Arash Naraghi's article “Religious Intellectualism and Its Role in Iran's Political Future”

Religious Intellectualism and Its Role in Iran's Political Future

Author: Arash Naraghi - Professor of Philosophy at Moravian University, Pennsylvania - July 12, 2018

Religious intellectuals or neo-thinkers in post-Islamic Revolution Iran were among the intellectual and political groups that sought to propose an alternative theory to the doctrine of the Absolute Guardianship of the Jurist for a desirable government in Iranian society. In this article, I wish to briefly explain the salient points of the theory of government held by religious intellectuals or neo-thinkers, and on that basis, offer suggestions regarding their role in Iran's political future. In the first part, I will briefly refer to the views of two figures of this movement, Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohsen Kadivar; in the second part, I will briefly examine their views; and in the third part, I will put forward suggestions concerning the position and role of religious intellectualism in Iran's political future.

(1)

The Views of Abdolkarim Soroush:

Soroush is among those who have actively endeavored over the years to propose an alternative theory for government in Iranian society. His theory of a desirable government has two main parts: the political part, and the religious part. In the political part, Soroush seeks to delineate the pillars of his theory of government, and in the religious part, he seeks to clarify the desirable relationship of this type of government with religion.

A. The Political Part:

Soroush's theory of a desirable government, from a political perspective, has been articulated particularly in opposition to religious despotic government (or the Absolute Guardianship of the Jurist) and non-religious despotic government (monarchy or royal government). In Soroush's view, the most important role of government, first and foremost, is to meet the basic needs of human beings—such as the need for food, housing, employment, healthcare, and so on. In his belief, if these basic needs are met, then human beings will find the opportunity to turn to securing their secondary needs.^[1]

But the desirable government that can fulfill such a purpose must be founded on a kind of political secularism or "supra-religious government." Political secularism necessitates the establishment of an ethical government in society that "is neutral towards all religions, grants no special rights to the followers of any particular religion, recognizes religious and political pluralism, accords equal rights to all, and enforces the law equally for everyone."^[2] Therefore, the secularism envisioned by Soroush is founded on two fundamental pillars: the pillar of legitimacy (the realization of which depends on the realization of justice), and the pillar of the political system's neutrality towards religious and intellectual denominations.^[3]

But which form of government, in Soroush's belief, can be built on this basis and succeed in managing society? In Soroush's view, democracy is the best method of government available to human beings. In his belief, democracy is a method of "low-error management" over "rights-oriented people," and the best method for realizing justice in society. In Soroush's desirable democratic government, the appointment, criticism, and removal of rulers by the people is feasible.^[4]

اما دموکراسی مورد نظر سروش گرچه سکولار است اما لیبرال نیست.  سروش همواره قاطعانه از مخالفت با لیبرالیسم گفته است.  او به صراحت معتقد است که «لیبرالیسم مخالف دین است.»^[5] و «اگر کسی اصل ولایت دین را مورد سؤال قرار دهد، به عمیقترین عرصه های لیبرالیسم پا نهاده است.»^[6] او به کرّات بر تفاوت بنیادین «جامعه دینی» و «جامعه لیبرال» تأکید می ورزد.  به اعتقاد او در جامعه دینی، برخلاف جامعه لیبرال، پاره ای از امور ورای نقد و وارسی است.  در جامعه دینی اصل تساوی حقوق مردم (برخلاف جامعه لیبرال) ممکن نیست، و به همین اعتبار است که «هیچ دین داری نمی تواند لیبرال باشد.»^[7]  از همین روست که او حکومت دموکراتیک مطلوب خود را در تمایز و بلکه در تقابل با لیبرالیسم تعریف می کند: «دموکراسی و لیبرالیسم یکی نیستند.»  « و جامعه دموکرات دینی، جامعه‌ای است برخاسته از انفکاک منطقی دموکراسی و لیبرالیسم.»^[8]  او در سالهای اخیر هم همچنان به نگاه منفی خود نسبت به لیبرالیسم وفادار مانده است،‌ و معتقد است که امروزه نشانه های آشکاری از بیماری و زوال لیبرالیسم در غرب به چشم می خورد.  از نظر او مهمترین نشانه های بیماری و زوال لیبرالیسم را خصوصاً باید در قلمرو امر جنسی یافت، چیزی که وی از آن به «هوس رانی های اخلاقاً ناروایی» یاد می کند که امروزه تحت عنوان «حق» در جهان غرب روان شده است.^[9]

