The Article “Scholarly Exclusivism in the Domain of Religion” by Arash Naraghi

Is religious exclusivism a defensible position from an epistemic and moral standpoint? Is religious pluralism, in comparison to religious exclusivism, a superior and more considered position? In this essay, I wish to briefly argue that at least one form of religious exclusivism is morally and epistemically defensible and, in important respects, is superior to religious pluralism. In the first part of the article, I will present an account of this theory, and in the second part, I will briefly examine the shortcomings of the theory of religious pluralism.

Part One: An Account of the Theory of Scholarly Exclusivism

What is religious exclusivism? Exclusivism can be examined on at least two different levels: exclusivism at the level of truth or knowledge, and exclusivism at the level of salvation.

Religious exclusivism at the level of truth or knowledge: Exclusivism at this level is a view about religion and its relation to truth that possesses the following characteristics: (1) The religious believer holds, on rationally justified grounds, that at least the core tenets of their chosen religion are true; and (2) on this basis, they come to hold, in a rationally justified manner, that any religion or school of thought that entails propositions contradicting those core tenets is, at least to the extent that it entails such propositions, false; (3) the individual has more or less sufficient knowledge of the content of other religions; (4) and acknowledges that within those religions there are genuine instances of piety, righteousness, and sincere devotion that are truly praiseworthy and inspiring; (5) and concedes that they themselves have no decisive proof at their disposal that could necessarily convince reasonable and sincere opponents of their religion of the truth of its claims regarding that religion.^[1] This position can be called "scholarly exclusivism," and the individual who possesses these five characteristics can be called a "scholarly exclusivist."

In scholarly exclusivism, the individual not only adopts their religious beliefs (or at least their central beliefs) on rationally justified grounds, but is also sensitive and responsive to criticisms and potential defeaters of their beliefs. That is, one of the conditions for the rationality of their beliefs is that there be no undefeated defeaters for those beliefs. Therefore, the scholarly exclusivist is always sincerely and truth-seekingly open to criticisms and defeaters raised against their religious beliefs, and after empathetically understanding those cases, strives to fairly assess the weight of those criticisms. If they can show that those criticisms and defeaters do not lead to their claimed conclusion, meaning their religious beliefs emerge unscathed from the crucible of those criticisms, then they are epistemically entitled to continue adhering to their beliefs. However, if those criticisms are serious and valid, then the scholarly exclusivist considers themselves rationally obliged to either offer a new interpretation of those beliefs that is immune to the defeaters, or, if they fail in this endeavor, they inevitably consider themselves rationally obliged to abandon those beliefs.^[2]

Among the things that challenge the exclusivist beliefs of a scholarly religious person, the following two phenomena can be mentioned:

            The first phenomenon is that of religious diversity and plurality. The scholarly believer knows that other religions have existed in the world and throughout history that have been, from a theoretical standpoint, rationally appealing or at least rationally acceptable, and from a practical standpoint, have had a luminous and inspiring record, including the fact that within the context of those religions, spiritual and virtuous individuals have flourished whose moral and spiritual worth is undeniable. Scholarly exclusivism acknowledges this phenomenon and has a positive sensitivity toward it. This sensitivity manifests itself particularly in two respects: (first,) when confronted with the phenomenon of religious diversity and plurality, the scholarly exclusivist finds himself rationally obliged to re-examine and reassess his religious beliefs (which, from his perspective, are true). If, after this critical examination, he concludes that his belief in the truth of the central propositions of his chosen religion remains defensible and rationally justified, then he continues his adherence to those beliefs. Here, emerging triumphantly from this test can increase his heartfelt confidence in his chosen religion. The phenomenon of religious diversity and plurality prompts believers toward a more meticulous and critical scrutiny of their religious beliefs, and in this respect, it plays an important role in the refinement and flourishing of the scholarly individual's religious faith. (Second,) those who are outside the scholarly exclusivist's chosen religion (whether they believe in another religion or are fundamentally free of any religion), due to their faith-distance from the exclusivist's religion, can discern the shortcomings of his beliefs with greater precision and impartiality and bring them to his attention. In this way, these critics continually compel the scholarly exclusivist toward a creative re-examination of his religious faith. Therefore, the phenomenon of religious diversity plays a flourishing and irreplaceable role for the religious faith of the scholarly exclusivist. If the scholarly exclusivist's beliefs are false, these diligent opponents help him see the falsity of those beliefs; and if those beliefs are in fact true, they help him gain greater confidence in his conviction of their truth; and if the formulation of those beliefs suffers from deficiencies, they make him aware of those deficiencies and prompt him to remedy them. It is in this sense that a requirement of scholarly exclusivism is that the space for religious discussion and analysis remain open and safe, and it is in this sense that scholarly exclusivists must, for their part, strive to ensure that the proponents of alternative or rival religious viewpoints, as well as opponents of religion, remain in the arena of dialogue, discussion, and intellectual critique within society and freely present their views and critique and examine rival views. Scholarly exclusivists themselves must also actively participate in these dialogues and clashes of opinions. The realization and flourishing of scholarly religious exclusivism depends on the provision of the possibility for the free presentation and critique of rival religious views, including anti-religious views.

