Arash Naraghi's Article: 'Critical Traditionalism in the Realm of Religion'

Arash Naraghi: The reform of religious thought is a prescriptive, historical, and continuous process. Muslims in every age must meticulously examine the rational and ethical dimensions of their faith, and, when necessary, reform and reconstruct them. But religious reformers have always been concerned about delicately navigating between the two extremes of excess and deficiency, namely "innovation" (bid'ah) and "stagnation" (jumud). It seems that in our time, the movement for the reform of religious thought in Islam oscillates pendulum-like between two extremes: the approach of uncritical traditionalism and the modernist approach.

Note: The following text explains the core idea of the author's proposed model concerning the "logic of understanding and reviving religious thought in the realm of theology." More detailed explanations can be found in the book Tradition and Open Horizons.

Critical Traditionalism in the Realm of Religion:

A Theory on the Logic of Reforming Religious Thought in Islam[1]

Introduction

The reform of religious thought is a prescriptive, historical, and continuous process. Muslims in every age must meticulously examine the rational and ethical dimensions of their faith, and, when necessary, reform and reconstruct them. But religious reformers have always been concerned about delicately navigating between the two extremes of excess and deficiency, namely "innovation" (bid'ah) and "stagnation" (jumud). It seems that in our time, the movement for the reform of religious thought in Islam oscillates pendulum-like between two extremes: the approach of uncritical traditionalism and the modernist approach.

By "modernist reformism," I mean the reform of religious thought based on the primacy of extra-religious critical rationality. Modernist reformers keenly feel the necessity of reforming religious thought, and they strive to reconstruct the rational and ethical dimensions of religious thought through the critique and reinterpretation of religious thought based on extra-religious rationality. However, in this process, they sometimes grant such primacy to extra-religious rationality that they entirely marginalize intra-religious rationality, and they abandon or fundamentally revise certain core doctrines of religious thought without clear and justified reasons.[2]

By "uncritical traditionalism," I mean an approach to religion that grants primacy to intra-religious rationality and is suspicious of extra-religious critical rationality, and does not tolerate changes to religious thought based on extra-religious critical rationality. Hence, uncritical traditionalists strive to organize religious thought and life with disregard for, or even in spite of, extra-religious rationality.[3]

Can a middle way be found between the "modernist approach" to religion and "uncritical traditionalism" that, in the process of reforming religious thought, recognizes both intra-religious rationality and extra-religious rationality? Can religious thought be reformed based on an approach that recognizes extra-religious rationality but does not forget intra-religious rationality?

In this article, I wish to propose a general outline of such an approach. This approach, in the context of reforming religious thought, grants primacy to preserving the religious "tradition," and in this respect, it is "traditionalist." But at the same time, it is positively sensitive to extra-religious critiques, and in this respect, it is "critical." Hence, this approach can be called "critical traditionalism."

This article is organized into two main parts: Part One, Theology; and Part Two, Law. In Part One, a model of theoretical rationality is proposed that defines the reform of the reasonableness of the system of religious beliefs based on a specific relationship between intra-religious rationality and extra-religious rationality. And in Part Two, a model of practical rationality is proposed that redefines the reform of the reasonableness of the religious legal system based on a specific relationship between law and ethics.

Part One: Theology

The Reasonableness of the System of Religious Beliefs

Within the framework of the "critical traditionalism" model, the rationality of a system of religious beliefs must be seen as the outcome of two types of rationality: extra-religious rationality and intra-religious rationality. In other words, a system of religious beliefs is rationally justified if and only if it possesses both extra-religious rationality and intra-religious rationality. This approach can also be called "rational fideism." Here, I would like to express my own conception of these two types of rationality conditions.

A- Extra-Religious Rationality:

1. A rational believer is entitled to believe in a religious doctrine only if that belief is "rationally justified" from an extra-religious perspective. But the main question here is:

Under what conditions is a religious person's belief in religious proposition X rationally justified from an extra-religious perspective?

This question is ambiguous. This question can, in fact, be raised in two different contexts, and the condition for a belief being "rationally justified" (from an extra-religious perspective) is not necessarily the same in each of these two contexts.

The first context is when the religious person is (for example) in the position of propagating their religion or persuading others of their religious doctrines who do not share their religious beliefs (such as atheists or agnostics). In this case, the burden of proof lies with them. In other words, they are epistemically obligated to provide strong arguments or sufficient evidence to render the religious doctrines they propose rationally justified. This type of rationality can be called "maximal critical rationality" or, for short, "maximal rationality." Here, the condition for a belief being "rationally justified" is as follows:

The Condition of Maximal Rationality: Belief X is rationally justified (from an extra-religious perspective) if and only if a strong argument or evidence is provided in its support.

The second context is when the religious person is faced with the question of whether (the continuation of) their belief in religious proposition X is rationally justified (from an extra-religious perspective) or not. In other words, in this situation, for example, opponents claim that the religious person's belief in religious proposition X is rationally unjustified, and they must, by the decree of reason (and on the condition of adherence to the requirements of reason), abandon that belief. Here, the burden of proof lies with the opponents who consider belief in proposition X to be rationally unjustified (from an extra-religious perspective). In other words, they must show on what grounds and evidence belief in religious proposition X is rationally unjustified. Under these conditions, the religious person's belief in religious proposition X is justified if they can show that the opponents' reasons and evidence are insufficient to prove their claimed conclusion, meaning that either at least one of the premises of their argument is false, or, assuming the truth of all premises, those premises do not lead to their claimed conclusion. This type of rationality can be called "minimal critical rationality" or, for short, "minimal rationality." In other words, in this context, the condition for a belief being "rationally justified" is as follows:

The Condition of Minimal Rationality: Belief X is rationally justified (from an extra-religious perspective) if and only if the reasons and evidence refuting belief X are rebutted by a strong argument or evidence—that is, it is shown that (1) at least one of the premises of the "refuting argument" is false; and/or (2) assuming the truth of the premises, those premises do not lead to the conclusion claimed by the critics.

But what is meant here by a "strong argument" or "sufficient evidence"? Suppose that, in the context of preaching or disputing with atheists, I wish to present a "strong argument" for the religious proposition that "God exists." My argument will be "strong" if, when presented to ideal audiences who are completely agnostic or neutral regarding the existence or non-existence of God, it can convince those ideal audiences of my argument's conclusion, namely the existence of God. Or suppose that opponents of the proposition "God exists" have advanced the argument from evil to deny belief in God. In that case, the theist's counter-argument will be "strong" if it can convince ideal audiences who are completely agnostic or neutral regarding the existence or non-existence of God that at least one of the premises of the atheists' argument is false, or that, even assuming the truth of all those premises, they do not logically lead to the conclusion they claim (that is, their argument is not valid). By "ideal audience" here, I mean an individual who possesses the utmost intelligence and acumen, has a very high level of logical and philosophical knowledge, is intellectually honest (that is, exerts their utmost sincere effort to understand and impartially evaluate the argument), and has no time constraints in understanding and evaluating. In the meantime, of course, atheists also have sufficient time to critique the theists' positions before the ideal audiences. Furthermore, by a "completely agnostic or neutral audience," I mean someone who holds no negative or positive stance regarding the truth or falsity of the proposition "God exists," and whose initial inclination or disinclination toward the truth or falsity of this proposition is equal.[4] Therefore, in the context of "extra-religious rationality," a "strong" and acceptable "argument" or "evidence" is that which is considered strong and acceptable from the perspective of ideal agnostic or neutral observers—the reference group here is ideal observers who are completely agnostic or neutral.

It is also worth mentioning here the distinction between two types of "defeater": the "undercutting defeater" and the "rebutting defeater." Suppose proposition A is evidence for proposition B. An "undercutting defeater" for proposition A is a proposition C that severs the evidential relationship between proposition A and proposition B. For example, suppose Ali tells me: "Today, a group of thieves robbed the bank on the corner." And based on his report, I come to believe that "Today, a group of thieves robbed the bank on the corner." Here, Ali's statement is evidence for my belief regarding the robbery of the corner bank. But suppose someone provides me with conclusive evidence showing that Ali is a pathological liar, and that lying is second nature to him. This latter evidence, of course, does not necessarily show that the corner bank was not robbed today, but it discredits Ali's testimony; that is, his statement, by virtue of this new evidence, loses its evidential role for my belief regarding the robbery of the corner bank. In this sense, the latter evidence can be considered an "undercutting defeater" for Ali's testimony. On the other hand, suppose proposition A is evidence for proposition B. Here, a "rebutting defeater" for proposition A is a proposition C* that more directly confirms the negation of proposition B, and thereby prevents proposition A from justifying proposition B. For example, suppose in the previous example, after Ali's testimony, another trustworthy person (say, Hassan) arrives and reports that "I have just come from the corner bank, and nothing unusual has happened there." Hassan's testimony supports the claim that "The corner bank was not robbed today." Under these circumstances, Hassan's testimony can be considered a "rebutting defeater" for Ali's report. Defeaters, whether undercutting or rebutting, provide reasons by virtue of which we can abandon something we believe, but a "rebutting defeater," in addition, provides a reason to also affirm the proposition that negates that belief. For example, if I had come to believe, based on Ali's testimony, that "Today, a group of thieves robbed the bank on the corner," after learning that Ali's words are untrustworthy, I have a reason to abandon that belief (without necessarily coming to believe that no robbery occurred). But Hassan's testimony becomes a reason not only to abandon that belief, but moreover, by virtue of his statement, to come to believe that "The corner bank was not robbed today."[5] In the context of the present discussion, by "defeater" I mean both the undercutting defeater and the rebutting defeater.

2. However, regarding the relationship between these two types of rationality, namely maximal rationality and minimal rationality, several important points must be noted:

First, these two types of rationality are compatible with one another. That is, a religious believer can justify the continuation of their belief in their religious teachings on the basis of minimal rationality, and at the same time, when inviting and/or persuading non-believers to their religious teachings, argue within the framework of the standards of maximal rationality; that is, argue for their religious teachings in such a way as to convince the ideal, completely agnostic or neutral audience. These two projects, though different, are compatible.[6]

Second, the maximal rationality of a religious doctrine is not a necessary condition for the minimal rationality of that doctrine. That is, it is entirely possible that a religious believer never attempts to persuade non-believers (in other words, never adopts an "offensive" approach) or that their attempt to persuade non-believers ends in failure, but it does not necessarily follow from this that the minimal rationality of their religious doctrines is thereby nullified after that failure, and that they are no longer rationally permitted to adhere to their religious beliefs. In other words, proving or failing to prove religious beliefs to non-believers (or more precisely, to completely agnostic or neutral ideal observers) is not a necessary condition for the reasonableness (continuance) of a religious person's belief in their religious doctrines. This epistemological principle is, of course, general and not confined to religious doctrines. Confusing these two levels is a kind of fallacy that we may call the "fallacy of conflating levels of rationality." It is good to give an example to clarify the distinction between these levels. Suppose I am walking in a remote spot in the forest, and suddenly I see a white tiger amidst the dense trees (and I know enough about tigers to confidently identify the animal before me). A white tiger has never been seen in this region, and therefore, the existence of this tiger in this area is an exceptional event. As it happens, I do not have a camera with me to take a picture of the tiger, and no one else passes by to witness this event. Now suppose that after a few days I return home and inform my friends of the existence of a white tiger in the forests of that region, but I have no way to prove the existence of that animal in that region to my friends (lack of evidence within the framework of maximal rationality). But does it follow from this that my belief in the existence of a white tiger in that specific region is rationally unjustified? It seems clear that in this example, the failure to meet the condition of "maximal reasonableness" for a belief does not necessarily mean the absence of its "minimal reasonableness."

Third, in many cases, it is the opponents of religion who commit the "fallacy of conflating levels of rationality" in the realm of religious beliefs; that is, in negating religious belief, they begin by negating the maximal rationality of religious beliefs, and from that starting point, they conclude the negation of the rationality of religious beliefs in general, including the minimal rationality of those beliefs. One form of this argument is based on the fallacy of "proving based on the absence of evidence"[7] and can be formulated as follows (I formulate this argument here based on the negation of just one religious proposition, namely the proposition "God exists"):

• There is no evidence to prove the existence of God.
• Therefore, God does not exist.
• If God does not exist, belief in God is rationally unjustified.
• Therefore, belief in God is rationally unjustified. (Conclusion derived from premises (2) and (3))

In this argument, what is meant by "evidence" in the first premise is evidence or indication according to the model of "maximal rationality," that is, evidence which, if presented to completely agnostic or neutral ideal observers, would convince or incline them towards the truth of the proposition "God exists." And in proposition (4), they in fact conclude the negation of any rationality for belief in God (including, and especially) the minimal rationality of the person, meaning they claim that no one, including theists, can be rationally justified in believing in God. But in this argument, proposition (2) does not logically follow from proposition (1), and the move from premise (1) to proposition (2) is an instance of the fallacy of "proving based on the absence of evidence." For example, from the proposition that "there is no evidence or indication for the existence of life in other galaxies," one cannot logically conclude that "therefore, life does not exist in other galaxies."

Of course, opponents of religion can argue in another way to negate the "minimal rationality" of religious beliefs based on the negation of the "maximal rationality" of religious beliefs. This new form of the argument can be formulated as follows:

• There are no sufficient and convincing reasons or indications (as defined within the framework of "maximal rationality") for the truth of the proposition "God exists."
• Therefore, the probability of the truth of the proposition "God exists," given the absence of sufficient and convincing reasons or indications (as defined within the framework of "maximal rationality"), is low.
• Therefore, belief in the proposition "God exists" is rationally unjustified. (The conclusion derived from premises (2) and (3)) (Here it is assumed that this judgment also entails the denial of the "minimal rationality" of the proposition "God exists".)

Let us assume that propositions (1) and (2) are true (an assumption that could itself be a matter of dispute). In that case, the main problem with this argument is the move from proposition (2) to (3). The basis for justifying this move is the following general principle:

The probability of the truth of proposition P given evidence E is low, and therefore, belief in proposition P is rationally unjustified.

But this general principle is false: from the proposition that the probability of the truth of proposition P given evidence E is low, it does not logically follow that belief in P is rationally unjustified (unless it is also proven that: (i) E is the only possible and available relevant evidence or encompasses all possible and available evidence relevant to that belief; and (ii) "justification" is a function of "evidence," meaning the presence or absence of evidence is a necessary and sufficient condition for a belief being justified or unjustified—a position sometimes called "Evidentialism" in epistemology[8].) It is good to give an example to clarify this claim: the probability of the emergence of intelligent life on planet Earth (P) given the set of accessible physical and chemical evidence (E) is very low. But from this proposition (which is almost certainly true) one cannot conclude that belief in the existence of intelligent life on planet Earth (P) is rationally unjustified. (Obviously, this belief is rationally justified—for the clear reason that intelligent life exists on planet Earth!) Therefore, the move from proposition (2) to conclusion (3) is logically impossible. Of course, if we add the auxiliary premises (i) and (ii) to the above argument, the argument's conclusion will become more acceptable. But proving those auxiliary premises is absolutely no easy task.[9]

3. The necessary condition for the rationality of religious beliefs is the fulfillment of the conditions of "minimal rationality," not "maximal rationality." In other words, if the conditions of "minimal rationality" are not met regarding a religious belief, commitment to that belief is rationally unjustified. But this judgment does not apply to "maximal rationality," meaning the failure to meet the conditions of "maximal rationality" does not necessarily negate the reasonableness of religious beliefs, and its absence does not necessarily compel rational religious believers to reject or modify their religious beliefs.

To put it more precisely, within the framework of the model of rationality chosen here, the situation is more or less as follows: Opponents and critics of religion claim that the system of religious beliefs, or at least some of the propositions within that system, is false, and therefore, belief in those doctrines (or continued commitment to them) is rationally unjustified, and hence religious believers, provided they are committed to reason, must necessarily, by the dictate of reason, abandon those doctrines. Under these conditions, either (a) religious believers can refute the defeating reasons proposed against their beliefs, in which case their belief (or continued belief) in those doctrines is rationally justified, or (b) religious believers cannot refute the defeating reasons presented against their beliefs, in which case their belief (or continued belief) in those doctrines is rationally unjustified, and they must, by the dictate of reason, set aside those beliefs or revise them.

