On Hijab, Ahmad Qabel

برای مطالعه ی راحت تر این مقاله ، لازم است مخاطبانی که آشنا به متون عربی نیستند و آنانی که پیگیری مدارک و اسناد مورد نظر را طالب نیستند ، از خواندن  بخش های رنگی این نوشتار ، منصرف شوند و تنها متن نگاشته شده با قلم سیاه را مطالعه کنند.

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در مورد حجاب

احمد قابل

 

بسم الله الرحمن الرحیم

مقدمه

در زمستان ۱۳۸۲ نسبت به موضوع « حجاب و پوشش سر و گردن » در پاسخی به یک پرسش مطالب مختصری ارائه کردم که متن آن را مجددا از نظر می گذرانیم ؛

به نام خدا

۱- اصل پوشش عورت ، بر مرد و زن مسلمان واجب است.

۲- فقهاء در مصداق عورت ( بخصوص در مورد زنان ) اختلاف نظر دارند .

۳- اکثریت فقهاء ، پوشاندن سر را برای زنان مسلمان آزاد( غیر برده ) لازم دانسته اند و « سر و گردن » را نیز از مصادیق عورت می دانند.

۴- « ابن جنید اسکافی »  از فقهای نامدار شیعه و همردیف اساتید شیخ مفید ، مصداق عورت در زن و مرد را  یکسان و مساوی دانسته است.

۵-  تمامی فقهای شیعه ( بلکه تمامی فقهای اسلام ) پوشاندن سر و گردن را بر زنان مسلمانی که برده بودند ، واجب نمی دانند . بلکه مثل شیخ صدوق و گروهی از علمای قم ( در زمان صدوق ) پوشش سر را بر زنان برده ، حرام می شمردند . در حالیکه پوشاندن عورت بر آنان نیز واجب بود.

۶- مرحوم« صاحب جواهر » پوشاندن اجزاء بدن ( به استثنای صورت ، دستها- تامچ –  پاها- تامچ-  گردن ، موی سر ) را اجماعی می داند . یعنی در موارد استثنا شده ، نظریات فقهاء، مختلف است و اتفاق نظری وجود ندارد .

۷- ایشان از قول« علامه طباطبایی» استاد صاحب جواهر و « صاحب مدارک » نقل می کند که نظر آنان ، عدم وجوب پوشش« سر و گردن » است و می نویسد ؛ « قاضی ابن براج ،عدم وجوب پوشش سر و گردن را به بعضی از علمای شیعه نسبت داده است » . ( ج ۸ ص ۱۶۶ تا ۱۶۹ )

۸- صاحب جواهر ، نظر خود را اینگونه بیان کرده است ؛ « پوشاندن موی سر ،مطابق با احتیاط ، بلکه قول قوی تر است » . بنا بر این فتوای صریح  بر لزوم آن ارائه نکرده است ، بلکه از روی احتیاط و احتمال ، ابتدائا احتیاط کرده و سپس آن را ترجیح داده است .

۹- از مجموع این بر رسی ، روشن می شود که مساله ، اختلافی است و اجماع مسلمانان در این امر ( پوشش سر و گردن ) محقق نشده است .

۱۰- برخی آیات و روایات معتبره نیز وجود دارندکه ظهور در عدم وجوب دارند (مثل آیه ۵۹سوره ی احزاب) گر چه آیات و روایاتی نیز وجود دارند که لزوم پوشش سر را یاد آوری می کنند . البته مقضای جمع عرفی بین دلائل وجوب و دلائل عدم وجوب ، تصرف در مدلول آنها است . اگر به این قاعده عمل شود ، نتیجه ی آیات و روایات نیز موید عدم وجوب پوشش سر و گردن می شود و تنها « استحباب » را ثابت می کند . با توجه به مطالب یاد شده ، بنده مبتنی بر دلائل علمی « پوشش بدن را لازم می شمارم ، ولی پوشش سر و گردن را مستحب شرعی می دانم » . امید وارم پاسخ  پرسش خود را دریافت کرده باشید .

موفق و پیروز باشید .خدا نگهدار .

احمد قابل………………………………تهران…………………….۲۰بهمن ۱۳۸۲

[ توضیح ؛ در بند ۴ این نامه  از « ابن جنید » به عنوان  « همردبف اساتید شیخ مفید » یاد شده است که نسبت صحیح آن « از اساتید شیخ مفید » است . در بند ۷  این نامه ، نسبت به ذکر نام « صاحب الفیه » که « شهید اول » است ، اشتباهی از طرف من صورت گرفته و بجای آن ، نام « صاحب ریاض » یعنی « علامه طبا طبایی » استاد صاحب جواهر ، آورده شده است که به این ترتیب ، اصلاح می شود . در حقیقت متن بند ۷ باید اینگونه اصلاح شود ؛

7 – He quotes the First Martyr in Alfiya and Sahib Madarik as saying that their view is that covering the “hair and neck” is not obligatory, and he writes: Qadi Ibn Barraj has attributed the non-obligation of covering the hair to some Shia scholars.]

After this letter, I was confronted with scholarly and social critiques and repeated, insistent questions (with approaches of: criticism, endorsement, or condemnation) that failing to address and respond to could have led, and can lead, to the impression of “lacking reasoning or the weakness of this viewpoint” or provoke the impression of “disregard for the critiques and questions of the questioners.” For this reason, from that time onward, in various public and private gatherings, such as: “Hosseiniyeh Ershad, Kanun-e Tawhid, the central office of the Participation Front, the Society of Women of the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Association of Engineers, the Islamic Association of the Faculty of Theology of the University of Tehran, and the Islamic Association of Shahid Beheshti University of Tehran,” I addressed the questions, and in one instance, I undertook a “debate with a knowledgeable friend.” Of course, in all the aforementioned cases and the responses I gave to individuals via the internet, the audience for those explanations was limited, at most to a few hundred people.

Recently (in the year since the launch of the blog “Rational Sharia”), more audiences have requested further explanations on this matter. Considering that I have placed writing a detailed scholarly and jurisprudential discussion of this issue on my agenda (God willing), I will now provide some necessary (not sufficient or complete) explanations to clear up some of the ambiguities of this important scholarly and social discussion. I am grateful for the kindness and attention of esteemed audiences to scholarly discussions on religious issues, and I ask the Almighty God for success for myself and everyone, so that perhaps a step may be taken in the path of discovering the truths of the Muhammadan Sharia (PBUH), and if lapses are seen from the author on this path, scholarly critics endowed with human ethics may emerge to warn him of the scholarly foundations and conclusions and guide him with sufficient reasoning.

