Arash Naraghi's Article “The Virtue of Vegetarianism”

The central question of this essay is: Is a carnivorous diet morally defensible? In other words, do humans have the moral right to take the lives of other animals to provide for their own sustenance?

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Many of those who consider a carnivorous diet morally permissible without any conditions or restrictions more or less believe in the following principle (let us call it the “anthropocentric principle”):

The Anthropocentric Principle: Humans are morally superior to other living beings.

Here, the “moral superiority” of humans means at least that the moral value of humans is greater than that of other living beings, and therefore, human needs morally take precedence over the needs of other living beings. Thus, whenever a conflict arises between the needs of humans and those of other living beings, fulfilling human needs takes moral priority. For example, if fulfilling human dietary needs depends on killing other animals, according to the “anthropocentric principle,” we must inevitably consider killing those animals morally permissible. Therefore, as we can see, the “anthropocentric principle” plays an important role in the moral justification of a carnivorous diet.

On the other hand, however, other living beings also have their own interests and concerns that can be harmed in various ways. I believe one can well argue on this basis that other living beings also possess their own specific moral rights. For example, animals that are the source of human meat consumption have the capacity to experience pain, and therefore, can be subjected to cruelty, meaning unnecessary pain and suffering can be imposed upon them. But cruelty to animals and imposing unnecessary pain and suffering upon them seriously harms the specific interests or concerns of those animals, and is therefore clearly a morally reprehensible act. It seems that living beings, from a moral perspective, possess rights that humans are obligated to observe. If we accept that the specific interests and concerns of living beings must be respected, and that living beings possess moral rights, then any distinction between living beings, and the preference of the interests of one species over others, will only be morally justified if it is not done arbitrarily and without a rationally justified basis. The basis of this argument is largely similar to the argument made in the moral condemnation of racism or gender discrimination against women. Racism or discrimination against women is morally reprehensible because, according to those views, humans are distinguished from one another based on their race or gender, and on that basis, the interests of one group take precedence over another. But making a moral distinction between humans based on race or gender is not rationally defensible. Therefore, the following general principle seems morally acceptable (let us call it the “principle of moral equality of living beings”):

The Principle of Moral Equality of Living Beings: Living beings should be treated equally unless it can be shown that there is a real and morally relevant difference between them by virtue of which a difference in treatment can be justified.

If we accept the “principle of moral equality of living beings,” then the “anthropocentric principle” or the superiority of humans is only morally justified if there is a real and morally relevant difference between humans and other living beings by virtue of which the moral superiority of humans over other living beings can be rationally justified. Therefore, the important question is: Is there a real and morally relevant difference between humans and other living beings by virtue of which humans can be considered morally superior to other living beings?

Proponents of the “anthropocentric principle” argue that humans possess certain unique and distinguished characteristics by virtue of which they can justifiably be considered (morally) superior to other living beings. For example, one of those characteristics is that humans possess the faculty of reason. But how can one logically conclude from the fact that humans possess certain distinguished and unique characteristics (assuming its truth) that humans must be considered morally superior to other living beings?

There are two fundamental flaws in this argument:

First, merely because humans possess a real characteristic A (for example, possessing the faculty of reason), one cannot conclude that characteristic A is the very "morally relevant difference" by virtue of which humans can be considered morally superior to other living beings. To conclude human superiority over other living beings from characteristic A, we need another premise demonstrating that characteristic A is precisely the "morally relevant" reality we are seeking. In fact, a form of the "is-ought" fallacy lies at the heart of the above argument: the premise of the argument is a descriptive or "is" proposition (i.e., the proposition that "humans possess certain unique and distinguished characteristics"), but the conclusion of that argument is a prescriptive or "ought" proposition (i.e., the proposition that "humans ought to be considered morally superior to other living beings"). From a simple "is" proposition alone, one cannot logically deduce an "ought" proposition.

Second, even if we accept that the existence of certain distinguished and unique characteristics in a living being can, in principle, justify the moral superiority of that being over other living beings, why then should we restrict this argument solely to the human species? Other living beings also each possess distinguished characteristics not found in other species. For example, pigeons have an astonishing ability to navigate, cheetahs have a unique ability to run fast, cows and sheep have the ability to ruminate, and so on. Why should we not consider the distinguished characteristics of these beings as grounds for their moral superiority over humans? Is there a reason to assume that the distinguished characteristics of humans are more valuable than the distinguished characteristics of other animals? Undoubtedly, the distinguished characteristics of us humans are more valuable to us humans, because these characteristics guarantee our survival and serve our interests. But the distinguished characteristics of other species of living beings are also more valuable to them, because they guarantee their survival and serve their interests. We can only consider our distinguished characteristics superior to the distinguished characteristics of other living beings if we consider the human perspective (i.e., the perspective through which our characteristics appear more important and superior) to be more valuable than the perspective of other living beings (i.e., the perspective through which the characteristics of each species appear more important and superior to that species). But why should we consider the human perspective superior and more valuable than the perspective of other living beings? As far as I know, the only reason offered so far to prove the superiority of the human perspective over the perspective of other living beings ultimately boils down to the fact that humans themselves are superior to other beings. But if we ultimately justify the "principle of anthropocentrism" based on the assumption of human superiority, we have clearly begged the question. Of course, my claim is not that a non-circular argument for proving the moral superiority of humans can never be found. However, the burden of proof here lies with the proponents of the "principle of anthropocentrism." In the absence of such a non-circular argument, we must inevitably consider the "principle of anthropocentrism" invalid.