Therefore, according to this model of rationality, our religious beliefs are innocent in the court of rationality unless proven otherwise. The duty of religious believers, insofar as they are religious believers, is not to prove the innocence of their beliefs, but to refute the accusation of guilt; that is, here the burden of providing a defeating argument/evidence (i.e., proving guilt) rests on the opponents of religion, and the duty of religious believers is to show that the reasons and evidence presented against their religious beliefs are invalid. Of course, if it turns out that the defeating reasons/evidence against religious belief X are valid, then the rationalist religious believer is necessarily obliged by the dictate of reason to set aside that belief or revise it.[10]

4. In this model of rationality, a conflict between reason and intra-religious teachings occurs only when reason presents a defeater for a religious teaching, and believers have no way of defeating that defeater. The existence of an undefeated defeater for religious proposition A confronts the believer with a trilemma: (first) to ignore the undefeated defeater entirely and adopt a wholly fideistic stance—that is, to abandon the commitment to minimal rationality, exit the project of rationality, ground one’s religious belief entirely on faith, and place the content of faith beyond rational critique and assessment. (second) not to ignore the undefeated defeater, and by the dictate of reason, to abandon the defeated religious teaching altogether. (third) not to ignore the undefeated defeater, and by the dictate of reason, to set aside the prevailing understanding of religious teaching A, and attempt to provide a new interpretation of religious proposition A that is safe from the reach of the undefeated defeater.

In the Islamic tradition, Ibn Rushd can be considered (at least according to certain interpretations) a defender of the third approach. The Averroist position is based on the fundamental presupposition that truths (including rational truths and religious truths) are compatible with one another. According to Ibn Rushd, if rational demonstration proves matter A, then religion/divine law either has a position on it or it does not. If religion is silent regarding matter A, then there is compatibility between religion and the dictate of reason. But if religion has spoken regarding matter A, then the ruling of religion on matter A either agrees with the dictate of reason on that matter or disagrees. If it agrees, then compatibility is of course achieved. But if there is disagreement and conflict between the dictate of reason and the ruling of religion on matter A, then that passage of religion must be given a “figurative interpretation” (taʾwīl). And what is meant by “figurative interpretation” is that the signification of the religious text is changed from literal signification to figurative signification.[11]

B- Intra-religious Reasonableness:

But here another important question arises: What is the basis for the affirmation of religious propositions by believers? Under what conditions does the community of believers accept proposition A as an accepted proposition within their system of religious beliefs? This question can be raised under the heading of the conditions of “intra-religious reasonableness.”

In general, believers can affirm religious propositions in two different ways: (1) acceptance or practical affirmation, and (2) belief or theoretical affirmation.

1. Practical Affirmation:

Acceptance or practical affirmation, which can be called “taking as accepted,” differs from belief or theoretical affirmation in at least two important respects:

First, practical affirmation or taking as accepted is, above all, an act, or more precisely, a mental act. The practical affirmation of proposition A is an act, meaning the individual “accepts” that proposition and incorporates it into the system of propositions upon which they rely in practice and thought. An individual who “accepts” proposition A is not necessarily committed to the truth of that proposition, but uses that proposition as a premise in their reasoning, and in practice, finds their way and organizes their behaviors in light of the requirements of that proposition. On the other hand, theoretical affirmation is more of the nature of belief, and “belief” is a positive mental state or attitude toward a proposition, and its most important characteristic is that the individual’s mind finds that proposition true with more or less confidence. Therefore, acceptance or practical affirmation does not entail belief or theoretical affirmation, meaning an individual can accept proposition A without necessarily believing it.

Secondly, practical assent or acceptance is a voluntary matter. We can (under certain conditions) freely accept proposition A or refuse to accept it. Of course, this does not mean that under any circumstances, as soon as we will it, we can accept any proposition. Nevertheless, in some circumstances where one cannot wait for clear and decisive evidence for proposition A to arrive, a person can freely decide whether to accept proposition A or refuse to accept it. But belief or theoretical assent is often beyond our volition. We cannot (at least not directly) compel ourselves to believe proposition A or refrain from believing it. For example, when I enter a room and see a person in the room, the belief that "someone is present in the room" involuntarily forms in me. This mental event occurs outside my volition and I have little control over it—although under certain conditions I may be able to indirectly bring about some changes in my beliefs.[12]

Practical assent can be realized in different forms. For example, in some cases, a person acts "as if" proposition A is true. That is, they base their actions on the "assumption" of the truth of proposition A, without committing themselves to the truth of proposition A. In other words, the individual takes proposition A as a kind of "hypothesis" and tries to organize their arguments and behaviors based on this "hypothesis," and tests and evaluates the consequences of that hypothesis in practice and theory. In some cases, a person takes proposition A as an "axiom" of a belief system—meaning the truth or falsity of that axiom is less relevant to them than its consistency with the other axioms of the belief system and the consistency between the theoretical and practical implications of those axioms as a whole. In some cases, the individual "accepts" proposition A in a much more specific sense ("acceptance" in this specific sense can be considered a kind of "heartfelt assent" as opposed to "intellectual assent.") In this more specific sense, "acceptance" of proposition A entails a more positive attitude towards that proposition. The individual accepts proposition A in the hope that it is true. Here, the individual clearly acknowledges that there is insufficient and conclusive evidence for the truth of proposition A, and also acknowledges that it is entirely possible that proposition A might turn out to be false, but hopes that this proposition is true, and organizes their thought and action in light of this hope. "Heartfelt assent" is a completely meaningful and recognized phenomenon in the realm of religious life. For example, consider someone who, in their teenage and young adult years, has a deep and sincere belief in Islam, performs religious rituals fervently, and whose religious life is a source of peace and spiritual flourishing, and whose religiosity gives their life meaning and positive direction. But this person, years later on the threshold of middle age, loses their firm certainty, becomes skeptical, and can no longer consider the central teachings of Islam to be decisively true; in other words, they do not find the available evidence strong enough to arouse "belief" in those teachings in them. But at the same time, one can imagine conditions where this individual, despite the lack of belief, decides to "heartfully accept" the central teachings of Islam as the window through which they look at the world and themselves. Or consider a person who has no religious affiliation or background, but in a particular critical situation finds themselves confronted with the message of the Quran, and suddenly finds it an answer to some of their deepest existential anxieties, and without necessarily being able to believe those teachings as true propositions, is drawn towards them, and "heartfully accepts" them as the framework for their life—that is, makes them the basis of their thought and action. Here, it is the prospect of a hope that prompts the individual to submit to or accept the religion (or its central teachings), and it is entirely possible that this faithful life, in its later stages of development, may also lead to deep and firm beliefs in the central teachings of the religion.

2. Theoretical Assent:

Belief or theoretical assent, as noted, is a positive mental state toward a proposition that motivates the individual to find that proposition true. Belief or theoretical assent can be considered of at least two important types: belief independent of propositional evidence; and belief based on propositional evidence.

Belief or theoretical assent independent of propositional evidence:

In some cases, belief or theoretical assent in proposition A is based on the direct experience of the believer; that is, in these cases, the individual believes proposition A, but their belief is not the result of other propositions or beliefs within their belief system, but rather arises directly from their experience. These types of beliefs can be called "experience-based" beliefs (as opposed to "belief-based" beliefs). Experience-based beliefs, under certain conditions, can be rationally justified. For example, suppose my mother lives in Tehran, and one morning she calls my home in Shiraz. As soon as I pick up the receiver, I hear from the other end of the line: "Hello my dear, it's your mother!" The moment I hear this phrase, the belief forms in me that "I am talking to my mother." Here, my belief is not the result of laying out premises and deducing a conclusion from them. As soon as I hear the voice, I know I am speaking with my mother. Of course, this belief could also be arrived at in another way: suppose intelligence agents are tapping my phone calls. My home phone rings and a voice from the other end says: "Hello my dear, it's your mother!" The agent listening to the conversation cannot immediately arrive at the belief that "So-and-so is talking to his mother." They must put together a set of evidence, and based on that evidence, infer that belief. Here, my belief is "experience-based," but the intelligence agent's belief regarding the same proposition is "belief-based," meaning it is inferred from their other beliefs. In the mentioned circumstances, if my auditory system is not impaired, and no abnormal conditions are present (for example, I have not used psychedelic drugs), my experience-based belief that "I am talking to my mother" is rationally justified. By analogy, some religious teachings are, for at least some religious people, of the type of experience-based beliefs, and if the cognitive faculties that produce those beliefs are fundamentally reliable, and those beliefs are formed in an environment appropriate to the function of those cognitive faculties, then the experience-based beliefs that arise under these conditions are rationally justified.[13] For example, some religious people find themselves directly addressed by God, and based on this experience, they arrive at the belief that "God is speaking to me." This experience-based belief can, under certain conditions, be rationally justified and reasonable.

اما ممکن است در اینجا ادعا شود که میان این باور که "من در حال گفت و گوی با مادرم هستم" و این باور که "خداوند با من سخن می گوید" تفاوت اساسی وجود دارد: هر چقدر که یک واقعه نامحتمل تر باشد، تمسک به قرائن برای توجیه آن باور ضرورت بیشتری می یابد (به فرض یکسان بودن سایر شرایط). گفت و گوی تلفنی با مادر و تشخیص صدای او واقعه ای متعارف و شایع است، و همه می دانند که وقایعی از این دست مکرراً رخ می دهد. اما سخن گفتن موجودی استعلایی چون خداوند پدیده ای نامتعارف (و به فرض وقوع) بسیار نادر است. تصدیق گزاره های تجربه- بنیان متعارفی که در زندگی هرروزینه به کرّات رخ می دهد، می تواند عقلاً موّجه و قابل دفاع باشد، اما تصدیق امور نامتعارف و "عجیب و غریب" را نمی توان بر همان مبنا عقلاً موّجه و قابل قبول دانست. به بیان دیگر، شرط تصدیق نظری گزاره های تجربه- بنیان متعارف را نمی توان بر گزاره های نامتعارفی که بنا به ادعا "تجربه- بنیان" است، اطلاق کرد. برای مثال، فرض کنید که دوست من ادعا می کند صاحب ماشینی پرنده است! واکنش من در برابر این مدعا چیست؟ به احتمال زیاد در برابر این ادعا بی درنگ این باور در ذهن من شکل می گیرد که سخن او قابل قبول نیست: (مثلاً) یا دروغ می گوید یا شوخی می کند، یا دچار توهم شده است. علّت این امر آن است که من بنا دلایل و قرائن متقن معتقدم که ماشین ها پرواز نمی کنند. بنابراین، "ماشین پرنده" پدیده ای نامتعارف و عجیب و غریب است، و اگر کسی ادعا می کند که چنان موجودی وجود دارد لاجرم باید برای مدعایش دلایل و قرائن روشن عرضه کند. به بیان دیگر، در رویارویی با پدیده های نامتعارف و عجیب و غریب، اخلاق باور ما را به پیروی از اصل قرینه گرایی الزام می کند: یک باور (دست کم باور ناظر به پدیده های نامتعارف و عجیب و غریب) فقط در صورتی عقلاً موّجه است که مستند به قرینه یا دلیل استواری باشد. بر این مبنا، چون پدیده هایی مانند "خداوند" یا "سخن گفتن خداوند" نامتعارف و "عجیب و غریب" است، باور به آنها عقلاً موّجه نیست، مگر آنکه قرائن و دلایل استواری برای آنها اقامه شود.

But here an important question arises: On what basis is the existence of God or His speaking considered "unconventional" and "bizarre" or "contrary to nature"? It seems that here, critics mean by "unconventional" and "bizarre" impossible or improbable phenomena. A "flying car" is, of course, not "impossible" from a logical and metaphysical perspective, but given the information we have about nature and the automobile industry, its existence is unlikely. Therefore, the "improbability" of this phenomenon is meaningful in relation to a specific epistemic background. For those who will live in, say, the 28th century AD, "flying cars" might well be part of their daily lives, and if, under those circumstances, someone made a claim like my friend's, their statement would not seem "unconventional" and "bizarre" at all. By the same analogy, the unconventionality or bizarreness of God's existence and His speaking is also meaningful in relation to a specific background. But what is this assumed background, and whose is it? Apparently, belief in God and His speaking seems "unconventional" and "bizarre" assuming the epistemic background accepted by naturalists. The naturalistic attitude is already based on the assumption of denying God's existence, and it is obvious that assuming a worldview in which there is no place for God, belief in God and His speaking will be "unconventional" and "bizarre." But why should theists bind themselves to the cosmology of atheists? Why should the naturalistic cosmology hold authority for theists and be used as a criterion for evaluating their beliefs? It is clear that the assumption of God's existence and His speaking, assuming the naturalistic cosmology of atheists, is, if not impossible, at least improbable, and in this respect, "unconventional" and "bizarre." But the assumption of God's existence and His speaking, assuming the religious cosmology of theists, is not only possible but, more than that, entirely probable, and in this respect, "conventional" and "expected." Why should theists set aside their own epistemic background in favor of the rival epistemic background, and evaluate the worth and validity of their beliefs based on the narrow criteria that the rival has set for them? An atheist who calls belief in God "unconventional" and "bizarre" commits a kind of begging the question; that is, they first assume the non-existence of God (or the improbability of His existence) in their premises (i.e., their naturalistic epistemic background), and then deduce the same thing as a conclusion from those premises. Therefore, it is true that from the perspective of an atheist, and based on their knowledge and experiences, the assumption of God's existence or His speaking is highly improbable, and in this respect, "unconventional." But the whole point is: why should their judgment be considered binding for theists? Let me give an example to clarify this point: Suppose my home phone rings. But this time, my friend Ali answers the phone. Ali, of course, has not spoken to my mother before, and therefore, when my mother says: "Mr. Ali, hello! I am Arash's mother," he cannot recognize my mother's voice instantly upon hearing it. But what does Ali's inability to recognize my mother's voice have to do with me? Ali does not know my mother, and therefore, lacks the necessary experiential basis for the immediate recognition of my mother's voice. Of course, he has the "capacity" for such recognition, but he lacks the necessary "skill" for that recognition in the actual world. But from the fact that Ali lacks such a skill and cannot instantly recognize my mother's voice, one cannot conclude that when I immediately recognize my mother's voice from the other end of the line and arrive at the belief that "I am talking to my mother," my belief is, by virtue of Ali's limitations, rationally unjustified.

But now suppose Ali knows that his mother passed away last year. And this morning his home phone rings, and someone on the other end says: "Hello, Ali dear! It's your mother." In this case, how should Ali regard this phone call? Suppose he clearly remembers his mother's funeral, and he filmed the entire ceremony. His mother is dead, and the dead do not call anyone! But now a woman on the other end, with his mother's voice, introduces herself as his mother. Under these circumstances, the first belief that forms in Ali's mind will most likely be: "Impossible! I am not speaking with my mother." In this situation, this belief is his "experience-based" belief; that is, he does not infer this belief as a conclusion from premises—the moment he hears the voice, the belief forms in his mind that the claim "I am speaking with my mother" is false. Thus, the individual's epistemic background plays a decisive role in shaping the kind of "experience-based" beliefs they hold. By analogy, if theism is false, then the claim that God exists or speaks to us would be truly unacceptable and, in a sense, "anomalous." But if theism is true, then it is highly probable that God would establish a relationship with human beings and create within them ways of knowing Him. If God exists, the experience of God is by no means an "anomalous" or "unacceptable" phenomenon, and believers have the right to consider at least some of their beliefs concerning God as "experience-based" and, on that account, rationally justified. Therefore, atheists cannot subject the "experience-based" beliefs of religious people to the principle of evidentialism on the grounds of being "anomalous" or "bizarre," and thereby cast doubt on their rational validity, unless they first demonstrate that theism is false (or at least highly improbable).[14]

Belief or Affirmation Based on Propositional Evidence:

But not all religious beliefs of religious people are "experience-based." Many religious beliefs are "belief-based" for religious believers; that is, they are inferred from their other beliefs. In other words, the affirmation of these beliefs is based on evidence, or more precisely, propositional evidence. Here, by evidence, I mean a proposition that, assuming it is true, rationally justifies accepting the truth of another proposition or provides a reason for affirming or preferring that second proposition.

