Pari Iranmanesh: An Inquiry into the Meaning, Types, and Scope of Religion from Ibn Arabi's Perspective

The Scope of Religion

In the course of his discussions, Ibn Arabi addresses the question of the scope of religion, which, of course, differs from what is discussed under this heading in contemporary philosophy of religion. One can, however, find an answer to the question of what humanity expects from religion: What is the primary aim of religion? Has it come to make our inner being heavenly, or to build an earthly paradise for us? The kind of answer given to this question will undoubtedly determine the direction of each person’s religious studies.[43]

While explaining the requirements of the immutable essences of the prophets, Muḥyī al-Dīn elaborates on their prerogatives and duties. In keeping with his customary mystical approach, he resolves issues through the divine names and immutable essences. Here, too, in connection with the discussion of immutable essences in explaining the mystery of predestination, he addresses the requirements of the immutable essences of the prophets and states: The requirements of the immutable essences of the prophets are, on the one hand, service to the primordial nature of humanity and delivering spirits from spiritual ailments (the answer to the question above), and service to religion on the other. In other words, they have one relationship with religion, such that they are absolutely in the service of religion and obedient to whatever religion dictates. And they have another relationship with the faithful; but they are not absolutely in their service, because human beings, in addition to their divine primordial nature and receptivity to religion, also possess a nature that is enveloped in lusts and casts dust upon that primordial nature. Therefore, if they were to be absolute servants of people’s desires, they could no longer be perfect servants of religion, for religion calls towards paradise and lusts towards hell: ḥuffat al-nār bi-l-shahawāt. Just as physicians of the body are, on the one hand, in the service of the human body and its treatment, and on the other, in the service of medicine and the science of healing; so too are the prophets in the service of the human spirit and primordial nature, and they have come to heal it. Just as the service of physicians to medicine is absolute and they are entirely at the disposal of the science of healing, their service to the patient is relative, meaning that it is not the case that the physician obeys whatever the patient’s sick nature demands (for example, someone suffering from hemorrhage asks for a great deal of water due to extreme thirst, even though it is harmful to them); rather, he strives to impose a healthy temperament upon the patient so that, consequently, the demands of their nature may also become healthy. The prophets and messengers, who are the physicians of the soul (wa nunazzilu min al-Qurʾān mā huwa shifāʾ wa raḥmah… religion is the cure and the prophets are the healers, and the Qurʾan has both identified spiritual ailments and the way to treat them), engage in dusting off the God-seeking primordial nature and restoring the temperaments of human beings to health, so that their demands may become sound: li-yastadūhum mīthāqa fiṭratihi… wa yuthīrū lahum dafāʾin al-ʿuqūl (Nahj al-Balāgha). And their true heirs and successors, namely the saints and true gnostics, are likewise in every age:

We are sages and physicians, arrived from Baghdad; / Many a sufferer have we redeemed from sorrow.

Eloquent physicians are we, disciples of the Messiah; / Many a dead one have we taken and breathed spirit into him.

We are divine sages, we ask no wage from anyone; / For we are pure of soul, not greedy and base.

We are skilled physicians who take no urine flask; / For we course through the ailing body like thought.

This statement of Ibn Arabi corresponds with al-Ghazali's words: “The mission of the Prophet consists of calling people to the Truth. However, since people live in the world and are in need of it, it becomes necessary to attend to the world to the extent of that need.” Al-Ghazali also considered true jurisprudence and the mission of the jurists after the Prophet to be the pursuit of that same prophetic mission in recognizing the spiritual ailments and treating them (the jurisprudence of the Hereafter), and he condemns those who have abandoned the true jurisprudence of religion and clung to the jurisprudence of the world.[44]

Mulla Sadra, too, in the nineteenth key of Mafatih al-Ghayb, and especially in the second and fourth witnessing-places, expounds upon the nobility of the knowledge of the Hereafter over the knowledge of the world.[45]

Furthermore, the prophets are absolutely in the service of God's legislative will and the propagation of His religion, and they carry out whatever His legislative will requires, paying no heed to the reactions of human beings. If a command is necessary, they command; if a prohibition is necessary, they prohibit, and in the course of proclaiming these matters, which are founded upon the holistic welfare of humanity, they have no concern for people's approval or disapproval.

A more precise exposition, analyzing the issue through the Lord of the Worlds and His names, is this: God possesses two wills, the existential and the legislative, and accordingly, the divine prophets also possess two stations: prophethood (nubuwwa) and sainthood (walaya). Of course, some prophets also hold the station of messengership (risala). Prophethood and messengership pertain to the outward aspect of the world, while sainthood corresponds to the inward dimension of existence. (We shall refrain from elaborating on this part.)