            The second phenomenon is the fact that many religious people, including scholarly exclusivists, had they been born in another time and place and grown up within the context of another religious culture, would most likely have adopted another religion and considered other religious beliefs to be true. Does this fact not show that believers' belief in the truth of the central propositions of their religion is rationally unjustified? As far as I understand, the answer is no. The truth is that many of our beliefs are bound to the time, place, and culture in which we were born and raised. For example, had I been born and raised in the time of Ptolemy in ancient Greece, I would most likely have believed in the geocentric theory of the solar system, and now, living in the post-Copernicus and Galileo era, I believe in the heliocentric theory of the solar system. Many of my other beliefs (including my scientific, philosophical, ethical, and political beliefs) are a reflection of the time, place, and culture in which I have been nurtured. But from this mere fact, one cannot conclude that these beliefs (for instance, my belief in the heliocentric theory) are false, or that my belief in their truth is rationally unjustified. Of course, this fact that our beliefs are to a large extent bound to our geography and history can and should prompt us toward further reflection and investigation. But it is entirely possible that after scholarly and methodical research and examination, an individual may ultimately arrive at the rationally justified judgment that the beliefs he adopted under the influence of his environment and the culture of his time are sufficiently valid and robust, and that belief in their truth is sufficiently justified.

Scholarly exclusivism stands in contrast particularly to dogmatic or imitative exclusivism. In dogmatic exclusivism, the exclusivist individual adopts the core beliefs of their religion primarily in an imitative manner, and remains imitatively committed to those beliefs. Moreover, in dogmatic exclusivism, criticisms and counterexamples are either entirely ignored, or are not considered serious and worthy of reflection. Also, in this view, other religions, alternative religious beliefs, and the moral and spiritual achievements of those religions are not of due importance, and awareness of them is not necessary. When confronted with other religions, the dogmatic exclusivist either arrogantly assumes the truth of their own religious beliefs to be self-evident and in no need of proof, or ignorantly believes that they possess "decisive proofs" for their beliefs that will easily convince and overwhelm others, and that others' resistance to those "proofs" is often due to obstinacy or blindness of heart. The exclusivism I defend in this essay is "scholarly exclusivism," as opposed to dogmatic and imitative exclusivism.

Religious Exclusivism in the Realm of Salvation: Exclusivism in this realm claims that salvation and proximity to the sacred is realized only through one particular religion (i.e., the chosen religion of the exclusivist). Religious exclusivism is based on the assumption that there is a significant connection between the truth of beliefs and the possibility of salvation. In other words, the truth of religious beliefs must be considered a condition for religious salvation. However, at least two different conceptions of religious exclusivism in the realm of salvation can be offered: the maximalist conception, and the minimalist conception.

According to the maximalist conception, the truth of religious beliefs is a sufficient condition for religious salvation. That is, if someone believes in the true religion, that individual will necessarily be saved in a religious sense.

According to the minimalist conception, the truth of religious beliefs is a necessary condition for religious salvation. That is, if someone is saved in a religious sense, that individual has necessarily believed in the true religion.

The maximalist and minimalist conceptions share a presupposition: without belief in the true religion, salvation is absolutely impossible. Therefore, it seems that if someone accepts one of these two conceptions, they must necessarily accept that pious, virtuous, noble, and spiritual human beings who have been nurtured in other religious traditions, and who have brought warmth and light to the world of meaning, are deprived of religious and spiritual salvation. This judgment does not seem fair or acceptable.