The Main Point

1- Most Islamic jurists (both Shia and Sunni), based on narrations from the Prophet of God (PBUH) and the Imams of Guidance (AS) with the purport of “woman is awrah,” have made a mistake and imagined that “the entire body of a woman (except for the face, hands, and feet up to the ankles) is awrah” and have considered it a true instance of “awrah.” On this incorrect assumption, they have also claimed “consensus.”

As an example, note this statement by the author of Jawahir, which he quoted from his teacher (Jawahir al-Kalam 8/164):

There is no doubt that the woman, in her entirety, is awrah, linguistically and conventionally. As for language, it is evident, and as for convention, it is because it is customary to refer to her as awrah, and the application of this term to her is widespread and common, such that its negation is not valid. Moreover, it has been established in the Sharia that she is awrah, from the reports, such as “Women are awrahs” and others. And consensus, for the jurists have unanimously agreed that the woman, in her entirety, is awrah, then they exclude from it = There is no doubt that the entire existence of a woman is awrah. It is clear that the word “awrah” is used for the concept of woman in the Arabic language, and in “custom” it is also conventional and usual to use the word “awrah” instead of the word “woman,” and “calling a woman awrah” is a prevalent and widespread matter, to the extent that one cannot say “woman is not awrah.” From the perspective of the Sharia, it has also been proven that “woman is awrah.” The purport of some narrations and the consensus of jurists has also been established on this: “The entire existence of a woman is awrah,” and then they exclude some instances (such as the hands and face).

To prove the correctness of this claim (the tendency of the majority of jurists to consider the entire body of a woman as awrah), one can refer to books such as Nihayat al-Ahkam 1/365, Allama Hilli (As for the free, adult woman, her entire body is awrah …) and al-Mu’tabar /153 and 154, Muhaqqiq Hilli (As for the free woman, her body is awrah …) and al-Kafi /139, Abu al-Salah Halabi and al-Fiqh ala al-Madhahib al-Arba’a 1/192, in the text and margin, and so on.

Of course, a group of leading jurists, such as the “Sahib al-Riyad” and the “Sahib al-Jawahir,” have criticized this view, stating: “In terms of the obligation of covering, they are in the ruling of ‘awrah; otherwise, the term ‘awrah does not mean woman, and no such consensus has been realized in the terminology of the Shari‘ah.” The scholarly opposition of these two great figures (and other leading figures who agree with them) does not amount to a refutation of the reality of the well-known tendency to “consider the entire body of a woman as ‘awrah,” nor does it negate the fact that such a view has existed and continues to exist. Rather, there is no doubt that this tendency has been the approach of the “well-known jurists of both the Shi‘a and Sunni” schools.

The expression “the woman’s body being ‘awrah” has been explicitly stated in the language of most jurists, such as “Shahid al-Awwal, Miqdad al-Suyuri, Shaykh al-Tusi, Qadi Ibn al-Barraj, Shahid al-Thani, al-Muhaqqiq al-Karaki, and others.”

The late “Fadil al-Abi” in “Kashf al-Rumuz 1/141” has stated:

و منشأ التردد ، النظر الی ان القدمین من العورة ام لا . فمن قال بالاول ، فسترهما واجب . و من قال بالثانی ، فغیر واجب ، بل مستحب = The source of the disagreement is whether the feet are part of the ‘awrah or not. One who holds the first view considers covering them obligatory, and one who holds the second view does not consider covering the feet obligatory, but rather recommended.

Therefore, those who do not exclude the “feet” and those who do exclude them differ on the referent of ‘awrah. That is, those who have considered “women’s feet up to the ankle” as a referent of ‘awrah have deemed covering them obligatory, and those who have not considered them a referent of ‘awrah have not deemed covering them obligatory.

As “Fadil al-Abi” has explicitly stated, in detailed jurisprudential books, there are other instances where there is a difference of opinion regarding “whether or not something is ‘awrah.” This matter amounts to the “non-realization of a consensus of jurists” and shows that the “technical ‘awrah of the chapter on covering” is a matter of dispute, and the “claim of consensus” on this issue is not correct.

2- The non-obligation of covering the head and neck of enslaved Muslim women (which is the requirement of reliable transmitted proofs and a consensus-oriented tendency) indicates this very important matter: “It is not forbidden for the head and neck of any Muslim woman to be visible and in view.”

In other words; “Neither being a woman nor being a Muslim woman” is the reason for the obligation of covering the head and neck. For “enslaved Muslim women” were both “women” and “Muslims,” and covering the head and neck (and even some other parts of the body, according to the explicit statements of some jurists) was not obligatory upon them. Some even believed in the reprehensibility or prohibition of covering the head for enslaved Muslim women.

Of course, a woman’s social respect was contingent upon covering her head and neck, and enslaved women (Muslim and non-Muslim), because they were not considered very respected socially and were looked upon with contempt, their usual covering did not include the head and neck. Just as in pre-Islamic Iran (the Sassanid era), aristocratic women were kept away from the eyes of men (even mahrams other than the husband) in public gatherings and were covered with difficult and severe coverings, but poor women belonging to the lower classes of society would appear in public gatherings with their heads, faces, necks, forearms, and lower legs uncovered.

3- Although many of the aforementioned differences among jurists appear in the discussion of “ritual covering for prayer (satr salati),” it must be noted that leading jurists, such as al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli in his book “al-Mu‘tabar /153 and 154” and al-‘Allamah al-Hilli in his last jurisprudential book “Nihayat al-Ihkam 1/366,” and many others in their jurisprudential books, have utilized proofs related to “non-ritual covering (satr ghayr salati)” in the discussion of ritual covering for prayer, and proofs related to the discussion of “ritual covering for prayer (satr salati)” in non-ritual covering. An uncommon majority of them have presented both discussions in the “Kitab al-Salat” (Book of Prayer), side by side and without separation, which indicates “the unity of the criterion for both discussions in their view.” Therefore, the validity of the approach of generalizing the presented materials and proofs to both discussions is guaranteed according to the well-known jurists, even though a smaller group of jurists have opposed the “unity of the criterion and the inseparability of these two discussions.”