At the end of this section, based on this very division, he provides a mystical exposition and Qur'anic interpretation of the saying of the Noble Prophet: Shayyabatni Surat Hud (The Chapter Hud has made me old), though his more complete discussion of the interpretation of this hadith is found in the Futuhat.[46]

Examination (An Introduction to Sharia and Tariqa):

Among the numerous topics raised in this discussion, it is not possible to examine all of them in detail within a single article. Therefore, we shall only address the controversial subject of endorsed religion (din-e imza'i), which throughout history (aside from the historical debate) has also been a pretext for dispute and, at times, conflict with the Sufis and the people of gnosis.

In examining Ibn Arabi's claim, it seems the best approach is to scrutinize his source, namely verse 27 of Surah al-Hadid, which addresses the issue of Christian monasticism. To this end, we shall first glance at various commentaries, including tradition-based exegeses, then at the views of a few commentators on the Fusus, and thereafter at the criticisms leveled against this matter.

It is obvious that mentioning the understanding of all exegetes regarding the aforementioned verse is not possible here, so we shall only address a few important commentaries from both Shia and Sunni traditions. What emerges from the majority of commentaries is a confirmation of Ibn Arabi's understanding, at least concerning Christian monasticism.

Majma‘ al-Bayān: “... Regarding the failure to observe the right of monasticism, there are two views: 1. They did not observe that very self-devised thing (special worship) which they had made obligatory upon themselves. 2. They did not believe in the prophethood of the Prophet and the Qur’an... . This view of Zajjāj is confirmed by a tradition received from the Prophet. Ibn Mas‘ūd has reported that: I was riding behind the Prophet on a mount when he said: ‘Hark! O servant of God! Do you know whence the Children of Israel devised and contrived monasticism?’ I said, ‘God and His Messenger know best.’ He said: ‘Tyrannical, harsh zealots gained dominance over the Children of Israel—who, after the apostleship of Christ, had stooped to wickedness and sin. Following that dreadful event, the faithful people’s patience overflowed, and they rose up three times against the oppressors; but each time they were defeated, and all but a few took to flight, saying: If we confront these tyrants again, we shall all be destroyed and no religious person will remain to call people to God and His Prophet; therefore, let us scatter throughout the earth, until God raises up the Prophet whose coming Jesus foretold. After that, they went into the mountains and plains and invented monasticism, which was a kind of self-devised worship and devotion; but some of them did not even observe that, turning away from that path as well and taking the way of unbelief and misguidance.’” After narrating this tradition, Ibn Mas‘ūd adds that the Prophet then recited the verse ‘and monasticism...’ and said: ‘Do you know what the monasticism of my community is?... Emigration for the sake of God, and Jihad, and prayer, and fasting, and Hajj, and ‘Umrah.’”

...Elsewhere, Ibn Mas‘ūd says (quoting the Prophet’s words in commentary on this verse): “He who bears witness to my heavenly apostleship and call, and remembers the glad tidings of Jesus concerning my coming, has observed the right of monasticism; and he who declares my apostleship a lie has ruined himself.”[47]

Mullā Ṣadrā’s Commentary: He, who is thoroughly acquainted with mystical discussions and whose teachings are, to a great extent, indebted to the achievements of Ibn ‘Arabī;[48] in his numerous books laments the ignorant among the Sufis and considers them the cause of the deviation of mysticism and the pessimism towards it. In his commentary, after mentioning the statements and the meaning of the verse, and especially the meaning of the failure to observe (which is almost similar to other commentaries, particularly those of Ṭabarī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī), he addresses a point that can also be considered a historical document: ‘—True monasticism—... just as, among those attributed to Sufism in these times and in the Islamic era, some of them have observed its right—by purifying the inner self, practicing asceticism in the world, and cutting off from its people and possessions, seeking God’s pleasure—yet most of them have not observed its right; rather, they have added to it reputation-seeking, hypocrisy, singing, listening to music, occupying themselves with diversions, the company of falsehoods, and idleness, refraining from reflection and journeying in the spiritual realm, and from the remembrance of God except with the mere tongue in gatherings of people. So We give those believers among them who observe it their reward, but many of them are transgressors, and they are those who did not observe it and did not fulfill it...’[49].