The evidence pertaining to religious beliefs can be divided into two types: general or extra-religious evidence, and specific or intra-religious evidence. By "general evidence" for a religious proposition, I mean a proposition whose evidentiary status can be affirmed independently of religious beliefs and sources of religious authority; that is: (a) the truth of that proposition (or piece of evidence) can, in principle, be affirmed independently of religious beliefs and sources of religious authority, and (b) assuming the truth of that proposition (or piece of evidence) is affirmed, accepting the truth of the related religious proposition becomes rationally justified, or a reason is provided for affirming or preferring that religious proposition. For example, for many rational believers, belief in God can be justified, among other ways, on the basis of philosophical arguments whose validity (assuming they are valid) is independent of religious beliefs and sources of religious authority. Such arguments can be considered instances of "general evidence." Therefore, "general evidence" has evidentiary status, in principle, for both theists and atheists. However, "specific evidence" for a religious proposition is a proposition whose evidentiary status can only be affirmed by virtue of religious beliefs and sources of religious authority; that is, (a) the truth of that proposition (or piece of evidence) must be affirmed on the basis of religious beliefs and sources of religious authority, and (b) assuming the truth of that proposition (or piece of evidence) is affirmed, accepting the truth of the related religious proposition becomes "rationally justified." Thus, "specific evidence" can only have evidentiary status for religious believers, and it justifies the acceptance of religious propositions solely from an intra-religious perspective and within the circle of the faithful. The expression "rationally justified" in this context should be understood in this specific sense, where the individual obtains a "reason" from an intra-religious perspective for affirming or preferring the relevant religious proposition. For example, suppose a Muslim asks whether fasting is obligatory. In this case, a verse from the Quran that makes fasting obligatory for Muslims becomes, for that Muslim individual, a "reason" or "evidence" (in the sense of "specific evidence") by virtue of which they can accept the obligation of fasting. Here, the relevant Quranic verse has evidentiary status only for Muslims who consider the Quran authoritative in matters of legislation, and it can be considered a "reason" for accepting the obligation of fasting; but the same verse has absolutely no evidentiary status or prescriptive value for a non-Muslim or an atheist. Therefore, what is evidence or a reason for accepting a (religious) belief from an intra-religious perspective does not necessarily play such a role from an extra-religious perspective.

In the discussion of "intra-religious rationality," "specific or intra-religious evidence" of course plays an important and special role. Therefore, I would like to examine this type of evidence more closely here. The prescriptive and binding aspect of "specific or intra-religious evidence" is based on the authority of religious references and sources. For example, in Islam, the Quran and the authentic Sunnah of the Prophet hold religious authority for Muslims; that is, if it is established that proposition A derives from the Quran or the authentic Sunnah, then this proposition has a prescriptive status for a Muslim and will be considered binding evidence or a reason—meaning it either fully justifies and establishes belief in proposition B, or at least counts as a reason in favor of believing that proposition.

But it is good to examine the prescriptive aspect of "specific or intra-religious evidence" more carefully. What is the source of the prescriptive aspect of this evidence? In other words, why does the religious person find this evidence to be a "reason" for affirming or preferring a specific belief? It seems that the source of the prescriptive aspect of this evidence stems from its attribution to God; that is, it is assumed, for example, that the content of the Quran and the authentic Sunnah directly or indirectly reveals the divine decree or opinion, and since a believing Muslim has already accepted the authority of God's command and opinion as the foundation of their religious life, they consequently also accept the authority of the decrees or opinions derived from the Quran and the authentic Sunnah.

But this claim requires further scrutiny: it seems that the religious thought and life of a Muslim individual (as a Muslim) is organized based on several important presuppositions:

(1) An omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God exists;

(2) The will and opinion of this God are binding upon human beings;

(3) The will and opinion of this God are reflected, directly or indirectly, in His Word (the Quran) and the authentic Sunnah of His Prophet.

One who accepts propositions (1) through (3) necessarily grants authority to the divine word and decree in the Qur’an and authentic Sunnah, and if it becomes known that proposition A in the text of the Qur’an or the authentic Prophetic Sunnah supports belief in proposition B, then one will possess a compelling indication or reason for affirming or preferring proposition B.

            However, from an epistemological standpoint, propositions (1) through (3) do not share the same status: proposition (1) is a metaphysical proposition, belief in which can be justified (assuming the existence of such a God) on the basis of perception (religious experience) or reasoning (proofs for the existence of God)—at least prima facie. If God, as a being encompassing all perfections, exists, then a decree issued by Him will have a special status, that is, it will be regarded as identical with truth and righteousness.

But even if we consider God’s “decree” to be identical with truth and righteousness, it does not follow that obeying God’s decree and will is “obligatory.” That is, God’s decree, merely by virtue of being His decree and (by assumption) identical with truth and righteousness, does not possess a prescriptive and duty-imposing character. In fact, the source of the prescriptive aspect of the “divine decree” is the affirmation of proposition (2), which does not logically follow from proposition (1). That is, an individual can accept the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent God, yet not consider themselves bound to obey His decrees. From the proposition that:

(A) An omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent God exists.

one cannot logically conclude that:

(B) The decrees of an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent God are obligatory.

On the other hand, it is clear that the necessity of obeying the divine decree cannot be accepted on the basis of the authority of the divine decree itself. Affirming the divine decree by virtue of the divine decree entails a vicious circle. If an individual does not consider obeying the divine decree obligatory, one cannot oblige them to obey that decree by appealing to the divine decree itself. Therefore, God’s decree (or more specifically, what is found in the text of the Qur’an and authentic Sunnah) will only serve as a duty-imposing indication or reason for an individual if that individual has already, and independently of the sources of religious authority, accepted proposition (2). In other words, the primary source of the prescriptive status of “divine decrees” is not the divine decree itself, but the human being’s free submission to the divine decree. It is precisely for this reason that the “divine decree” holds no authority for one who has not accepted proposition (2), and cannot serve as an indication or reason for affirming or preferring belief in a proposition. Thus, the “specific or intra-religious indication” comes into existence after the existential and creedal state of “aslama” (submission), and the scope of its authority is limited to those who have crossed the threshold of “aslama” and entered the circle of the community of believers.

            Therefore, proposition (1) grants a special status to God’s decree, and proposition (2) gives the divine decree its prescriptive and obligatory character.

But proposition (3) actually transfers the authority of the divine decree, after the station of “aslama,” to specific historical texts and sources, such as the Qur’an and authentic Sunnah; that is, it clothes the prescriptive and obligatory status of the “divine decree” in historical garb, and links it to specific sources and events (in this case, the Qur’an and authentic Sunnah). As soon as this link is established, the content of the Qur’an and authentic Sunnah can, for a Muslim (insofar as they are a Muslim), acquire the status of a “specific or intra-religious indication,” and provide a basis and reason for affirming a particular belief or preferring it over alternative beliefs.

            But what is the basis for affirming proposition (3)? On what basis can an individual consider a specific historical text (such as the Qur’an) to contain the divine word and decree? What is the epistemological basis for this affirmation? In my view, the most important epistemological basis for this matter is ultimately the authority of “transmission” or the testimony of a (truthful) narrator. If this claim is correct, then the authority of “transmission” or the testimony of a (truthful) narrator will be a necessary condition for the realization of the “specific or intra-religious indication” (in its concrete and historical form). In other words, the testimony of a (truthful) narrator—for example, the Prophet himself—can, under certain conditions, lead us to the knowledge or justified belief that (for instance) the Qur’an is the divine word, and therefore, by virtue of this, the claims of that text (i.e., the Qur’an) can serve as a (specific) indication or duty-imposing reason for a believing Muslim.

But can "tradition" (naql) or the testimony of a (truthful) narrator, in principle, provide an epistemological reason for affirming or preferring a specific belief (for example, that the Quran is the Word of God)?

It is best to first examine the epistemic role of "tradition" or "testimony" in general, independent of the specific religious context. From an epistemological perspective, can tradition fundamentally serve as a valid indicator for affirming or preferring a belief?

By "tradition" here, I mean that someone (the narrator)—at least ostensibly—attempts to convey information in the form of a report to another (the recipient). Thus, "tradition" consists of at least four main elements: (1) the transmitter or narrator, that is, the person who either directly witnessed an event and reports it, or heard the report from another individual and transmits it to the next person; (2) the transmitted, that is, the content of the report or information to be conveyed by the transmitter; (3) the recipient or hearer of the report, that is, the person who receives the narrator's testimony; and (4) the context or epistemic setting of the information exchange, that is, the epistemic background within which the narrator conveys the report to the recipient.

On this basis, the main question is whether the testimony of the narrator or transmitter of a report can serve as a justified indicator or reason for the hearer or recipient to affirm or prefer the content of the report. Can I, merely because I have heard a report from person A, justifiably believe that report and incorporate it into my system of beliefs?

To facilitate analysis, let us limit the discussion to a chain of narration that has only two members: a speaker or narrator, and a hearer or recipient. Now suppose I ask a passerby on the street what time it is. And they reply, "It is ten past three in the afternoon!" Here, based on that passerby's report, the belief "It is ten past three in the afternoon" immediately forms in me. Is this belief of mine rationally justified? Under "normal conditions," the answer to this question seems to be yes. But what is meant by "normal conditions"? Under "normal conditions," our assumption is that (for example) honesty and truthfulness are the rule, not the exception; that is, most people tell the truth in most cases, and are therefore generally trustworthy; the narrator has sufficient knowledge about the subject they are reporting on; the hearer or recipient of the report is in a state where they can correctly receive the report, for instance, they possess the necessary mental capacity for this task; the content of the report is also confirmed by, or at least consistent with, the other beliefs in the hearer's or recipient's belief system; and so on. In the above example, I have no reason to suspect that the passerby intends to deceive me, and it also seems they can correctly read the time from their wristwatch. I am also in a normal state, meaning, for example, I have not consumed any psychoactive drugs, my hearing is normal, and the passerby's answer is consistent with my other beliefs—for instance, I already know that it must be a few hours past noon. Of course, my belief is not necessarily deduced from these background beliefs. As soon as I heard the passerby's answer, I arrived at the belief that "It is ten past three in the afternoon." Of course, if for any reason I had also consulted my epistemic background during the exchange of information, I would still have found the conditions to be "normal." Therefore, under these conditions, my belief, formed on the basis of that passerby's report or testimony, is rationally justified. But of course, if there are indicators that (for example) cast doubt on the passerby's honesty or competence, or my own capacity for discernment, or if some beliefs in my belief system negate or contradict the passerby's claim (for instance, if I know that it is now morning, not afternoon), then I have justified reason or reasons not to consider the conditions "normal." If the conditions are considered "abnormal," then the hearer or recipient of the tradition must apply stricter criteria for accepting the content of the report; for example, they must first ascertain whether the necessary conditions for accepting the narrator's report are met in that specific case. If it turns out that those conditions are met, then my belief in the content of the narrator's tradition will be inferential; that is, for example, I have first ascertained their honesty, and then, based on that assumption, I have concluded the validity of the content of their tradition.

It seems that under "normal conditions" two important principles exist in my epistemic background by virtue of which I can consider a belief based on transmission or the testimony of a narrator to be rationally justified[15]:

First, the "principle of honesty or trustworthiness," according to which individuals are considered honest and worthy of trust, unless a reason to the contrary is found.

Second, the "principle of credulity," according to which listeners or recipients of a report are rationally entitled to accept the reports of narrators and believe them, unless a reason to the contrary is found.

On this basis, the following epistemological principle can be formulated (let us call it the "principle of the authority of transmission"):

The principle of the authority of transmission: Person A can believe in matter C solely on the basis of the testimony or witness of narrator B, and this belief is rationally justified, if and only if, there is no undefeated defeater for that belief.

Here it is worth pointing out this important point: the transmission or testimony of a truthful narrator is not, by itself, a source for producing new knowledge. The primary role of the transmission or testimony of a reliable narrator is the "transmission" of knowledge, not its "production." In other words, knowledge must be obtained on another basis (for example, sensory perception or rational reasoning), and after that, the transmission or testimony of a reliable narrator can transfer that knowledge from one individual to another. In this respect, the transmission or testimony of a reliable narrator is similar to "memory." Memory, too, is not by itself a source for producing new knowledge. The primary role of memory is the "preservation" of knowledge, not its "production." That is, if someone does not know something, that individual's memory cannot, by itself, produce knowledge of that thing for them. But if an individual attains knowledge on an independent basis (such as sensory perception or rational reasoning), then memory can preserve that knowledge for that individual over time. Therefore, as far as the category of knowledge is concerned, if the speaker or narrator does not have knowledge of matter A, then their transmission or testimony cannot produce knowledge of matter A for the listener or recipient of that transmission.[16]

However, the transmission or testimony of a reliable narrator can provide a justified reason for affirming or preferring a belief, even if the narrator themselves does not actually have knowledge or even justified belief regarding the content of the news they give. Here, it is sufficient that the listener or recipient of the news has a reason for the narrator's honesty and reliability. Under these conditions, the recipient's belief, which is based on the narrator's transmission, is a justified belief, although it is not necessarily an instance of knowledge. For example, suppose I ask a passerby for the time, and they glance at their wristwatch and say: "It is ten past three in the afternoon." But in reality, their wristwatch is not working, and they have simply announced a time based on a guess. Under these conditions, the passerby does not, in the strict sense of the word, "know" that it is ten past three. And therefore, my belief, which is based on the transmission or testimony of that passerby (i.e., the belief that "it is ten past three in the afternoon"), is not an instance of knowledge. But suppose I have a reason to believe that passersby on this street are trustworthy in most cases, and as it happens, I have asked this particular passerby for the time several times in the past and they have given an accurate answer. On this basis, it can be accepted that the testimony of that passerby provides me with a reason or evidence by virtue of which I accept that "it is ten past three in the afternoon." This belief, of course, under the mentioned conditions, is not an instance of knowledge, but it is justified—even if the report is false, that is, even if the time at that particular moment is not actually ten past three. Therefore, the listener or recipient of the news can believe in matter A based on the transmission or testimony of the narrator, and their belief can be justified, provided that the recipient has a reason for the narrator's honesty and reliability, and of course, there is no undefeated defeater against that belief. Under these conditions, this belief based on transmission may well not be an instance of knowledge, but it is (at least prima facie) rationally justified. [17]

But suppose a friend comes to me and claims to have seen a spaceship in the sky on the way. Am I entitled, on the basis of his report and testimony, to arrive at the belief that "spaceships exist"? If I arrived at such a belief on the basis of his testimony, would my belief be rationally justified? Suppose I believe that "as far as science tells us, nothing like a spaceship has been observed in the realm of the Milky Way, and therefore, it is highly unlikely that a spaceship would be observed in the sky of Earth." In this case, the content of the friend's report conflicts with one of the accepted beliefs of my cognitive system, and this very fact may cause me to hesitate in accepting the content of that report. That is, one can assume that here, due to the "unconventional" content of the report, the conditions are "abnormal." Under these conditions, the belief that "spaceships exist" faces a counter-instance, namely the findings of current science. Therefore, here, before accepting my friend's claim, I must ensure that the necessary conditions for accepting his testimony have been met. Now suppose that I have known the reporter for many years, and I know well that he is a moral person and extremely honest and truthful. No unconventional or abnormal change has occurred in his individual or social behavior and personality. I also know that he is a distinguished scientist in the field of space sciences. On the other hand, I know that new scientific findings do not negate the existence of spaceships, but merely consider their existence in the sky of Earth highly improbable (in other words, the current findings of science are a "negating counter-evidence" against the reporter's claim, not an "opposing counter-evidence" to it.) I also learn that some other expert individuals have previously claimed to have possibly seen a spaceship in the city's sky. Under these conditions, it is entirely possible that I accept my friend's claim, and my belief in the existence of a spaceship in the city's sky, based on that friend's testimony, is justified, at least prima facie.

As we can see, the authoritativeness of report depends to a large extent on the character of the reporter. The reporter's character is the backing for the credibility of his report. That is, the report or testimony of the reporter is acceptable and leads to justified belief only if (among other things) the reporter is known for truthfulness and trustworthiness. It is this honesty and trustworthiness that largely guarantees the credibility of the reporter's words and makes belief in his claim rationally justified.