برای اطمینان خاطر برخی مخاطبان ، توجه همگان را به بیان صریح شهید بزرگوار ، آیةالله مطهری در کتاب « مسأله حجاب/۲۲۴ » جلب می کنم که آورده است :

چنانکه ملاحظه می شود ، فقهای اسلام در باب ستر صلاتی ، به آیه ی سوره ی نور تمسک می کنند که مربوط به نماز نیست ، زیرا آنچه در نماز لازم است پوشیده شود ، همانست که در مقابل نامحرم باید پوشیده شود . و شاید اگر بحثی باشد در این است که ؛ « آیا در نماز ، زاید بر آنچه در مقابل نامحرم باید پوشیده شود ، لازم است پوشیده شود یا نه ؟ » اما در اینکه ؛ « آنچه در نماز لازم نیست پوشیده شود ، در مفابل نامحرم هم لازم نیست پوشیده شود » بحثی نیست .

ایشان همین مطلب را در صفحه ی بعد ، از مرحوم آیةالله محمد جواد مغنیه ، در کتاب « الفقه علی المذاهب الخمسة » نیز نقل می کند .

مرحوم شیخ یوسف بحرانی ، در کتاب مفصل فقهی خود « الحدائق الناضرة » نیز به « وحدت ملاک و تلازم ستر صلاتی و غیر صلاتی » تصریح کرده و آن را برآمده از « ظاهر روایات و بیانات فقهای شیعه » دانسته است . ( ۷/۱۳ = ان الظاهر من الأخبار و کلام الأصحاب ، ان وجوب الستر عن الناظر المحترم و کذا فی الصلاة ، امران متلازمان و ذلک ، فإن وجوب الستر فی الموضعین ، دائر مدار ثبوت کونه عورة ) .

بنا بر این ، اختلافات فقهاء در بحث « کمّیت پوشش برای نماز » ، به بحث « کمّیت پوشش از نگاه » نیز سرایت می کند .

۴- « علامه ی حلی » که از بزرگان فقه شیعه است و به لحاظ زمانی ، از بسیاری فقهای شیعه نزدیکتر به عصر حضور « ابن جنید اسکافی » ( استاد شیخ مفید ) بوده و یکی از کتاب های فقهی او را در اختیار داشته است ، عبارتی را از وی در مورد « پوشش » گزارش کرده ( الذی یجب ستره من البدن ، العورتان و هما القبل و الدبر من الرجل و المرأة = مقداری از بدن که واجب است پوشانده شود ، دو عورت است که عبارت اند  از پیش و پس ، از مرد و زن ) و برداشت خود را در تفسیر آن چنین آورده است ؛

و هذا یدل علی مساواة المرأة للرجل عنده ، فی ان الواجب ستر قبلها و دبرها لاغیر = این سخن ابن جنید ، بر مساوی بودن مرد و زن ، نزد وی دلالت می کند که ؛ « آنچه بر زن واجب است ، پوشاندن پیش و پس خویش است و پوشاندن غیر آن دو ، واجب نیست » . ( مختلف الشیعة / ۸۳ ) .

این سخن را بعد از نقل کلام شیخ طوسی ( یجب علیها ستر رأسها و بدنها من قرنها الی قدمها … = واجب است که زن ، از سر تا پایش را بپوشاند ) آورده است . عبارت « لاغیر » ، صریح در عدم وجوب پوشش بقیه ی بدن زن ( غیر از وجوب پوشش دو عورت ) است .

گمان می کنم فهم علامه ی حلی از بیان ابن جنید ، که کتاب وی ( المختصر الاحمدی فی فقه المحمدی ) را در اختیار داشته است ، از فهم متفاوت عالمانی که در این زمانها زندگی می کنند و دسترسی به کتابهای مفقود شده ی وی ندارند ، اطمینان بیشتری را بر انگیزد .

به عبارت دیگر ، اگر پژوهشگری ترجیح دهد که به برداشت علامه ی حلی و دیگر بزرگان فقه شیعه از بیان ابن جنید ، اعتماد کند و مبتنی بر گزارش آنان ، به پی گیری مسأله ی پوشش در احکام شریعت محمدی (ص) بپردازد ، مسیری ناصواب را نپیموده است .

علاوه بر اینکه همین برداشت از سخن ابن جنید را فقیهانی چون ؛ شهید اول ( ذکری/ ۱۳۹ ) صاحب مفتاح الکرامة ( ۲ / ۱۶۸ ) علامه ی مجلسی ( بحار الانوار ۸۳/ ۱۸۰ ) محقق طباطبائی ( ریاض المسائل۲/ ۳۷۸ ) محقق نراقی ( مستندالشیعة ۴ /۲۴۲ ) و دیگرانی از متقدمین و متأخرین ، به او نسبت داده اند و بعید است که بتوان برداشت تمامی این فقها از سخن ابن جنید را غیر واقعی و باطل دانست ( خصوصا کسانی که کتاب او را دیده اند ) .

5- Judge Ibn Barrāj, died 481 AH, in his book "Sharḥ Jumal al-ʿIlm wa-l-ʿAmal /73" has stated:

And there is also no disagreement that a free woman must cover her head during prayer, for this is not obligatory upon a slave woman. And although a group of jurists have differed regarding a free woman who covers her head but whose hair remains exposed, as to whether covering it is obligatory or not, they have agreed upon the obligation of her covering her head. = There is no disagreement that a non-slave woman is obligated to cover her head during prayer. This covering of the head is not obligatory for a slave woman. Although a group of jurists have differed regarding a non-slave Muslim woman who has covered her head but whose hair remains uncovered, as to whether covering the remaining hair is obligatory or not, they nonetheless agree on the obligation of covering the head.

a) The late Ibn Barrāj acknowledges that: "A group of jurists held the view that covering hair that extends beyond the area of the head and neck is not obligatory."

b) He says that there is a general consensus on the obligation of covering the head. However, there is apparently disagreement regarding its quantity and quality.

This statement also serves as a confirmation that "the issue of covering the hair is not a matter of consensus." For the transmission of a differing opinion, especially from a group of Shiʿi jurists, assures one of the non-realization of consensus regarding "the obligation of covering all the hair of non-slave women."

6- The late ʿAllāma Najafī, known as "Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir," has stated on this matter (Jawāhir al-Kalām 8/169):

And the possibility that hair extending beyond the head is excluded... covering it, while being more precautionary, is stronger. = The possibility has been given that long hair is excluded from the ruling of the obligation to cover the head... however, covering it, while closer to precaution, has stronger evidence.

"Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir" also, as a confirmation of "the non-definitive nature of the evidence's indication regarding the obligation of covering all the hair of non-slave Muslim women," uses the phrase "the more precautionary and stronger" concerning "hair that is longer than the area of the woman's head and neck." Although the expression "the stronger" after "the more precautionary" indicates the author's preference for "the ruling of the obligation to cover," it makes it completely clear that there are no "reliable transmitted proofs" in the primary texts of the Sharia for a definitive ruling on "the obligation of covering all the hair of non-slave Muslim women."

7- The late Muḥammad Bāqir Sabzawārī, died 1090 AH, in his book "Kifāyat al-Aḥkām/16" has stated:

And the stronger view is that the entire body of a free woman is ʿawra except for the face, the hands up to the wrists, and the feet up to the ankles. And there is difficulty in proving the obligation of covering the neck for a woman. And in most statements, the obligation of covering the hair has not been mentioned, and al-Shahīd deemed it obligatory, but this requires reflection. = The stronger theory is that: the entire body of a non-slave Muslim woman is ʿawra, except for the face, the hands up to the wrists, and the feet up to the ankles. There is difficulty in proving the ruling of "the obligation of covering the neck for a woman," and in most statements and expressions of the jurists, no mention has been made of "the obligation of covering the hair," although "al-Shahīd al-Awwal" deemed it obligatory, and one must pause before agreeing with his view.

a) He considers proving "the obligation of covering the neck" to be faced with difficulty and ultimately finds issuing a fatwa on it problematic.

b) He also reflects on "the obligation of covering the hair" and says that it has not been mentioned in the statements of most Shiʿi scholars. Although al-Shahīd al-Awwal (died 786 AH) deemed it obligatory.

8- Sayyid Muḥammad ʿĀmilī, author of "Madārik al-Aḥkām," has stated in this same book (3/188):

And know that in this expression — as in the expressions of most of the companions — there is no treatment of the obligation to cover the hair; rather, it may appear from it that it is not obligatory , … and al-Shahīd in al-Dhikrā deemed obligation closer [to the truth], based on what Ibn Bābawayh reported from al-Fuḍayl from Abī Jaʿfar (a.s.) … and this [narration], even if its chain is accepted, does not indicate obligation. Yes, it is possible to infer from it the non-obligation of covering the neck, and in the preceding narration of Zurārah, there is also an allusion to this = Know that in this expression [ ] just as in the statements of other Shīʿī jurists, the issue of “the obligation of covering the hair” has not been addressed; rather, it appears from this expression that “covering the hair is not obligatory” … and al-Shahīd al-Awwal deemed “the obligation of covering the hair” closer to reality, and his evidence is the report of “Ibn Bābawayh from al-Fuḍayl” who transmitted from Imām al-Bāqir (a.s.); … and this narration, assuming the reliability of its chain is accepted, does not indicate “the obligation of covering the hair.” Yes, one can use this narration to argue for “the non-obligation of covering the neck,” and in the narration of “Zurārah” (which was mentioned earlier [in the text of Madārik al-Aḥkām]) there was also an allusion to “the non-obligation of covering the neck.”

a) He acknowledges that in most of the expressions of the Shīʿī jurists, there is no discussion of the obligation to cover the hair .

b) He considers the statements of most jurists to be apparent in [indicating] “the non-obligation of covering the hair” (it may appear from it that it is not obligatory) and believes that from “the unqualified command to pray” it is understood that specifically during prayer, covering the hair is not obligatory, and other narrations are also silent regarding the restriction to covering the hair.

c) He also deems the inference from the narration of al-Fuḍayl from Imām al-Bāqir (a.s.) insufficient for the obligation of covering the hair. Rather, he permits the logical possibility of using this narration to infer the non-obligation of covering the “neck” (it is possible to infer from it the non-obligation of covering the neck).

d) He says that: the narration of Zurārah ibn Aʿyan also conveys “the non-obligation of covering the neck” .

e) Although in his text, the issue of “the unqualified command to pray” and “its lack of restriction in the narrations” is cited, “the affirmation of a thing does not negate what is besides it,” and proving non-obligation during prayer does not amount to its obligation outside of prayer.

f) His reliance on the expressions of most of the companions can serve as an indication that in no discussion of jurisprudential topics (whether in the chapter on looking or the chapter on the clothing of the worshipper) did an explicit statement regarding “the obligation of covering the hair” appear from most scholars before him ; otherwise (even with a mention of the separation of topics) he would have referred to its precedent. Thus, the conclusion he draws also pertains to “the principle of the obligation or non-obligation of covering the hair.”

9- The late Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī, in the discussion of “the obligation of covering the ʿawrah” and after quoting the statements of some scholars such as Abī al-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī and Ibn al-Junayd regarding the principle of covering the ʿawrah, writes (Biḥār al-Anwār 83/180) ;

Then in the statements of most [jurists] there is no treatment of the obligation to cover the hair . And al-Shahīd in al-Dhikrā deemed obligation closer [to the truth], and this is more precautionary = Then know that in the statements of most Shīʿī jurists, there is no mention of “the obligation of covering the hair.” Al-Shahīd al-Awwal deemed the obligation of covering the hair closer to reality, and this approach of his is more compatible with precaution.

a) ʿAllāmah al-Majlisī , in a context where the discussion concerns the principle of the obligation of covering the ʿawrah and the enumeration of its instances that must be covered during prayer or otherwise (which must be covered during prayer and otherwise. Biḥār al-Anwār 83/177) , says: in the expressions of most Shīʿī jurists, nothing indicating “the obligation of covering the hair” is seen.

b) He himself, after considering all the evidence and the statements of the jurists, does not issue a definitive fatwā on “the obligation of covering the hair”; rather, based on the general method of the “Akhbārīs,” he exercises precaution .