Al‑Mizan: “The word rahbaniyyah (monasticism) derives from rahbah, meaning awe and fear, and is conventionally applied to renouncing the world by severing one’s relations with people, the motive for this being fear of God. The word ibtida‘ (innovation) means that a person makes something part of the religion that is not part of the religion, introducing a practice or custom that did not exist in any religion. The phrase ma katabnaha ‘alayhim (We did not prescribe it for them) answers an implicit question. It is as if someone asked: What is the meaning of their innovation? It is said: That they made something part of the religion which We had not prescribed for them. The meaning of the verse is that the followers of Christ, of their own accord, innovated a monasticism that We had not legislated for them; illa ibtigha’a ridwan Allah fa ma ra‘awha haqqa ri‘ayatiha (except for seeking God’s pleasure, yet they did not observe it with its due observance). This exception is, technically, a disconnected exception, and its meaning together with the preceding clause is that We did not make that monasticism obligatory upon them, but they themselves made it obligatory upon themselves for God’s satisfaction and to obtain His pleasure; however, they did not preserve that self‑made monasticism as it ought to have been preserved and transgressed its bounds. In this statement there is an allusion to the fact that the monasticism which the companions of Christ devised of their own accord, although God Almighty had not legislated it, was nonetheless pleasing to God Almighty. Fa atayna alladhina amanu minhum ajrahum wa kathirun minhum fasiqun (So We gave those who believed among them their reward, but many of them are transgressors). This verse indicates that they are like the communities of previous messengers: some are believers and are rewarded according to their faith, while most of them are transgressors, and transgression predominates…”[50].

‘Allamah then proceeds to relate the statement of Majma‘ al‑Bayan.

Nemuneh: “…According to this interpretation, monasticism was not originally part of the Christian religion and was later invented by its followers; however, at first it was a kind of asceticism and was considered one of the good innovations, like many commendable ceremonies and customs that are currently prevalent among people and which no one relies upon as divine legislation or a religious command. But this custom later deviated… The Qur’an’s expression fa ma ra‘awha haqqa ri‘ayatiha (yet they did not observe it with its due observance) indicates that if its right had been fulfilled, it would have been a good custom… In short, if a good custom becomes prevalent among people whose general principles (such as the command to asceticism) exist in the true religion, and people do not attribute that custom specifically to a divine command but rather regard it as an instance of the general commands and fulfill its right, it is not a bad thing. The misfortune begins when excesses and deficiencies arise and turn it into an evil custom… If we see that Islam vigorously combats this monasticism, it is because of its final form. The well‑known hadith la rahbaniyyata fi al‑Islam (there is no monasticism in Islam) is found in many Islamic sources. Among the ugly innovations of these people are: the prohibition of marriage, social isolation and turning one’s back on human duties in society, choosing remote monasteries and convents for worship and living, and then the corruptions that arose in these monasteries.”

This commentary then also quotes the narration from the commentary of Majma‘ al‑Bayan.[51]

Tabari: This authoritative commentary among the Sunnis first recounts the disagreements concerning the meaning of failing to observe the right of monasticism; then, following its hadith‑based approach to Qur’anic exegesis, it cites hadiths. What, in Tabari’s view, emerges from these hadiths is: 1. They innovated monasticism to obtain God’s pleasure. 2. Regarding the reason for failing to observe its right: some hadiths say the same as what was mentioned in Majma‘ al‑Bayan; some are similar to the arguments mentioned in the Nemuneh commentary, and there are hadiths that enumerate other reasons. 3. This group that failed to observe it is different from the group that innovated it.[52]

Fakhr al‑Din al‑Razi: This commentary adds nothing beyond what has been said in the other commentaries. Fakhr al‑Razi first explains the meaning of monasticism and strongly emphasizes that ibtida‘ (innovation) in this verse does not carry a blameworthy meaning. He then presents five exegetical aspects for the meaning of fa ma ra‘awha haqqa ri‘ayatiha (yet they did not observe it with its due observance), which in his view pertains to the monks who came after the founding group: inclination toward the Trinity and union (with God), abandoning the original monasticism through worldliness, hypocrisy, and mere verbal adherence (‘Ata’ said: they did not observe it as the disciples observed it), abandoning obligations, and not believing in the Prophet despite having recognized him.”[53]

It goes without saying that these narrative claims, in addition to the examination of their chains of transmission, textual implications, and the interpretations of exegetes, require—and perhaps demand—extensive scrutiny from the standpoint of the history of Christianity and especially the history of Christian mysticism.[54]

Deemed Religion in the View of the Commentators on the Fuṣūṣ:

The Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam is one of the most fortunate books in attracting the attention of thinkers, both proponents and opponents, and it has numerous commentaries.[55] Relating all of their views would exceed the scope of this article; however, most commentators, including Qūnawī, Jandī, Ibn Turka, Jāmī, Khwārazmī, Kāshānī, Qayṣarī, Pārsā, and many ancient and contemporary commentators,[56] have accepted his words and sometimes added a supplement to them. Due to the constraints of space, we have selected only the words of two eminent figures, which more or less encompass the statements of the other commentators as well:

Tāj al-Dīn Khwārazmī: "...First, there is the religion that God, glorified and exalted be He, has chosen; and the second religion is that which the masters of guidance, by the light of Truth, and the companions of reflection upon the world of Command and creation, impose and oblige upon themselves, of their own accord, hardship for the sake of recognizing the station of their servitude..., as He, the Exalted, said: 'And monasticism, which they invented...' This refers to the sacred laws that wisdom and gnosis have necessitated; not that a known messenger from God brought it to the commonality of worshippers. Rather, monks, through a specific, well-known method in tradition, originated and invented it. So, since the wisdom and outward expediency in these laws were in accord with the divine ruling in what is intended by the divinely instituted legislation—which is the perfection of souls through knowledge and action—God, the Exalted, deemed their innovations and inventions as valid, just as He deemed His own sacred laws valid, and just as He deemed valid what He has made obligatory upon the commonality of His servants; for this is the path of the elect, not the common people.

...We did not make it obligatory upon them, and they did not undertake these binding spiritual struggles except to seek the pleasure of God (the meaning of the verse). He placed veneration in their hearts for what they invented and instituted as sacred law, by which they seek God's pleasure, upon a path other than the prophetic way. Such as reducing food, refraining from excessive speech, abandoning sociability and mixing with the common people, choosing seclusion, preferring isolation, increasing fasting, decreasing sleep, and constant remembrance; not choosing what contradicts the prophetic way, such as drinking what is forbidden or worshipping idols..."[57]

ʿAfīfī in his commentary on the chapter on Ezra: "But monasticism is not exclusive to Christians; rather, Islam has also moved along a parallel line, which is the line of the teachings of the ascetics and Sufis. The Sufis hold that this entire tradition is derived from an esoteric knowledge that they inherited from the possessor of this knowledge, namely, Muḥammad (peace be upon him). For, in their view, Muḥammad possesses two kinds of knowledge: a knowledge of the outward aspect of the Law, which is what God revealed to him, and a knowledge of the inward aspect of the Law, which is his legacy for the Muslim saints after him. Ibn ʿArabī made this theory, in which he explains the nature of messengership, prophethood, and sainthood, the basis of his defense of monasticism and Sufism, and he views the teachings of the Sufis as a part of the teachings of Islam—Islam in a sense more general than what people understand, not the Islam that consists solely of the rules of the revealed Law. Yes, an Islam that possesses both these rules and is constituted by the esoteric knowledge of the Law, which shone directly from the unseen world upon the heart of the Prophet and was disclosed to him not in his capacity as a prophet, but in his capacity as a saint, and will always be disclosed to every Muslim saint after him."[58]

Opponents of Ibn ʿArabī's View

Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī: He is a pure Shiʿi mystic, deeply devoted to the People of the House of Infallibility and Purity, and in many subjects, this inclination of his profoundly influences his knowledge.

In his highly important book Jāmiʿ al-asrār wa manbaʿ al-anwār,[59] Seyyed repeatedly brings up the discussion of monasticism. For example, on p. 210, point 404, he relates an account of a group of monks entering Medina during the caliphate of Abu Bakr. The caliph is at a loss to answer their mystical question concerning the Quran's view on the Face of God, but through Salman al-Farsi they are guided to the true caliph and, upon receiving Imam Ali's precise answer, embrace Islam: fa-aslama al-rahbāniyyūn kulluhum bi-dhālika ʿalā yadihi wa ṣārū muwaḥḥidīn ʿārifīn.

On page 358, he considers the Mosaic religion as inclined toward perfecting material aspects and the Christian religion as inclined toward spiritual aspects, which is why mystical tendencies, such as monasticism, arose within it. However, due to its comprehensive and all-encompassing nature, he holds that monasticism has been lifted in Islam: "wa qad awrada baʿḍ al-fuḍalāʾ hādhā al-baḥth bi-ʿaynihi fī baʿḍ taṣānīfihi wa huwa qawluhu: lammā kāna al-takmīl al-mūsawī fī ṭarīq al-kamāl al-muṭlaq al-nawʿī, kāna mayluhu ilā takmīl al-juzʾ al-akhass min al-insān wa huwa al-badan; wa li-dhālika shuḥinat al-tawrāh bi-bayān maṣāliḥ al-maʿāsh. wa lammā kāna ʿĪsā akmal minhu, kāna takmīluhu li-l-juzʾ al-ashraf minhu wa huwa al-nafs wa li-dhālika shaḥana al-injīl bi-bayān al-maṣāliḥ al-maʿād. wa lammā kāna Muḥammad ṣ qad ḥāza al-kamāl al-muṭlaq al-nawʿī kāna takmīluhu li-juzʾay al-insān maʿan. fa-inna ghāyat al-murakkab huwa ikmāl jamīʿ ajzāʾihi al-māddiyya wa al-ṣūriyya wa huwa sulūk al-faḍīla, wa hādhā huwa sirr rafʿ al-rahbāniyya fī dīnihi."

