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In his lecture series 'The Principle of No Coercion in Religion,' Mohammad Soroush Mahallati examines the jurisprudential and Quranic foundations to establish non-compulsion as the fundamental rule. Drawing on the concept of human self-sovereignty, he challenges juristic views that mandate the enforcement of religious rulings.

Lecture Series: “The Principle of No Compulsion in Religion” by Mohammad Soroush Mahallati
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1- The concept of compulsion (ikrāh) and its difference from similar terms
2- The domain of compulsion in:
Forcing acceptance of Islam
Forcing acceptance of Islamic government
Forcing the implementation of Islamic rulings
Audio of Session One, Lecture on the Principle of “No Compulsion in Religion”, Ramadan 1396
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The primary principle: The impermissibility of compelling others
This principle has a thousand-year history in our jurisprudence, and according to it, the permissibility of compulsion requires evidence. But what is the basis of this principle?
Some have considered it based on the “principle of non-existence” or grounded in “attachment to the preponderant,” but the truth is that this principle is rooted in “human dominion over oneself,” which prevents the compulsion of another.
Audio of Session Two, Lecture on the Principle of “No Compulsion in Religion”, Ramadan 1396
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Some jurists have considered the principle of the impermissibility of compulsion to be a branch of the rule of dominion over oneself, but what evidence exists for the validity of “human dominion over oneself”?
Is this rule:
- Derived from textual sources? Or
- Does it have a necessary correlation with the rule of dominion over property? Or
- Does it arise from the conduct of the wise?
Audio of Session Three, Lecture on the Principle of “No Compulsion in Religion”, Ramadan 1396
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The scarcity of transmitted evidence for the rule of dominion over oneself has led some jurists to use proofs with weak implications. Ayatollah Haj Sheikh Abdolkarim Haeri relied on the verse “The Prophet is closer to the believers than their own selves.” There are two different interpretations for this reliance. However, the meaning of this verse has sparked a challenging discussion among contemporary scholars: Abdollah Javadi Amoli, Mehdi Haeri Yazdi, and Seyyed Kazem Haeri. But can that rule be built upon these shaky interpretations?
Audio of Session Four, Lecture on the Principle of “No Compulsion in Religion”, Ramadan 1396
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The principle of no compulsion in religion is based on verses from the Quran, including “There is no compulsion in religion.” However, jurists and exegetes have differing opinions about this verse. One notable theory is from Ayatollah Khoei, who generally negates its implication of the impermissibility of compulsion and essentially considers it related to the negation of “determinism” (jabr) by God, not the negation of “compulsion” (ijbār) by humans. Thus, the verse does not prohibit us from using force in religious matters...
Audio of the Fifth Session, Lesson on the Principle of "No Compulsion in Religion," Ramadan 1396
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Ayatollah Khoei, because he considers two types of compulsion as established in Islam: one is compulsion in performing obligations such as paying debts, and the other is jihad against unbelievers to compel them to accept Islam. Therefore, he cannot interpret this verse as meaning the absence of compulsion in religion and is forced to interpret it as meaning the absence of divine compulsion, which is compatible with the permissibility of compulsion by humans. However, regardless of the incompatibility of this interpretation with the lexicon and the occasion of revelation:
1_ Is this interpretation compatible with the continuation of the verse: "Truth stands out clear from Error"?
2_ Does the negation of determinism not entail the negation of compulsion? And if God has given us free will, can we take it away?
Audio of the Sixth Session, Lesson on the Principle of "No Compulsion in Religion," Ramadan 1396
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Allameh considers "There is no compulsion in religion" to mean "the non-compellability of faith," that the imposition of belief is fundamentally impossible. With this conception, he opens the way for compulsion in religious sayings and actions. However, one can ask:
1_ Why is religion restricted to faith and belief?
2_ Why is the non-compellability of faith, as an internal and heartfelt matter, justified by "Truth stands out clear from Error"?
3_ If compulsion upon faith is not possible, then how has the impermissibility of compulsion been considered a longstanding religious ruling in past religions up to the present?
Audio of the Seventh Session, Lesson on the Principle of "No Compulsion in Religion," Ramadan 1396
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In jurisprudential works, there is less attention paid to the Quranic evidence for the absence of compulsion, but Allameh Tabatabai, in the context of interpreting the verses, has addressed it repeatedly. He considers compulsion to accept Islam through fighting permissible because monotheism is among human rights and imposing a right is permissible (Al-Mizan, Vol. 2, p. 68). But how is this reasoning compatible with the verse negating compulsion in religion?
Furthermore, what does he do with other verses that make the acceptance of Islam contingent upon human free will and desire? It is astonishing that in those instances, Allameh completely rejects compulsion and coercion by the Prophet. For example, regarding the verse "except him who wills to take a way to his Lord," he says: "He has made taking the way contingent upon their will to indicate their complete freedom from his (the Prophet's) side, so there is no compulsion and no coercion."
Audio of the Eighth Session, Lesson on the Principle of "No Compulsion in Religion," Ramadan 1396
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Is the principle of no compulsion in religion a principle that is:
a) Not susceptible to restriction? And is compulsion even for fulfilling the rights of others not permissible?! Or b) Susceptible to restriction, and compulsion is permissible in some religious rulings? And in this case, what is the criterion for the permissibility of compulsion? For example: —The separation between matters of belief and practical rulings —The separation between devotional matters and rational matters —Or ....