پ ) با توجه به اینکه اخباریان شیعه ، عمدتا به روایات  مراجعه می کنند و آنها را مبنای حکم شرعی می شمارند و در این راه ، معمولا به روایات غیر معتبر ه نیز اعتماد می کنند ، باید پرسید ؛ چه اتفاقی افتاده است که یکی از آشنا ترین فقهای اخباری شیعه که جامعترین مجموعه ی حدیث شیعه ( بحار الانوار ۱۱۰ جلدی ) را ایجاد کرده و از هر کس دیگری به اخبار شیعه آشنا تر است ، آخر الامر به احتیاط روی می آورد و مستندی برای « فتوا » و « حکم صریح در خصوص پوشش مو » پیدا نمی کند ؟

۱۰- مرحوم ملا احمد نراقی در کتاب « مستند الشیعة ۴/۲۴۶ » می نویسد ؛

و منه یظهر الحال فی الشعر ، و انه لایجب ستره ، کما صرح به بعضهم . بل العنق ، کما عن بعضهم . بل الاذنین ، مع احتیاط فی الاخیر ، بل الثانی . و المراد بالشعر الذی لایجب ستره ، ما انسدل من الرأس و وقع علی الوجه و نحوه . و اما الواقع علی الرأس ، فوجوب ستره مجمع علیه . و فی الاخبار دلالة علیه = از این بررسی ، حکم « مو » آشکار می گردد و اینکه « پوشاندن مو ، واجب نیست » همانگونه که برخی فقهای شیعه به آن تصریح کرده اند . بلکه حکم « عدم وجوب پوشش گردن » نیز آشکار شد ، همانگونه که از برخی فقهاء نقل شده است ، بلکه حکم « عدم وجوب پوشش گوش ها » نیز آشکار شد ، البته با « احتیاط در پوشش گوش ها » بلکه « احتیاط در پوشش گردن » .

الف ) ایشان با قاطعیت تمام ، به « عدم وجوب پوشش مویی که از محدوده ی سر ، به محدوده ی صورت و کتف تجاوز می کند » فتوا داده است ، و این فتوا را به بعضی از فقهاء نیز نسبت می دهد . (یظهر الحال فی الشعر ، و انه لایجب ستره ، کما صرح به بعضهم ) .

ب ) وی ، عدم وجوب پوشش گردن و گوشها را هم مطرح کرده است . هرچند در هر دو مورد  احتیاط می کند . البته قول به عدم وجوب پوشش گردن را نیز به برخی فقهای شیعه نسبت می دهد . (لایجب ستره  … بل العنق ، کما عن بعضهم ) .

پ ) هیچ سخن صریحی در اختصاصی بودن این فتاوی ، نسبت به ستر صلاتی ، در کلام ایشان وجود ندارد . به عبارت دیگر ، اطلاق کلام او شامل هر دو بحث می شود .

۱۱- عمده ترین دلیل قرآنی در بحث « پوشش بدن » و چند و چون آن در مرد و زن ، آیات « ۳۰ و ۳۱ سوره ی نور » اند .  اکنون به این آیات توجه می کنیم ؛

قل للمؤمنین یغضوا من ابصارهم  و  یحفظوا فروجهم ، ذلک ازکی لهم ، ان الله خبیر  بما یصنعون . و قل للمؤمنات یغضضن من ابصارهن و یحفظن فروجهن ، و لایبدین زینتهن الاّ ما ظهر منها ، و لیضربن بخمرهن علی جیوبهن و لایبدین زینتهن الاّ لبعولتهن او آباء بعولتهن او ابنائهن او ابناء بعولتهن او اخوانهن او بنی اخوانهن او بنی اخواتهن او نسائهن او ماملکت ایمانهن او التابعین غیر اولی الإربة من الرجال او الطفل الذین لم یظهروا علی عورات النساء ، و لایضربن بأرجلهن لیعلم مایخفین من زینتهن ، و توبوا الی الله جمیعا أیها المؤمنون لعلکم تفلحون . ( نور ۳۰ و ۳۱ )

در این دو آیه ، احکامی در مورد پوشش بدن ، بیان گردیده است . عمده ی این موارد ، عبارتند از ؛

۱ ) « چشم ندوختن به نامحرم» ،برای زن و مرد . ( یغضوا من ابصارهم -  یغضضن من ابصارهن ).

۲ ) قرار ندادن زینت های طبیعی و غیر طبیعی زنان در معرض دید بیگانگان و نامحرمان . ( و لایبدین زینتهن الا … ) .

۳ ) جواز آشکار کردن زینت هایی که معمولا و طبیعتا آشکار اند ، مثل دست و صورت و زینت های عرفی و معمول در آنها که زنان در جوامع مختلف بشری عموما خود را با آن می آرایند . ( و لایبدین زینتهن الا ما ظهر منها ) .

4) The permissibility of revealing hidden adornments to certain female relatives (mahrams), such as: the husband, the father-in-law and his forefathers, the son and male descendants through sons and daughters, the stepson (born of another wife), the brother, the brother's son and his male descendants, the sister's son and his male descendants, unrelated women, a male slave in her ownership, and a male stranger or boy lacking carnal desire. (and not to reveal their adornment except to their husbands, or their fathers-in-law, or …).

5) Placing the headscarves so as to cover the bosom. (and to draw their veils over their bosoms).

6) Not stamping the feet with the intention of informing non-mahrams of their hidden adornments. (and let them not stamp their feet so as to reveal what they hide of their adornments).

Of course, differences of opinion have arisen among the jurists of the Sharia regarding the nature and extent of the indication of some of these cases upon obligation, prohibition, recommendation, or reprehensibility, just as various viewpoints have been expressed in identifying the instances of some of the aforementioned titles.

It is also necessary to recall that regarding the woman's relatives (mahrams), cases such as: "the father and forefathers, sons-in-law, paternal uncles and great-uncles, maternal uncles and great-uncles" are also added to the cases mentioned in the verse (concerning the permissibility of revealing hidden adornments before them). This matter is proven from other verses and narrations, and there is no considerable disagreement about it.

A) These two verses (cited by the jurists) are situated within an interconnected set of verses from Surah "An-Nur," attention to all of which clarifies the true intent and purpose.

The matter begins from verse 27, which concerns "the necessity of seeking permission and greeting" when entering others' dwellings, and concludes with verse 33, which concerns "the chastity of those who cannot marry and refraining from compelling slave girls into fornication." In between, mention is also made of placing women's headscarves (khimar) so as to cover the bosom (jayb) and refraining from displaying hidden adornments to adult, sane, non-mahram individuals.

It can even be said that all the opening verses of the Surah (which concern: fornication, imprecation, accusations of honor, the propagation of indecency, and the affinity of the impure with the impure and the pure with the pure – verses 1 to 21) relate to issues of honor and sexuality and the positive and negative relations of people in this regard, from an ethical and jurisprudential perspective.

Of course, in the concluding verses of the Surah (58 to 60), it returns again to the discussion of seeking permission, as if dedicating the core of this Surah to sexual and honor-related discussions.