ب. بخش دینی:

سروش در مقام توضیح رابطه میان دین و سیاست به طور عام و حکومت به طور خاص، نخست میان دو نوع دخالت دین در امر سیاست تمایز می نهد:  «دخالت حقیقی» و «دخالت حقوقی».^[10]  به اعتقاد او، دخالت حقیقی دین در امر سیاست در متن یک جامعه دینی امری اجتناب ناپذیر است.  بنابراین، خواه کسی این دخالت را مطلوب بداند خواه نه، در هر حال در متن یک جامعه دینی، دین رنگ خود را لاجرم به سیاست می زند.  بنابراین، به اعتقاد سروش، این اسطوره ای خطاست که «دین به عرصه خصوصی متعلق است.»^[11]  اما «دخالت حقوقی» دین در سیاست امر ناگزیری نیست.  یعنی جامعه دینی می تواند تصمیم بگیرد که دین را مبنای قانون گذاری و مشروعیت بخشی سیاسی قرار بدهد یا ندهد.  سروش دخالت حقیقی دین را در عرصه سیاست به عنوان یک امر واقع برسمیت می شناسد و می پذیرد، اما دخالت حقوقی دین را در امر سیاست (دست کم به نحو مستقیم و از بالا) مردود می داند، و به صراحت می گوید که «ارتباط حقوقی [میان دین و سیاست] را خوبست که قطع کنیم.»^[12]  اما آیا این بدان معناست که از منظر سروش دین نباید مطلقاً و به هیچ نحوی در عرصه سیاست و حکومت «دخالت حقوقی» بکند؟  حقیقت این است که به نظر نمی رسد مقصود سروش قطع کامل رابطه حقوقی دین و سیاست باشد.  در آثار سروش حکومت مطلوب در جامعه دینی دو ویژگی دارد: نخست آنکه، دموکراتیک است، و دوّم آنکه، نسبت به دین باوری و دین ورزی بی تفاوت نیست، یعنی به نظر می رسد که حکومت به نوعی و در سطحی به امر دین متعهد است (و این امر دست کم در نگاه نخست با اقتضای «سکولار» بودن حکومت مطلوب سروش سازگار به نظر نمی رسد.)  اما این «بی تفاوت نبودن» و «متعهد بودن» نسبت به امر دین به چه معناست؟  به نظر می رسد که در آثار سروش دست کم دو نظر کمابیش متفاوت در این خصوص بیان شده است: تلقی حداکثری، و تلقی حداقلی.

Maximalist conception: In the view of the early Soroush, in a desirable religious democracy, the government is obliged not to violate the “definitive and necessary laws” of religion.^[13] That is, in this ideal government, “an effort is made not to pass laws that conflict with definitive religious laws; these definitive and necessary laws are also very limited in Islam. Many fatwas may exist, but one can suffice with the most important of them and even, if necessary, perform new ijtihad. This very thing guarantees the Islamization of laws, and the rest of religion reverts to the heartfelt commitment of the believers themselves, to what extent they are diligent in practicing the Sharia.”^[14] Here, it seems that the “religious legitimacy” of the democratic government is secured from above, meaning the government chosen by the religious community oversees the legal system from above, lest any law or policy come into conflict with the certainties of the Islamic religion.

Minimalist conception: But it seems that in recent years, Soroush has offered a somewhat different account of his view regarding the legal relationship between government and religion. According to the later Soroush, in a desirable religious democracy, the government adheres to religious pluralism, and therefore “draws upon all religions in legislation.” He calls this type of government “extra-religious.” But in an extra-religious government, what is the manner of “drawing upon” the teachings and values of religion in the society’s legal system? Here, it seems that the “religious legitimacy” of the democratic government is secured from below, meaning society itself, through democratic processes, strives to make the legal system compatible with its religious beliefs and values. Soroush writes on this matter: “Everything here comes back to the religious society. The government does not make society religious; on the contrary, society makes the government religious. Because the government is a child, a fruit, a product, a consequence, and a reflection of society. And if society is religious out of passion and faith, its government will also take on that color. Therefore, a religious government is an ‘is,’ not an ‘ought.’ Meaning society does not say the government must be religious, but rather says the government ‘is’ my child, and since I am religious, it too is inevitably religious. And of course, if society were not religious, the government would not become religious either, and no one’s ‘must’ or ‘must not’ operates here.”^[15]