On page 453, Seyyed proceeds to state and explain the types and categories of revelation, inspiration, and unveiling. In his discussion of general inspiration, he states that every inspiration, unveiling, and disclosure must be measured against the Book and the Sunnah (the unveiling of the Infallibles). Of course, contrary to the earlier statement, these remarks, which also appear in the seventh chapter of Qaysari's prolegomena to the Fuṣūṣ, cannot be considered in direct opposition to, or as an 'endorsed religion' (dīn imḍāʾī).

Allameh Tabatabai: In his Risālat al-wilāya, he first discusses the nature of true perfection and its essence (tawḥīd), then examines the path to this perfection. He strongly attacks those who hold that the path of perfection, or a portion of it, has not been expounded in the Sharia and who therefore believe in a spiritual path (ṭarīqa) that is pleasing to God Almighty, similar to what has been said regarding monasticism:

"...God, the Glorified, is the ultimate reality of every perfection... The true perfection of every contingent being is to be annihilated in Him, and the true perfection for the human being is likewise to become absolute, to be freed from all constraints, and to be annihilated in Him. Indeed, there is no perfection for the human being other than this: kullu man ʿalayhā fānin wa yabqā wajhu rabbika dhū al-jalāl wa al-ikrām (al-Raḥmān 26-27). Self-knowledge is the best and nearest path to attaining perfection, and there is no doubt in this. However, the question is: what is the quality and method of wayfaring and moving along this path? Some have supposed that the quality of wayfaring this path has not been clarified or expounded in the Sacred Law. Some writers have even claimed that the method of spiritual wayfaring in Islam is like monasticism in Christianity, which the Christians innovated and introduced as a heresy without a divine ruling descending, yet God, the Glorified, accepted it from them, based on verse 27 of Surah al-Hadid: 'rahbāniyyatan ibtadaʿūhā...'; and they have also said that the method of self-knowledge has not been set forth in the Sharia, even though the Sharia is a path to the approved perfection. This is a summary of their words. And it is for this reason that we find, among some of the wayfarers of this mode, specific ascetic practices and spiritual conducts that are not mentioned in the legal sources and are not observed in the conduct of the Prophet and his Household. All of these methods are based on the very belief we mentioned. Their goal is to cross over and arrive (at their intended perfection), by whatever means possible, while preserving that goal. Similar to this are the methods that have reached us from non-Muslims, including the theistic philosophers and their practitioners of asceticism.

اما شیوه‌ی حق و درست، که اهل حقیقت برآنند و ظاهر کتاب و سنت نیز آن را می‌رساند، آن‌است که شریعت اسلام، هیچ نحوی به سالک راه الهی اجازه‌ی توجه به غیر الله را نمیدهد، و تمسک به(غیر) خدای سبحان را روا نمی‌دارد، مگر از راهی که خود شریعت به لزوم و به‌کار‌گیری آن فرمان داده است. حقیقت آن‌است که شریعت اسلام ذره‌ای از آنچه را که مربوط به سعادت و شقاوت آدمی می‌شود را، ناگفته نگذاشته است و بلکه آنرا بیان نموده است و تمام چیزهای کوچک و بزرگ و سخت و آسان لازم برای سیر و سلوک به سوی خداوند را واضح نموده است...:«نزلنا علیک الکتاب تبیانا لکل شیء؛ نحل 89 ». «لکم فی رسول الله اسوة حسنة؛ احزاب 21 »...، علاوه بر آیات متعدد قرآن، روایات مستفیضه و بلکه متواتره‌ای از اهل‌بیت در این باب به دست ما رسیده است، که از تمام این‌ها بر‌می‌آید که بهره‌ی هر کسی از کمالف به مقدار تبعیتش از شرع است. البته همانطور‌که می‌دانید، کمال دارای درجات متعدد است... . خلاصه آنکه، شرع مقدس ذره‌ای در بیان چگونگی سیر‌و‌سلوک از راه نفس و معرفت نفس اهمال و کم‌گویی نکرده است.»[60]

سپس علامه به توضیح و تحلیل تقسیم سه‌گانه‌ی معروف از عبادت و دینداری می‌پردازند و نتیجه‌ی حاصله از هر‌یک را می‌شمارند. رسیدن به کمال مطلوب از راه عبادة الاحرار است که ‌منشأش عشق است و معرفت: بنده‌ی عشقم و از هر دو جهان آزادم.

