Farhad Shafti’s Critique of Arash Naraghi’s View: “Pluralism or Scholarly Exclusivism?”

This piece is a critique of the recent article by Dr. Arash Naraghi, a respected scholar of religion and philosophy, on exclusivism in religion.[1] In his article, Naraghi first presents and explains a version of religious exclusivism that, in his view, is defensible, and then proceeds to critique religious pluralism. In the first part of this piece, I challenge the assumptions and arguments upon which Naraghi explains exclusivism. In the second part, I defend pluralism against Naraghi’s eightfold critiques. This discussion has a continuation that I will present in another piece. In that piece, I will address the question of whether the Quran is closer to religious exclusivism or religious pluralism.

Here, I have used the word “religion” in its broadest sense, encompassing any spiritual orientation, from followers of formal Abrahamic and non-Abrahamic religions who believe in a personal God, to followers of formal religions who believe in an impersonal God, as well as followers of any spiritual path that does not belong to a formal, recognized group. I have also used the phrase “the Transcendent” to mean that superhuman and supramaterial reality in which religious people believe, and this includes a personal or impersonal God and related concepts such as the afterlife, the realm of the kingdom, and that which is beyond matter.

Part One: Critique of the Assumptions and Arguments of Exclusivism

Before critiquing Naraghi’s view, I must acknowledge that the point Naraghi makes about the difference between scholarly exclusivism and dogmatic, imitative exclusivism can, in practice, be very valuable and problem-solving. Naraghi clearly explains that religious exclusivism does not necessarily lead to the denial of salvation or the denial of the rights of others. Naraghi himself is a clear example of the model he defends, and in his writings, he has clearly shown how one can be an exclusivist while simultaneously being concerned with the rights of others. Regardless of whether we agree with exclusivism or not, it seems to me one can hope that the presentation of this scholarly view will, in the long run, lead to a transformation in the ignorant disposition of some followers of dogmatic and imitative exclusivism.

In the first part of his article, Naraghi presents his preferred version of exclusivism based on assumptions that, from this writer’s perspective, are not correct or precise. The result of my scrutiny among Naraghi’s sentences is that he considers exclusivism justified, and indeed necessary, based on two unstated assumptions:

First assumption: Any two religious propositions that are different are necessarily also contradictory.

Second assumption: Religious beliefs are directly related to the possibility of salvation.

The first assumption, that is, considering any two religious propositions that are different as contradictory, leads in Naraghi’s discourse to the conclusion that only one understanding of the Transcendent is true and other understandings are false. He writes:

"A scholarly exclusivist can, in a rationally justified manner, consider the core beliefs of their own religion as true and the contradictory beliefs in rival religions and schools as false."

The narrative of true and false dominates Naraghi’s article, and many of his explanations in defense of exclusivism and critique of pluralism rest upon this narrative.

My assumption is that Naraghi, along with many other religious thinkers, both modernist and traditionalist, would agree that a complete understanding of the Transcendent is not possible for a human being confined to the material world. On this basis, how can one argue that different understandings of the Transcendent are necessarily contradictory and that, at best, only one of these understandings is true? How can one deny the possibility that these different understandings are a matter of “perspective” and see the “disagreement of the believer, the Zoroastrian, and the Jew” as necessarily arising from contradictory understanding? I will try, like Naraghi, to use a simple example to explain the matter. A young child imagines the sun to be a lamp in the sky, and another young child sees the same sun as the face of a mother. Are these two different interpretations not in harmony in their essence and inner core? Are they not both different descriptions of the truth, yet consistent with the truth and arising from the perception of the sun’s brightness and pleasant warmth? If we accept that neither of these two descriptions is the truth itself but merely a perception of the truth, then we see no contradiction.