Mohsen Kadivar’s Views:

It seems there is no significant difference between the foundations of Soroush’s and Kadivar’s views regarding the nature and structure of a desirable government within the context of a religious society. Kadivar’s theory of a desirable government can also be examined in two parts, political and religious:

The Political Part:

Kadivar also considers the desirable government of society to be a form of democracy. In his view, democracy has two fundamental pillars: (a) public oversight, which is realized, among other ways, through the exercise of majority vote; (b) political equality of citizens, which means, among other things, that no one has a special right to assume and manage the affairs of society due to their religious affiliations or jurisprudential expertise.^[16]

He specifies that his desirable democracy must be “secular,” meaning it must not try to coercively impose religious rulings and beliefs on society. Kadivar succinctly summarizes his view in this statement: “My desired model of government is a secular democratic government, in the sense that all its institutions, officials, laws, and decisions are determined without any exception in a democratic manner; they come by the people’s vote, they go by the people’s vote, and they are placed under the institutionalized supervision of the people in a glass room. No privilege or special right is accepted for any individual, guild, or class. There is no lifetime or supra-legal official in it. All laws are enacted, interpreted, and repealed with the consent of the people’s representatives. The basic rights of all citizens are guaranteed, rights that are absolutely inviolable under any circumstances. One of these rights is the possibility of the minority becoming the majority. Freedom is observed in it to the extent of international human rights standards.”^[17]

اما حکومت دموکراتیک سکولار کدیور هم لیبرال نیست. از نظر او در لیبرالیسم انسان تماماً و یکسره محق تلقی می شود و در مقابل هیچ منبع ماورایی مکلف بشمار نمی رود . حال آنکه در چارچوب دین، انسان نسبت به خداوند مکلف است، و این تکلیف «محدودیتهایی برای انسان ایجاد می کند.»^[18]  بنابراین، کدیور گوهر لیبرالیسم، یعنی «حق ناحق بودن»، را فقط با قیودی و در محدوده های معینی برسمیت می شناسد.  از نظر او، وقتی که بیان و عمل انسان به عرصه عمومی درمی آید، در آن صورت موضوع داوری قرار می گیرد.  و اگر عرف ( و در متن جامعه دینی، «عرف اهل دین») آن بیان یا عمل را تحمل نکند، در آن صورت باید محدودیتهایی برای آن بیان یا عمل قائل شد.  او خصوصا از محدودیتهای دینی در زمینه «آزادی های جنسی، آزادی روابط اجتماعی» یاد می کند، و معتقد است که این محدودیتها موجب می شوند که «آزادی های واقعی و معنوی مردم برقرار بماند و توانایی های دیگر آنها هم شکوفا شود.»^[19]

کدیور در مقطعی از سیر تحول فکری اش صریحاً از نظارت بر امور فرهنگی یاد می کند و می گوید: «معتقدم يك جامعه ديني جامعه اي است كه به ارزشهاي متعالي قائل است و لذا نمي تواند بدون نظارت رها شود لذا به نظارت فرهنگي به طور كلي و اصولي قائل  هستم  اما نظارت  فرهنگي  لزوما به  معناي  مميزي  قبل  از نشر نيست.»  او به نظارت پس از نشر قائل است.^[20]  پاره ای قرائن نشان می دهد که کدیور در سالهای اخیر در پاره ای از این نظرات تا حدّی تجدیدنظر کرده است.  اما به نظر نمی رسد که تجدیدنظر او تا به آنجا باشد که لیبرالیسم را به مثابه بخش ضروری و انفکاک ناپذیر یک حکومت دموکراتیک مطلوب در متن یک جامعه دینی بپذیرد. به نظر می رسد که از چشم او مهمترین نقصان لیبرالیسم همچنان عبارتست از دیدگاه آن نسبت به مسائل جنسی، یا به تعبیر کدیور، «آزادی های جنسی و آزادی روابط اجتماعی».^[21]  یعنی کدیور هم مانند سروش قبح لیبرالیسم را خصوصاً در قلمرو مسائل مربوط به امور جنسی می جوید.

بخش دینی:

            اما در مدل مطلوب کدیور رابطه دین و حکومت چگونه تعریف می شود؟  در آثار کدیور هم مانند سروش می توان دو مدل از این رابطه را تشخیص داد: تلقی حداکثری، و تلقی حداقلی.

