traditional cultures. In traditional “open marriage,” it is men who clarify in advance that they will still have the right to have sexual relations with women other than their current wife after marriage. However, this type of marriage is not morally defensible unless both parties commit to such a pact under completely equal and just conditions—conditions that have often not been available to women.

c) Finally, perhaps the “first argument” can be rendered ineffective in another way: as we saw earlier, one of the most important reasons that infidelity in marital relationships is morally wrong is that awareness of it is, in most cases, a very painful and agonizing experience for the spouse who has been betrayed. And within the framework of the first argument, it is precisely this harm that makes those relationships particularly morally objectionable. But if a person can conceal their extramarital sexual relations from their spouse, then presumably there is no longer any reason to consider those relationships morally reprehensible. Therefore, individuals can betray their spouses provided they can skillfully hide their extramarital sexual relations from their life partner.

Thus, it seems that if we combine breach of promise with deception, the moral problem of infidelity in marital relationships is solved! In my opinion, this argument is based on an inadequate understanding of the concept of “harm.” It is good to reflect on this for a moment. According to the conventional understanding, “harm” is anything that makes an individual's situation worse than it is. For example, suppose my total capital is one hundred thousand tomans, and someone steals fifty thousand tomans from me. In that case, the thief has harmed me, because my capital has now been reduced from one hundred thousand tomans to fifty thousand tomans, and I am actually in a worse financial situation. But this is not the only form of being harmed. Suppose again that my total capital is one hundred thousand tomans, and I have bought a lottery ticket. As it happens, my lottery ticket wins one million tomans. But before I find out, someone steals that ticket from me. In this case, my total capital is still one hundred thousand tomans. That is, no change has occurred in my actual financial situation. But does this mean that the thief has not harmed me? I think the answer is clear: the thief has harmed me. Even if I never find out that the ticket won one million tomans, it can still be reasonably said that the thief has caused me harm. Here we are dealing with a different understanding of the concept of “harm.” Here, “harm” is the loss of anything that could have made the individual's situation better than it is. I believe the second conception of the concept of “harm” has a very important implication that is entirely relevant to our discussion: the condition for being harmed is not that the individual's actual situation worsens or that the individual is necessarily aware of the harm inflicted upon them. A person who betrays their spouse harms them, even if their spouse never finds out about the affair. To clarify this meaning, it is good to compare the following two situations:

First situation – Before his death, Mr. A looks back on his life and feels a deep sense of satisfaction: his wife has lived faithfully by his side for years with love and affection, his friends have sincerely cared for him, and his colleagues have always regarded him with respect. Mr. A passes away with this profound feeling of contentment.

Second situation – Before his death, Mr. B looks back on his life and feels exactly the same deep sense of satisfaction as Mr. A, for he sees that his wife has lived faithfully by his side for years with love and affection, his friends have sincerely cared for him, and his colleagues have always regarded him with respect. Mr. B passes away with this profound feeling of contentment. But the truth is that throughout all these years, Mr. B’s wife was secretly betraying him, his friends detested him and only pretended to be his friends, and his colleagues considered him a fool and always ridiculed him in secret.

The question is: would you prefer to be in Mr. A’s place or Mr. B’s? For example, suppose God asks you right now, “I can place you in the situation of Mr. A or Mr. B; which do you prefer?” I believe the overwhelming majority of us would choose Mr. A’s situation in response. That is, we evaluate Mr. B’s situation as worse compared to Mr. A’s. Whatever the reason for this, it shows that for most of us, the mere feeling of satisfaction with life is not enough (in this respect, by assumption, there is no difference between Mr. A and Mr. B); rather, we generally prefer that our feeling of satisfaction with life be based on reality, not illusion. A person who secretly betrays their spouse transforms their situation from the first situation (i.e., Mr. A’s situation) to the second situation (i.e., Mr. B’s situation). In this case, although their spouse is unaware of this change, they are placed in a worse situation, meaning their spouse’s betrayal has harmed them. And this very harm is sufficient to make the violation of the marital pact morally impermissible. Here, the spouse’s unawareness does not diminish the moral repugnance of the pact-breaking.

Of course, introducing the element of deception brings other difficulties, which I will examine in the discussion of the “second argument.”

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The Second Argument: This argument morally condemns sexual relations outside the marital bond on the basis of the repugnance of deception. We can state this argument more or less as follows:

(4) A married person who engages in sexual relations outside the marital bond is inevitably forced to resort to deception. (5) Deception is morally impermissible. (6) Therefore, a married person who engages in sexual relations outside the marital bond commits a morally impermissible act.

Proposition (4) seems largely acceptable. A person who betrays their spouse inevitably deceives their spouse. This deception can, of course, take different forms. Sometimes this deception is “active” and sometimes “passive.” The most common type of “active deception” is lying. In this case, the person knowingly gives their spouse false information to mislead them. For example, they tell their spouse they are spending the afternoon in an office meeting, but in reality, they have a date with another woman. But in “passive deception,” the person deceives their life partner not by giving false information, but through silence, that is, by withholding essential information. Therefore, deception is not necessarily accompanied by lying. For example, a person can have sexual relations with someone other than their spouse but never reveal anything about it to their spouse. The unaware spouse asks nothing, and the unfaithful partner says nothing. This silence is also deceptive. For the requirement of the marriage pact is that the man and woman remain faithful to each other and not engage in sexual relations with anyone other than their spouse. Therefore, when a person conceals their sexual relations with a third party, they are in fact deceiving their spouse about the true state of their marital relationship.