Audio of the Ninth Session, Lesson on the Principle of "No Compulsion in Religion," Ramadan 1396
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Some rules in jurisprudence are unrestrictable, such as the repugnance of punishment without declaration and the impermissibility of a condition contrary to the Book and the Sunnah. Is "no compulsion in religion" also among these rules? Its evidence includes:
1_ The import of this formulation, like no hardship in religion 2_ The rational and reasonable basis of the rule 3_ The repetition of the rule in different wordings and in a general form 4_ The generality of its reasoning: "the right course has become clear from the wrong"
➖On this basis, instances where compulsion is permitted are inherently outside the rule's domain and become a matter of specification, such as using compulsion to prevent the violation of a right or to fulfill the rights of others.
Audio of Session Ten, Lesson on the Rule of "No Compulsion in Religion", Ramadan 1396
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This theory is deeply rooted in Islamic jurisprudence and is expressed as follows: "Anyone who neglects an obligation is compelled to perform it."
Based on this, jurists in various chapters of jurisprudence (both acts of worship and transactions) have issued fatwas that compelling legally responsible individuals who violate the Sharia is necessary, such as: compulsion to perform the call to prayer, Hajj, and visiting the Prophet (PBUH), and to pay khums and zakat, and to marry, and to pay maintenance, etc.
In this list, compulsion is seen both for fulfilling the rights of people and the rights of God, and even for entirely private matters like circumcision.
But what evidence exists for the permissibility of employing compulsion in this vast domain?
Audio of Session Eleven, Lesson on the Rule of "No Compulsion in Religion", Ramadan 1396
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Compelling others to observe religious rulings is of three types:
a) General compulsion, which is permissible for all citizens. b) Private compulsion, which is permissible only for a specific person. c) Governmental compulsion, which is permissible only for the rulers.
The first type of compulsion is subject to the conditions of enjoining good; for example, the specific stages of enjoining good must be observed. Furthermore, it does not apply to those for whom the ruling has not reached the stage of actualization due to ignorance or the like. But the important question is how the evidence for enjoining good indicates the permissibility of using force and compulsion?
Audio of Session Twelve, Lesson on the Rule of "No Compulsion in Religion", Ramadan 1396
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Most compulsions discussed in jurisprudence are based on enjoining good, but how is "compulsion" and the use of force derived from the "enjoining and forbidding" that is our duty? There are two types of reasoning in this regard:
1_ The word "enjoin" means "to compel." 2_ In the narrations, "practical action" is considered one of the stages of enjoining good.
In this session, these two arguments are examined.
Audio of Session Thirteen, Lesson on the Rule of "No Compulsion in Religion", Ramadan 1396
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Practical enjoining of good is of four types:
1_ Reforming oneself and practically inviting others
2_ Practical measures for reforming the individual
3_ Exercising force and power against transgressors of rights and in order to eliminate oppression
4_ Employing coercive power to compel people to perform religious duties
➖The first, second, and third types face no problem in terms of evidence, but some contemporary jurists have raised objections to the last type. His Eminence Ayatollah Tabrizi finds fault with its religious proofs, while Ayatollah Mehdi Haeri Yazdi has also raised a rational objection.
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In contrast to scholars who consider compulsion in religious duties obligatory and necessary based on the proofs for enjoining good, some scholars deem it forbidden or impossible. Dr. Mehdi Haeri has raised two rational objections on this matter:
1_ Divine duties fall within the framework of "legislative will," which is based on "free will." 2_ Enjoining good has a guiding aspect, and its authoritativeness entails an infinite regress invalidating legislation.
Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Haeri and Ayatollah Javadi Amoli have addressed these objections.
Audio of the Fifteenth Session, Lesson on the Principle of "No Compulsion in Religion", Ramadan 1396
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To judge this issue, the guiding nature must first be interpreted: 1_ Guidance to the rational necessity of enjoining good 2_ Guidance to the rational necessity of complying with religious rulings 3_ Guidance to divine commands and prohibitions
➖Those two eminent jurists differ on the third meaning, while Sheikh Tusi and Seyyed Morteza discuss the first meaning. However, Dr. Mehdi Haeri, considering the second meaning, defends its guiding nature and, based on that, deems compulsion impossible.
Audio of the Sixteenth Session, Lesson on the Principle of "No Compulsion in Religion", Ramadan 1396
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By what criterion is the reasonableness or unreasonableness of compulsion in religious duties measured?
Usually, jurists consider any kind of compulsion reasonable, while on the other hand, some consider no compulsion reasonable at all!
It seems that neither of these two logics has sufficient rational support. Therefore, in this session, both the view of Seyyed Kazem Haeri (proponent of the possibility of compulsion in all duties) and the view of Dr. Mehdi Haeri (proponent of the impossibility of compulsion in any duties) have been critiqued.
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Some jurists, like Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, justify compulsion in enjoining good on the grounds of grace, saying: 1_ Coercive prevention of sin keeps society pure and is a grace to others. 2_ Compulsion is also a grace for the individual himself, as it distances him from sin and provides the grounds for his moral upbringing.
This theory is based on the view that the condition for reforming individuals is the forcible elimination of the attractions of sin in society and the construction of a one-sided society in which only the call to truth is heard.
Moreover, what is the meaning of grace, and in cases of disagreement, can we forcibly impose our understanding of grace on others? For example, regarding compulsory education or vaccination, we agree that it is a grace, and the person compelled will also confirm it in the future. But in religious matters and matters of dispute, is imposition a grace? Can one, with the motive of grace, use force and coercion and impose one's own understanding on another?
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