Now we can return to our main question: On what basis can an individual consider a specific historical text (for example, the Quran) to contain divine speech and decree? What is the epistemological basis for this affirmation? As I mentioned earlier, I believe one acceptable answer to this question is the authoritativeness of the report or testimony of a truthful reporter. Suppose that God exists, and this God enters into a linguistic relationship (revelation) with a human being. In that case, that human being, or prophet, based on his perceptual experience (under certain conditions), has knowledge of the fact that God has spoken to him (this knowledge is a kind of "experience-based" belief for the prophet himself). Now suppose that this individual recounts his experience and its content to another person, that is, he informs him that the set of propositions A (here, the Quran) were God's words to him. Under these conditions, does the listener have the right to accept the claim of the person who had the experience? Here, the epistemic background of the exchange of report plays an important role. It is best to examine this issue in two situations:

In the first situation, the "conditions are normal." The most important feature of the epistemic background in "normal conditions" is that the phenomenon of human communication with supernatural beings, including God, is part of the common beliefs among the audience. Under these conditions, it is entirely possible that someone hears the Prophet's claim, and since they have no reason for his lack of honesty and reliability, they believe his claim immediately and non-inferentially. That is, for this individual, both the "principle of honesty" and the "principle of credulity" are at work, and therefore, by virtue of the principle of "the authoritativeness of the reliability of report," the individual, based on the reporter's testimony (i.e., the person of the "Prophet"), arrives at the belief that "the Quran is the Word of God," and this belief is rationally justified, as long as there is no undefeated counter-evidence against it.

In the second situation, we have "abnormal conditions." "Abnormal conditions" usually occur when the content of the report seems "unconventional" and "strange." At any rate, in the context of the current discussion, assuming abnormal conditions, the individual cannot, on the basis of the narrator's testimony, arrive non-inferentially at the belief that "the Qur'an is the Word of God." But sometimes, even under "abnormal conditions," the audience can, on the basis of the narrator's testimony (inferentially), arrive at the belief that "the Qur'an is the Word of God," and their belief can be rationally justified. For example, suppose that a person discovers through personal experience and collective testimony that Muhammad was an extremely truthful and "trustworthy" man, possessed of a sensitive spiritual personality, and also experienced and tested in the realm of spiritual conduct. On the other hand, the listener themselves has reasons to believe that the experience of God and hearing His speech is an improbable but possible phenomenon, and perhaps they have even tasted some of these kinds of spiritual experiences in their own personal life. It seems that under these conditions, the account or testimony of a truthful narrator (i.e., Muhammad the "Trustworthy") can be considered a reason for affirming or preferring the belief that "the Qur'an is the Word of God." In other words, if a person, based on the account or testimony of Muhammad the Trustworthy, arrives at the belief that "the Qur'an is the Word of God," their belief can, at least prima facie, be rationally justified (so long as there is no undefeated defeater for it).

Of course, if the narrator does not have "knowledge" of the content of their account (for example, if they were mistaken in identifying the subject of their experience and the content of their account is false), their account and testimony will not yield knowledge, meaning the audience cannot attain knowledge of the narrator's claim based on their account or testimony. But even in this case, the belief formed in the audience's mind based on the narrator's testimony can be rationally justified—provided that the audience has reason for the narrator's truthfulness and trustworthiness.

Therefore, for religious believers who believe in the truthfulness and trustworthiness of the Prophet, his testimony possesses authority and can be counted as evidence or a reason in favor of his claims. Here, the personality of the Prophet is the support for his message. And thus, if the truthful Prophet reports that, for example, "the Qur'an is the Word of God," and the believers, based on his testimony, arrive at the belief that "the Qur'an is the Word of God," their belief will be rationally justified.

In this way, a specific historical text is accepted by a group of human beings as the locus of the manifestation of divine speech and decrees (in a rationally justified manner), and thereafter, from the perspective of these believers, the authority of the divine decree and speech is transferred to this specific historical text (i.e., the Qur'an). In this case, the content of this specific historical text, namely the Qur'an, can serve as a "specific or intra-religious evidence" possessing authority for that specific religious community, and play an important role in affirming or preferring religious doctrines.

Of course, it is clear that this text lacks authority and evidential status for those who do not consider the will and command of God as binding, and/or do not believe in the trustworthiness and truthfulness of the Prophet. But from the mere fact that atheists or non-Muslims do not grant authority to the Qur'an and the authentic Sunnah of the Prophet, it does not follow that these sources also lack, or should lack, authority and evidential status for Muslims.

C- Summary:

The upshot of the discussion so far is as follows:

• Religious believers form their religious beliefs in various ways:
• In some cases, an individual's religious beliefs are "practice-based," meaning they are formed solely on practical or pragmatic grounds. For example, the religious person, although lacking sufficient and decisive reasons and evidence for the theoretical affirmation of their religious belief, accepts that belief or affirms it in their heart and uses it as a framework for viewing the world and as a basis for religious living—in the hope that the belief will turn out to be true.
• In some cases, an individual's religious beliefs are "experience-based," meaning they are formed on the basis of personal experiences (or "non-propositional evidence").
• In some cases, an individual's religious beliefs are

  Regarding the first condition, it is difficult to deem the existence of God metaphysically impossible, and if God exists, it is difficult to consider the possibility of His speaking to human beings metaphysically impossible.[18]  Moreover, throughout history many believers have experienced various forms of address in their faith lives, and for them, the possibility of God's existence and His speaking to human beings is not a purely theoretical belief, but a kind of "experience-based" belief.  Affirming the truthfulness of Muhammad "al-Amin" (the Trustworthy) is also not a difficult task for Muslims, especially since the historical sources of the Islamic tradition provide evidence in support of this belief.  Of course, this does not mean that Muslims' belief in these matters is necessarily and absolutely true or justified.  But it does mean that Muslims can consider the two aforementioned conditions to be true, and this belief of theirs is, at least at first glance, rationally justified.

  The third condition—however, Muslims' commitment to the belief that the Quran is the Word of God remains rationally justified only if there is no undefeated defeating evidence against it. In other words, Muslims, in defending the rationality of their belief, must be able to defeat the counter-evidence that is presented against their belief.

  But has the third condition been fulfilled?  The truth is that judging this matter is an unending and continuous process.  That is, believers must always be sensitive to the criticisms raised in critique and refutation of their system of religious beliefs (including the belief in the Quran being the Word of God), and strive to evaluate the counter-evidence and indications empathetically and with precision.  If it becomes clear that these counter-indications against belief X are sound and justified, then they must either modify and adjust that belief to such an extent that its shortcomings are rectified, or, if it is irreparable, set it aside from their system of beliefs.

  Therefore, it seems that the most important condition for the reasonableness of the belief in the Quran being the Word of God is the evaluation of the evidence and reasons presented in refutation of this belief.  Critics and deniers of the Quran being the Word of God have presented various reasons to prove their view; some of these reasons are non-historical (particularly theological and philosophical), and others are historical.  Here, I wish to confine my discussion solely to one of the important historical criticisms raised in refutation of the Quran being the Word of God.[19]

  In the history of Islamic culture, there has been an important distinction between the "Quran" and the "Mushaf."  The "Quran" is that which (according to Muslim belief) was sent down from God as revelation upon the heart of the Prophet.  And the "Mushaf" is the written form of that revelation which is now present and current among Muslims.   Muslims who consider the Quran to be the Word of God, in fact, believe that God Himself has been the preserver of the Quran, and the book that is now present with us under the title of the Quran (i.e., the Mushaf), is in reality the very same Quran that was revealed to the Prophet of Islam.  Therefore, by the same authority that the "Quran" is considered the Word of God (i.e., by the authority of the Prophet's trustworthy report), the "Mushaf" (i.e., this specific book) can also be considered to contain the Word of God.  This argument can be formulated as follows:

  • If the Prophet is a truthful narrator, then the Quran is identical to the Divine Word (or at least belief in it will be rationally justified).
  • If the Quran is identical to the Divine Word, then any text that contains the Quran is a text comprising the Divine Word.
  • The Mushaf is a text containing the Quran.
  • Therefore, if the Quran is identical to the Divine Word, then the Mushaf contains the Divine Word (or at least belief in it will be rationally justified).
  • The Prophet is a truthful narrator. (A presupposition that Muslims consider belief in to be rationally justified.)
  • The Quran is identical to the Divine Word (or at least belief in it is rationally justified). (Conclusion derived from premises (1) and (5), according to the rule of modus ponens)
  • Therefore, the Mushaf contains the Divine Word (or at least belief in it is rationally justified). (Conclusion derived from premises (4) and (6), according to the rule of modus ponens)

  Therefore, belief in the book that is now present with us under the title of the Quran (i.e., the Mushaf) being the Word of God is conditional upon the Mushaf containing the very same text or speech that was sent down from God to the Prophet of Islam.

  اما آیا گزاره (3) صادق است؟  بدون شک میان "قرآن" (یعنی کلام الهی که بر قلب پیامبر اسلام نازل شد) و "مصحف" (یعنی صورت مکتوب آن وحی که در اختیار مسلمانان است) تمایزی وجود دارد.  فرض مسلمانان این بوده است که "مصحف" (تقریباً) به نحو تمام و کمال "قرآن" را شامل است (یعنی گزاره (3) صادق است)، و چون قرآن عین کلام الهی است، "مصحف" هم  عین یا (دست کم) شامل کلام الهی است.

  اما رابطه میان "قرآن" و "مصحف" پیچیده و گاه مبهم بوده است، و خصوصاً درباره نحوه پدید آمدن "مصحف" اختلاف نظرهای جدّی وجود داشته است.

  دیدگاه سنتی مسلمانان درباره نحوه شکل گیری و تدوین مصحف مبتنی بر دو باور اصلی بوده است: نخست آنکه، قرآن بتدریج و نه یکباره نازل شده است؛ و دوّم آنکه، فقرات وحی قرآنی بعدها در قالب یک کتاب (یعنی مصحف) گردآوری و تدوین شده است.

  بنابراین، روایت منابع اسلامی از نحوه شکل گیری و تدوین مصحف تمایز میان "قرآن" و "مصحف" را تأیید می کند، اما باور نهایی مسلمانان این بوده است که فرآیند گردآوری و تدوین قرآن به نحوی بوده است که می توان از وثاقت مصحف اطمینان (ولو نسبی) داشت، یعنی با اطمینان قابل قبولی پذیرفت که:

   یا (الف) "مصحف" عین قرآن است، یعنی شامل "قرآن" است و شامل جز "قرآن" نیست- یعنی تمام آیات وحی شده بر پیامبر در آن آمده است، و جز آن آیات متضمن هیچ فقره دیگری نیست، و به این اعتبار مصحف، قرآن کامل و خالص است. ( بگذاریم آن را "آموزه حداکثری" بنامیم)؛

  یا (ب) "مصحف" لزوماً عین "قرآن" نیست، اما "متضمن" کلام الهی (قرآن) است. (بگذارید آن را "آموزه حداقلی" بنامیم).  روایت حداقلی را نیز می توان مطابق سه قرائت متفاوت فهمید:

  مطابق قرائت اوّل، مصحف جز قرآن را شامل نیست، اما تمام قرآن را  دربر ندارد.  یعنی متن بخش عمده (و نه لزوماً تمام) آیات وحی شده بر پیامبر اسلام را شامل است، اما جز آیات وحیانی فقرات دیگری به آن راه نیافته است- به بیان دیگر، مصحف، قرآن ناقص اما خالص است.[20]

  مطابق قرائت دوّم، مصحف بخش عمده ( و نه لزوماً تمام) آیات وحی شده بر پیامبر اسلام را شامل است، اما ممکن است که فقراتی جز قرآن نیز در آن راه یافته باشد- به بیان دیگر، مصحف، قرآن ناقص و ناخالص است.[21]

  و سرانجام، مطابق قرائت سوّم، مصحف تمام قرآن را شامل است، اما چه بسا عناصر دیگری جز قرآن هم در آن راه یافته باشد- به بیان دیگر، مصحف قرآن کامل اما ناخالص است.

  قدر مشترک قرائت حداکثری و قرائت حداقلی آن است که "مصحف متضمن کلام الهی است"، یعنی فرد خواه به قرائت حداکثری باور داشته باشد، خواه به قرائت حداقلی، در هر حال تصدیق می کند که "مصحف شامل کلام الهی است".  بگذارید این آموزه را که قدر مشترک دو قرائت حداکثری و حداقلی است، "آموزه محوری" بنامیم.  بنابراین، در بحث جاری تلاش من آن خواهد بود که از "آموزه محوری"  (یعنی این آموزه که "مصحف شامل کلام الهی است.") در برابر انتقادات کسانی دفاع کنم که بر مبنای روش شناسی علمی- تاریخی جدید مدعی اند که مصحف "آیات وحیانی" را که از جانب خداوند بر پیامبر اسلام نازل است (به فرض آنکه چنان پدیده ای واقع شده باشد)، شامل نیست. به بیان دیگر، مدعای اصلی ایشان این است که "مصحف شامل کلام الهی نیست."

  اما پیش از آنکه به بحث درباره این انتقاد تاریخی بپردازیم، خوبست که (نخست) تصویری از تلقی سنّتی مسلمانان در خصوص نحوه پدید آمدن مصحف به دست دهیم، و (دوّم) دلایل تاریخی مسلمانان را در خصوص اعتبار آن تصویر، و نیز صدق آموزه محوری بررسی کنیم.

   

  تلقی سنّتی مسلمانان در خصوص نحوه پدید آمدن مصحف:

  Islamic sources offer differing and sometimes seemingly contradictory information regarding the manner in which the Qur'anic codex was collected and compiled. For example, some of these sources emphasize that the Qur'an and the method of its preservation were fundamentally an oral phenomenon. That is, the Prophet received the revealed verses orally, then recited them to his followers, and his followers committed those verses, or at least a portion of them, to memory. In later centuries, the Islamic tradition also claimed that the term "ummi," which the Qur'an uses to describe the Prophet, meant that he did not know how to read or write. On the other hand, however, the Qur'an repeatedly refers to itself as "al-Kitab" (the Book) (although commentators believe that, at least in some instances, this term could refer to the "Preserved Tablet" or the written form of the revelation with God, not its earthly, written form). Also, some Islamic sources speak of individuals who served the Prophet as scribes of the revelation, and the Prophet personally tasked them with recording the revealed verses he recited to them in written form. It is also reported that at the time of the Prophet's death, some of his close associates, including his wife Aisha, possessed written copies of the Qur'an (or at least parts of it). Therefore, considering the various historical accounts found in Islamic sources, one can assume that shortly after receiving the first revealed verses, the Prophet necessarily recited those verses to his trusted individuals so that they would memorize them and be able to repeat them in his absence.[22] These individuals were called "huffaz" (memorizers) or "qurra" (reciters). It is likely that in the early years of receiving revelation, the Prophet did not deem it necessary to record the revelation in written form. But as the frequency of revelation and the length of the revealed verses increased, it is natural to suppose that the Prophet resolved to have the revealed verses written down, and therefore appointed individuals to write down the revelation.[23] Thus, based on Islamic sources, it can be accepted that by the time of the Prophet's death, portions of the Qur'anic verses were preserved in the memory of the memorizers of the Qur'an, and portions of it had also been rendered into written form by the scribes of the revelation.[24]

  Therefore, Muslims had two important sources available for the collection and compilation of the codex: first, fragments of the Qur'anic revelation that had been written down by the scribes of the revelation and were in the possession of the Prophet's companions and followers; and second, fragments of the Qur'anic revelation that were recorded in the memory of the Prophet's companions and followers.

  After the death of the Prophet of Islam, the Islamic community, in order to establish the Qur'an as a sacred and standard text among Muslims, faced three important tasks: (first) it had to collect and compile the scattered fragments of the Qur'an, based on written and oral sources, into a single text or book; (second) it had to standardize and stabilize the orthography of the Arabic text; and (third) it had to fully add diacritical marks and vowel points to the text so that its final form would be accepted and consulted by the Islamic community as an official and standard text.

