Moral Worthiness or Parental Competence in Childbearing, Hamidreza Yazdani

This piece is a raw expression of a thought that may itself not be raw. After the publication of the engaging article “The Phenomenology of the Gamble of Childbearing” by Dr. Hossein Dabbagh[1], I was involuntarily reminded of Dr. Malekian’s earlier writings on the immorality of childbearing, which discussed childbearing and the ethics associated with it. Although Dr. Malekian’s article consisted of quotations from him, and Dr. Fanaei later provided explanations on his behalf regarding the text being taken out of context and Professor Malekian’s supplementary statements, a refined version of his views has not been published to this day. In any case, the initiation of such discussions should be welcomed and should be examined and scrutinized as much as possible. Since the publication of those articles, I had intended to write something on this matter, but it did not materialize until today, when I found the opportunity suitable to elaborate on my own perspective.

Having a child appears to be a personal and spontaneous process. History shows, of course, that our reason for childbearing is, to a large extent, determined by the indoctrinations of our surroundings and the age-old tradition of our ancestors. We learn childbearing by copying the subtle cues that our culture has produced. And perhaps this category can be considered the most conspicuous sign of the absence of critical rationality in society and an unconscious adherence to tradition.

What does “childbearing” mean? Should it be interpreted as bringing a child into the world? In the view of the author of these lines, the word “childbearing” is not only incorrect but itself causes the mind to deviate from the importance of the subject. In truth, “childbearing” takes for granted something that is precisely the issue requiring meticulous scrutiny and analysis. In fact, if there is any talk of morality or immorality, it must begin exactly from this premise. Because “childbearing” addresses the parents and is more or less considered a personal category, which anyone can view through the lens of their own mind and have their own reasons for accepting or rejecting it, making the having or not having of a child contingent and conditional upon the fulfillment of conditions that are important only from their own perspective. What is hidden beneath this word and should be examined further is, in reality, “the competence for childbearing.” It is at this point that one might be able to both glance at the right to have a child and, so to speak, remove childbearing from the dominion of the parents’ taste and perspective as the primary agents of this phenomenon.

It is abundantly clear that human beings have possessed and continue to possess many abilities, of which, over the passage of long days and ages, perhaps only a portion have emerged and been revealed to them, while many abilities still remain undiscovered and hidden. Among these abilities, reproduction, like other existing abilities, is one case among many types of abilities that, depending on circumstances, has been revealed and known to humankind since the dawn of human life (perhaps the main reason for this can be attributed to the pleasure derived from sexual intercourse as a prerequisite for reproduction; were it not so, perhaps many humans would forgo the prospect of having children). Consequently, what becomes important and must be raised is this question: Do we have the right to use this ability under any circumstances and solely based on our own opinion, or not? Under what ethical conditions and requirements can we utilize this ability? Is the use of this ability unconditional?

Perhaps at first glance this question seems unacceptable and unfamiliar, but in what follows I will try to examine this discussion more closely with an example. This issue can be elaborated with an instance, albeit a contrasting one. As previously stated, human beings possess many abilities, and alongside the multitude of positive and negative abilities they have, they also carry the ability to kill other people in their repertoire. That is, in situations of necessity, humans can eliminate their fellow human beings and deprive them of the right to live. The question that arises here is whether humans inherently have the right to use the ability to kill others or not? In fact, the answer to this question determines the more important question, "Do humans have the right to take life?" Perhaps at first, this comparison will offend the reader and disturb their mind, and they will consider this analogy a false equivalence and see its difference as being as vast as the distance from heaven to earth. But what has led me to consider this analogy as illuminating is a truth that exists at the core of this issue and this comparison. First of all, it must be accepted that an ability is an ability, and there is no room for any ifs or buts in this statement. Looking at the course of human evolution, we know that in ancient times, killing humans not only did not have today's consequences, but was even considered a necessary and very obvious matter; not only was it not prohibited, but it was regarded as being among natural laws, and, as it happens, deviating from it was considered the cause of all kinds of calamities. Over time, as humans reached intellectual maturity, they realized that depriving another of the right to life is not among natural laws and can and must be viewed differently. Consequently, specific moral laws gradually surrounded this act and caused human ability in this area to be limited. That is, humans not only no longer considered killing a source of pride, but matters progressed to the point where it was deemed reprehensible and immoral, and rights and punishments were created for disobeying it. In short, what gained importance was that this ability must be subjected to moral evaluation and judgment, and its boundaries were limited by legal and moral laws. As a result, this act became surrounded by ethics, and the human ability concerning the deprivation of the right to life was subjected to moral and value judgment.