The important point here is the criterion for considering a proposition true, and based on that, the basis for considering two propositions contradictory. A proposition about a comprehensible truth is true when it is an accurate description of that truth. Accordingly, if two propositions describing a comprehensible truth differ from one another, they will inevitably be contradictory. “The earth is spherical” and “the earth is flat” are two different propositions about a comprehensible truth and are therefore contradictory, meaning both cannot be true at the same time, and at least one of them is false. However, when we are faced with an incomprehensible truth, the matter is entirely different. A proposition about an incomprehensible truth is true when it is a consistent perception of that truth. On this basis, two different propositions describing that truth are not necessarily contradictory, because they can both be perceptions consistent with that truth. In this case, two different propositions are only antithetical when they lead to two antithetical interpretations of that truth. In the example of the young children for whom the nature of the sun is incomprehensible, if one child considers the sun the goddess of darkness and another sees it as a lamp in the sky, then we are faced with two contradictory propositions; not because these two propositions differ from one another, but because the interpretations of these two propositions are not reconcilable with each other. If we consider the afterlife to be a world where the good suffer torment and the wicked are in bliss, this too is inconsistent and in contradiction with the conception of heaven and hell or with the philosophy of reincarnation.

The upshot of the discussion is that as long as we proceed on the basis of the impossibility of comprehending the Transcendent, we must be cautious in considering two different understandings contradictory. If we accept that understanding of the truth is not the truth itself but a perception of the truth, then we no longer see every difference in perception as a contradiction, and contrary to what Naraghi writes, we do not necessarily see contradictory propositions in another religion as a sign of that religion’s falsehood. One can enjoy one’s own spiritual nourishment and let it fatten the soul and spirit. One may dislike the spiritual nourishment of another nation and even be disturbed by the thought of it. But it is not fitting to consider the spiritual nourishment of another nation, which is delicious and fattening for them, as contaminated and non-nutritious, simply because its color and scent differ from the color and scent of our spiritual nourishment.

The second assumption posits a direct but complex relationship between religious beliefs and salvation. Here, Naraghi acknowledges that, in his view, true religious belief is not a condition for salvation but is a condition for the higher ranks of salvation:

"Sincerity in the path of intellectual and spiritual conduct and ethical living is a sufficient condition for religious and spiritual salvation. ... True religious beliefs are a necessary condition for the highest ranks of salvation."

Naraghi expresses the theoretical benefit of this “hybrid model” as follows:

"This model tries, on the one hand, to preserve the relationship between the truth of beliefs and the possibility of salvation, and on the other hand, to remain safe from narrow-minded exclusivism ..."

I will summarize my critique of this model and its basis, namely the second assumption, in five points:

1- Theoretical Critique: My first critique of this assumption and the hybrid model derived from it stems from the previous discussion regarding the first assumption. It appears that the motivation for formulating this “hybrid model” is the very concern with truth and falsehood. Based on the previous discussion, if “true” here means the very essence of reality, then at least in this earthly abode, there exists no true belief about the transcendent, unless it refers to the most fundamental religious beliefs (and even then, only in a summary form), such as the existence of a reality beyond the material world and belief in some form of life after death. On the other hand, if “true” means consistent with reality, then as I argued above, many seemingly different beliefs can be simultaneously true. On this basis, the second assumption I found in Naraghi’s article would be practically unusable.

2- Methodological Critique: I am fully aware that Naraghi seeks to define a hybrid model in order to bridge exclusivism and non-exclusive salvation. Naraghi speaks of the benefits of his hybrid model but offers no argument to prove it. Demonstrating the benefits of a theory does not constitute proving that theory. Such a model is only useful when we first seek its theoretical proof through some method (empirical, logical/philosophical, or even based on a citable intra-religious text like the Quran[2]). Only after a theoretical defense of a model does the turn come to defend the outputs of that model.[3] In Naraghi’s writing, we see a defense of the second type, but a defense of the first type is absent.