  According to the common understanding in Islamic sources, a short time after the death of the Prophet, during the Muslims' wars against "Musaylimah" or the "False Prophet," particularly at the Battle of Aqraba in Yamama (11 or 12 AH), a large number of the memorizers, reciters, or bearers of the Quran were killed. This caused Umar ibn al-Khattab to worry that with the passing of these men, the Quran itself might be lost. Therefore, Umar proposed to Abu Bakr, the Caliph at the time, that he order the scattered fragments of the Quran to be collected. Abu Bakr initially hesitated to command something the Prophet had not authorized. But he eventually overcame his hesitation and tasked Zayd ibn Thabit, who had previously been appointed by the Prophet himself in Medina to record the revelation, with collecting and writing down all the scattered fragments of the Quran. Zayd accepted this responsibility with reluctance, as in his eyes, this task seemed more difficult than "moving a mountain." Zayd gathered the fragments of the Quran that had been written here and there on sheets of papyrus, deerskin, palm fibers, camel shoulder blades, and the like. He also summoned the memorizers of the Quran and transcribed what they held in their memory. And finally, trusting in God, based on this Quranic verse: "But if they turn away, say, 'Sufficient for me is Allah; there is no deity except Him. On Him I have relied, and He is the Lord of the Great Throne'" (At-Tawbah/129), he completed the task. Zayd wrote each and every fragment he had collected onto uniform, equal-sized "suhuf" (sheets) to compile a collection between two covers ("jama'a bayn al-lawhayn").[25] He placed this collection at the disposal of the Caliph of the time, Abu Bakr. After Abu Bakr's death, the collection Zayd had compiled passed to Umar, the second Caliph, and after him to his daughter Hafsa (one of the Prophet's wives). However, this copy was considered more of a personal copy than an official and final one.[26] There is no reason to assume that the copy of Abu Bakr/Umar/Hafsa was the only or the first systematically recorded and organized copy of the Quran. Some historical evidence indicates that other copies of the Quran also existed (more or less at the same time or slightly later) with other companions of the Prophet.[27] These copies were probably written collections of Quranic verses that their owners used to aid their memory.[28]

  حدود بیست سال پس از نسخه ابوبکر، در زمان عثمان، خلیفه سوّم مسلمانان، اختلاف میان کسانی که نسخه های متفاوتی از قرآن را در اختیار داشتند، بالا گرفت. این نسخه ها از حیث تعداد و ترتیب سوره ها با هم تفاوت داشت، و قرائت های آنها هم یکسان نبود.[29]  صاحبان این نسخ هریک نسخه خود را بهترین و تنها نسخه معتبر بشمار می آورد. منابع تاریخ اسلام حاکی از آن است که در دوران جنگهای مسلمانان در ارمنستان و آذربایجان، مجاهدان عراقی و سوری درباره صورت صحیح و معتبر قرآن اختلاف نظر یافتند.  جنگجویان استان حمص نسخه مقداد بن اسد را معتبرترین می دانستند، و اهالی شام و سوریه نیز هر کدام نسخه رایج در منطقه خود را.  سربازان کوفی فقط قرائت عبدالله بن مسعود را معتبر می دانستند، و سربازان بصره فقط قرائت ابو موسی اشعری را.  حذیفه بن یمان، از سرداران نام آور، این اختلافات را سخت نگران کننده و تهدیدی جدّی برای آینده اسلام یافت.  و نگرانی خود را به خلیفه وقت، عثمان، گزارش داد. عثمان با صحابه نزدیک پیامبر در این باره مشورت کرد، و ایشان جملگی نگرانی حذیفه را موّجه یافتند.  از این رو، خلیفه فرمان داد تا نسخه ای رسمی از قرآن فراهم آید و به تمام مراکز مهّم امپراتوری اسلامی فرستاده شود، و تمام نسخه های دیگر از میان برود. این نسخه رسمی توسط زید بن ثابت، و با کمک سه نفر از میان قریش (عبدالله بن زبیر، سعید بن العاص، و عبدالرحمن بن حارث)، بر مبنای نسخه ابوبکر (که در اختیار حفصه بود) فراهم آمد.   این متن نهایی که در سالهای پایانی خلافت عثمان پدید آمد، به "مصحف عثمان" مشهور است. مصحف عثمان بسرعت به عنوان متن رسمی و معیار در جهان اسلام پذیرفته شد، هرچند مطابق منابع اسلامی، بی رقیب نبود، و رسم و قرائت آن هم شکل یکسان و مقبولیت عام نیافت.  ظاهراً فقط اهالی کوفه به سرکردگی ابن مسعود در برابر پذیرش این نسخه رسمی مقاومت ورزیدند.[30]  اما تحقق کامل وظایف سه گانه فوق- یعنی تدوین متن، تثبیت رسم الخط، و نقطه گذاری و اعراب گذاری آن- در طول قریب به سه قرن سرانجام به انجام رسید.  امروزه صرفاً بنابر ملاحظات عملی، صورتی از قرآن در سراسر جهان اسلام مورد استفاده عموم است که در سال 1942 در مصر به عنوان متن معیار به تصویب رسید.

  بسیاری از قرآن پژوهان غربی، خصوصاً پژوهشگران نسل اوّل، مانند تئودور نولدکه و ریچارد بل، نیز این تلقی سنّتی مسلمانان را از نحوه گردآوری و تدوین مصحف قرآنی کمابیش پذیرفته اند.[31]

  اگر این تلقی از نحوه شکل گیری و تدوین مصحف را بپذیریم، در آن صورت می توانیم به نحو عقلاً موّجهی بپذیریم که مصحف قرآنی موجود (دست کم) شامل وحی قرآنی یا کلام الهی است- یعنی باور به "آموزه محوری" عقلاً موّجه است.

  دلایل تاریخی مسلمانان در خصوص اعتبار تلقی سنّتی:

  اما مسلمانان بر مبنای کدام دلایل تلقی سنّتی را از نحوه پدید آمدن مصحف موّجه می سازند؟ به بیان دیگر، بر مبنای کدام منابع و قرائن مسلمانان معتقدند که مصحف قرآنی همان آیات وحیانی را شامل است که پیامبر اسلام در طول رسالت اش در مکه و مدینه (از جانب خداوند) دریافت کرده و بر پیروانش فرو خوانده است؟

  به نظر می رسد که برای تحقیق تجربی این مدعا دست کم می توان سه منبع اصلی را فرض کرد: (1) نسخه های قدیمی قرآن؛ (2) متن خود قرآن؛ (3) سنّت اسلامی مربوط به قرآن.[32]

  But do we possess any copy of the Quranic codex whose antiquity reaches back to the time of the Prophet himself? Did a copy of the Quran ever exist that bore the personal seal of approval of the Prophet? The answer to this question is negative. The ancient copies of the Quran are very few, and determining their exact date is no easy task. Of course, fragments of the Quran have been found recorded on papyrus or gazelle skin. But researchers do not agree on the precise date of these fragments; some date them to the late first century and the first half of the second century AH, while others consider this dating incorrect and imprecise.[33] On the other hand, the oldest copies of the Quran are fragmentary, and for this reason, based on those copies, it is difficult to claim that the original form of the Quran, in terms of shape, volume, and content, was similar to the later Qurans (a form of which is now available to us). Therefore, based on the ancient copies of the Quran, it is difficult to justify the "core doctrine."

  But can the text of the Quran itself provide evidence to confirm the "core doctrine"? More specifically, are there indications within the text of the Quran itself that identify the author or compilers of the codex? The name of the Prophet of Islam ("Muhammad") appears only four times in the Quran, and in all four instances, he is referred to in the third person.[34] The Quranic text usually addresses the "Messenger" or the "Prophet," and commentators, in most cases, have necessarily, by virtue of intra-textual and extra-textual evidence, considered the referent of those expressions to be "Muhammad." In many instances, the addressee of the Quran is not even the "Messenger" or the "Prophet"; rather, the Quran addresses a referent in the form of the second-person singular pronoun, which, according to some Quranic scholars, is not always and necessarily the person of the Prophet (and in some cases, it is quite clear that the referent is not the person of the Prophet). For example, in many cases, the referent of that pronoun could be the reader or reciter of the text (whoever that may be).[35] If one adopts this somewhat skeptical position, then it would be difficult, based on the Quranic text, to decisively rule that the person of the Prophet is the "author" or "narrator" of all the Quranic verses. Therefore, based on this somewhat skeptical view, if the text of the Quran, and nothing else, is the sole criterion for judgment, one can at most claim that the person of the Prophet was the "author" or "narrator" of parts of the Quran, and not all of it.[36]

  Thus, it seems the most important empirical document for affirming the "core doctrine" (i.e., the belief that the Quranic codex comprises the revealed verses that were sent down upon the person of the Prophet of Islam) is the Islamic tradition that has reached us in the form of various "hadiths." In fact, the traditional Muslim conception of how the codex came into being, as we saw in the previous section, is mainly based on the Islamic tradition,[37] and its roots go back to hadiths and narrations according to which, as mentioned in the previous section, the compilation of the Quran took place in two main stages: in the first stage, the "Abu Bakr Codex" was compiled by the order of Abu Bakr and under the supervision of Zayd ibn Thabit—a copy that, after Abu Bakr's death, came to Umar and after him to Hafsa; and in the second stage, the "Uthmanic Codex" emerged as the official version and was quickly established. But the important question here is: does the Islamic tradition provide a reliable basis for accepting the traditional Muslim conception of how the codex came into being?

  Historical Critique of the Traditional Muslim Conception Regarding the History of the Codex:

  The traditional Muslim conception of how the Quranic codex came into being has been subjected to serious criticism, particularly from two aspects:

  The first criticism is that the Islamic tradition, or specifically the hadiths, cannot provide a reliable basis for accepting the traditional Muslim conception of the history of the collection and compilation of the Quranic codex, and therefore, the traditional Muslim conception regarding the history of the codex lacks a solid foundation. (Let us call this criticism the "minimalist criticism.") The minimalist criticism is an instance of what we earlier called a "negating counter-evidence."

  The second criticism is that a number of historical and literary indications show that the traditional Muslim understanding of the history of the collection and compilation of the Qur’anic codex is not only unfounded, but more importantly, is very likely incorrect. (Let us call this criticism the “maximalist criticism.”) The maximalist criticism is an instance of what we earlier called a “contrary counter-indication.”

  It is good to examine these two types of criticism in greater detail:

  The Minimalist Criticism of the Traditional Muslim Understanding of the History of the Codex:

  The foremost pioneers of the “minimalist criticism” were Ignaz Goldziher[38] and Joseph Schacht[39]. Of course, the scope of these two scholars’ criticism extended far beyond the hadiths that served as the basis for the traditional Muslim understanding of the history of the codex. These two scholars considered the authenticity of the hadiths found in Islamic sources (including those concerning the manner of the codex’s collection and compilation) to be doubtful and ultimately unreliable.

  Goldziher’s fundamental assumption in determining the dating of hadiths is this claim: the majority of hadiths found in official Islamic sources (including the Six Canonical Collections) were fabricated by Muslims during the first two centuries AH and arose from the religious, historical, and social developments of Islam during those two centuries; rather than recounting events from the time of the Prophet, they reflect the efforts of the Islamic community in its later stages of evolution.[40] Based on this principle, Goldziher rejects almost all hadiths attributed to the Prophet and his Companions that historically contain information about their era. In this regard, he believes that hadiths are worthless for understanding and knowing the history of early Islam, and their historical significance and value lie mainly in the fact that they can help us gain a better understanding of the developments of later periods of Islam—that is, to better understand the evolution of Islam during the years when it was striving, amidst conflicting forces, to organize itself into a coherent and structured whole.[41] Of course, Goldziher’s point is not that all existing hadiths are necessarily unreliable. But if his claim is correct, then the vast majority of these hadiths must necessarily be considered historically late and therefore invalid, and in that case, the probability of finding an authentic and reliable hadith among the enormous volume of these hadiths would be very small. Therefore, in his view, the condition of caution is to view all hadiths with doubt and to assume they are unreliable.[42]

  But on what basis does Goldziher justify his theory?

  Goldziher bases his final claim on the analysis and evaluation of a limited number of hadiths. In his view, the following points are among the factors that motivated some people in the Islamic community during the first and second centuries AH to fabricate hadith:

  The first factor was the political conflicts and religious differences within the nascent Islamic community. According to Goldziher, the aristocratic and worldly caliphate of the Umayyads provoked a reaction among many pious and God-fearing Muslims, driving them toward world-renunciation and an ascetic life. These pious individuals considered their way of life to be inspired by the way of life of the Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphs. In contrast, the worldly Umayyad rulers sought to justify their own way of life and political practice with the help of opportunistic and self-serving scholars, that is, to make it appear as though their way of life and conduct derived from the original teachings of the Prophet and his Companions. Hence, they ordered their court scholars to fabricate hadiths suited to their purposes and to attribute them to the great figures of early Islam and the Pious Predecessors. Goldziher believes that the bulk of hadiths whose chains of transmission (allegedly) trace back to the Prophet himself or his Companions actually emerged in this manner during the second half of the first century AH.[43]

  Another portion of the hadiths were forged during the era of the Abbasid Caliphate. The Abbasid period was a period of growth and flourishing for Islamic jurisprudence. For this reason, the study and production of hadith found a thriving market. The Abbasid caliphs gathered a group of scholars, jurists, and notables around themselves to forge hadiths condemning the Umayyads and praising the Abbasids—the situation reached a point where court scholars forged hadiths in any field that pleased the rulers.[44]

  On the other hand, in the middle of the second century AH, the conflicts between two groups of jurists, namely the Ahl al-Ra'y (proponents of opinion) and the Ahl al-Hadith (proponents of tradition), intensified. The Ahl al-Hadith insisted on basing legal rules and rulings, as far as possible, on the Sunnah of the Prophet and the Companions, and according to Goldziher, in cases where they could not find a hadith in defense of their legal position, they resorted to forging hadith. The opposing group, the Ahl al-Ra'y, also tried to utilize the Sunnah to consolidate their stance and position, and in cases they deemed necessary, they did not refrain from forging hadith in favor of their position.[45]

  And finally, according to Goldziher, amidst the political and religious conflicts within the fabric of Islamic society, many of the conflicting groups who were dissatisfied with their rulers also resorted to forging hadith to find a basis in the Sunnah of the Prophet and the Companions for their political grievances, or to discredit rival groups, or to condemn the rulers' methods of governance, or to attribute the right to the caliphate to this or that family within the Prophet's tribe. In other words, rivalry among tribes, cities, or scholarly circles was also among the important factors in the forgery of hadith in the Islamic tradition.[46]

  In evaluating hadiths, Goldziher bases his approach on several important principles, without explicitly stating them[47]:

  First, anachronism in the text of a hadith indicates that the hadith emerged in periods later than what is claimed. For example, if the text refers to events that had not yet occurred at the time the hadith is supposed to have originated, then the hadith must be assumed to be of later origin.[48]

  Second, hadiths whose content reflects the evolution of a subject in later times and has a more complex theme are later than hadiths whose content is simpler and more rudimentary.[49]

  Third, if a hadith presents an image of the Prophet or the early Muslims that does not seem very favorable or agreeable, then that hadith can be considered early and acceptable. For example, Goldziher approvingly cites narrations showing that during the early period of Muslim conquests, many new Arab and non-Arab Muslims in regions far from Medina had little knowledge of religious rites and rituals, and for instance, were unaware of the exact times and number of obligatory prayers.[50]

  Fourth, the taunts and insinuations of opposing and conflicting groups against each other probably contain a historical reality.[51]

  Joseph Schacht, in his important and influential book, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence[52], also accepted Goldziher's theory regarding hadith, meaning he too believed that the hadiths and narrations prevalent in Islamic sources are mostly forged, and especially the hadiths attributed to the Prophet and the Companions were fabricated in the second century AH and later, that is, concurrent with the formative period of the legal schools. He sought to demonstrate the validity of Goldziher's theory based on the analysis of legal hadiths, but his final conclusion was general and encompassed other types of hadith as well. In determining the date of hadiths, Schacht employed a set of methods: from the analysis and evaluation of the text and chains of transmission (isnad) of the hadith to dating the hadith based on the written sources in which it was first transmitted.

  But perhaps Schacht’s most influential achievement in the field of hadith studies was the method he employed for dating traditions based on the analysis of chains of transmission (isnads). He proposed five principles for dating hadiths on the basis of their isnads:

  The first principle: “The most perfect and complete isnads are the latest.”[53] He believed that the isnads of traditions were improved over time. Jurists gradually developed newer doctrines, and to confirm and establish those doctrines, they sought to attribute them to higher authorities of proof, and therefore, they fabricated hadiths in support of their views, and alongside this, they endeavored to provide more refined and flawless chains of transmission for those hadiths.