B) In the opening verses up to 21, which concern "fornication, the propagation of indecency, slandering chaste women, and the great lie," the most severe phrases are used at the end of the mentioned verses. (Phrases such as: "and let not pity for them overcome you … and let a party of the believers witness their punishment /2" or "and that has been forbidden to the believers /3" or "those are the defiantly disobedient /4" or "…the sin he has earned … for him is a great punishment /11" or "this is a manifest lie /12" or "those, in the sight of Allah, are the liars /13" or "you would have been touched for what you indulged in with a great punishment /14" or "and it is, in the sight of Allah, great /15" or "for them is a painful punishment in this world and the Hereafter /19" or "they are cursed in this world and the Hereafter, and for them is a great punishment /23").

At the same time, "regarding seeking permission (isti'dhan), lowering the gaze (ghadd al-basar), guarding the private parts, and not revealing hidden adornments (not displaying adornment)" (verses 27 to 33), it suddenly abandons the language of threat, warning (of punishment), and compulsion to desist, and enters the field with the language of ethical recommendation, such as: "this is better for the believers (that is better for you / 27) or is purer (is purer for them / 30) or it is better for elderly women to refrain (that they refrain is better for them / 60)."

Therefore, if someone claims that these verses (in and of themselves) do not indicate obligation, not only has he not spoken idly, but his statement is also consistent with the apparent meanings of the Quranic expressions.

C) The late Naraqi, in his book "Mustanad al-Shiʿa 16/42 and 43," writes regarding "the permissibility of looking at the private parts of a non-Muslim":

… khilāfan li-l-Ḥillī [Ibn Idrīs] wa-l-Mukhtalif, li-iṭlāq qawlihi taʿālā: "Qul li-l-muʾminīn yaghuḍḍū min abṣārihim" wa yujāb ʿanhu; bi-annahu mujmal. wa maʿa al-taslīm, ʿalā al-wujūb ghayr dāll… = …Contrary to Ibn Idris al-Hilli and al-ʿAllama al-Hilli in the book "Mukhtalaf al-Shiʿa," who, citing verse 30 of Surah al-Nur, [held the view of "the impermissibility of looking at the private parts of a non-Muslim"]. In response to the view of these two jurists, it is said: "The meaning of the verse is ambiguous and vague," and assuming the acceptance of "the absence of vagueness and ambiguity in the verse's meaning," this verse does not indicate the obligation of "averting one's gaze (ghaḍḍ al-baṣar) and not looking."

He explicitly states that: "The verse does not indicate obligation" (ʿalā al-wujūb ghayr dāll).

D) Based on this interpretation, all the commands and prohibitions in the above verses (especially verses 30 and 31), considering the reasoning provided within them (dhālikum azkā lahum), are taken to imply non-obligation. That is, their commands are considered recommendatory (istiḥbābī) and their prohibitions are considered to indicate dislike (tanzīhī/kirāhatī).

E) Among those jurists who have commented on the verses of Surah al-Nur and their indication regarding the subject of covering the body, the vast majority have emphasized the derivation of "obligation" and have considered the commands in these two verses as obligatory and the prohibitions as prohibitory. Of course, in these verses, there is no explicit ruling regarding "covering the head and neck," and only by relying on "implied or necessary indication" do they say: "The ruling to cover the bosom with the khimār is also a ruling on the necessity of wearing the khimār on the head." This approach may stem from interpreting the verses with certain narrations, whose indication "of the obligation of covering the head and neck" is also not reassuring.

In these verses, specific items for covering are primarily and explicitly mentioned:

First: Covering the private parts, for both men and women (yaḥfaẓū furūjahum – yaḥfaẓna furūjahunna – lam yaẓharū ʿalā ʿawrāt al-nisāʾ).

Second: Covering the bosom for women (wa l-yaḍribna bi-khumurihinna ʿalā juyūbihinna), because the necklines (collars) of the customary clothing of that time were wide and open, and during trade, activities outside the home, or entertaining guests, other parts of women's bodies could be seen through their necklines. Even due to the lack of common undergarments, the potential for incitement to corruption through this means was greater than from other aspects. Therefore, using the common coverings of that time (khimār = a piece of cloth thrown over the head, taken behind the ears and tied, leaving the neck, bosom, and ears in view of others), the Holy Quran, in verse 31 of Surah al-Nur, only recommends "covering the bosom" using the available means, and no other recommendation can be definitively attributed to this Word of God, the Glorified.

Third: Covering the hidden adornments of the body for women (wa lā yubdīna zīnatahunna illā li-buʿūlatihinna… – wa lā yaḍribna bi-arjulihinna li-yuʿlama mā yukhfīna min zīnatihinna).

Fourth: It formally excludes from the scope of the "recommendation to cover" those things which were not customarily covered, making an exception for them. That is, not covering things that were not customarily covered is deemed permissible. (wa lā yubdīna zīnatahunna illā mā ẓahara minhā).

The late Muqaddas Ardabili offers the following opinion regarding things that were not customarily covered:

And also, if one looks at custom and outward appearance, especially of the poor women, the custom is that the neck, indeed the chest, the upper arms, the shins, and other such parts are visible. In sum, the ruling is problematic. = If one considers the custom and outward practice at the time of the revelation of the verse, particularly among poor women, the neck, the upper chest, the forearms, the shins, and certain other parts were usually not covered, and in brief, the ruling on the matter is problematic. (Zubdat al-Bayān 2/687).

Therefore, there is no explicit statement concerning “the necessity of covering the head and neck” in the verses of Sūrat al-Nūr; rather, the permissibility of not covering those parts of the body that were not customarily covered at the time of revelation has also been confirmed. Historical research likewise confirms that covering the head and neck (in all situations and all public places) was not prevalent.

11- Regarding the verse “al-Aḥzāb/59” and its lack of indication of the obligation to cover the head and neck, I draw the readers’ attention to the view of the late Ayatollah Muḥaqqiq Dāmād, as reported by Ayatollah Jawādī Āmulī in “Kitāb al-Ṣalāh 2/51 and 52”;

Discovering the secret of the revelation, by joining the beginning of the verse to its end, yields a result contrary to what has been inferred, and brings the jurist to the assurance that the ruling is among the recommended etiquettes, without obligation. … And it is evident that this language does not speak of obligation at all … so the noble verse is insufficient to convey obligation = Discovering the secret of the revelation of this verse and joining its beginning to its end yields a result contrary to the inference of the obligation of covering, and assures the jurist that the ruling in this verse is of the type expressing recommended, non-obligatory etiquettes … and it is clear that this phrase and the language used in it does not at all speak of requirement and obligation … so the noble verse is insufficient with regard to conveying obligation.