In contrast to this type of narrow-minded exclusivism, it seems there are two paths forward:

The first path is for the individual, in the manner of pluralists like John Hick, to completely sever the relationship between the truth of beliefs and the possibility of salvation. In this model, an individual's religious beliefs play no role in their salvation. Salvation depends entirely on sincerity in one's intellectual and spiritual conduct and moral life. If a person is pious and good-natured, regardless of their beliefs, they will attain salvation. Within the framework of this model, beliefs are completely marginalized and their religious importance is more or less negated.

The second path, however, is the hybrid model that I wish to defend. This model attempts, on the one hand, to preserve the relationship between the truth of beliefs and the possibility of salvation, and on the other hand, to remain safe from the narrow-minded exclusivism inherent in the maximalist and minimalist conceptions. This hybrid model rests on two main pillars:

First pillar: Sincerity in intellectual and spiritual conduct and moral life is a sufficient condition for religious and spiritual salvation.

Second pillar: True religious beliefs are a necessary condition for the higher levels of salvation.

Several important conclusions follow from this hybrid model:

First, if an individual does not have true religious beliefs, but is sincere in their intellectual and spiritual conduct and has led a decent moral life, this individual is worthy of salvation.

Second, if an individual has true religious beliefs, but is not sincere in their intellectual and spiritual conduct and their life falls significantly short of moral standards and values, this individual is not worthy of salvation.

Third, if an individual holds true religious beliefs, is sincere in their intellectual and spiritual conduct, and has led a decent moral life, this individual is worthy of the highest degrees of salvation.

Scholarly exclusivism at the level of truth or knowledge is entirely compatible and reconcilable with the hybrid model regarding religious salvation. The theory I favor in this essay is, in fact, the combination of scholarly exclusivism at the level of truth and the hybrid model regarding religious salvation.

From a practical standpoint, however, one of the most important criticisms leveled against the theory of exclusivism is that it inevitably leads to narrow-mindedness, intolerance, and violence in practice. When an individual considers their own religious beliefs to be true and the religious beliefs of others to be false, they will grant themselves the right to commit violence against others and to suppress false beliefs and their bearers. Historically, I think it is not an unfounded claim that religious exclusivism has been accompanied by violence, narrow-mindedness, and religious and social intolerance. But I believe two important points must be noted in this regard:

First, the concurrence of two phenomena is not necessarily indicative of a causal relationship between them. Even if we accept that exclusivism and religious intolerance and violence have historically coincided, it does not follow that exclusivism was the cause of those acts of violence or religious and social intolerance. As I mentioned earlier, I believe a distinction must be made between "scholarly exclusivism" and "dogmatic or imitative exclusivism." It seems that what has been the cause of violence and intolerance throughout history has not been exclusivism, but dogmatism. The dogmatic person (whether exclusivist or pluralist) is not open to scholarly and critical discussion and debate; rather, they see the existence and presence of the critic and opponent as a threat to their own existence and identity. It is for this reason that dogmatism quickly leads to violence and intolerance. But the scholarly individual (whether exclusivist or pluralist) respects the opponent and critic, and considers their existence and presence a necessary condition for the realization and flourishing of fair and critical scholarly inquiry. Therefore, it seems that because in the pre-modern world, cultures were not very open to or aware of one another, the exclusivism prevalent among them was more of the dogmatic variety, and this dogmatism, of course, quickly replaced critical dialogue with violence.

Second, scholarly exclusivism (for the reasons mentioned) recognizes the right to be wrong.^[3] That is, although the scholarly exclusivist is rationally justified in believing that the core beliefs of their chosen religion are true and the contradictory beliefs in other religions are false, they do not consider the falsehood of rival beliefs as sufficient reason to violate the human and civil rights of the holders of those beliefs. Being right in one's belief does not, in itself, grant one special rights, and being wrong in one's belief does not, in itself, deprive one of human and social rights. Many religious pluralists believe that pluralism (unlike religious exclusivism) is a natural bedfellow of tolerance. In order to provide the grounds for tolerance in a religious society, they try to encourage respect and tolerance towards one another by relativizing truth or distributing it among different and rival religions and schools of thought. If that other religion partakes of truth as much as my religion does, then we must consider the adherents of that religion as possessing human and social rights and being worthy of respect just as much as ourselves. Therefore, here, the followers of rival religions are worthy of tolerance and respect because they partake of truth. But this approach is built upon a presupposition that is theoretically invalid and practically dangerous. According to this view, only those who hold true beliefs can enjoy human and social rights. In other words, being true is considered a necessary and sufficient condition for having rights. But the truth is that there is no logical entailment between being true and having rights. And as soon as we make having rights contingent upon being true, we open the way for violating the rights of human beings whom we consider to hold false beliefs. In contrast, scholarly exclusivism, instead of realizing respect and tolerance for others through distributing or relativizing truth, defines having rights independently of being true. Therefore, a scholarly exclusivist can consider the core beliefs of their own religion to be rationally justified as true and the contradictory beliefs in rival religions and schools as false, yet at the same time consider the human and social rights of the adherents of those rival religions and schools to be fully respected and protected.