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The negation of the "principle of anthropocentrism" fundamentally transforms the nature of our moral relations with other living beings. The first consequence that follows from negating that principle is that, from a moral perspective, the interests and well-being of all living species must, in principle, be considered equal. Therefore, from a moral perspective, the interests and needs of humans cannot be prioritized over the interests and needs of other living species merely because they are human. Prioritizing the interests and needs of one species over another is morally defensible only if there are justified moral reasons for that preference. It is clear that among all living beings, observing these moral considerations is obligatory only for humans. In other words, if we consider the "principle of anthropocentrism" invalid, then it is incumbent upon humans, as moral agents, to fundamentally reconsider their relations with other living beings and to organize their behavior towards other living beings within the framework of new moral principles. But what are those moral principles? To what moral constraints does the negation of the "principle of anthropocentrism" bind human relations with other living beings?

Before answering this question, it is well to first distinguish between two categories of interests or needs of living beings: basic interests or needs, and non-basic interests or needs. Basic interests or needs are the set of conditions whose fulfillment is a necessary condition for enjoying a minimally dignified life (in the case of humans), or a healthy life (in the case of other living beings). If an interest or need lacks this characteristic, we call it a non-basic interest or need. For example, the human need for adequate food should be counted among their basic needs. But the desire for luxuries cannot be considered among the basic needs of a human being.

Now we can enumerate the most important principles that should govern the relations of humans with other living beings as follows:

The First Principle, or the Principle of Self-Defense: Humans are morally entitled to defend themselves and other humans against the aggression of other beings, even if this defense necessitates encroaching upon the basic interests of the aggressor being. For example, if a human is attacked by a predatory lion, they have the right, if necessary, to destroy that lion to save their own life.

The Second Principle, or the Principle of Survival: Humans are morally entitled, in order to meet their own basic needs or those of other humans, to encroach upon the basic interests of other living beings if necessary. For example, humans can, if necessary, hunt other animals to save themselves from starvation. It should be noted, of course, that the "Principle of Survival" does not permit humans to treat other living beings in any way they please to secure their basic needs. In cases where humans are compelled to override the basic needs of other living beings to meet their own basic needs, they must impose the least possible harm and suffering upon them. On the other hand, it is also important to note that the "Principle of Survival" is not applicable to relations among humans. That is, humans do not have the right to sacrifice the basic interests of other humans to secure their own basic needs.

The Third Principle, or the Principle of Disproportionality: Humans do not have the right to encroach upon the basic interests of other living beings to satisfy their non-basic or luxury needs. For example, when humans engage in hunting animals or fishing for entertainment and recreation, they are in fact sacrificing the basic needs of those animals (i.e., their right to life) to satisfy a non-basic need (e.g., having a good time), and this violates the Third Principle.

The Fourth Principle, or the Principle of Restitution: Whenever humans violate at least one of the above principles, it is obligatory upon them to compensate for the damages inflicted. The Principle of "Self-Defense" as well as the "Principle of Survival" can also be accepted within the framework of an ethics based on the "Principle of Anthropocentrism." The most important point of distinction between an ethics based on the "Principle of Anthropocentrism" and an ethics that rejects that principle is the "Principle of Disproportionality." Within an ethical framework based on the "Principle of Anthropocentrism," observing the "Principle of Disproportionality" and, consequently, the "Principle of Restitution" is not obligatory for humans. Therefore, the "Principle of Disproportionality" should be considered the most important ethical consequence of negating the "Principle of Anthropocentrism" and the most important pillar of revising the type of relationship humans have with other living beings.

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Accepting the "Principle of Disproportionality" leads to a fundamental transformation in our way of life and the type of our relationship with other living beings. One of the most important ethical consequences of accepting this principle is the necessity of changing our diet. In particular, it seems that based on the "Principle of Disproportionality," one must inevitably deem a carnivorous diet morally impermissible. To strengthen this claim, one can argue as follows:

1- According to the "Principle of Disproportionality," if meat consumption is not among the basic needs of humans, then meat consumption will be morally impermissible, and humans are morally not entitled to kill animals to meet their dietary needs. 2- Meat consumption is not among the basic needs of humans. Therefore, 3- Meat consumption is morally impermissible, and humans are morally not entitled to kill animals to meet their dietary needs.