3- Critique of the Model’s Output: But I do not find even Naraghi’s defense of the output of this hybrid model to be robust and well-reasoned. In the realm of exclusivism, he critiques other models of salvation and writes that one who adheres to those models “must inevitably accept that pious, detached, virtuous, and spiritual human beings who have been nurtured in other religious traditions, and have brought warmth and light to the world of meaning, are deprived of religious and spiritual salvation. This judgment does not seem fair or acceptable.”

My question is this: Would merely replacing “religious and spiritual salvation” with “the highest degrees of religious and spiritual salvation” in the above statement truly make our judgment fair and acceptable? Let us note that the discussion here is not about deprivation from the highest degrees of religious salvation for a period or even for a lifetime. According to Naraghi’s view, this deprivation is eternal. Naraghi’s motivation in elaborating his hybrid model is to avoid an unfair judgment regarding the salvation of followers of other religions. It does not appear that this hybrid model is free from unfair judgment.

4- Theological Critique: Naraghi’s hybrid model suffers from the same problem that afflicts other exclusivist models:

In the realm of religions that believe in a personal God (which, I imagine, is the chosen religion of Naraghi and many other religious exclusivists), how can one reconcile divine justice and wisdom with the exclusivity of the highest degrees of salvation based on true beliefs (as Naraghi defines them)?

Naraghi accepts that religious belief is heavily dependent on the socio-cultural background of the society in which an individual is born and raised. The sum of that belief (the hybrid model) and this acceptance (the influence of one’s environment) means that the highest degrees of a person’s salvation are heavily contingent upon their place of birth and upbringing. Yet, how can one insist that the personal God is wise and just, and has grace and mercy upon all servants? Why did not, and does not, the Wise and Just (and Omnipotent and Omniscient) God send down, for all human communities, a religion with identical beliefs and harmonious prophets in the language of each community, so that, as required by His justice, all of them would equally have the possibility of attaining the highest degrees of salvation?

In a discussion in which Naraghi recently participated, I heard a response from him on this matter which, in my opinion, is either irrelevant to the subject or begs the question. He argued that difference exists in this world anyway:

”For example, people in ancient Greece were deprived of many truths that have been revealed to us today, and we are deprived of many truths that will be revealed even 100 years from now ... therefore, justice or injustice is not confined to religious exclusivism. “[4]

If Naraghi means truths related to the empirical sciences here, this justification seems irrelevant to the discussion about the transcendent and salvation. If he means knowable truths concerning the transcendent, then this response or justification can only be raised in this discussion if we first believe, by virtue of an exclusivist view, that those truths are enumerable and effective in salvation.

5- Empirical critique: What is this mechanism that grants an individual the possibility of salvation based on their belief, but does not grant the possibility of salvation at the higher levels? I think this theory can only mean one of two things:

Religious belief, as a belief, is connected to the higher levels of salvation.

Or

Religious belief, as a factor leading to action, is connected to the higher levels of salvation.

The first meaning is unproven, and my understanding is that Naraghi himself does not endorse the first meaning:

”If an individual holds true religious beliefs, but is not truthful in their intellectual and spiritual conduct, and their life significantly diverges from moral standards and values, this individual does not deserve salvation “.

But regarding the second meaning, a point I previously mentioned applies here as well, and I am compelled to repeat it: provided that the most fundamental religious beliefs are meant (such as the existence of a reality beyond the material world and belief in some form of life after death), yes, it can be accepted that believing death is the end of the story of being may, in some (not all) individuals, reduce or stifle the desire for spiritual conduct in its infancy. But among the various conceptions of life after death, how can one truly argue that one is more effective in practical conduct than the others? Practical conduct certainly has a clear, attractive, and observable manifestation in the individual. Throughout history, humanity has witnessed sublime examples of spiritual individuals in various religions, but regardless of intra-religious and inter-religious biases and resentments, on the whole, human experience has not found the spiritual training of any single religion to be absolutely more effective than all other religions.

Based on the critique I have presented and the five points above, I do not see the scholarly exclusivist theory and the composite model of salvation as proven or defensible, either from an ethical or an epistemological standpoint, although I still consider the articulation of such an anti-dogmatic formulation of exclusivism to be practically useful and auspicious.