Now the question is, has the human ability in the field of reproduction, or so-called childbearing, ever been examined? Have humans established any laws regarding this ability of theirs, which grants permission to enter the world and gives the right to life to an unborn human? Do they consider themselves responsible through granting the right to life, just as they do through taking it? What the evidence suggests indicates that when the topic of childbearing is discussed in isolation, this ability and the conditions for its use, which are implicit and invisible, are unconsciously taken for granted. Whereas this ability, too, must be viewed like other abilities and weighed in the scales of ethics.

Even stranger is that humans have more real and objective reasons for killing people than for childbearing, which rests solely on subjective grounds and cannot be scrutinized or judged as good or bad without experiencing it. One can even go further and say that in many cases, killing people and depriving them of the right to life occurs because of the misbehavior or the type of behavior of the slain themselves[2], and both sides are actors in this arena; but to what extent are the reasons for using the capacity for childbearing inherent in the child itself? Does the child have any role in its own coming into being? It seems that for centuries, the most important factor determining our childbearing has been tradition and blind obedience to the culture of our ancestors. A culture that, through novels, poems, songs, and films, has taught us to pursue our own concerns in the name of the child and to find our own excuses for living by bringing it into existence, which, by relying on this sentiment, has turned it into an inviolable law. It goes without saying that culture has not acted honestly in this regard, and sometimes children have been portrayed as sweet, lovable symbols and a minor part of mutual love—they do not take up much time, are usually wise, and display an understanding for which they have not been trained, and not only do they not take much time but are an essential element for parents. But in real life, children usually put couples under severe pressure. Children may destroy the love that brought them into being. Love comes crashing down from heaven to earth. Everyone is always tired and worried. Therefore, one can say that arguments such as "Yes, love is beautiful. But without the birth of other humans, won't the lamp of love be extinguished forever?"[3] are unjustified and unacceptable. One must ask: burning the lamp of love with another individual's life? It goes without saying that with a child, the lamp of love will also head toward extinction, perhaps even faster, and is this not the very essence of immorality and selfishness? Even if becoming a parent leaves such a deep and lasting pleasure that it encourages people to have children, such pleasures are one-sided and unilateral and stem from selfish hedonism. Does anyone think about at what cost and in exchange for what they obtain this pleasure?

This is sad. The issue is not that the tradition of our ancestors was bad. The issue is that representations of the child in culture have usually been deeply misleading from a psychological standpoint. And more importantly, members of society have considered the act of childbearing within the context of instinctual behaviors, the practice of which is deemed very natural and, of course, vital. And by examining the reasons that are put forward even in contemporary times, one can see the same effects of tradition and consider it the legacy of our ancestors. And in justifying it, we sometimes witness strange ramblings that see otherworldly reasons as confirmation for childbearing.

"What if there is an afterlife and the possibility of eternal proximity to the Almighty God is available to humans? If immortality in the paradise of divine approval is true, would depriving others of such a blessing not be an act of ingratitude for that blessing? What reason is there to deny life after death?"^[4] It is evident that with such reasoning, we have in fact surrendered to a strange dogmatism. First of all, we seem to have forgotten that in this argument we are debating on behalf of an individual who does not exist and making decisions for them, and we generalize what we ourselves imagine to all human beings, which is itself an unethical act. Secondly, for what reason must an individual, after being born, think as we do? That is, can someone who does not believe in the afterlife and the Day of Judgment ethically choose not to have children? The capacity for childbearing is a natural act and belongs to all human beings; making it religious is impossible, and such a religious perspective and doctrinal boundary-setting amounts to nothing but begging the question. Most importantly, bringing a child into the world so that they may benefit from the blessings of the afterlife is akin to encouraging others, in the hope of the highest paradise, to kill and be killed in the path of religion. So where does ethics stand? Will we not, with this view, drag ethics into the abyss of destruction? At the end of the above argument, is depriving others not an act of ingratitude? One must ask: ingratitude from whose perspective? Even if it is ingratitude from our perspective, no logic permits its generalization to others, and others do not necessarily think as we do.[5]