تلقی حداکثری: در این تلقی حکومت مکلف است اهداف و احکام مسلّم دینی را رعایت کند.  کدیور این مدل را «مردم سالاری دینی» می نامد، و معتقد است که بقای این نوع حکومت در گرو دو امر است: «اول، اعتبار دینی‌بودن یا حداقل عدم تنافی با تعالیم دینی. دوم، برخورداری از اعتماد، رضایت و رأی عمومی یا اکثریت مردم.»^[22]  در این مدل، «كوچكترين  امر منافي  شرع و ناهمساز با اهداف  متعالي  دين  در آن  ممنوع است.»^[23]  و برای تأمین این مقصود پیشنهاد او این است که «شورايي  از عالمان  دين  به  انتخاب  شهروندان  مسلمان  بر رعايت سازگاري  با اهداف  دين  و عدم  ناسازگاري  با احكام  شرع نظارت  (و نه  ولايت ) دارند.»^[24]  البته به اعتقاد او «ضمانت اجرایی» این نظارت عبارتست از «دین داری و ایمان شهروندان.»^[25]  حتّی در این مدل اجرای صورتی از حکم ارتداد‌ (البته با قیود و شرایطی خاص) پذیرفتنی بشمار می رود: «اجراي  حكم  ارتداد به  بيان  و اظهار برمي گردد. آن  هم  بياني  كه  معاندانه  و مروجانه  باشد.» «شما مجاز هستيد دين  را نپذيريد اما اگر دين را پذيرفتيد، خروج  از آن  ضوابطي  دارد. نگفتم  مطلقا مجاز نيست،  بلكه  ضوابطي  دارد كه  اگر احراز عناد و جحد و تمسخر و به  بازي گرفتن  مؤمنان  شد، مجازات  آن  سنگين  خواهد بود.»^[26] بنابراین، تلقی حداکثری برای حفظ هویت دینی حکومت قائل به نظارت از بالا بر قوانین و سیاستهای کلان جامعه است.

The Minimalist View: In recent years, however, Kadivar, like Soroush, has presented a somewhat different version of his view on the desirable government in a religious society. In this new version, the religious character of the government springs from within society, that is, it is secured from the bottom up. He distinguishes between the “validity” of law and its “rightness.”^[27] From his perspective, the “validity” of law depends on the vote of the majority. But legal validity does not necessarily mean the “rightness” of that law, i.e., its conformity with moral and religious standards. Therefore, in this version, if a law has the backing of the majority vote, it is valid—even if it is incompatible with moral and religious standards—that is, from the perspective of the faithful, it is unjust. Under these conditions, that is, when there is a conflict between the “validity” and “rightness” of the law, “they must logically persuade public opinion by criticizing that law, showing that its disadvantages outweigh its benefits, so that they vote to repeal, change, or amend it.”^[28] Thus, here the attribute of laws and government being “religious” is a natural outcome of society being “religious”: “In a society where the majority are Muslims, any religious ruling that seeks to be clothed in the garb of law has no choice but to pass through the filter of public consent. As long as public opinion supports that ruling, it enjoys legal validity, and as soon as, for any reason, they disapprove of it and vote to change or repeal it, that ruling will lose its legal validity, although its religious rightness remains in place both before its enactment and after its legal repeal. Renewalist Islam believes that no religious ruling can be imposed on society as law by force.”^[29] Of course, the implication of this statement is that a religious ruling can be enforced in the public sphere with the consent of the majority.

(2)

But what can be said about the views of Soroush and Kadivar regarding government and its relationship with religion?

First, the model of non-liberal democracy proposed by Soroush and Kadivar is certainly a great step forward compared to its alternative religious model, namely, the Guardianship of the Jurist. But is their proposed non-liberal democracy the best model that can be considered for Iran's political future? It seems that Soroush and Kadivar's answer is affirmative. For example, Soroush believes that if, in a sound voting system, faithful democrats win the majority vote and ascend to the seat of power, “the non-religious should not fear that the religious democrats will trample their rights, or pass laws that will turn them into second-class citizens in society.” And if secular democrats (who could be the same “faithful democrats”) come to power, “the religious can rest assured that no harm will come to their religion, beliefs, and values.”^[30] Of course, both Soroush and Kadivar believe that within a religious society, it is the faithful democrats who have a greater chance of gaining political power. When the absolute majority of society is religious, naturally, in a healthy democracy, it is these “religious democrats,” that is, the followers and proponents of Soroush and Kadivar's views, who will ascend to the seat of power. Therefore, it seems that religious intellectuals and renewalists, implicitly or explicitly, consider themselves and their conception of government to be the best alternative for Iran's political future. But is this judgment correct?