Part Two: A Critique of the Critique of Pluralism

In the second part of his article, Naraghi critiques the theory of pluralism by raising eight points. Here, I will present these eight points in order and briefly examine them. To express and recall Naraghi's view, I will begin each of these eight points with a key sentence or sentences from him:

First point: "Scholarly exclusivism, as I brought up earlier, can (and in my view, should) accept the phenomenon of religious plurality and welcome it, without committing itself to the theory of religious pluralism."

In the first part of this writing, I explained that, at least within the scope of religions believing in a personal God, scholarly exclusivism, like dogmatic exclusivism, faces the problem of justifying divine justice and wisdom. Furthermore, Naraghi's composite model of salvation only serves to transform the proposition "only the followers of my religion are saved" into the proposition "only the followers of my religion attain the higher levels of salvation." My suspicion is that scholarly exclusivism's welcoming of the phenomenon of religious plurality will be a merely formal and superficial welcome.

Second point: “The theory of pluralism rests on two main pillars: the first pillar is the belief in the existence of a transcendent being that lies at the heart of different religions. The second pillar is the belief that the various religions each partake of that single, central transcendent truth to a more or less equal degree. Therefore, according to this theory, all religions are more or less equally true (or, to put it another way, false).”

Naraghi writes in a footnote: “This reading of the theory of pluralism is largely based on John Hick’s account.”

Although Naraghi uses the phrase “largely based,” it does not appear that his formulation of the theory of pluralism shares much common ground with John Hick’s formulation of this theory. John Hick emphasizes that in explaining his theory of pluralism, he uses not the term “the ultimate” but the word “the Real” so that his theory of pluralism also encompasses religions that believe in a non-personal God.[5] Although he believes that the major religions partake of that truth to a more or less equal degree, he sees this partaking as contingent upon religious experience and its effect on the individual. On this basis, Hick does not see all religions as partaking in this more or less equal manner, nor does he consider them all equally true.[6]

In this essay, however, I am not seeking to defend John Hick’s specific formulation of the theory of pluralism. Since Naraghi’s critique is directed at pluralism in general, I prefer to defend that version of pluralism to which I am personally attached and which I find defensible. This conception of pluralism is based on a reading of the Quran that I hope to address in another essay.

On this basis, my alternative conception of religious pluralism has at least these two pillars:

The first pillar is the belief in the existence of a transcendent reality that lies at the heart of different religions.[7]

The second pillar is the belief that the various religions each partake of the truth of that transcendent reality.

I find it necessary to add a third pillar to this formulation:

The third pillar is the belief that the transcendent reality interacts with the individual in a manner suited to the individual’s capacity and mental and cultural framework.[8]

The reading of pluralism that I will defend in the remainder of this discussion is based on these three pillars.

Third point: “It is as if the theory of pluralism adopts an exclusivist stance toward the theory of exclusivism. But if exclusivism ... is epistemically indefensible and morally scandalous, then we must consider the pluralists’ belief in the exclusive truth of the theory of pluralism to suffer from the same epistemic and moral flaws.”

It seems that in this critique, which Naraghi quotes from Plantinga, there is a kind of strawman fallacy[9]; as if religious pluralism means accepting all opinions about the nature of religion. The desired conclusion of this critique is that if we are pluralists, we must also accept exclusivism and bring it into the domain of our pluralism. I think this is a confusion of issues.

Firstly, the subject of religious pluralism is religious beliefs, not epistemological views about religion. The theory of exclusivism is not a religious belief that a pluralist would be expected to accept by virtue of being a pluralist; rather, it is an epistemological view. This theory stands in contrast to religious pluralism. Therefore, pluralism does not fall into contradiction by negating exclusivism. On the other hand, if someone argues that exclusivism is not an epistemological or extra-religious theory but one of their religious beliefs, then including this belief within pluralism may be possible, because this belief would also be considered a conception of the transcendent reality. This, of course, is contingent upon our agreeing with the individual’s reading of their own religion that has led to the belief in exclusivism.