But why should proposition (5) be affirmed? Why is deception fundamentally morally objectionable?

In my view, one of the best rational justifications for the moral wrongness of deception has been offered by Kant. Kant considers respect for human dignity to be the supreme moral value, and in his view, human dignity largely depends on one's autonomy. Therefore, anything that deprives a person of the capacity for rational and autonomous decision-making harms their dignity. For Kant, the fundamental principle of morality is built on this basis. According to one of the interpretations he gives of this principle, we must always treat humanity, whether in our own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end. To put it more simply, we must not use human beings merely as instruments to fulfill our own goals and desires. For Kant, the most obvious instance of using a human being as a means is deceiving them. When we deceive someone, we are, in effect, through the false information we provide, covertly compelling them to decide according to our will and desire and to serve a purpose we favor. In this way, we deprive them of the possibility of rational and autonomous decision-making. And thus, we transform a "person" into a "thing." This act signifies the negation of that individual's human dignity and is considered a clear instance of violence in human relations. Kant rejects all forms of (active) deception without any exception from a moral standpoint. However, many moral philosophers believe that, at least in some cases, deception is morally permissible, and even sometimes obligatory. For example, a "white lie," although a clear instance of deception, seems morally defensible under certain conditions. Therefore, from the perspective of these philosophers, we should interpret proposition (5) as follows:

(5a) From a moral standpoint, deception is improper unless one has a truly justified and convincing reason for it.

But even if we accept this amendment, the wrongness of deception remains the principle, and the deceiver is morally obligated to provide a truly justified and convincing reason for their action; otherwise, their act is not morally commendable.

What can be said about this argument?

a) One straightforward response is to bring up "open marriage" again: when both parties in the relationship accept "the freedom of sexual relations outside the marital bond" as a condition of their contract, then engaging in such relations would not be deceptive. However, the idea of "open marriage" in this case also faces the same difficulties I mentioned earlier in the discussion about breaking promises.

b) But there is another way to confront this argument. One might accept the first and second arguments in their entirety. That is, one might affirm that engaging in sexual relations outside the marital bond entails a kind of promise-breaking and deception, and also affirm that promise-breaking and deception are morally wrong, and consequently accept that engaging in sexual relations outside the marital bond is morally improper. Yet, at the same time, one might claim that in most cases, the importance of sexual relations outside the marital bond is excessively exaggerated. This act is morally improper, but it is not as horrific as it is often portrayed. We and our spouses tell lies many times in daily life, and we break our promises many times. Yet, we never consider ourselves and others to be immoral and detestable beings for this reason. Yes, relations outside the marital bond are morally bad, but not as bad as is often imagined.

But if this is so, then why is the phenomenon of infidelity in marital relationships so distressing and devastating for the spouse who has been betrayed? Those who believe the importance of sexual relations outside the marital bond is exaggerated answer this question in two completely different ways:

The first approach—A group of these individuals believe that the root of that excessive, pathological negative sensitivity toward sexual relations outside the marital bond is that many people mistakenly regard sexual relations as a sign of love or a kind of deep emotional attachment to the sexual partner. For example, when a woman discovers that her husband has had sexual relations with another woman, she imagines that she has lost her husband's love, and that the other woman has become her rival in love and affection. And it is this perception that deeply wounds her spirit. But according to these individuals, sexual relations and love are two different things, and the two should be kept separate. Having sexual relations with a person does not necessarily signify emotional and romantic attachment to them. Undoubtedly, if sexual relations are accompanied by mutual love and affection, they are far more delightful and pleasurable, but it is entirely possible for a person to satisfy some of their sexual desires with someone other than their spouse, without any emotional or romantic attachment existing between them. In the view of these individuals, sexual need is something like hunger and the desire for food. Just as a person can quench the fire of their hunger with diverse foods, in various restaurants, and with different companions, they can also satisfy their sexual needs in various ways and with different people.

The second approach—Another group of these individuals has taken a completely different path. This group, unlike the previous one, believes that love and sexual relations are deeply interconnected. There is a direct correlation between the level of physical contact between two individuals and the level of their spiritual and emotional closeness and intimacy. The more closeness and intimacy people feel toward each other, the more they desire to have closer physical contact with one another. When the emotional passion between two people peaks, that passion manifests itself in sexual relations. So where is the root of the excessive, pathological negative sensitivity toward sexual relations outside the marital bond? According to these individuals, the root of that negative and inappropriate sensitivity must be sought in the incorrect belief that true love is accompanied by a sense of possessiveness and sexual exclusivity. A human being cannot love more than one person, and therefore, if a person gives their heart to someone other than their spouse and has sexual relations with them, it means that their love for their spouse has diminished. And it is this incorrect notion that leads to such inappropriate and pathological sensitivity. But from the perspective of this group, a normal, mature human being can love more than one person over the course of their life (or even simultaneously). Loving more than one person at the same time is a completely familiar phenomenon. For example, a father and mother who have ten children, in most cases, truly and sincerely love all their children dearly. Love for one does not crowd out love for another or others. By the same analogy, when, for example, a woman discovers that her husband has had sexual relations with another woman, she should, of course, rightly accept that there is most likely a thread of emotional and romantic attachment between the two. But this does not necessarily mean that her husband's love for her has diminished. That man can truly and sincerely love both women dearly.