I think it is worth reflecting a little on this question: from the perspective of Soroush and Kadivar, the ultimate arbiter of laws and major policies, and the limits of freedoms in society (both in the maximalist and minimalist conceptions) remains, in the final analysis, religion—but this time a reformist interpretation of religion (which, in Soroush's words, is a pluralistic interpretation, compatible with the foundations of modernity and modern human rights). That is, from their perspective, religion still remains the ultimate criterion in the public sphere (including the political sphere); only the traditional interpretation of religion gives way to a reformist interpretation. It is for this reason that they advocate a secular but non-liberal democracy. That is, they are proponents of secular democracy but opponents of liberalism. From the perspective of liberalism, the "right to be wrong" is bound by no constraint unless that constraint is determined and justified on the basis of common reason and the public interest of society. But in the desirable democracy of religious reformists, the right to be wrong is bound, in addition to conventional constraints, by religious constraints (albeit with a reformist interpretation) as well. It is for this reason that the desirable democracy of Soroush and Kadivar is—in the final analysis—bound by religious constraints and operates within the radius of religious precepts, and by this token is incompatible with liberalism.

Therefore, it seems that in practice there is no significant difference between their maximalist and minimalist conceptions of government. To clarify this claim, let us suppose that democratic believers could take hold of political power by virtue of the majority vote (a matter that seems very probable to Soroush and Kadivar). But here an important question arises: just as a religious society naturally imparts its color to the government, does not the government of democratic believers also naturally impart its color to society? Soroush and Kadivar, on the one hand, believe that the government must be neutral toward the religions and thoughts of society, and on the other hand, they believe that a democratic government within a religious society inevitably takes on the color of that religion, and more importantly, "must" take on such a color, otherwise it will not be democratic.^[31] In other words, even if we take the minimalist conception as a basis, the legal system of society will inevitably be influenced by the religion of the majority of society, and through this, the observance of the "definitive and necessary laws of Islam" is secured. Therefore, the difference between the maximalist and minimalist conceptions lies not in their outcome, but in the method of achieving that outcome. Both conceptions ultimately lead to the point that a desirable democratic government in a religious society must operate within the radius of the definitive and necessary laws of Islam—in the maximalist conception, the government is directly and from above responsible for this matter; in the minimalist conception, society itself undertakes this matter directly or through its representatives in the power structure (from below?). But in this case, can a government that takes on the color of religion in this manner still remain indifferent to the different religions and thoughts current in society? Or will this religionized government inevitably rule over society within the radius of its own religious ideals and values and impart the color of its own conception of religion onto society?

To put it more clearly, can democratic believers who occupy the seat of government remain indifferent to the will of the majority of the people in implementing the laws and rulings of the Sharia? A government that is elected by the vote of the majority will lose its acceptability (and indeed its legitimacy) if it does not implement the demands of that majority. Therefore, one can easily imagine conditions in which the government of democratic believers ultimately becomes the enforcer of Sharia rulings. That is, it considers itself responsible for safeguarding and guaranteeing at least "the observance of the definitive and necessary laws of Islam" from above. Thus, within the context of a religious society, democratic believers have a greater chance than other rivals of democratically seizing power, but as soon as they seize political power, in order to maintain legitimacy and the continuity of their acceptability and presence in the power structure, they must, in the position of government and politics, demonstrate their commitment to the religion of the majority, and sooner or later become the enforcer of Sharia rulings in society, even if the implementation of those rulings conflicts with the rights of the minority in society. It should be noted that in the views of Soroush and Kadivar, democratic legitimacy depends on the vote of the majority, not on the observance of minority rights. Of course, from their perspective, the fundamental rights of citizens (as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) must be respected. However, the observance of these citizens' rights is realized within the radius of their modernist understanding of religion. That is, the observance of these rights in society is obligatory only to the extent that it is compatible with their modernist understanding of religion. But if their modernist understanding of religion does not recognize certain rights or minorities, will their desired religious democratic government be obligated to observe those rights or consider the interests of those minorities? The answer to this question appears to be negative. The secular and non-liberal democracy of Soroush and Kadivar is not committed to observing the rights of minorities—if observing these rights contradicts the rulings of the Sharia—unlike liberal democracy, which does not bind itself in observing minority rights to the constraints of Sharia (whether in its traditional or modernist interpretation).

