Lantouri and Avoiding the Motive–Action Fallacy

In the story of Lantouri, the character Maryam, who is an advocate of “forgiveness and consent” as opposed to “retribution and revenge,” is, through the writer’s sleight of hand, afflicted with an injury that causes her forgiveness-nurturing and consent-seeking belief to waver and be disregarded. Of course, this wavering and inner turmoil of Maryam, and the tension that is likely unfolding in her conscience, remains hidden from the viewer’s—your and my—sight. The audience only sees the outward manifestation of this contradiction on the screen, namely that Maryam, contrary to all her beliefs that had earned the spectator’s admiration, decides to pursue retribution. Throughout the story, we see several sequences of Maryam’s efforts, in each of which she tries to obtain consent from the victims’ families. She puts forward arguments that, in a reduced and perhaps inadequate manner, recount the ineffectiveness of punishment in reducing crime—and I wish this part had been more developed in the film. The discussion of the extent to which punishment is effective in reducing crime, and the radical idea that punishment, in the manner of underdeveloped societies, is more effective in increasing crime and criminality than reducing it, belongs, of course, to the newly established modern social sciences. Alongside these discussions, thinkers in the field of the philosophy of law in particular, and moral philosophy, believe that punishing the criminal is eliminating the problem rather than solving it. And if we are precise and fair, we will see that numerous factors hand in hand drive a person onto the path of error and the commission of a crime, and punishment only exacts retribution from the last link in the chain of crime. It seems to me that the fact that the criminal is the final link in the chain of crime and criminality arising from multiple factors is alone enough to make one reflect: is punishment inherently logical? Is it fair? Moreover, by punishing the criminal, not only does he suffer harm (which, according to some, he deserves), but the criminal’s dependents, relatives, and family will also certainly suffer psychological and even financial and economic damages. Is it justifiable that the mother or siblings of the criminal should bear such a penalty? (I had read an anecdote in Saadi’s Golestan concerning this very issue, which shows that this matter has occupied the minds of the aware and the wise for centuries). Let us move on. What I wish to conclude is neither an endorsement of forgiveness nor a prohibition of punishment. If the film Lantouri had ended with the retribution of the acid-attacker, could one conclude that all of Maryam’s slogans in rejecting revenge and retribution were hollow? Does the mere fact that the advocate of “forgiveness” herself reneges on forgiving and pardoning and decides on revenge indicate the weakness of the theoretical foundations of her beliefs? Can we conclude that, citing the phrase “only the brother of a dead brother knows the grief of a dead brother,” we have no right to stand outside the arena and preach forgiveness? In my view, the answer to the above questions is: No! Let us bridge from here to a common fallacy that is ingrained in most of us and is known as the conflation of motive and action. That someone recommends forgiveness to the avenger of blood or to an injured and wronged person has nothing to do with their own capacity for pardon and forgiveness in similar circumstances. Forgiving and pardoning have robust philosophical and theoretical foundations that have no connection or relevance to the personal temperaments and emotions of human beings. These two operate in separate phases, and conflating them leads to fallacy. Fortunately, in the final sequence of the film, Maryam decides to forgive, but apparently not based on her previous arguments. Rather, in her own words, the only thing left for her was this very “forgiveness.” It seems that with this act, she pulled up the remnants of herself and created another Maryam for herself. But are not the remnants of every human being the deep-rooted beliefs in their conscience? Although Maryam, after forgiving the criminal, makes no reference to her former slogans and does not resort to reason and argument, the sharp-eyed audience will understand that those slogans were not mere hot air, but had taken root in Maryam’s being and borne fruit, and this is the only thing that, in her view, remains in her bag for continuing life. The Maryam of the final sequence is a clear example of a human being who has an “authentic life” (I have borrowed the term authentic life from Mostafa Malekian) and aligns her behavior with her own view. Even if she had not done so, not a particle of doubt would have been cast on the correctness of her slogans and reasons regarding the preference of forgiveness over retribution.

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Lantouri and Avoiding the Motive–Action Fallacy

Author: Amirhossein Pourfarrokh

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