Second, there is a clear boundary between exclusivism and pluralism. If we hold that only one religion can lead a person to salvation or the highest degrees of salvation, then we are exclusivists, and if we hold that two or more religions can do so, then we have entered the realm of pluralism. At the same time, and despite this clear boundary, neither of these two theories is obliged to be absolute. Absolute pluralism may have proponents in the realm of relativism, but in the realm of knowledge, pluralism is usually not absolute. It seems to me entirely acceptable that any pluralist will be pluralist within their own domain and exclusivist outside of it. For example, many religious pluralists do not accept within their sphere of pluralism a ritual based on Satanism and anti-morality. This is not a contradiction but a necessary feature of the concept of non-absolute pluralism[10]. Pluralism can have a ceiling, just as exclusivism can have a floor. If an exclusivist who sees only their own religion and religious belief as completely true holds that two different understandings of one of their religious beliefs can both be true, I still consider them an exclusivist and see no contradiction in their views, because I do not see it as logically necessary that every exclusivist be an absolute exclusivist.

Fourth point: " The relationship between that central transcendent reality and the God of the religions can be understood according to two different models: the disguise model, and the inspiring landscape model."

Naraghi cites this from George Mavrodes in his critique of John Hick's pluralism. Hick, of course, did not leave Mavrodes's critique unanswered and, in response to these two models, while acknowledging that fundamentally no symbolic model does full justice to this subject, proposed the model of the Wooden Table Top.[11]

Here, however, I do not intend to examine the debates between Hick and Mavrodes, and I wish, based on the foundations of pluralism I referred to above, to directly examine Naraghi's critique of pluralism based on the dual models he cites from Mavrodes; two models that Naraghi has translated well and with admirable taste as the "disguise model" (مدلِ بت عیّار) and the "inspiring landscape model" (مدلِ منظره‌ی الهام بخش).

From my perspective, neither Mavrodes's and Naraghi's critiques of each of these two models are entirely true, nor is there fundamentally any necessity or justification for imposing one of these two models onto the theory of pluralism. Here, I will explain the second point so as to dispense with explaining the first and not prolong the discussion further:

In the disguise model, as depicted, it is as if the transcendent reality, for its own amusement and pleasure, appears "every moment in a different form." In this taking of another form, it is as if there is no proportion between that form and the observer. In the inspiring landscape model, such a proportion exists, but it is as if (unlike the disguise model) the transcendent reality in this model is completely silent and inactive. To use the translated expression of Khwaja Abdullah Ansari, the disguise model is devoid of cognition, and the inspiring landscape model is devoid of familiarity: "Both cognition and familiarity are needed together for one to become the sign of this work and worthy of this robe of honor."[12]

I repeat the third pillar I proposed for pluralism: The transcendent reality interacts with the audience in a manner that is within their capacity and mental and cultural framework.

In this reading of pluralism, the disguise model does not change its form for its own pleasure but based on the capacity, taste, and perspective of its audience. Likewise, that inspiring landscape is not unconscious and neutral but intelligent and active, displaying its colors and beauties based on the impression each painter has received from it, and thus interacts with the painter. In this way and with this change, the disguise model and the inspiring landscape model seem to draw closer to one another and, with a little leniency, become one. This inspiring disguise model, which is the result of this merger, leads neither to polytheism in its idolatrous sense nor ends in the negation of the transcendent reality.

Fifth point: "The theory of pluralism is committed to assumptions that exclude some religions from the circle of legitimate and rightful religions. For example, Tibetan Buddhism fundamentally does not believe in a transcendent entity in this world."