  The second principle concerns a phenomenon Schacht calls the “Backwards growth of isnads.” This phenomenon occurs when, for example, a transmitter narrates a particular tradition, and this tradition is heard and retold by others, and in this way, different individuals transmit the tradition from one another, and a multi-branched chain of transmission diverges from the original transmitter. But according to the rule, the chain of transmission for a tradition must ultimately reach higher authorities of proof, such as the Prophet or the Companions. It is here that the original transmitter or subsequent transmitters attempt to reconstruct the missing chain of transmission (i.e., the chain of transmitters connecting the original narrator to the Prophet or one of the Companions). Now suppose we compare two sets of isnads for the text of a single hadith: the first set stops at the level of later transmitters, for example, at the level of the Successors of the Prophet, but the second set reaches a higher authority of proof, such as the Prophet or the Companions. Under these conditions, based on the phenomenon of “Backwards growth of isnads,” it is assumed that the isnads of the second set came into existence later compared to the isnads of the first set.[54]

  The third principle concerns a phenomenon Schacht calls the “Spread of isnads.” The “Spread of isnads” was a device often used to resolve the problem related to “isolated reports” (khabar al-wāḥid). A “khabar al-wāḥid” or “khabar al-infirād” is a hadith narrated by a single transmitter, and therefore, it cannot be accepted as an authentic hadith. The condition for accepting a hadith is that it be narrated by at least two reliable witnesses.[55] Therefore, some would try to fabricate more transmitters or authorities of proof for a hadith (especially an isolated report) in order to establish it.[56] In this regard, Schacht believed that if a form of a hadith’s isnad is found in later sources in which the number of transmitters or authorities of proof has been increased, that isnad is forged.[57]

  The fourth principle concerns a phenomenon Schacht calls the “Common link.” The idea of the “Common link” is this: Suppose a hadith has been narrated through various paths. In most cases, if we compare all the different isnads for the text of that hadith, we find a transmitter who stands at the intersection point of all (or most) of those isnads. Schacht calls that transmitter the “Common link.” In his view, if a common link exists among all or most of the different isnads for the text of a tradition, this is a strong indication that the hadith spread during the time of that individual (i.e., the common link) and often by him (or someone using his name). In most cases, it is this common link who fabricates an isnad for that tradition to bridge the gap between himself and one of the authorities of proof (i.e., the Prophet or the Companions) (that is, he engages in “Backwards growth of isnads”).[58]

  And finally, the fifth principle is that among the various isnads for the text of a tradition, those that bypass the common link and remove him from the chain of transmitters are later.[59]

  It is on the basis of such criteria that Schacht ultimately fosters a kind of radical skepticism towards the hadiths and traditions found in Islamic sources—a skepticism that is transmitted to the hadith scholars of subsequent generations as well.

  It seems that if we accept the radical and far-reaching skepticism of Goldziher and Schacht regarding hadiths, we must inevitably doubt the validity and reliability of the hadiths that have served as the basis for the traditional Muslim understanding of the history of the collection and compilation of the Quran. And on this basis, we must ultimately consider the traditional Muslim understanding of the history of the collection and compilation of the Quran to be unfounded.

  Maximalist Critique of the Traditional Muslim Understanding of the History of the Mushaf:

  The most important pioneers of the "maximalist critique" of the traditional Muslim understanding of the history of the Mushaf have been John Wansbrough in his book Quranic Studies[60] and John Burton in his book The Collection of the Qurʾān[61]. These scholars not only considered the traditional Muslim understanding of the history of the Mushaf to be unfounded, but further claimed that, based on internal and/or external textual evidence, it could be shown that this understanding was most likely incorrect. Both Wansbrough and Burton were deeply influenced by the research of Goldziher and Schacht, and in fact took the views of these two pioneering scholars as given in their own research. On that basis, they concluded that all Muslim hadiths and narrations concerning the collection, editing, and compilation of the Quranic Mushaf are historically unreliable and should be considered a reflection of the jurisprudential and theological debates of the Islamic community from the end of the second century AH onwards.

  A noteworthy point is that the research of Wansbrough and Burton on the history of the collection and compilation of the Quran, which was published within a more or less unified theoretical framework (i.e., the Goldziher-Schacht tradition) and almost simultaneously (1977), led to two completely different conclusions.[62]

  After a detailed study of Muslim narrations concerning the manner of the Quran's collection and compilation, Burton concluded that all narrations related to the collection and compilation of the Quran after the Prophet's death are fabricated. According to his view, the "Abu Bakr's codex" and the "Uthman's codex" never actually existed. The Quranic Mushaf, in its present form, was collected, compiled, and finalized during the time of the Prophet of Islam and under his supervision. However, jurists of later periods fabricated hadiths about the collection and compilation of the Quran after the Prophet's death so that they could claim that the Quranic Mushaf is an incomplete version and does not necessarily include all of the Quranic revelation, and particularly that the Prophet of Islam had no role in its collection and compilation process.

  But what motivated these jurists to fabricate a false history for the manner of the Quran's collection and compilation? Burton argued that legal rulings and procedures were common among those jurists that had no Quranic basis[63], and some were even incompatible with the text of the Quranic Mushaf. In many cases, jurists, citing the theory of abrogation (naskh), considered the Sunna to abrogate the Quran in order to provide religious legitimacy for those legal rulings. However, the incongruity or contradiction of these legal rulings and procedures with the Quran was ultimately problematic and a source of criticism and protest from the traditionalists of the Islamic community—especially since, at some point, the jurisprudential schools also accepted the Quran as one of the primary sources of their legal system in their principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh). Therefore, jurists were compelled to take the Quran more seriously in their juristic derivations. But reconciling those legal rulings with the Quranic Mushaf was not always easy. It was in this context that jurists sought to remove the Prophet from the process of the Quran's collection and compilation, and to emphasize that the Quranic Mushaf is an incomplete version of the Quranic revelation. Their motivation for this was particularly twofold:

  First, in cases where a legal ruling was agreed upon in jurisprudence but no mention of it appeared in the Mushaf, they could more easily refer to Quranic sources other than the existing Mushaf, thereby providing justification and legitimacy for the desired jurisprudential ruling.

  Second, in certain regions of the Islamic world, many jurists had adopted legal rulings and procedures that were previously prevalent in those regions, and in cases where opponents argued against them on the basis of the Muṣḥaf (i.e., the official existing copy of the Quran), they could defend the approach of the inhabitants of those regions toward those specific issues by citing other versions of the Quran that were known and prevalent in those areas.[64]

  For example, nearly all jurists had a consensus that the punishment for certain types of adultery is stoning. However, there is no trace of this ruling in the Quran; indeed, the explicit Quranic ruling regarding adultery is a punishment other than stoning (Q. 24:2). Under these circumstances, some jurists, in justifying the ruling of stoning, claimed that the Quranic ruling had been abrogated by virtue of the Sunna (for instance, a solitary report narrated from Umar, the second caliph). Yet another group claimed that the existing Muṣḥaf does not contain the entire Quran, and that the ruling of stoning is found in the omitted passages of the Quran; that is, the stoning verse has disappeared, but its ruling remains (its wording was lifted, but its ruling endures). According to this latter group, in fact, the Quran, in the stoning verse (which was removed from the Muṣḥaf), had abrogated its previous ruling (i.e., the punishment of flogging).[65]

  Therefore, if the Islamic community accepted that the Quranic Muṣḥaf is an incomplete version, then jurists could claim that the legal procedures prevalent among them were rooted in the omitted passages of the Quranic Muṣḥaf.

  But Burton argues that historically, only the Quranic Muṣḥaf holds authority, not the narrations and hadiths that were later fabricated about the manner of its collection and compilation.[66] Thus, Burton rejects the traditional Muslim understanding of the history of the Muṣḥaf, but his theory does not negate the "central doctrine" (i.e., the belief that the Quranic Muṣḥaf includes verses that the Prophet of Islam himself recited to his followers as revealed verses); on the contrary, it affirms that doctrine in a more emphatic manner.

  Therefore, rejecting the traditional Muslim understanding of the history of the Muṣḥaf does not necessarily lead to the negation of the "central doctrine." Hence, in the context of the present discussion, examining Wansbrough's view on the history of the Quran's emergence is of greater importance, because his critical view (unlike Burton's view) leads to the negation of the "central doctrine" through the rejection of the traditional Muslim understanding of the history of the Muṣḥaf.

  Wansbrough is one of the prominent figures of "Revisionist" Quranic studies. Revisionist scholars, despite significant differences among themselves, all reject the general framework of the traditional Muslim understanding regarding the manner of the Quran's emergence. Providing an account of Wansbrough's views in the book Quranic Studies is no easy task. His writing style, as acknowledged by experts, is complex and the structure of his text is unnecessarily difficult, and this very fact sometimes makes understanding his intent challenging.[67]

  Wansbrough, unlike Burton, believed that the Quranic Muṣḥaf was prepared and compiled around the third century AH by Muslims, based on the necessities of the Islamic community and on the basis of a version containing earlier prophetic words and statements (Prophetic logia). In his view, the ancient version that served as the basis for constructing the Quran had probably emerged in Mesopotamia during the first two centuries AH. But on what basis does he justify his claim? Here, I must necessarily suffice with outlining the main framework of several of his important arguments, particularly those in critique of the traditional Muslim understanding of the history of the Quran's collection and compilation:

  His first and best-known argument rests on an analysis of non-Qurʾānic sources. The oldest Arabic-Islamic literary sources are the books of sīra, tafsīr, fiqh, and grammar (ṣarf wa naḥw) written in the Abbasid period. Most of these sources claim to transmit information from earlier generations, and particularly from the person of the Prophet of Islam. This claim, of course, as we saw earlier, has been criticized by Goldziher and Schacht. But one particular point especially attracted Wansbrough’s attention:[68] according to Schacht’s research, early Islamic sources, with rare exceptions, do not refer to the Qurʾān. For example, in the early stages of the formation and evolution of fiqh, legal rulings and procedures were rarely based on the content of the Qurʾān. And even in cases where the Qurʾān was cited, it is difficult to consider those citations as evidence for the existence of an official, fixed text. For instance, in the book Fiqh Akbar, whose date has been determined as the mid-second century AH, no reference to the Qurʾān appears.[69] Legal exegesis of the Qurʾān essentially emerged in the third century AH. Likewise, before the third century, there is no trace of commentaries that gloss the Qurʾānic text and explain its linguistic and grammatical aspects (technically termed Masoretic exegesis[70]). The emergence of literature concerning the variant readings of the Qurʾān (“maṣāḥif”) is even later.[71] It is on this basis that Wansbrough argues that the date of the final form of the Qurʾān should not be considered earlier than the time when the Qurʾān came to be cited as a source in the books of sīra, tafsīr, fiqh, and grammar. “Logically, it seems to me quite impossible that the Qurʾān could have become a canonical text before (and not after) it had acquired the authority and sanctity of a sacred scripture within the Islamic community. The data derived from Arabic literature, in terms of chronological order, do not indicate that such a canonical text existed before the beginning of the third century AH.”[72] In other words, in his view, the reason early sources did not refer to the Qurʾān as a source before the third century AH was that no official, fixed text of the Qurʾān existed before that time. Therefore, in his belief, the official, fixed text of the Qurʾān must necessarily have been born in Abbasid Iraq, not in the Hijaz. He does not deny, of course, that the raw materials of this official version may have existed in some form before the era of the flourishing of the vast literature concerning the Qurʾān, but he considers it exceedingly unlikely that an official, fixed version like the ʿUthmānic codex was actually in circulation before that time.[73]

  Wansbrough's second argument concerns the literary nature and structure of the Muṣḥaf text. According to him, structural analysis of the text shows that it is not the product of a precise, pre-planned design. For example, it appears that the "salvation history," or the ethical or apocalyptic themes and passages in the Quran, were gathered from several different traditions. Moreover, repetition and omission are not uncommon in the text. Wansbrough believes that, considering such instances, it is difficult to accept that the text is the result of the precise and coherent work of a single individual or even a specific editorial committee. Rather, it is more appropriate to assume that the various passages of the text took shape gradually and independently of one another over many years and were later brought together using a limited number of rhetorical conventions.[74] He writes in this regard: "The overall framework of revelation includes certain rules typically employed to set forth the major themes of Quranic theology. These formulas, which exhibit a limited lexical range, foster the notion that the text resulted from the conflation of prior versions or passages that originally had no connection to one another."[75] In his view, this hypothesis can better explain "the repetitive character of the text" and also "its homogenized style"[76]. [77] Wansbrough believes that these independent passages, which formed the basis for compiling the Muṣḥaf, can be considered a collection of "Prophetic logia"—passages whose form analysis reveals a diversity of literary styles. In the prophetic literature of the Jewish tradition, the Torah and post-Torah texts, specific literary styles were used to express the main themes of the divine message (i.e., "retribution," "sign," "exile," and "covenant"), namely the "apodictic," "supplicatory," and "narrative" styles[78]. Wansbrough demonstrates that these expressive styles can also be clearly recovered in the prophetic discourses constituting the Quran.[79] In the text of the Quranic Muṣḥaf, these prophetic discourses are regarded, somewhat incoherently, as the Word of God, but outside the Muṣḥaf text, these same passages are considered not the Word of God but a report of that Word.[80]

  Wansbrough believed that in Abbasid-era Iraq, Christians and Jews constantly challenged the nascent religion of the Arabs, and the marketplace of sectarianism and apostasy was heated. Therefore, in response to these challenges (and not the challenge of pagan infidels), Muslims compiled the scattered versions or passages of prophetic utterances that already existed into a single sacred text, and also, during that same period, shaped their own "salvation history." Thus, neither the Quranic Muṣḥaf nor the Muslims' salvation history reflects the actual prophetic experience in seventh-century CE Ḥijāz.[81]

  Wansbrough's third argument is a critique of the historical existence of the Uthmanic codex. As mentioned earlier, according to Islamic sources, multiple versions of the Quran existed (at least) contemporaneously with and independently of the compilation and redaction of the Uthmanic codex. But according to the account in those sources, after the Uthmanic codex received its final form, the Caliph ordered all those alternative versions to be collected and destroyed. Wansbrough claims that by examining what has come down to us of those ancient codices, one can see that the differences between those versions and the Uthmanic codex are very slight. But if that were the case, there would have been no reason for the Caliph to order the destruction of those alternative versions, especially since minor deviation from the text of the codex was compatible with the doctrine of "ahruf" or the multiplicity of readings (at least according to some interpretations of it)[82]. Therefore, to understand the traditions concerning the Uthmanic codex, we must either assume that the task of destroying versions that differed substantially and seriously from the Uthmanic codex was carried out so swiftly and comprehensively that no trace of those alternative versions remains, or we must assume that the traditions concerning the Uthmanic codex were fabricated and pursued some other purpose. Wansbrough believes that the first option is incompatible with the chronological sequence of the literature pertaining to the Quran, because, for example, in those sources, where the context demands it, there is no clear reference to an official text (canon). Thus, from his perspective, the second option seems more plausible, as it simultaneously shows how the nascent Muslim religious community sought to produce an account of its own origins.[83] I should also add that, in Wansbrough's view, the variety of codices or readings was the product of the exegetes' erasures, corrections, or morphological and syntactical interventions over the course of nearly two centuries, during which the sacred text had not yet attained its final, stabilized form.[84]

  And finally, the Quranic codex is in the Classical Arabic language. Nöldeke, following the traditional Muslim conception, believed that the Quran had in fact preserved the pure and uncorrupted form of this classical language (although he identified many grammatical errors in the text). On the other hand, Karl Vollers[85] believed that the Quran was originally written in a pure tribal dialect and was later subjected to modification to conform to Classical Arabic. But Wansbrough disagrees with both theories. He argues that Classical Arabic was created by the grammarians in the second century AH, contemporaneously with the compilation and redaction of the Quran. Therefore, contrary to Nöldeke's view, speaking of "grammatical errors" in the Quran is meaningless, since prior to that, no standard existed against which the language of the Quran could be deemed "erroneous." On the other hand, contrary to Vollers's view, at the time he claims, Classical Arabic did not exist so that the original language of the Quran could be modified and conformed to it. In his opinion, the Quran was essentially written concurrently and contemporaneously with the evolution and formation of this language. Thus, Wansbrough argues that before the second century AH, Classical Arabic fundamentally did not exist for the Quran to be written in that language.[86]

  It is more or less on the basis of the above arguments that Wansbrough casts doubt on the traditional Muslim conception of the history of the Quran's compilation and redaction. He himself, of course, acknowledges the "hypothetical nature" of his theory[87], but if his theory about the history of the Quran's formation is correct, then it would be difficult to consider the Quranic codex as containing verses that the Prophet himself recited to his followers as revealed verses. That is, assuming Wansbrough's theory, the "central doctrine" must be considered false.