Even such reasons as that most moral perfections find the ground for realization in social interactions and confrontations are unacceptable, because society is formed from individuals who have been born (for whatever reason), but the child must be brought into the world, and it is here that reflection is required. It is true that until a child is born and human individuals step into the realm of existence, no society takes shape, but my point is that childbearing must be limited within ethical boundaries, and the mere possession of this capacity by humankind is not a license for reckless and unjustified procreation. Not to mention that the humans present in society are still bewildered in attaining moral perfections and cannot provide the best conditions, let alone inviting another guest to this troubled feast.

Even the naive illusion that a person who is good must strive to raise a good generation so that the world becomes a better place, and that a father who has traversed half the path of contentment and can instead raise children with similar development can justify childbearing, is so confused and invalid that it requires no evidence for its refutation. Nevertheless, it must be said that fatherhood is a fixed attribute, whereas being good or bad is variable, and besides the change in their instances over time, the human being themselves undergoes changes. In other words, a good father can become a bad father, or vice versa, but fatherhood is never, under any circumstances, annulled from him. Consequently, if an individual feels that they can cause the growth of perfections in another and that "since I can be a good father" (although this reason is also sterile due to the lack of experience of fatherhood[6] and perhaps many, after becoming fathers, even lose the ability to be a good husband), therefore I must and can have children, it is in no way logical, because with the birth of a child, I may no longer be a good father, or the criteria of goodness may change from the individual's perspective, just as many consider paternal strictness a reason for being good, and these criteria are so caught in the grip of relativity that they have a fragile foundation.

Some have gone so far as to say that since human reason, when alone, has little knowledge of the past and future of human history, and such reason, in domains like ethics and knowledge, is caught in relativism and doubt and has formulated no universally agreed-upon cosmology or methodology, then on what basis can one so recklessly clarify the duty of the world and humanity, opine on matters pertaining to the survival of the human species, and reject childbearing.[7] But they overlook the fact that precisely because human reason is imperfect and in many domains needs to be completed, this is a reason for not having children, for how, with such reason, do we issue a ruling in favor of childbearing? Especially since the matter is not merely about a decision where one can easily take a risk and, in harmony with Rumi, say

I have tested far-sighted reason; henceforth I shall make myself mad

rather, the matter concerns granting the right to life to an individual who, after birth, will pursue an independent existence, and this will make the issue even more intractable.

Before we think about what becoming a father or mother resembles[8], we must ponder the question of whether one may use the ability to give life to a child. For all measures and criteria are not within us and dependent on us, such that by examining all aspects we could reach a clear conclusion; rather, one side of the matter is a child who has not yet been born and has no involvement whatsoever in this subject.

We return again to the first question: why does killing human beings—which is in fact a matter between individuals who have been born and concerns interpersonal relations—involve all these moral rules and laws, yet bringing a child into the world, who has no choice in entering this world and becoming entangled in the issues we grapple with, elicits no such sensitivity?

Here one must sympathize with Dr. Malekian and consider his reasoning justified: that the world we are in, on the whole, its sufferings and pains outweigh and surpass its pleasures and joys, and it seems that as we go forward, the volume and density of sufferings increase. For in undertaking any action, a human being examines its consequences and dangers more closely, and even if, hypothetically, its joys and pleasures quantitatively outweigh the evils, one must still consider the quality of the evils. In general, most people undertake an action only when its evils are minimal; otherwise, pleasure in itself leaves no room for risk, and decision-making in this regard is moot. Consequently, the fact that the world, on the whole, has become or is becoming a bad place is itself a very strong and decisive reason. Especially since, in response to Dr. Dabbagh, it must be said that, as it happens, one must see the evils, because the matter concerns childbearing. Comparing goods and evils is meaningful for human beings who are in a position of decision-making, and for acting human beings this comparison can be a matter of dispute; but for the child and the granting of the right to life, these issues cannot be compared quantitatively and considered a matter of dispute. To decide in this matter, one must see the evils, for it is precisely these evils that make a person weary.