In examining the first point, I explained that this statement is incorrect. It seems that in explaining pluralism, Naraghi is primarily focused on the writings of John Hick. I explained that John Hick explicitly states that his reason for using the word "Real" instead of the word "God" is to include traditions such as Buddhism in his pluralism.[13]

As I mentioned, the reading of pluralism that I am defending here emphasizes belief in the transcendent matter and not a transcendent being.

Sixth point: "The theory of pluralism is incapable of explaining some important and central religious ideas."

In this section, Naraghi addresses the differences of opinion among religions regarding certain doctrinal and historical issues. He does not see these differences of opinion as explicable within the theory of pluralism. It seems that two completely different subjects have been mixed together here. To explain my view on the sixth point, I must separate these two subjects:

First Subject: Differences in Religious Beliefs

Here, Naraghi once again raises the concern of whether a religious belief is true or false. As I explained, this argument is begging the question. The entire basis of the pluralism I defend is that the truth of the transcendent matter is incomprehensible to human beings in this world. Therefore, different perceptions of that truth are not necessarily false. As I wrote, if two propositions are about an incomprehensible subject like the transcendent matter, then the basis for their contradictoriness is the incompatibility of the interpretation derived from them. In this very mortal world, individuals express simple, entirely material phenomena (like a natural landscape) in different ways. We typically not only accept different expressions of a material matter but find them fascinating and valuable. How is it that regarding the expression of the transcendent matter, we do not tolerate differences in perception and seek to confine them to the binary of true and false?

Yes, bodily resurrection, spiritual resurrection, reincarnation, and union with a greater, impersonal existence are different perceptions. But is it not the case that the core theme of all of them is the belief that death is not the end and being aware of the impact of our today on our tomorrow? None of these perceptions contradict the core theme of belief in the afterlife.[14]

At the same time, if a pluralist individual, through research or based on their own religious belief, encounters not a difference but a contradiction in one of the beliefs of other religions and denies that specific belief, they still have not deviated from pluralism. As I previously explained, the majority of religious pluralists are not absolute pluralists. Therefore, for example, if a pluralist Muslim, based on what they learn from the Quran or based on their own research, concludes that the belief in the Trinity was not an original belief in Christianity and was added later, and on this basis, instead of this belief of the majority of Christians, includes the belief of Unitarian Christians, who deny the Trinity, within their pluralism, they have not deviated from pluralism.

I feel it necessary to point out that in pluralism (at least the version I defend), the subject of plurality is not the sectarian or individual beliefs of the faithful, but the overarching religious beliefs. Followers of a religion usually disagree in their understanding of some of its beliefs, and thus branch into numerous sects and groups. The pluralist is not obliged to accept all of these beliefs as correct. For example, a Hindu pluralist is not obliged to accept all the beliefs of Muslims, whether Twelver Shia, Ismaili Shia, Sunni sects, Sufis, and all the anthropomorphist and corporealist sects. For him to remain a pluralist, it suffices that he accepts that the Hindu faith is not the only path to attaining high levels of salvation, and that the Islamic faith also provides Muslims with a path to the same destination. The pluralist's claim is not that everyone is right. His claim is that he alone is not right.

Second Issue: Disagreement in Historical Interpretation

Disagreement in historical interpretation is a different matter. Certainly, in this case, disagreement in interpretation is not an issue, or is less so, and naturally, true and false have meaning here. The fundamental question, however, is this: did religion come to teach history, and does our salvation depend on knowing history? In other words, disagreement in interpreting historical matters is not among the subjects of religious pluralism. Making such matters important and central does not seem a correct interpretation, even if these matters have gradually transformed from historical knowledge into religious belief.

Seventh point: "Is the theory of religious pluralism limited to the inter-religious domain, or can it also be extended to the relationship between religion and anti-religion?"

As I wrote in explaining the third point, one can be a pluralist without including every belief within pluralism. I also think that the theory of pluralism is limited to the inter-religious domain, but I see no logical problem with such a stance. However, it is also useful to note that religion was defined at the beginning of this writing as any kind of spiritualist disposition. Therefore, that part of an individual's spiritual character and method that is entirely non-believing is also included in religious pluralism.[15]

Naraghi then asks: "On what basis can an individual consistently be a pluralist in the realm of intra-religious diversity, yet adopt an exclusivist stance when confronting extra-religious diversity and plurality?"