Part Two: Critique of the Theory of Pluralism

Is the theory of pluralism, in comparison with the theory of scholarly exclusivism, a more suitable alternative for explaining the phenomenon of religious diversity? It seems that the theory of religious pluralism itself faces significant challenges that must be given sufficient attention. In this section, I would like to briefly point out some of these difficulties.

One. First, I would like to emphasize the point that a distinction must be made between the "phenomenon of religious plurality" and the "theory of religious pluralism." Religious plurality is a fact, but pluralism is a theory to explain that fact. Religious pluralism as a theory claims to provide the best interpretation of the reality or phenomenon of religious plurality. Scholarly exclusivism, as I mentioned earlier, can (and in my opinion, should) accept and welcome the phenomenon of religious plurality, without committing itself to the theory of religious pluralism.

Two. The theory of pluralism rests on two main pillars:

The first pillar is the belief in the existence of a transcendent being that lies at the heart of various religions.

The second pillar is the belief that various religions each partake more or less equally of that single, central transcendent truth.

Therefore, according to this theory, all religions are more or less equally true (or, in other words, false).^[4]

Three. It seems that the theory of pluralism considers these pillars to be true and the best explanation for the phenomenon of religious diversity. But if this theory is true, then inevitably the alternative and rival theories to pluralism, which consider at least one of these two pillars to be false, must be deemed false. That is, it is as if the theory of pluralism holds an exclusivist position towards the theory of pluralism. But if exclusivism (as Hick and some other pluralists claim) is epistemically indefensible and morally scandalous, then we must consider the pluralists' belief in the exclusive truth of the theory of pluralism to suffer from the same epistemic and moral defects.^[5]

Fourth. But the relationship between that transcendent being and the various religions requires further explanation. The main question is: what relationship does that single transcendent reality have with the God of the religions? The relationship between that central transcendent entity and the God of the religions can be understood according to two different models: the model of the shape-shifting idol, and the model of the inspiring landscape.^[6]

According to the shape-shifting idol model, the gods and impersonal absolutes in different religious traditions are nothing but the various ways in which that central transcendent entity reveals itself to the followers of different religions. In other words, the gods in different religious traditions are not independent, self-subsisting essences, but are fundamentally that same single transcendent entity which assumes a different form at every moment. By way of analogy, the situation is like a king who, in order to be directly informed of the conditions of his subjects, puts on a new disguise every night and goes among the people in a new guise. One time he appears in the guise of a villager and goes among the people, another time he appears in the guise of a merchant and converses with his subjects, and so on. In all these cases, the people seemingly see different individuals, but all these individuals are in reality none other than a single individual, namely the king himself, but in disguise.

According to the inspiring landscape model, the gods and impersonal absolutes in different religious traditions are in fact human constructs. These humans, in encountering the single transcendent entity and in the light of its inspiring presence, each create an image of that presence according to their own capacity and creativity. This situation is like a group of impressionist painters standing before a single beautiful landscape, and each, based on the inspiration and impression they receive from that landscape, creates a picture on the canvas. Here, the paintings in fact reflect, more than anything, the style, mentality, and psychological structure of the painters, even though the painters have all been inspired by the landscape before them. Here, the paintings (read: gods) are the creations of the painters' minds (read: believers), and therefore, they possess an identity of their own, independent of the landscape (read: that single central transcendent entity).

These two models are not compatible, because, as I mentioned, in the shape-shifting idol model, the gods in religious traditions have no independent essence and are in fact nothing but that single central transcendent entity, whereas in the inspiring landscape model, the gods in religious traditions possess an essence and a subsistence independent of that single central transcendent entity.