Paying close attention to phrases such as “without obligation = non-obligatory” and “insufficient to convey obligation = insufficient with regard to conveying obligation” and “does not speak of obligation at all = does not at all speak of obligation” leaves no doubt that “in the view of the late Muḥaqqiq Dāmād, verse 59 of Sūrat al-Aḥzāb has no indication whatsoever of the obligation to cover the parts of a woman’s body.”

In addition, the late Ayatollah Shaykh Muḥammad Mahdī Shams al-Dīn has also confirmed this same understanding. (Masāʾil Ḥarija fī Fiqh al-Marʾa 1/195 – this is in addition to the fact that the language of the verse is not one of requirement and obligation; rather, it is perhaps more apparent in indicating recommendation and discouragement = The language of this verse is not one of requirement and obligation; rather, it is perhaps more apparent in indicating recommendation and reprehensibility).

If we add these understandings to the rationale present in the noble verse itself (That is more likely that they be known and not be harmed), we arrive at a truth that “the late Ṭabarsī” points to in his commentary “Majmaʿ al-Bayān” regarding the occasion of the verse’s revelation, something that the late Muḥaqqiq Dāmād also relied upon.

Now, if we consider the differing exegetical understandings of commentators and jurists to be permissible, we arrive at nothing other than disagreement in the interpretation of this verse among commentators and jurists. Therefore, one cannot definitively use this verse as evidence for “the obligation of covering a woman’s head and neck.”

12- I have never claimed “a consensus on the non-obligation of covering the head and neck.” Rather, the utmost extent of my effort regarding the existence or non-existence of consensus on this issue has been to prove “the non-realization of a consensus on the necessity of covering the head and neck”. The reports presented so far concerning the differences of opinion among jurists regarding the head and neck were some of the evidence for proving “difference of opinion,” so that it becomes clear that, given the existence of opposing views, one should not rely on the claim of consensus by well-known jurists.

If one refers to the statements of well-known Shīʿa jurists and “their claims regarding the realization of consensus,” one can understand why I insist on “the non-realization of consensus” and the disputed nature of “covering the head and neck.”

When it is claimed that an issue is a matter of consensus and that there is no dissenting opinion, the path to investigating the foundations of the issue and examining the evidence is practically closed. Even some of the great jurists, such as the late Muhaqqiq Naraqi (Mustanad al-Shiʿa 4/242 and 243), and the author of Qawanin, the late Mirza Abu al-Qasim Qummi (Ghanaʾim al-Ayyam 2/255 and 256), have explicitly stated that "the main and primary evidence in this matter is consensus." The claim of consensus has been repeated in most of the books I have cited (in this writing) so far and in some other jurisprudential works, most of which, of course, pertain to the principle of "the obligation of covering the ʿawra or covering the body."

Even if the realization of consensus on this issue were proven, it would still not give independent value to the consensus, because "the claimed consensus is school-based (madraki)," and it is clear that "a school-based consensus has no authority."

13- In my opinion, the requirement of "reconciling the implications (jamʿ-i dalali)" and the necessity of applying it in this matter will lead to no result other than accepting the ruling of "the recommendability (istihbab) of covering the head and neck." This is not an unsubstantiated claim by an individual ignorant of Shiʿi jurisprudence; rather, great figures of jurisprudence, legal theory, virtue, piety, and sanctity have paid attention to this matter.

The late Muqaddas Ardabili writes on this subject (Majmaʿ al-Faʾida wa al-Burhan 2/105):

And were it not for the fear of the claimed consensus, it would be possible to rule for the exception of other than them from the head and what is usually apparent, so reflect... And reconciling the evidence by interpreting it as recommendability is also a clear path, so reflect = If there were no fear of the claimed consensus, the logical possibility of excepting other than the face and hands—that is, the head and other things that have usually been apparent—would have existed and still exists. So, ponder this point... and "reconciling the evidence" in such a way that it is "interpreted as recommendability" is a clear and accepted method, so ponder.

...In summary, it is not hidden that these reports support the aforementioned exception. Because their apparent meaning is the non-obligation of covering the head, so how about the feet? ... = In summary, these narrations support the aforementioned exception (regarding the face and hands up to the wrists), because their apparent meaning is "the non-obligation of covering the head," let alone the "feet"? ...

I think the words of this Shiʿi jurist and legal theorist on "reconciling the evidence" and "interpreting it as recommendability," and that this method is a "clear path" that is recognized and methodical, are sufficiently explicit regarding the intended point. Likewise, the phrase "the non-obligation of covering the head" possesses sufficient clarity and explicitness.

14- The late Haj Aqa Rida Hamadani, regarding the reliable (muwaththaqa) narration of Ibn Bukayr from Imam al-Sadiq (AS) which states: "A free Muslim woman can pray without having a head covering," has also written (Misbah al-Faqih 10/385):

And were it not for the turning away of the renowned jurists from the apparent meaning of this narration, it would be possible to reconcile it with most of the aforementioned reports by interpreting them as recommendability = If it were not for the turning away of the renowned jurists, there would be a logical possibility for reconciling the implications between these narrations and most of the aforementioned narrations so that they are "interpreted as recommendability."

Therefore, "interpreting as recommendability (al-haml ʿala al-istihbab)" is not an innovative or invented matter; rather, it is a principle that great figures of Shiʿi jurisprudence, centuries removed from our time, have also applied and bequeathed regarding "head covering." Paying attention to accepted principles and the heritage of the righteous predecessors, and making scholarly choices in disputed matters, is not a new thing nor a departure from the common jurisprudential method and foundation.

The late Ayatollah Khoei does not consider “the turning away of all scholars from acting upon a reliable narration” to be an obstacle to its value and authority, especially if there is a reason other than the weakness of the narrator (Kitab al-Tahara 3/359 and Kitab al-Sawm 2/103 and 104), let alone in cases where only “the well-known scholars” have turned away from it (meaning some scholars have acted upon it or assessed it as authoritative). Therefore, the logical and scholarly possibility of “interpreting it as recommended” still exists.

15- Regarding the possibility of misuse of such discussions, I agree with all those who have this concern. But one must ask all of them: what is to be done? Is the necessity of presenting theories that are derived based on accepted, scholarly, and thoroughly methodical approaches, and the necessity of the clash of opinions—which is the only path to the survival of the Muhammadan Sharia (PBUH) and especially its jurisprudence—any less than the necessity of preserving the custom of the religious community? Are the obvious theoretical deficiencies in the fields of theology, ethics, and jurisprudence, in the face of the unceasing needs of the present generation (even scholarly and legal circles outside of Islam), not the result of limitless precautions that have always been realized under the notion of defending the Sharia? Was not the very founder of the Islamic Republic (RA) reproached by some of his friends and students regarding certain of his fatwas (my intention is not to compare myself with him), and did he not state in response to them: “God forbid that a person should deny God’s rulings because of…”? Did he not say elsewhere that “some precautions are contrary to precaution”?