نتیجه گیری:

نگارنده، به هیچ‌وجه در‌صدد تطهیر بِدعت‌های برخی صوفیان ناصافی، و آفاتی که از ناحیة‌ برخی عارف‌نمایان بر تاریخ این ملت رفته است، نمی‌باشد، اما در سلوک حقیقت طلبی خود، فعلاً، بر این اعتقاد است که تکیه بر معارف و دستاوردهای عرفان اصیل می‌تواند در جدال امروزین مدرنیته و سنت (که دین شاخص‌ترین نماینده‌ی آن‌است)تا حدّ‌ زیادی از خسارات این جدال بکاهد و دین را همچنان حریفی سرزنده در میدان ستیز با مادی‌گرایی نگه‌دارد؛ و محی‌الدین در این راه سراجی پرفروغ است که نباید از او به غفلت گذشت.

قضاوت در باب شریعت و حقیقت، بسیار دشوار بوده و پردامنه است که در اینجا اشارة اندکی بدان می‌نماییم.  سه اصطلاحِ شریعت و طریقت و حقیقت، از واژهای پر‌استفاده در کتب عرفانی است و برای آن‌ها تعاریف متعددی ارائه شده است. یک تعریف ساده‌ی آن عبارت است از:

شریعت: دو معنا از شریعت در مباحث عرفانی به کار می‌رود: الف: معنای عام که تمام آنچه در اسلام آمده است را در‌بر می‌گیرد و مرادف با دین است؛ ب: معنای خاص: فقط به دستورالعمل‌های فقهی و ارزشی دین یعنی احکام (و اخلاق دینی)اطلاق می‌شود. در بحث شریعت و طریقت و حقیقت، محل نزاع معنای خاص شریعت می‌باشد، گرچه در برخی مواقع، در این بحث معنای عام نیز وارد بحث می‌گردد.

طریقت: مقصود، مجموعه دستوراتی است که عمل به آن در وصول و رسیدن به حق‌تعالی شرط است و تقرب الی‌الله از نظر عارف بدون آنها میسور نیست. فرق میان دستوراتی که در شریعت و دین آمده است، با دستوراتی که در عرفان بیان می‌شود، این است که در شریعت، آن دستورات به صورت عام ذکر شده است و لکن در عرفان عملی به صورت برنامه‌ی جزیی بیان می‌گردد و یا مصادیقی برای آن ذکر می‌شود که در شریعت نیامده است.

حقیقت: به معارف و حقایقی که از راه شهود و کشف، نصیب عارف واصل می‌شود، حقیقت اطلاق می‌گردد، که بیان آن حقایق و معارف ، همان عرفان نظری است.[61]

The battle of opinions between scholars of jurisprudence and mystics concerning these three is familiar to both the general public and the elite. On the one hand, mystics, by labeling jurists and people of the exoteric law as “people of outward appearance” (one does not ask al-Shafiʿi about such matters), and this group, in turn, by labeling some adherents of Sufism and mysticism as people of innovation, antinomians, and irreligious, have fueled this time-consuming dispute.[62] It seems that many of these disagreements stem from a lack of linguistic understanding and semantic misunderstanding in both groups. Furthermore, not sharing the same intellectual horizon in understanding religious concepts, in the method of jurisprudential inquiry and religious studies, in the accepted foundations regarding the domain, purpose, ultimate end, kernel and shell of religion, humanity’s expectation of religion and vice versa, as well as the historical conduct of both groups, and so on, are among the other factors of these disagreements, which have existed and continue to exist not only in the religion of Islam but in all religions, especially those where sacred law plays an active role. Another important point is that both groups, in proving their own views, cite original religious sources, and it is not the case that one can easily be dismissed from the arena by this criterion.

For a brief acquaintance with the mystics’ view on the necessity or non-necessity of the sacred law and the relationship between the two, we will first present a portion of Lahiji’s commentary on the mystical poem Gulshan-i Raz (which is a summary of the views of great mystics and scholars of mysticism, including Qaysari in his treatises), and then we will sit in judgment regarding the views of Muhyi al-Din. A: Verses 346 to 367 of Gulshan-i Raz concern these three terms and the view of the people of mysticism on this matter:

...The sacred law is the shell, the kernel is the truth         Between this and that lies the path...

“The manner of reconciliation between the words of the saints and mystics and the scholars is that, of these three groups who have attained the station of union and true unification, the first category, which was mentioned as not having returned from the state of immersion and intoxication to the station of sobriety and having become deprived of intellect, by the consensus of all, the obligations of the sacred law and outward acts of worship are not incumbent upon them, and they are the freedmen of the Real, ‘They are neither to be followed nor reproved’ applies to their state. And those other two groups, who are commanded to guide and have come from the station of intoxication and immersion to the shore of sobriety, the obligations of the sacred law and acts of worship are not lifted from them... And by the consensus of all, they must certainly observe all the rites of the sacred laws and acts of worship: firstly, so that they themselves may move from that station of variegation and veiling to the station of steadfastness; secondly, so that they may be able to guide and direct seekers. And for this reason, commands and prohibitions are not lifted from them. And if novices are obligated and commanded from one aspect, they are obligated from two aspects...’”[63].