I think the answer is clear. Pluralism is not obliged to be absolute. Based on non-absolute pluralism, one can be exclusivist about some beliefs or non-beliefs.

Eighth point: "It seems that the theory of religious pluralism makes religious commitment and faith difficult. A Muslim who believes that Islam is as true as Hinduism must necessarily conclude that the relationship between specifically Islamic teachings and truth is very weak."

That, based on pluralism, "Islam is as true as Hinduism" depends on first specifying which Islam and which Hinduism. This is, of course, another discussion. Here, however, I address the essence of Naraghi's eighth critique, which is the "relationship between specifically Islamic teachings and truth." As I mentioned earlier, the application of true and false to a truth that is completely comprehensible differs from the application of these two terms to a truth that is not completely comprehensible. In the latter case, true is that interpretation which in some way corresponds with the truth, and false is that interpretation which in no way corresponds with the truth. On this basis, accepting differences in religious teachings does not necessarily lead to considering their relationship with truth weak. Many great figures of various religions, including Islam, do not consider their understanding of the transcendent to be the truth itself. In Islam particularly, contemplation on the essence of God is forbidden. The existence of ambiguous verses in the Quran has deprived the followers of this book of the claim to a complete understanding of the transcendent. Many interpretations of the verses of paradise and hell take an allegorical view of these verses. The discussion is not about affirmative or negative theology. It is about the "And what will make you know" that has, to a greater or lesser extent, seized the hem of both schools.

I emphasize again that the subject of discussion here is religious beliefs about the transcendent, not beliefs at lower levels.

In explaining his critique, Naraghi refers to the example of a person who is pluralist yet believes in a personal God, and he argues that such an individual, on the basis of pluralism, must simultaneously accept that his belief in a God who hears prayers is equivalent to belief in an impersonal force with which a personal relationship may not be possible at all. In Naraghi's words, the result is that the foundation of this individual's religious conduct "becomes completely shaky". I previously stated the three pillars of the pluralist reading I defend. The third pillar was: "The transcendent interacts with the individual in the way that is bearable and within their mental and cultural framework." Naraghi's assumption is that the transcendent truth which people like us see as personal and followers of Buddhism see as impersonal can only be either this or that. I believe that such a division is itself a product of the limited human mind, and that truth can be neither this nor that, and consequently, in a sense, both this and that, and thus can quench the spiritual thirst of believers of both persuasions in their spiritual journey. I imagine that the religious experience of humanity, on the whole, is more consistent with such an interpretation.[16]

Just as a university student, while aware of different teaching methods at other universities, sees themselves as bound to observe the regulations of their own university and succeed in its exams, a religious person can also, while being a pluralist, be completely bound and committed to the teachings and methods of their own religion. Such an individual can even benefit from the teachings of other religions in the two domains of belief and practice. Benefit in the domain of belief in the sense that they see different (non-contradictory) beliefs about the transcendent as images taken from different angles. Thus, the sum of these beliefs will give them an understanding of the truth that is richer than the understanding derived from looking from only one direction. Benefit in the domain of practice means using the effective methods of other beliefs that can make the individual more successful in better utilizing the methods of their own belief (like a Muslim who, by using the concentration methods of Buddhism, achieves greater focus in prayer).