Observing custom in all societies is a rationally necessary matter, and, praise God, the situation of my family has not and does not necessitate arranging such a theory, but what is to be done in the face of the results of scholarly investigations?

The issue of covering the head and neck has been turned into a kind of “red line,” and a sanctuary has been created for it, as if researchers and jurists of the present age have no duty other than repeating platitudes and confirming prevailing interpretations. The establishment of a sanctuary in this matter has gone so far that, without rational or transmitted proof, it has been referred to by the fabricated title “the flag of Islam,” and all the efforts of our great jurists have been and are devoted to preserving it, and extraordinary sensitivity has been shown towards it. Yet, in contrast, no sensitivity has been or is shown towards explicit fatwas and statements regarding “the non-obligation of covering the shape of the private parts of men and women” (which is far more provocative of corruption than “not covering the head and neck”).

How can it be accepted that covering “the shape of the private parts of men and women,” which is far more provocative than their “hair, head, and neck,” is not obligatory, and some great jurists consider it “required by the conduct of the Muslims” (the late Abd al-A’la Sabzevari, Muhadhdhab al-Ahkam 5/244), and it is even explicitly stated in some Persian books of rulings (whose publisher is supported by official governmental and seminary centers), and yet the possibility of its misuse is not considered by others, while expressing an opinion about women’s hair or neck is met with such sensitivity?

The late Ayatollah Mutahhari writes regarding covering the shape (Notes 3/168):

The chador—not the face veil and loose trousers—although it has no inherent specificity, is good for two reasons. One is that it is a full-body garment and covers the shape of a woman’s body; it does not reveal the prominent, smooth, and thin parts (covering the shape is not obligatory, but it is certainly further from temptation). The second reason is that, at present, it is a symbol of keeping distance.

He explicitly states that “covering the shape is not obligatory,” and it is clear that this statement of his pertains to “non-prayer covering = covering outside of prayer.” Of course, his statement concerns the “recommendation” of covering the shape.

The implication of the approach of the overwhelming majority of jurists regarding the non-obligation of covering the shape of the body for both men and women is that: if a woman wears stretchy stockings that are completely tight and display the shape of the private parts, but whose texture is such that it does not reveal their color, and a blouse of the same material and type that displays all parts of the body and its contours (and, of course, with a headscarf that does not permit even a single strand of her hair to transgress), she can easily appear on the streets, television, cinema, and theater, and this would be entirely lawful according to the Sharia. Yet, regarding the hair, head, and neck, such meticulous care is taken lest they be misused? (Truly, this is a strange thing).

My claim is not that "the covering of the shape of the body and private parts must be deemed a religious obligation without rational or textual proof." Rather, I claim that: "If the criterion for the rational necessity or textual obligation of covering a body part is 'the predominance of its being stimulating to corruption over its not being so,' then regarding the predominance of the potential to stimulate corruption, one cannot doubt that not covering the shape of the private parts and body is more stimulating than not covering the head and neck." Therefore, how can one "permit the greater possibility of excitation and stimulation to corruption, and deem the far lesser possibility forbidden?!!"

This well-known approach can also be seen in the words of great contemporary jurists. Jurists such as the late Ayatollah Borujerdi (Taqrir al-Bahth 1/75, Taqrirat of Ayatollah Eshtehardi from the lectures of the late Borujerdi = al-Zahir there is no proof for the obligation of covering the shape of the private parts for men or women) and the late Ayatollah Khomeini (Tahrir al-Wasilah 1/143) also concur with others in this approach.

In any case, these points and questions such as "What difference in stimulating potential exists between enslaved and free Muslim women that covering the head and neck is not obligatory for the former but is for the free? (Considering that some slaves during the time of the Imams of Guidance (AS) were from Iran and Europe and, in terms of hair color variety and beauty, were more beautiful and attractive than many Arab women in Mecca, Medina, and Yemen)" must be met with an appropriate answer so that, as in the past, the rationality of the Muhammadan Sharia can be defended in today's world.

Considering that the essence of beauty in the area of the head and neck relates to the beauty of "the eyes, eyebrows, nose, mouth, lips, teeth, chin, and their composition," and Islam has not made covering them obligatory, what uniquely attractive quality is there in a woman's hair and neck that the necessity of covering them has been so emphasized by Muslims?

These questions and issues of this kind must lead to a scholarly and convincing explanation for any researcher in jurisprudence and Sharia; otherwise, mere imitative conformity is not permissible for scholars.

Of course, some criticisms, such as: "If there were a difference of opinion on this issue, Reza Shah would have learned of it and exploited it by using court clerics to endorse the 'unveiling,' and since this did not happen, it is clear there was no difference of opinion"!! After recalling the differences of opinion (from sources and documents accessible to esteemed readers) and reporting the viewpoints, this is not very credible or scholarly. Just as one of the internet sites affiliated with authoritarians in Iran wrote that: "This theory was intended to defend Reza Khan's unveiling"!!

The implication of the author's approach is that "more and more complete covering is recommended (mustahabb)." From where in this theory does it follow that: "An ignorant and oppressive individual may permit himself to forcibly remove the covering a woman desires, without her consent, let alone from half the population of a nation devoted to the Sharia"?!!

Conclusion of the Discussion

In my opinion, the collection of material presented provides the necessary capital for a summary judgment on: "whether the claim of a student like Ahmad Qabel is worthy of consideration or not," even if it has not provided "sufficient capital for agreement and shared opinion."

It is better to leave this part of the discussion open for researchers and critics so that they themselves may proceed to “draw conclusions” and assign “their own desired grade” to this claim, and if they deem the author’s viewpoint on this particular matter “worthy of consideration,” they would do him a kindness and “gift” him their supplementary views or scholarly critiques.

From the Merciful God, I ask for health, happiness, well-being, fairness, security, and prosperity in this world and the hereafter for all, and I hope that with these explanations, I have presented a little of the much and have resolved some of the ambiguities of my approach. (O God, whatever truth You have made known to us, we have borne it, and whatever we have fallen short of, convey it to us…).

Ahmad Qabel………..22/4/1384………..Tajikistan ……….. 13/7/2005

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Author: Ahmad Qabel

22 / 4 / 84 | Tajikistan

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