  Evaluating the Historical Criticisms of the Traditional Muslim Conception of the History of the Codex:

  Now it is good to examine the historical criticisms leveled against the traditional Muslim conception of the history of the codex more carefully:

  (First) One of the methodological principles of Schacht's criticism, as we saw, was the principle of "backward projection of isnads." According to this principle, the "common link" is the originator or fabricator of the tradition, and the chain of transmitters connecting the common link to the Prophet is fabricated and was most likely forged by the common link himself. In other words, Schacht's argument is more or less as follows:

  • Based on the analysis of a tradition's isnads, one cannot determine with certainty whether the common link actually heard the tradition from someone else or not.
  • Therefore, we must assume that the common link is himself the originator or fabricator of the tradition and did not hear it from anyone else.

  This conclusion seems correct in some cases; that is, in the analysis of some hadiths, proposition (1) can be a justified basis for affirming proposition (2). But from the fact that in some cases the truth of proposition (1) is a good reason for affirming proposition (2), one cannot conclude that in all cases such a relationship exists between propositions (1) and (2). In fact, Schacht formulated the principle of "backward growth of isnads" based on the analysis of a limited number of traditions (especially legal traditions) and then applied it as a general guiding principle to all traditions. But this generalization seems hasty; that is, based on the analysis of a few limited cases, one cannot issue a general ruling about all traditions: (at least in some cases) it is entirely possible that the common link actually heard the tradition from the person he names in his chain of transmitters. This possibility cannot be ruled out a priori.

  (Second) But what can be said about the principle of the "proliferation of isnads"? Michael Cook believes that researchers who still accord validity to hadith have two methodological options before them: (1) they must either show that the phenomenon of the "proliferation of isnads" was not common and widespread on a large scale, in which case they must also regard mutawatir hadiths as historically reliable; or (2) they must accept that Muslim scholars engaged in the forgery of isnads on a large scale, in which case they must accept that the history of a narration cannot be determined based on its isnads, and particularly not by virtue of the common link.[88] The main problem with this argument is that neither Schacht nor Cook has shown that the phenomenon of the "proliferation of isnads" was actually common and widespread. In fact, what they have shown is the proposal of two possibilities: (1) they have shown what potential motives Muslim scholars might have had for forging hadith; and (2) they have shown the ways in which the isnads of a narration could be forged. But they never showed that those possible things actually materialized, meaning that in their works there is scant evidence to show that Muslim scholars actually acted upon those possible motives, and actually (on a large scale) utilized those possible methods and engaged in the forgery of isnads.[89] As it happens, the available evidence suggests that the phenomenon of the "proliferation of isnads" should not be considered pervasive and common. Evaluating narrations based on their isnads was a method to ensure the reliability of the process of transmitting narrations. In this method, the principle was that the transmitter would honestly and explicitly name their source of information; if they did otherwise, they would have deliberately committed forgery, and their action would be considered a violation and falsehood. This rule was well known among scholarly circles, and the scholarly community strove to uphold it in practice and ensure that no one violated it. Of course, this did not mean that no one transgressed that principle and engaged in the forgery of isnads. But it is highly unlikely that the current of isnad forgery was a dominant phenomenon in scholarly circles (especially among hadith scholars). If the meticulous and scrupulous system of transmitting isnads had been devised merely to deceive audiences and make hadiths appear reliable, then it would have been fundamentally futile. Because everyone would have known in advance that these isnads were fabricated in most cases, and were constructed merely to make narrations appear reliable. When al-Shafi'i emphasized that one must rely on hadiths whose isnads are reliable, did he already believe that the majority of these isnads were forged? In that case, what was the point of emphasizing the reliability of such hadiths? If the forgery of isnads was common on a large scale, then who was supposed to be deceived by that trick? In such an atmosphere, could a jurist argue with another jurist by citing the "reliable" isnad of a narration? It seems the general perception in Muslim scholarly circles was that the phenomenon of forgery and proliferation of isnads was not so common as to render the citation of isnads fruitless when assessing the reliability of a hadith. Therefore, considering the general perception of Muslim scholars regarding the scholarly tradition of hadith criticism, it is more plausible to assume that isnads were, in most cases, sufficiently accurate and reliable to be of use to scholars in determining the reliability of a hadith.[90]

  (Third) Harald Motzki believes that Schacht's theory of the "common link" can be given an alternative interpretation, and on that basis the date of the traditions can be determined more precisely.[91]  As we saw, Schacht believed that the "common link" was in fact the originator or forger of the hadith. But Motzki believes that the evidence shows that in many cases the common links can be considered the first people who collected hadiths and endeavored to disseminate those hadiths systematically.   Motzki agrees with Schacht that the chain of transmitters connecting the common link to the later collectors of hadiths (i.e., that part of the isnad which Schacht calls the "real part") is, in most cases, real.  But if we accept that the majority of transmitters in the "real part" are real, why should we categorically and a priori rule that the "common link" itself cannot be a "real transmitter" and must necessarily be the forger of the hadith?  For what reason can we not assume that the "common link" himself actually heard the hadith from another informant?  (Of course, this does not mean that common links never forged hadiths, or did not deliberately or inadvertently alter the text and isnad of a hadith, or did not make mistakes in mentioning the name of their informant.)[92]  If we accept Motzki's interpretation of the "common link" theory, then we are entitled to assume that the "common link" received the hadith (or at least its gist) from another individual or individuals—unless the contrary is proven. Therefore, within the framework of Motzki's interpretation, more than the "common link" himself, his informant (or, more precisely, the date of his informant's death or the date of his contact with the "common link") will be important.[93] This shift is important in that it allows us to trace the date of the tradition back to a time earlier than the "common link."

  (Fourth) Neither Goldziher nor Schacht independently evaluated the traditions concerning the collection and codification of the Quran, and Wansbrough also largely assumed the unreliability of the traditions concerning the collection and codification of the Quran based on the validity of the general results of Goldziher's and Schacht's research regarding the historical reliability of hadiths—although many Western Quran scholars, including Goldziher and Schacht, despite considering Islamic traditions unreliable, traced the history of the Quran back to the time of the Prophet of Islam based on those very traditions, and considered it the most authoritative source about the life and teachings of the Prophet of Islam.[94]  But Motzki, within the framework of his interpretation of Schacht's "common link" theory, evaluates the historical traditions concerning the codices of Abu Bakr and Uthman in detail.[95]  And ultimately concludes that "the two traditions that recount the history of the Quranic codex and which Muslim scholars have generally accepted, were both disseminated by Ibn Shihab [al-Zuhri], and we can date them to the first quarter of the second century AH."[96] If we accept Motzki's analysis, then we must consider Wansbrough's opinion incorrect, which dated the traditions concerning the collection and codification of the Quran to the early third century AH onwards.

  (Fifth) There is other evidence indicating that Wansbrough's theory about the date of the codification of the Quran (in the early third century AH onwards) is incorrect.  For example, several years after the publication of Wansbrough's book, lengthy passages from the book al-Ridda wa al-Futuh al-Kabir by Sayf ibn Umar were discovered, in which an account of the manner of collecting and codifying the Uthmanic codex is transmitted.[97]  Sayf ibn Umar died around the year 200 AH, and if we assume that he wrote his book in the second half of his life, then we must date the writing of the book to the second half of the second century AH, meaning his account cannot be more than 120 years after the date of the codification of the Uthmanic codex (according to the well-known view).  But if we accept Wansbrough's analysis, then during the lifetime of Sayf ibn Umar, the final version of the Quran essentially did not yet exist.[98]

  (Sixth) Fred Donner[99] also believes that Wansbrough's theory regarding the history of the Quran is "definitely" incorrect. In his view, (firstly) an analysis of the Quran's structure suggests that the text must have been stabilized before the outbreak of the first civil wars among Muslims, known as the "Fitna," i.e., before the years 34 to 40 AH, because otherwise, the text would inevitably be replete with all kinds of anachronisms that are absent from the current text of the Quran. (Secondly) recent research on the oldest extant manuscripts of the Quran also indicates that the Quran apparently existed as a stabilized sacred text by the end of the first century AH at the latest.[100] For example, the date of the Quranic fragments found in the 'Sanaa manuscript' goes back to the second half of the first century AH. Researchers have shown that this manuscript is, without any alteration, the very same Uthmanic codex, and it even includes the first and last surahs of the Quran, which are often absent from non-Uthmanic codices.[101]

  The truth is that Wansbrough's theory regarding the genesis of the Quran has not found many adherents among scholars of Quranic history, although his historical and stylistic observations have often been found insightful.[102] In general, revisionist Quranic scholars who reject the traditional Muslim understanding of how the Quran came into being have themselves been unable to produce a coherent and unified account of this phenomenon, and the result of their work is a collection of hypotheses that are (scientifically) sometimes bold and often contradictory.[103]

  It is in this context that Motzki's conclusion regarding the historical reliability of the traditional Muslim understanding of how the Quran was collected and compiled appears more cautious: "We cannot prove that the accounts concerning the history of the Quran go back to eyewitnesses of the events that are claimed to have occurred. We cannot be sure that everything really happened as reported in the traditions. Nevertheless, we must concede that the Muslim reports and accounts are older, and thus closer to the time of the alleged events, than Western scholars have hitherto assumed. It is true that these accounts contain details that seem implausible—or, to put it more cautiously—require explanation; but the Western views that claim to have provided more plausible and historically reliable accounts in place of the Muslim traditions are clearly far from what they claim."[104]

  Conclusion:

  Based on the foregoing, Muslims who consider the "Quran" to be the divine word on the basis of the trustworthiness of the truthful narrator (i.e., the Trustworthy Prophet) can, in a rationally justified manner, consider the existing "Mushaf" to contain the divine word, provided that the "Mushaf" truly includes the "Quran." This belief is rationally justified as long as the "core doctrine" (i.e., the belief that "the Quranic Mushaf includes verses that the Prophet of Islam himself recited to his followers as revealed verses") has no undefeated defeater. The present examination shows that some recent historical studies conducted in criticism of the "core doctrine" lack the decisiveness that would rationally compel adherents of the "core doctrine" to abandon that doctrine. In other words, the "core doctrine" at least currently has no undefeated defeater, and therefore, Muslims can still, in a rationally justified manner, consider the existing Quran to contain the divine word.

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  Critical Traditionalism in the Realm of Religion

  Author: Arash Naraghi

  Moravian College, Pennsylvania

  January 30, 2014

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  [1]  Here I would like to thank my learned friend Mr. Yaser Mirdamadi, who read this article carefully before publication and favored me with his valuable insights.

  [2]  Perhaps the model of reforming religious thought as found in Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari and Abdolkarim Soroush can be considered an instance of "modernist reformism."

  [3]  Perhaps the model of encountering religious thought as found in Seyyed Hossein Nasr can be considered an instance of "uncritical traditionalism." It is worth emphasizing that I use the term "traditionalism" here in a sense different from "traditional." According to my understanding, a "traditionalist" is someone who turns to tradition with an awareness of modernity; that is, their inclination toward tradition can be seen as a kind of reaction or response to the exigencies of modernity. But a "traditional" person is immersed in the heart of tradition, oblivious to modernity. That is, the traditional person's absorption in the context of tradition does not stem from an awareness of modernity, nor is it a response or reaction to it. In this respect, many Muslim scholars, such as Ayatollah Safi Golpayegani or Ayatollah Vahid Khorasani, should be considered instances of "traditional" scholars, whereas, for example, Seyyed Hossein Nasr should be regarded as an instance of a "traditionalist" scholar.

  [4]  For a detailed discussion on this matter, see:

  Van InWagen, Peter, The Problem of Evil, Oxford University Press, 2006. Lecture 3. pp. 37-55.

  [5]  To become acquainted with this distinction, see:

  Pollock, John, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge,  Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1986, 2^nd edition.

  Also, Plantinga, Alvin, Warranted Christian Belief, “The Nature of Defeaters”, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 358-365.

  [6]  For a good discussion on the compatibility of these two models of rationality, see the following article:

  Sudduth, Michael, “Reformed epistemology and Christian apologetics”, Religious Studies 39, 299-321.

  [7]  The general form of the fallacy of "appeal to ignorance" is roughly this: "There is no reason or evidence to prove the existence of A; therefore, A does not exist."

  [8]  To become acquainted with "evidentialism" in the realm of religious thought, and some important critiques of it, see, for example:

  Plantinga, Alvin, “Reason and Belief in God”, in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, ed. By Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstroff, University of Notre Dame Press, (first printed 1983) 2004, pp. 16-93.

  [9] It is not only opponents of religion who commit the fallacy of "confusing the levels of rationality." Sometimes some believers also fail to pay attention to the distinction between levels of rationality, and set maximal rationality as the criterion for assessing their religious beliefs. When their religious beliefs prove incapable of meeting those criteria, they find those beliefs rationally unjustified, and (without any rational necessity) either abandon those beliefs or subject them to fundamental revision. For example, one writer, in criticizing the belief that the Quran is the Word of God, writes: "Proving that the Quran is the Word of God is 'impossible.' As far as I understand, there is no human (rational-empirical) way to prove that the Quran is the Word of God." And "there is no proof that the Quran is the Word of God, and as far as I understand, there cannot be." (Akbar Ganji, "The Possibility and Impossibility of Proving the Word of God," dated 26 Azar 1387, Radio Zamaneh website. And based on this presupposition that "no human (rational-empirical) way," meaning extra-religious, exists to prove a religious doctrine, he concludes that belief in that doctrine is rationally unjustified. That is, from this perspective, belief in religious doctrines is justified only if those beliefs meet the criteria of maximal rationality. Or some other experts believe that religious knowledge is entirely subordinate to extra-religious knowledge and a consumer of that knowledge (and should be), or that an understanding of the Quran not based on premises affirmed by atheists is fundamentally not understanding. Such cases can be considered instances of this confusion of the levels of rationality, but by believers.

  [10] This model of rationality is in important respects similar to the role that many Ash'ari Muslim theologians, chief among them Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali, assigned to reason in the realm of religion (or Kalam). Ghazali, for example, in al-Munqidh min al-Dalal, considers the ultimate aim of Kalam to be preserving the beliefs of the Ahl al-Sunnah and guarding them from the sophistries of the people of innovation. In other words, in his view, the most important role of reason (or its manifestation in Kalam) is defending the sanctuary of religion and repelling doubts by demonstrating the inconsistencies and contradictions in the opponent's position when criticizing religious doctrines. In the more modern terminology used in this article, the primary task of the theologians was to defeat the evidence or reasons that contradicted religious doctrines. Ghazali has written on this matter in various places; as one example, see:

  Abi Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali, al-Munqidh min al-Dalal wa al-Mawsil ila Dhi al-'Izza wa al-Jalal, edited by Muhammad Ismail Huzayyin and Shadha Ra'iq Abdullah, published by Mawkif al-Falsafa al-Islamiyya, p. 10.

  Of course, the model defended in the present article has a more positive approach toward external critique, and, among other things, places greater emphasis on the sifting role of reason in the realm of religious doctrines. In the model assumed in this article, as we have seen, the role of reason is not limited to the negative defense of religious doctrines; rather, reason can and must, like a sieve, purge the system of religious beliefs of "false" doctrines and play a significant role in correcting and enhancing our understanding of religious doctrines.

  Among contemporary religious epistemologists, particularly Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff have defended this model of rationality in the realm of religion. For example, Plantinga fundamentally considers the justification or warrantedness of a belief to ultimately depend on there being no undefeated defeater for that belief. In his important book Warranted Christian Belief, he particularly tries to defend the reasonableness and justifiedness of religious beliefs by defeating the most important criticisms or defeaters that have been leveled against religious belief. To become familiar with this conception of the concept of justification or warrant and its application in the realm of religious beliefs, see:

  Plantinga, Alvin, Warranted Chritian Belief, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. Ch. II.

  Also, Plantinga, Alvin, “Reason and Belief in God”, in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstroff, (eds), University of Notre Dame Press, first printed 1986, pp. 16-93.