Naraghi uses the term "shaky" to describe the foundation of the religious conduct of the pluralist individual. I believe (and we have seen and heard) that sometimes an exclusivist view, especially its scholarly variety, can also lead to the shakiness of the foundation of religious conduct. The scholarly exclusivist individual is faced with the constant concern of determining the truth or falsehood of religious propositions. At the same time, they witness the evident spirituality of followers of different paths and try to reconcile this observation with their belief in a wise and just God (at least within the scope of believers in a personal God). Exclusivism also limits the scope of their thinking in defending some of their religious beliefs (especially those beliefs that may be considered unscientific and mythical by others). This struggle and this incessant assault do not always end well and can easily lead the scholarly exclusivist individual into bewilderment and confusion. From this perspective, scholarly exclusivism may even lead to the shakiness of the foundation of an individual's religious conduct more than dogmatic exclusivism. In religious pluralism, however, all these cases can lead to the strengthening of the foundation of religious conduct, because the pluralist individual sees many of these as stemming from the impossibility of a complete understanding of the truth.

Following this discussion, in another writing, I will examine whether the Quran is more compatible with the scholarly exclusivist view or with the non-absolute pluralist view.

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[1] The original article, titled "Scholarly Exclusivism in the Realm of Religion," is accessible here or here.

[2] In another writing, I will argue that such a model contradicts the explicit text of the Quran.

[3] This, of course, is a critique that also applies to some theories of pluralism.

[4] The Pargar program titled “What Does ‘Only My Religion Is True’ Lead To?” with Dr. Arash Naraghi and Dr. Yaser Mirdamadi, December 7, 2019. The text of the discussion is available on this website.

[5] This point appears in many of John Hick’s writings and lectures, including:

Hick, John. Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent. Palgrave Macmillan Limited. 2004. P. 236.

Also see:

The Real and It's Personae and Impersonae, available on the John Hick’s works website

[6] See:

Hick, John. An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent. 2nd ed. Yale University Press. 2004. p. 26.

And also:

Hick, John. The Rainbow of Faiths: A Christian Theology of Religions. Westminster Knox Press. 1995. p.110.

[7] I presented my own definition of the transcendent and religion in the opening lines of this article.

[8] I see the spiritual experience of different religions and (as a Muslim) my own reading of the Quran as the cornerstone of this pillar, and I will address it in a subsequent article.

[9] I prefer this translation over the common rendering of “the straw man logical fallacy.”

[10] I deliberately refrain from using the phrase “relative pluralism” because I consider it a tautology, and furthermore, it might be mistakenly interpreted as relativism.

[11] See:

John Hick. Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave. 2001. pp. 34, 35.

For a review of the critiques and responses between these two philosophers, refer to:

William Hasker. “The many gods of Hick and Mavrodes” in Kelly James Clark & Raymond J. Van Arragon (eds.), Evidence and Religious Belief. Oxford University Press, 2011.

[12] Ahmad Meybodi, A Literary and Mystical Exegesis of the Holy Quran by Khwaja Abdullah Ansari, Eqbal Publications (1990), Vol. 1, 304.

[13] See the sources cited in footnote 5. John Hick divides Buddhism into two major branches, naturalistic/humanistic and religious, and then includes religious Buddhism under religious pluralism.

[14] It is interesting that in the Quran, not belief in heaven and hell, but belief in the Hereafter is a condition for salvation. I will explain this point in another article.

[15] As a theist, I believe that all human beings—even atheists who do not believe in an impersonal God either—possess a degree of spirituality (the primordial nature of God) within themselves.

[16] In a Facebook post, I had written: “If we accept that the God of the Abrahamic religions and the God of certain Far Eastern religions, such as Buddhism, are one and the same, then we must accept that He is ‘laysa kamithlihi shay’ (there is nothing like unto Him), who has not confined Himself to any of the above assumptions. It is as if He says, ‘I am what you are receptive to, personal or impersonal.’ The result is that my answer to the question of whether God is personal or impersonal is a shrewd, but I believe calculated, one: God is neither personal nor impersonal, but unspecified. An unspecifiedness that submits to the mental confines of humans in order to be recognizable.”

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Pluralism or Scholarly Exclusivism?

A Critique of Dr. Arash Naraghi’s View

Author: Farhad Shafti (PhD in Theology from the University of Edinburgh)

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