What can be said about these two responses?

Firstly—These types of responses are predominantly put forward by men. And in most cases, the men who defend such views do not grant the right to sexual relations outside the marital bond to their own wives. It is as if those opinions are valid only insofar as they apply to men's sexual relations. But if, in reality, sexual relations outside the marital bond are an insignificant and simple phenomenon like eating, and a person can (and has the right to) court love and have sexual relations with several people simultaneously, why is this right confined only to men? This duality in judgment and valuation is not defensible from a moral perspective, and casts doubt in the mind of a fair and impartial observer regarding the sincerity of the proponents of those views. It is as if the goal of those theorists is, above all, to justify the irresponsibility of lustful men toward their wives.

Secondly—in my opinion, comparing sexual relations to the phenomenon of eating is, to a large extent, misleading. Sexual relations cannot be disenchanted to the degree of the phenomenon of eating, and even if they could, it is not clear to what extent this would be desirable. A significant part of the passionate intensities of our ordinary human life arises from the thrilling mystery of sexual relations. Disenchanting sexual relations and reducing them to a phenomenon like eating largely destroys the phenomenon of romantic love, which is intertwined with the mystery of sexual relations.

Thirdly—it is not clear to what extent the comparison between sexual love and (for instance) parental love for children is defensible. It is true that a common thread perhaps connects different types of love. Yet, at the same time, each type of love has a particular characteristic that distinguishes it from other kinds. Some philosophers, such as Robert Nozick, have argued in detail that romantic and sexual love, unlike many other types of love, necessitates a kind of positive possessiveness and sexual exclusivity.

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The Third Argument: It is now good to address the third argument. The essence of this argument can be expressed as follows:

(7) Confining sexual relations to the marital bond is necessary for preserving and promoting nuclear families. (8) Preserving and promoting nuclear families is morally obligatory. (9) Therefore, confining sexual relations to the marital bond is morally obligatory. (10) Therefore, a married individual who establishes sexual relations outside the marital bond commits a morally wrongful act.

In this argument, sexual relations outside the marital bond are condemned on the basis of the destructive effect they have on the institution of the family. Without a doubt, sexual desire is among the most powerful human inclinations. As soon as a person experiences sexual relations, they will find that this type of experience is among the strongest physical pleasures. Now, if we confine sexual relations to the marital bond, individuals, in order to enjoy the extraordinarily profound pleasure of sexual relations, will inevitably have to turn to their spouse and the family hearth. In this way, the spouse and the family hearth become the most important source of pleasure for the husband and wife. This strong and continuous need provides a powerful motivation for forming a family and preserving it. Of course, physical pleasure is only a part of sexual pleasure. Within the marital bond, a man and a woman can also, through sexual relations, establish a kind of soothing intimate relationship that is at least as delightful and desirable as the physical pleasure.

What can be said about this argument?

Firstly—the important point is that the third argument is a kind of instrumentalist argument. That is, sexual relations outside the family bond are prohibited only insofar as this act is a suitable instrument for securing another purpose (for example, preserving the institution of the family). Therefore, if it turns out that sexual relations outside the marital bond do not necessarily destroy the institution of the family, or the institution of the family can be preserved in other ways (despite the prevalence of infidelity in marital relationships), then we must accept that infidelity in marital relationships will be morally unproblematic. In other words, this argument makes the moral wrongness of infidelity in marital relationships, in the terminology of moral philosophers, a conditional matter. And conditional judgments are only valid insofar as they fulfill the intended end. As soon as that end is fulfilled, the obligation of that conditional judgment also ceases.

Secondly—conditional rulings, while they may be socially beneficial, possess moral standing only if the end they aim at is morally valuable. In other words, if we accept that confining sexual relations to the marital bond is truly an appropriate means of preserving the family institution, that confinement is morally valuable only if preserving the family institution is morally valuable. That is, the third argument is morally significant and valuable only if proposition (8) is true. Therefore, the third argument is morally incomplete unless its proponents can demonstrate that the nuclear family institution is just and morally desirable. As long as such an argument has not been presented, the truth of proposition (8) and, consequently, the proof of proposition (10) on that basis will remain doubtful.

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In sum, I believe the first and second arguments possess sufficient strength and convincingly show that, within the framework of the classical conception of the institution of marriage, sexual relations outside the marital bond are morally impermissible. The third argument is not without force from a sociological perspective. However, its moral value and significance are questionable unless certain additional arguments are appended to it.

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Arash Naraghi

California – Santa Barbara

January 5, 2007

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