Even the phenomenon of the flight from death is not an acceptable justification for ruling in favor of the world's goods, because once a human being is placed in the flow of life, it is natural that, by the dictate of instinct, they desire eternal life, and this phenomenon has been the subject of many myths and legends. But to look upon living from beyond life and evaluate it is another discussion, and perhaps the desire for immortality is no longer relevant; and for childbearing, one must look at life precisely from the boundary of life, not from within it.

Perhaps in response to these objections it might be said that in the course of one's life, a human being must incline and transcend from self-worship toward selflessness, and they can direct a person's gaze from the self to the "other" (in this case, children). An "other" who, in the words of prominent moral philosophers such as Emmanuel Levinas, Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, and T. M. Scanlon, is the point of departure for being moral and the "discovery" of ethics[9].

Now the very important question is whether the unborn child is considered an “Other”? Mere verbal similarity does not allow us to regard every other as the “Other.” The unborn child, who does not yet have a face and whose face a human cannot see, does not, by Levinas’s definition[10], create the sense of “Otherness,” and one must be wary of conflating issues here. Secondly, this “Other,” which lies at the center of gravity of ethicists’ discourse, finds its meaning and significance in relation to the individuals of society who make the society more ethical; and the very posing of the problem of the “Other” is for the purpose of making the world more ethical and creating a sense of responsibility towards the members of society, not towards a child not yet born, and this discussion inadvertently causes a great fallacy that diminishes the depth of the issue. In truth, the “Other” has taken shape and gained consistency through seeing the individuals of society, and especially seeing their faces, and all discussions related to the “Other” have been formed in relation to the individuals present in our social life; and using this term, which bears only a verbal resemblance, causes a neglect of the reality and importance of the right to give life to a child, because the unborn child is not an “Other” to whom one can apply the same moral judgment and whom one can analogize based on social others.

It seems that the use of the capacity for childbearing should be subjected to greater scrutiny, and instead of speaking of the ethics of childbearing, one should ask: Is the use of the ability to bear children always and under all circumstances ethical and permissible? When can we use this ability? By analyzing some of the reasons put forward by those interested in these discussions, it was observed that most of them view the matter from their own perspective and allow themselves to consider giving the right to life to a child as ethical, without attaching the slightest importance to the child itself.

In short, one must accept the responsibility of thinking on behalf of the child and consider its right as a child, not as an “Other.” In truth, just as the right to life is to be respected and its deprivation involves its own specific ethics, more important than that is the giving of the right to life, which must be surrounded by its own specific ethics so that we do not recklessly proceed to procreate...

"The End"

.

---

.

[1] The article “Phenomenology of the Gamble of Procreation” by Hossein Dabbagh

[2] I am well aware of the countless counterexamples that exist in this regard, such as being killed in a terrorist operation or being killed by psychopathic individuals, but these cases do not disrupt our discussion.

[3] From Philosophical Despair to the Prohibition of Marriage: A Critique of Mostafa Malekian’s Statements on the Unethical Aspects of Marriage and Procreation, Dr. Reza Sadeghi

[4] From Philosophical Despair to the Prohibition of Marriage: A Critique of Mostafa Malekian’s Statements on the Unethical Aspects of Marriage and Procreation, Dr. Reza Sadeghi

[5] To avoid prolixity, I will not discuss the inference of “must” from “is” that pervades this argument, for as Rumi says:

The sun came as proof of the sun       If you need proof, do not turn your face from it

[6] The article "Phenomenology of the Gamble of Childbearing" by Hossein Dabbagh

[7] From Philosophical Despair to the Prohibition of Marriage: A Critique of Mostafa Malekian's Remarks on the Unethical Aspects of Marriage and Childbearing, Dr. Reza Sadeghi

[8] The article "Phenomenology of the Gamble of Childbearing" by Hossein Dabbagh

[9] Marriage and Childbearing; Moral Permissibility or Impermissibility? - Dr. Hossein Dabbagh

[10] Ethics and Infinity; Conversations of Emmanuel Levinas with Philippe Nemo, translated by Morad Farhadpour/Saleh Najafi, Farhang-e Saba Publications

.

---

.

Article Title: Moral Worthiness or Parental Competence in Childbearing

Author: Hamidreza Yazdani

.

---

.