But each of these two models faces its own difficulties. For example, the inspiring landscape model in fact leads to a kind of polytheism, because the God of religion A is essentially different and independent from the God of religion B and also from the single transcendent entity. And the same is true for the God of religion B, C, D, and so on. Therefore, according to this model, we are suddenly confronted with a collection of gods. This polytheistic theology is, at the very least, incompatible with the tradition of monotheistic religions. Thus, if we interpret the theory of pluralism according to the inspiring landscape model, this theory cannot provide an adequate explanation of the theology and central experience of the monotheistic religious tradition (which is explicitly formed by the negation of polytheistic theology).

The Idol of the Trickster model also faces its own difficulties. This model ultimately proposes a combination of two types of theology: an anti-realist theology plus a thoroughly apophatic theology. The reason is that within the framework of this model, the image of God in various religious traditions is, in the strict sense of the word, false and does not correspond to any reality in the world. For example, the subjects who perceive their guest as an ordinary villager or a strange merchant are, in fact and in the strict sense of the word, mistaken. That is, the subjects' belief that "a villager is now present before me" or their belief that "we are now in the presence of a strange merchant" are both, in the strict and literal sense, false. Therefore, in the Idol of the Trickster model, the images of God in all religions are, in the strict sense of the word, all equally false! On the other hand, that single, transcendent, focal reality is also entirely beyond the reach of direct and immediate comprehension by our perceptual apparatus. The noumenal character of that reality removes it entirely from the reach of our cognitive apparatus, and consequently, we humans cannot attribute any non-formal, positive attribute to it. Any positive and non-formal attribute ascribed to that transcendent reality will be, in the strict sense of the word, false. It is for this reason that it is fundamentally impossible even to consider that reality as "one." On what basis can one truly claim that a single focal reality is the source of the various images of gods in different religions? Why not suppose that several "realities" of this kind are at work? Hick leaps from the claim that religions speak of an ineffable transcendental reality straight to the claim that all these religions therefore speak of "one" single, ineffable transcendental reality. But this leap is not logically justified. We have no reason (and more importantly, based on Hick's theory, we can have no reason) to believe that we are in fact dealing with "one" single transcendent reality. Furthermore, on what basis is that single reality (assuming it is single) "transcendent"? Does "transcendence" in this context have any meaning other than that no positive statement can be made about that reality (whatever it may be)? If this is the meaning of "transcendent," then what phenomenal difference exists between that "transcendent" reality, on the one hand, and the absence of such a reality, on the other? It is in this respect that our theological theory about that focal transcendent reality becomes entirely apophatic and devoid of positive meaning and attribute.

Hence, the Idol of the Trickster model ultimately results in a combination of an anti-realist theology and a thoroughly apophatic theology. This new theology also fails to explain the theology and focal experience of the traditions of monotheistic religions and pantheistic religions. For, in fact, it considers all the theology of these religions to be, in the strict sense of the word, false, and regarding that transcendent reality (which, by claim) lies at the heart of these religions, it has nothing to say but sheer silence. That claim of falsity and this sheer silence are the maximum that the pluralist theory according to the Idol of the Trickster model can offer regarding the phenomenon of religious diversity.

Fifth. Even if we ignore the above problems, the pluralist theory is committed to presuppositions that exclude some religions from the circle of legitimate and rightful religions. For example, Tibetan Buddhism fundamentally does not believe in a transcendent reality in this world. Thus, it seems that the pluralist theory excludes this tradition from the circle of religions that partake of truth, and since the pluralist theory seems to consider "having rights" as contingent upon "being right," should we conclude that followers of Buddhism, due to the incorrectness of their religious belief, enjoy fewer human and social rights compared to other religions that partake of truth?

Sixth. The theory of pluralism is incapable of explaining certain important and central religious ideas. For example, suppose religion A believes that the world was created from nothing, and religion B believes that the world is eternal. The beliefs of these two religions cannot both be true and be manifestations or expressions of a single reality. Or suppose that religion A believes in the theory of reincarnation regarding the human condition after death, religion B believes in spiritual resurrection or bodily resurrection, and religion C believes that after death, humans lose their personal life in a transcendent, impersonal existence. Can these three conceptions all be considered true simultaneously? Different religions also involve historical claims that do not seem explicable through the Hickian-Kantian pluralist model. Did Jesus really raise Lazarus from the dead? If one believes that this event actually occurred, one must necessarily believe that its negation is false. Was Muhammad a true prophet from God? Are the belief of a Muslim who considers this claim true and the belief of a Christian who considers it false both manifestations of a single reality? How can the theory of pluralism explain such important and central diversities in the realm of religions?