Therefore, the intention of that group of marketplace Sufis who shun the sacred law (whom al-Lumaʿ divides into three categories) and their saying, If the realities were to appear, the sacred laws would be nullified:

I found God, I saw the Reality I went forth from the bondage of the sacred law

is an incorrect path and saying, and this saying of Rumi, who himself is an advocate of the unity of these three, must be interpreted, allegorically explained, and justified in light of his other sayings:

When you have reached the rooftops of heaven Cold would be the search for the ladder

Except for aiding and teaching others Cold would be the path of good after good

The upshot is that the predominant view of the Sufis is that there is no distinction or difference between these three, and the difference and separation pertain to the degrees of religiosity and the religious. Just as true religiosity comes down to the combination of these three: “Indeed, the sacred law, the path, and the truth are names that apply truthfully to one single reality, which is the reality of the Muhammadan sacred law, considered from different perspectives, and there is no difference between them except in consideration of the stations.” And as Ibn Arabi says: “There is no truth that contradicts a sacred law, because the sacred law is part of the truths, so it is a truth for you called sacred law, and it is entirely true, so the very essence of the sacred law is the very essence of the truth, and the sacred law is true... but one who does not know imagines that the sacred law contradicts the truth, and far be it from what they imagine; rather, the truth is the very essence of the sacred law, for the sacred law is a body and a spirit: its body is the knowledge of rulings, and its spirit is the truth... So the sacred law is the kernel of the intellect, and the truth is the kernel of the sacred law; it is like the oil within the kernel which the husk protects; the kernel protects the oil, and the husk protects the kernel. Likewise, the intellect protects the sacred law, and the sacred law protects the truth. So whoever claims a sacred law without intellect, his claim is invalid... and whoever claims [truth] without a sacred law, his claim is invalid.”[64].

B: Judging Ibn Arabi's View[65]

1: Ibn Arabi is a first-rate scholar in Islamic studies and related sciences such as exegesis, hadith, jurisprudence, legal theory, philosophy, theology, etc.[66] Therefore, he cannot be dismissed with the cudgel of ignorance.

2: In his view, the Sharia is highly revered and obligatory, and the necessary path to attaining truth: The Sharia is divine etiquette, the path to felicity and reaching mystical unveilings. The laws of the Sharia are arranged based on the welfare of this world and the hereafter, and one must necessarily act upon them; their abrogation is impossible: Do not follow one whose Sharia has lapsed; The Truth is the very essence of the Sharia; Whoever claims the prophethood of legislation after Muhammad (PBUH) has lied....[67]

Like other renowned mystics, he considers jurisprudence, or the science of the Sharia, as a prelude to the science of Truth (I refer the reader to the weighty treatise Sullamī on these two sciences)[68]; and, like them, he holds that: "There is no Sufism except through jurisprudence... no jurisprudence except through Sufism"[69]. In a comprehensive statement, he divides religious people, including scholars, into three groups: the Exotericists (Ẓāhiriyya), the Esotericists (Bāṭiniyya), and the People of God (Ahl Allāh). He considers the first group deficient in religious understanding and practice, deems the second group entirely void, and regards authentic religiosity and religious understanding as belonging to the third group, who, in religious understanding, attend to the inner meaning, the philosophy of rulings, and the spirit of religion, and in religious practice, integrate the exoteric and the esoteric. Regarding the Esotericists, who do not consider the outward aspect of religion and the Sharia obligatory, he says: "This sect, which deals only with the inner and has cast aside the outer, has gone astray and leads astray (Hujwīrī and Suhrawardī call them heretics)[70]... Imam Abū Ḥāmid, in al-Mustaẓhirī, has exposed their errors (and deemed the killing of some of them permissible)[71]... All felicity is with those who have combined the outer and the inner, namely the People of God and the gnostic Sufis, who are, however, very few..."[72]