This argument is formally valid. Therefore, the truth of its conclusion depends on the truth of its premises. Proposition 1 follows directly from the “Principle of Disproportionality.” By killing animals, humans negate their most fundamental interest (i.e., their right to life), and according to the “Principle of Disproportionality,” this act is morally permissible only if humans do it to satisfy one of their own basic needs. Therefore, if we accept the “Principle of Disproportionality,” we must necessarily consider Proposition 1 to be true. However, judging Proposition 2 falls within the domain of competence of nutrition science experts. The truth is that today, the majority of nutrition science experts believe that Proposition 2 is true, meaning that providing the essential substances for the health of the human body is entirely possible without eating meat, provided that the individual adopts an alternative diet with sufficient care. In particular, the food industry has advanced so much today that the deficiencies in the human body resulting from abstaining from meat-eating can easily be compensated for in other ways. In this case, eating meat cannot be considered among the basic needs of humans.

However, some may dispute the truth of Proposition 2 for a number of reasons. Therefore, let us assume that eating meat is the only way (or at least the most accessible method) to obtain certain essential nutrients for human health. In this case, eating meat, insofar as it provides the necessary substances for human health, is counted among the basic needs of humans. But here, it is important to pay attention to two points:

The first point is that a normal adult human can, under typical conditions, obtain those essential substances for their body—which are said to be unobtainable except through eating meat—by consuming a very small amount of meat. Therefore, only the consumption of that small amount can be considered among the basic needs of humans. Consumption beyond that limit violates the “Principle of Disproportionality” and is morally impermissible. Therefore, the morally defensible diet is one in which the major part consists of plant-based foods, and meat consumption is very minimal.

The second point is that even in those rare cases where an individual eats meat out of necessity, it is better, if possible, to use the meat of animals in which the capacity to experience pain, as well as the sense of anticipating death, is either absent or very weak. Animals of higher evolutionary classes, such as cows and sheep, due to their advanced nervous systems, experience both pain and terror intensely. It appears that a sheep or cow prepared for slaughter senses the danger of death beforehand and experiences a deep terror before being slaughtered. However, animals of lower evolutionary classes, such as many marine creatures (for example, shrimp or many types of fish), due to having more primitive nervous systems, lack the sense of pain and the sense of anticipating death, and even when they are caught, they do not experience the pain and terror that livestock and poultry undergo. Therefore, in cases where eating meat is deemed necessary, consuming (for example) shrimp or fish meat is morally preferable to consuming sheep or cow meat.

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Some religious believers hold that the superiority and dominion of humans over the natural world, including the animal realm, can be justified based on religious teachings. For example, in some Quranic verses, it is stated that humanity is God’s vicegerent on earth, and that God has made everything in the heavens and the earth “subservient” to humans. According to the common interpretation, the aforementioned Quranic verses permit (and indeed oblige) humans to exercise their dominion over the natural world, including the animal realm. According to this interpretation, animals and plants were created for humans, and humans can exploit them in any way they please and for any purpose they deem fit, without needing to consider the specific interests and well-being of those living beings. It is clear that according to this interpretation, the “Principle of Disproportionality” would not be binding from a religious perspective.

But those Quranic verses can also be interpreted in another way. According to this alternative interpretation, human vicegerency on earth does not mean humanity's undisputed dominion over the natural world, but rather that God has made human beings, as rational and moral agents, responsible for the supervision and protection of the natural world, including the animal kingdom. Within the framework of this interpretation, "subjection" should not be understood as permission to exercise arbitrary domination and oppressive exploitation of the natural world. Of course, the natural world has been placed at the disposal of human beings, but this means that humans are obligated to responsibly respect the rights of other living beings, and to actively and responsibly strive to maintain the just balance of the ecosystem. Certainly, human beings have the right to utilize the natural world, but their utilization must be responsible and just. And adherence to the "principle of non-disproportionality" is among the conditions for the responsible and just utilization of the living ecosystem.

Therefore, religious believers who rationally reject an ethics based on the "anthropocentric principle," and consider the "principle of non-disproportionality" a necessary condition for a responsible and just encounter with the living ecosystem, can at least claim that the path to re-understanding those Quranic verses in favor of a more sympathetic interpretation towards the living ecosystem is open.

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If the arguments of this writing are valid, then our ethical system must recognize the rights of other living beings. And this means that we, as morally responsible human beings, must accept the "principle of the moral equality of living beings," and reject the "anthropocentric principle." If we reject the "anthropocentric principle," then we must accept the "principle of non-disproportionality" and consider it a necessary condition for our responsible and just encounter with the living ecosystem. Within the framework of an ethical system based on the "principle of non-disproportionality," a carnivorous diet is morally impermissible, and the condition for living ethically is that we change our carnivorous diet to a diet that is either entirely plant-based or at least consists primarily of plant-based foods, with meat consumption reduced to the absolute minimum possible.

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The Virtue of Vegetarianism | Arash Naraghi | 21 January 2008 | California – San Bernardino

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