Seventh. Is the theory of religious pluralism limited to the inter-religious domain, or can it also be extended to the relationship between religion and anti-religion? According to Hick's pluralist theory, an individual who believes in the exclusive truth of their own religion, when confronted with the phenomenon of religious diversity and plurality, is epistemically and morally obliged to suspend their belief in the exclusive truth of their chosen religion. By the same pattern of reasoning, can it not be claimed that an individual who believes in the exclusive truth of a single transcendent reality that sits at the heart of all religions and illuminates them equally, when confronted with the multitude of educated and rational human beings who fundamentally do not believe in any religion or transcendent reality, must necessarily suspend their belief in religions and the transcendental truth that (allegedly) sits at their heart? Assuming the basis of the pluralists' argument, is the continuation of the pluralist individual's exclusivist belief in the truth of the theory of pluralism, when confronted with the multitude of educated, moral, and sincere atheists, epistemically and morally defensible? On what basis can an individual consistently be a pluralist in the realm of intra-religious diversity but adopt an exclusivist stance when confronted with extra-religious diversity and plurality?

Eighth. It seems that the theory of religious pluralism makes religious commitment and faith difficult. A Muslim who believes that Islam is as true as Hinduism must necessarily conclude that the relationship between specifically Islamic teachings and truth is very weak, and the same point holds true for the followers of other religions. But for an individual to wholeheartedly embrace a religion, it seems that individual must see that religion as if it provides a deeper and more authentic understanding of the nature of the world and the individual's relationship with the world. For example, in the tradition of monotheistic religions, believers hold that the world has a personal Creator whose providence oversees the world, and who hears and answers the prayers of His servants. But if this individual accepts the theory of religious pluralism, they must necessarily acknowledge that their belief in this God is equivalent to the alternative belief that this universe is in the grip of an impersonal force with completely unknown and unknowable attributes, and it is fundamentally unclear whether a personal relationship can be established with that force or not. In this case, it seems that the basis of this individual's religious conduct, which among other things involves commitment to rituals based on the assumption of such a personal, prayer-hearing God, becomes completely shaky.

In conclusion, it seems that the theory of scholarly exclusivism, along with the hybrid model regarding the category of salvation, is both epistemically and morally defensible, preserves the diversity of religions and respect and tolerance towards others (whether believers or non-believers), and is free from some of the harms and difficulties of the theory of religious pluralism as well as dogmatic exclusivism.

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^[1] See:

Alvin Plantinga, “A Defense of Religious Exclusivism”, Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, ed. By Louis Pojman and Michael Rea, Thomson Wadsworth, Fifth edition, 2008, pp. 516-530, see, p. 519.

^[2] I have discussed in detail the conditions for the reasonableness of belief in the truth of religious propositions, including the role of defeaters, in the following article: Arash Naraghi, “Critical Traditionalism in the Domain of Religion: A Theory on the Logic of Religious Thought Reform in Islam,” Tradition and Open Horizons, Negah-e Moaser Publishing, 1395, pp. 5-71.

^[3] On the concept of “the right to be wrong,” see for example:

Arash Naraghi, “Being a Muslim and the Virtue of Tolerance in the Public Sphere” in the book Tolerance and Civility: Essays on Social Ethics, Negah-e Moaser Publishing, 1392, pp. 79-90; and also the article “The Paradox of Tolerance,” same book, pp. 91-102.

^[4] This reading of the theory of pluralism is primarily based on John Hick’s account. For a detailed introduction to his view, see:

John Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism, Palgrave Macmillan, 1985.

^[5] This criticism is among those raised by Plantinga in his critique of Hick’s theory of pluralism. See:

Plantinga, “A Defense of Religious Exclusivism”, pp. 520-521.

^[6] These two models were proposed by George Mavrodes in his critique of Hick’s theory of pluralism. For an introduction to Mavrodes’s critique, see:

George Mavrodes, “Polytheism”, in The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity, ed. By Philip Quinn and Kevin Meeker, Oxford University Press, 2000, Ch. 8. Esp. pp. 148-149.

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PDF file of the article Scholarly Exclusivism in the Domain of Religion

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Scholarly Exclusivism in the Domain of Religion

Arash Naraghi

1 December 2019

Moravian College, Pennsylvania

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