In distinguishing the religious understanding of the People of God from that of exotericist religious scholars (the scholars of formalities), besides the People of God's attention to the philosophy and wisdom of legislation and the spirit of religion, and their lack of unwarranted insistence on outward appearances and accidental aspects of religion, he says that the People of God derive the rulings of the Sharia directly from the original sources, without the mediation of narrators and transmitters. This is due to their spiritual strivings, whereby they elevate themselves, rather than bringing religion down to the level of their own understanding: "We took many of the rulings of Muhammad, which are established in the Sacred Law, from the scholars of formalities, and we possessed nothing of it. And when we took these rulings from this path (the gnostic wisdom and discernment which, in his view, is among the sources for deriving legal rulings for the People of God), we found that what the scholars of formalities have is the same as what we have. It is through this path that I judge the authenticity or weakness of the prophetic hadiths that have reached us. This is why the Lawgiver has affirmed the ruling of the jurist who exercises independent reasoning, even if he errs; but the people of the Path take nothing except what the Messenger of God has ruled. This is a testament from individuals, and his path in acquiring sciences is the path of Khiḍr, alongside Moses. He, too, is upon our Sacred Law, although the ways of reaching sound knowledge are diverse."[73].

Therefore, in his view, just as the world of existence, including human existence, has an outer and an inner aspect, so too does the Sharia. One address from God is with the outer, and another address is with the inner, and the People of God do not prefer one over the other, unlike the other two groups.

Muḥyī al-Dīn offers a mystical reason and an epistemological-psychological reason for the intolerance of the other two groups, particularly the scholars of outward forms, toward those who hold beliefs different from their own: 1. In the Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, chapter of Shuʿayb, where he analyzes the meaning of the heart (which is greatly emphasized in the Qurʾān and mysticism), he says that the hearts of human beings have mostly not attained vastness and expansion, and apart from the perfect mystics, others suffer from a constriction of the heart; therefore, they recognize God the Exalted only by a particular name and deny the other names and attributes through which He manifests Himself to others, and thus they fall into cursing and excommunication. But the people of God, on account of the expansion of the breast they have attained, know that “to God belong the Most Beautiful Names” and, based on this expansive knowledge of the aspect of the Absolute God, they do not deny His manifestation through other names, nor do they fall into cursing and excommunication. Others, however, will come to realize this point at the Resurrection, through a bestowed cognitive perfection. He thus explains inter-religious strife and the disputes among intra-religious groups.

The war of the seventy-two sects—excuse them all; Since they saw not the truth, they took to the path of fable.

It is worth noting that ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, in his Tafsīr al-Mīzān, has also interpreted “guidance” as the expansion of the breast.[74]

2: A profound cognitive difference lies between the people of God and others. The people of God are immersed in a bewilderment beyond knowledge and dare not claim certainty:[75]

A bewilderment comes from love upon that speech; It has not the audacity to recount the adventure.

For the Truth itself is ever-changing and manifold;[76] unlike the scholars of outward forms in every religion (the jurist, the theologian, and the non-mystic philosopher—with the qualification of all three) who readily claim certainty and imagine that the truth has become theirs, and thus consider themselves its defenders and guardians, yet do not know that the divine self-disclosures are in constant flow. They know nothing of the perpetual change and transformation of these self-disclosures...

Know this truth, not that all these are the Truth; Nor is this flock wholly astray.

He who says all is truth is a fool; And he who says all is false, he is wretched.

Nevertheless, Ibn ʿArabī considers them excusable and rewarded from one perspective, and even, like other devout mystics, thanks and appreciates them for preventing the spread of the esoteric mystical path among the common people, who, through misunderstanding or failure to comprehend these profound teachings (trust in God, contentment, submission, annihilation, divine decree and destiny, etc.), would both lead themselves astray—and consequently cause the backwardness of society (such as clumsy fatalism and predestinationism and the individual and social laziness resulting from it)—and cause the deviation and defamation of the subtle mystical teachings. He even censures mystics who divulge these secrets to the common folk and deems them deserving of punishment: “For the one who enforces the legal punishment upon him is rewarded, and he himself is not sinful, like al-Ḥallāj and those who followed his path.”[77].

3: But what is the Sharīʿa?

A: The Sharīʿa is the manifest way brought by the messengers by God’s command, and thereafter it is the duty of the mujtahid to derive these rulings through valid proofs (not by analogy). It is here that he says: “Whatever I have, I have from the prayer mat.”[78] But as mentioned, the Sharīʿa has an inner dimension, just as the human being possesses an inner dimension. Hollow legalism and soulless, mechanical externalism (which is the product of a certain type of theology) contradict the purpose and spirit of religious devotion: Complete felicity, all of it, is with the community that has combined the outer and the inner.[79]

B: The Sharīʿa, in addition to what has been mentioned, has another category: And the practices innovated in the manner of drawing near to God, as in His saying, Exalted is He: “And monasticism, which they innovated.” And the Messenger of God said: “Whoever institutes a good practice...” Thus He permitted us to innovate what is good, and placed in it the reward for the one who innovates it and for the one who acts upon it.[80]