  And to become acquainted with Wolterstorff's views on this matter, see:

  Wolterstorrf, Nicholas, “Can belief in God be rational if it has no foundations?” in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstroff, (eds), pp. 164-172.

  Also see:

  Sudduth, Michael, “Reformed epistemology and Christian apologetics”.

  [11] Ibn Rushd, Kitāb Faṣl al-Maqāl wa Taqrīr mā bayn al-Sharīʿa wa al-Ḥikma min al-Ittiṣāl, introduced and annotated by Dr. Albert Nasri Nader, second edition, Dar al-Mashriq (Catholic Press), Beirut, Lebanon, p. 35.

  [12] To become acquainted with the distinction between

  [17]  On the difference between the role of transmission or testimony in the transfer of knowledge and justification, see for example:

  Plantinga, Alvin, Warrant and Proper Function, pp. 86-87.

  Also:

  Audi, Robert, “Testimony, Credulity, and Veracity”, pp.31-32, and also,

  Audi, Robert, Epistemology: A contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge, Routledge, 1999, Ch. 5, pp.135-137.

  [18]  Today, few philosophers consider the existence of God metaphysically impossible; most educated atheists at most deem His existence highly improbable. Therefore, I assume here the principle of the possibility of God's existence. However, regarding the possibility of God speaking to human beings, I have spoken at length in other articles, and have, among other things, shown how one can defend the possibility of linguistic revelation within the framework of a kind of epistemology of perception. For a detailed discussion, see for example: Arash Naraghi, "The Possibility and Structure of Linguistic Revelation," in the book Hadith-e Hazer va Ghayeb, Nashr-e Negah-e Mo'aser, first edition, 1390, pp. 135-150; and also, "A Critique of the Theory of the Prophetic Reading of the World (2)," same book, pp. 237-245.

  [19] I have previously examined some of the theological and philosophical criticisms of certain (religious) critics of this central doctrine elsewhere, and therefore, I assume those discussions here. To become acquainted with my critique of those views, see the book Hadith-e Hazer va Ghayeb, chapters six through eight, and also chapters ten through fourteen.

  [20] For example, in some Islamic sources it is stated that Umar, who according to some sources played a role in compiling the "Abu Bakr Codex," would only include a verse in the Mushaf if two witnesses testified to its authenticity. It is reported that he did not include the verse on stoning in the Quran because he could not find two witnesses for it. See: (Suyuti, al-Itqan fi Ulum al-Quran, Cairo, 1318, p. 137; and also, Abd al-Rahman ibn Ali ibn Muhammad ibn al-Jawzi, Kitab al-Nawasikh al-Quran, vol. 2, publisher ?, p. 357.) Some Shia scholars also believed that certain verses concerning the guardianship of the Imams were removed from the Quran. Muhaddith Nuri, in the following book, compiled a large number of Shia hadiths regarding the distortion or incompleteness of the Quran:

  Hussein Nuri, Fasl al-Khitab fi Tahrif Kitab Rabb al-Arbab, publisher?, lithograph, 1298 AH. A copy of this book can be found here, a more refined version of this book along with a critique of it can be found here.

  This book, of course, has provoked many criticisms and objections among Shia scholars. For example, see:

  Mohammad Hadi Ma'refat, Sianat al-Quran min al-Tahrif, Islamic Publications Office affiliated with the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, Qom, 1413.

  [21] Some Islamic sources claim that certain verses of the Quran were added to it later. For example, the name "Muhammad" appears four times in the Quran. Some Quranic scholars have claimed that these passages were not in the older versions of the Quran and were later added to the text. To become acquainted with some of these discussions, see:

  Hischfeld, Hartwig, New Researches into the Composition and Exegesis of the Qur’an, Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1902, pp. 139-140.

  [22] Nӧldeke, Theodor, The History of the Qur’an, Edited and translated by Wolfgang H. Behn, Brill, 2013,p.36

  [23] Nӧldeke, The History of the Qur’an, pp. 36-37.

  [24] It is argued in detail in the following article that in the Prophet's time, the written recording of oral culture, particularly poetry, was common, and therefore, it is entirely probable that the Prophet of Islam also followed the pre-existing tradition among the Arabs of his time in the written recording of the Qur’an. See:

  Schoeler, Gregor, “A Comment on the hypotheses of Burton and Wansbrough”, in The Qur’an in Context: Historical and Literary Investigations into the Qur’anic Milieu, ed. By Angelika Neuwirth, Nicola Sinai, and Michael Marx, Brill, 2010, pp. 779-795.

  [25] Ibn Abi Dawud, Kitab al-Masahif vol. 1, al-Faruq al-Haditha lil-Tiba'a, Cairo, pp. 48-50.

  [26] Among the reasons Nӧldeke provides for this is that this codex (unlike the codices of Abdullah ibn Mas'ud and Ubayy ibn Ka'b) was not sent as the official version to the various regions of the Islamic realm after the great Muslim conquests during Umar's time:

  Nӧldeke, The History of the Qur’an,p. 229.

  [27] For example, sources speak of the codex of Abdullah ibn Mas'ud, the codex of Ubayy ibn Ka'b, the codex of Abu Musa al-Ash'ari, and the codex of Miqdad ibn Aswad. For a detailed discussion of these codices, for example, see:

  Nӧldeke, The History of the Qur’an, Ch. “The Other Pre-‘Uthmanic Collections”, pp. 235-250.

  [28] For a detailed introduction to the traditions concerning the genesis of the

  A good Persian translation of this article is available, see:

  Harald Motzki, "The Collection of the Qur'an: A Reconsideration of Western Views in Light of Recent Methodological Developments," translated by Morteza Karimi-Nia. Journal of Haft Aseman, no. 32, pp. 155-196.

  [33] For an introduction to these early Qur'anic manuscripts and the problems related to dating them, see:

  Grohmann, Adolf, “The Problem of Dating Early Qur’ans”, in Der Islam 33 (1958), pp. 213-231.

  [34] Some researchers have claimed that these four verses were later added to the text of the codex. For example, see:

  Hischfeld, New Researches into the Composition and Exegesis of the Qur’an, pp. 139- 140.

  [35] For example, see:

  Rippin, Andrew, “Muhammad in the Qur’an: Reading Scripture in the 21^st Century”, in The Biography of Muhammad: The Issue of the Sources, Harald Motzki (ed.), Brill Academic Publishers, 2000, pp. 298-309.

  [36] As we will see, one of the important defenders of this theory is John Wansbrough. See:

  Wansbrough, John, Qur’anic Studies: Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretation, Forwarded, Translations, and Expanded Notes by, Andrew Rippin, Prometheus Books, 2004, pp. 1-52.

  [37] Here, "Islamic tradition" is meant in its broad sense, that is, all the historical and exegetical traditions found in various sources in the form of literary genres, tafsir, sira, and collections containing sunan, which are supposed to provide the necessary background information about the Qur'an and its details—the totality of these passages can collectively be called "hadith."

  [38] Ignaz Goldziher

  [39] Joseph Schacht

  [40] Goldziher, Ignaz, Muslim Studies II, Trans. C. R. Varber nd S. M. Stern, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1971, p.19.

  [41] Goldziher, Muslim Studies II. p.19.

  [42] A form of this skepticism regarding the authenticity and reliability of hadith has also taken shape among Muslim reformers in recent centuries. For example, the community known as "Ahl al-Qur'an" (especially in the Indian subcontinent), has, to varying degrees, expressed serious doubts and opposition regarding the reliability of hadiths and the Islamic tradition's sometimes exaggerated reliance on them. To the extent that some Muslim reformers have defended the idea of "Sunnah minus hadith." For an introduction to the criticisms and conflicts of the "Ahl al-Qur'an" and the rival group known as "Ahl al-Hadith," see, among others:

  Brown, Daniel W., Rethinking tradition in modern Islamic thought, Cambridge University Press, 1999, esp. Ch. 2, 5, and 6.

  [43] For an introduction to Goldziher's view on the history of hadith during the Umayyad era, see:

  Goldziher, Muslim Studies II, pp.38-59.

  Also see:

  Ibn Abi al-Hadid, Sharh Nahj al-Balaghah vol. 4, edited by Muhammad Abu al-Fadl Ibrahim, Dar Ihya' al-Kutub al-'Arabiyyah and Isa Babi al-Halabi and Partners, pp. 63-64 and 73.

  And also, Mahmoud Abu Rayyah, Adwa' 'ala al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyyah, Cairo, Nashr al-Batha', p. 128.

  And also, it is narrated from Ibn Rahwayh (one of the famous Hanbali hadith scholars of the second and third centuries AH) that

  [60] Wansbrough, John, Qur’anic Studies:Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretation, Forwarded, Translations, and Expanded Notes by, Andrew Rippin, Prometheus Books, 2004.

  [61] Burton, John, The Collection of the Qur’an, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979.

  [62] For an introduction to Wansbrough's critique of Burton's book, see:

  Wansbrough, John “The Collection of the Qur’an by John Burton”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1978), pp. 370-371.

  [63] Joseph Schacht makes a stronger claim, arguing in detail that in the early stages of the evolution of jurisprudence in Islamic society, Muslim jurists, except in rare instances, did not derive and extract their legal rulings from the Qur’an or on its basis. For a detailed account of his view on this matter, see:

  Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, Part II, Ch.3, pp. 224-227.

  [64] Burton, The Collection of the Qur’an, pp. 162-163.

  [65] Abd al-Rahman ibn Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Ali ibn al-Jawzi, Kitab al-Nawasikh al-Quran, vol. 2, publisher ?, p. 357.

  [66] For a detailed introduction to Burton's views, see:

  Burton, The Collection of the Qur’an, pp. 105-240.

  [67] Many scholars consider Wansbrough's prose difficult to grasp and his book "extraordinarily complex, and unnecessarily difficult," and its structure "incomprehensible." For example, see several examples of introductions to his book provided by specialists:

  William Graham, "Considerations on the Book Qur’anic Studies," translated by Morteza Karimi-Nia, Ayeneh Pazhuhesh Journal, no. 65, p. 47.

  and also:

  Cobb, Paul, “John Wansbrough, Qur’anic Studies: Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretation”, Journal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 68, No.2 (april 2009), p. 157.

  Uullendorff, Edward, “Qur’anic Studies: Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretatioin by John Wansbrough”, Bulletin of The School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 40, No. 3 (1977), pp. 609-612.

  [68] Wansbrogh, Qur’anic Studies, p.44.

  [69] Wensinck, A. J. , The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development, (first published 1932), first published by Routledge in 2008, 102-124.

  [70] Here, "textual exegesis" means writing glosses, commentaries, and interpretations of the linguistic and grammatical aspects of the text.

  [71] Nӧldeke, The History of The Qur’an, Section on “The Non-Uthmanic Orthographic Variants and Readings: The Sources”, esp. Pp.429-470

  [72] Wansbrough, Qur’anic Studies, p. 202.

  [73] Wansbrough, Qur’anic Studies, p. 44.

  [74] Wansbrough, Qur’anic Studies, p. 47.

  [75] Wansbrough, Qur’anic Studies, p. 12.

  [76] Wansbrough, Qur’anic Studies, pp.117-118.

  [77] Wansbrough, Qur’anic Studies, p. 47.

  [78] In translating these terms, I have followed the equivalents provided by Mr. Morteza Karimi-Nia in his translation of "Considerations on the Book 'Qur'anic Studies'."

  [79] Wansbrough, Qur’anic Studies, p. 12.

  [80] Wansbrough, Qur’anic Studies, p. 47.

  To demonstrate this difference, Wansbrough analyzes in detail the words attributed to Ja'far ibn Abi Talib in the presence of the Negus, the King of Abyssinia. See:

  Wansbrough, Qur’anic Studies, pp. 38-43.

  [81] Wansbrough, Qur’anic Studies, p. 50.

  Also see:

  Wansbrough, John, The Sectarian Milieu: Content and Composition of Islamic Salvation History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 147.

  [82] For an analytical examination of this doctrine, for example, see:

  Nӧldeke, The History of the Qur’an, pp. 39-43.

  [83] Wansbrough, Qur’anic Studies, pp. 45-46, 22

  and also:

  Wansbrough, The Sectarian Milieu, p. 147.

  [84] Wansbrough, Qur’anic Studies, pp. 225-226.

  [85] Karl Vollers

  [86] Wansbrough, Qur’anic Studies, pp. 85-118.

  [87]Wansbrough, Qur’anic Studies, xxiii.

  [88] Cook, Michael. Early Muslim Dogma: A Source-Critical Study, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p.110

  [89] Motzki, “Dating Muslim Traditions: A Survey”, p.235.

  [90] Motzki, Harald, “The Prophet and the Cat: On Dating Malik’s Muwatta’ and Legal Traditions”, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 22 (1998), 32, note 44.

  [91] In the following book (especially its third chapter), Motzki critiques Schacht's methodology in detail and attempts to develop Schacht's "common link" theory on a different model:

  Motzki, Harald, The Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence: Meccan Fiqh before the Classical Schools, Translated from German by, Marion H. Katz, Brill, 2002.

  [92] Motzki, “Dating Muslim Traditions: A Survey”, P. 238.

  [93] Motzki, “Dating Muslim Traditions: A Survey”, P. 240- 241.

  [94] See:

  Motzki, “The Collection of the Qur’an”, p.4.

  and its Persian translation: Harald Motzki, "The Collection of the Qur’an", p. 162.

  [95] Motzki, “The Collection of the Qur’an”, p.21-31.

  Harald Motzki, "The Collection of the Qur’an", pp. 178-185.

  [96] Motzki, “The Collection of the Qur’an”, p.29.

  The translation of the quotation, with slight modification, is from the Persian translation of the article: Harald Motzki, "The Collection of the Qur’an", p. 183.

  [97] Sayf ibn Umar, Kitab al-Ridda wa al-Futuh al-Kabir wa Sirat Aisha wa Ali, edited by Qasim al-Samarrai, Leiden, 1995, pp. 48-50.

  [98] On this, see:

  Schoeler, Gregor, “A Comment on the Hypotheses of Burton and Wansbrough”, The Qur’an in Context: Historical and Literary Investigations into the Qur’anic Milieu, Ed. By Angelika Neuwirth, Nicolai Sinai, and Michael Marx, Brill, 2010, p. 786.

  Also, regarding the history of the Arabic language, its prevalence in the Middle East, and its use in the written recording of literary works, see:

  Hoyland, Robert, “Epigraphy and the linguistic background to the Qur’an”,in The Qur’an in Its Historical Context, ed. By Gabriel Said Reynolds, Rutledge, 2008, pp. 51-69.

  [99] Fred Donner

  [100] Donner, Fred M. , “The Historian, the believer, and the Qur’an”, in New Perspectives on the Qur’an (The Qur’an in its historical context 2), ed. By Grbriel Said Reynolds, Rutledge, 2011, p. 29.

  [101] Von Brothmer, H. C. and Puin, G. R. , “Neue Wege der Koranforschung”, Magazin Forschung (Universität des Saarlandes) 1 (1999): pp.39, 45-46.

  Quoted from:

  Schoeler, “A Comment on the Hypotheses of Burton and Wansbrough”, p. 792.

  and:

  Reynolds, Gabriel Said, “Qur’anic studies and its controversies”, in The Qur’an in Its Historical Context, ed. By Gabriel Said Reynolds, Rutledge, 2008, pp. 7-8.

  [102] Reynolds, “Qur’anic studies and its controversies”, p. 13.

  [103] For a detailed introduction to the difficulties and conflicts of these theorizations, see:

  Donner, Fred M. ,“The Qur’an in recent scholarship: Challenges and desiderata”, in The Qur’an in Its Historical Context, ed. By Gabriel Said Reynolds, Rutledge, 2008, pp. 29-50.

  and also:`

  Reynolds, “Qur’anic studies and its controversies”, p. 9, 17-18.

  and also:

  Reynolds, Gabriel Said, “The golden age of Qur’anic Studies?”, in New Perspectives on the Qur’an (The Qur’an in its historical context 2), ed. By Grbriel Said Reynolds, Rutledge, 2011, pp. 4-5.

  [104] Motzki, “The Collection of the Qur’an”, p.31.

  The translation of this quotation, with slight modification, is taken from the Persian translation of the following article: Harald Motzki, “The Collection of the Qur’an”, p. 185.

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