To clarify this claim, I would like to give an example. As we have seen, the most important point of divergence between the democracy of democratic believers and liberal democracy manifests itself in the realm of sexual matters and the lifestyle of minorities. Therefore, an analysis of Soroush and Kadivar's views regarding sexual minorities can be illuminating.

Kadivar specifies that "fundamentally, homosexuality or same-sex orientation is an irrational and inhumane matter and is considered a deviation from the correct human path."^[32] He adds: "Sexual relations with the same sex have been severely condemned and prohibited in all Abrahamic religions, including Islam. The Holy Quran, in the strongest possible tone, has censured this practice under the heading of the practice of the people of Lot. Islamic scholars—both Sunni and Shia—are unanimous on the religious prohibition and the severest punishment for homosexuals. The consent of the parties is ineffective in an act that has an emphatic religious prohibition. The religious sanctity of sodomy (liwāṭ) and tribadism (musāḥaqa) and the severe punishment of their perpetrators are among the fixed and permanent religious rulings. On this issue, which lacks rational support, religious intellectualism has a similar stance to traditional Islam regarding the religious prohibition and the principle of punishment (regardless of its type)."^[33] And "I say explicitly that a Muslim absolutely does not tolerate homosexuality and strives through all legitimate means to eradicate this regrettable deviation from human societies."^[34] The important point here is that Kadivar absolutely does not enter into a scientific and philosophical discussion about homosexuality, and condemns it on purely intra-religious grounds. And it is on those same intra-religious grounds that he considers homosexuality among the wrongful matters that should not be tolerated (at least in the public sphere). Of course, in recent years, Kadivar has somewhat toned down his verbal violence towards sexual minorities and has revised his views in this regard. For example, although he still considers the prescriptive ruling (ḥukm taklīfī) of the prohibition of homosexual relations (or in his terms, "sodomy" and "tribadism") to be a given, he revises the declaratory ruling (ḥukm waḍʿī) of those relations and explicitly writes: "Whether homosexuality is a disease or a natural matter, it is not punishable."^[35] Apparently, by "punishment" here, Kadivar mainly means the death penalty, which is prescribed in Shia jurisprudence for homosexual relations (under certain conditions). However, Kadivar believes that "a society that considers such relations detrimental to public morality has the right to impose restrictions on these individuals to preserve public morality in accordance with the law."^[36] . But elsewhere, instead of "has the right," he uses the term "is obligated": "A society that considers such sexual relations an anomaly and a disruption to public morality is obligated, alongside enacting restrictive laws, to provide the necessary facilities for sex reassignment for these individuals."(26) That is, Kadivar considers society (and consequently the government) "obligated" to pass laws to restrict and contain sexual minorities, and worse, to encourage them towards "sex reassignment"!

Soroush, too, without presenting a clear and precise substantive discussion about the moral status of homosexual relations, takes the moral reprehensibility of these relations for granted, and counts the recognition of these relations in the Western world as a sign of the decline and sickness of liberalism and the greed of capitalism. In his view, in today's world, people have become subject to their desires and whims, and they consider their whims as rights and act on that basis. Then a group comes along and fabricates moral foundations for those whims. He names three examples of such morally unjustified self-indulgence that have been circulated under the title of "rights" in the modern world: pornography, homosexuality, and infidelity in marital relations. He says about these instances: "These are now among the things that are counted as rights, meaning someone is not considered deserving of blame or deserving of punishment for committing them." Following these fabrications of rights, in Soroush's view, the capitalist system then arrives and turns such relations into profitable commodities, and in this way, solidifies the foundation of these immoral behaviors in society. He then expresses concern about the judgment of future generations regarding "these dregs and rubbish."^[37]

It is clear that, from the perspective of Soroush and Kadivar, homosexuality is impermissible from a religious standpoint, and apparently, in their view, this ruling is among the definitive and certain decrees of Islam. Now, when democratic believers following the views of Soroush and Kadivar assume the reins of power, will they not use the means of political power to curb and suppress sexual minorities in the public sphere? Since their reformist interpretation of religion does not recognize the rights of sexual minorities on the basis of their status as a sexual minority and considers it among "intolerable wrongs," it is entirely natural to suppose that a government of democratic believers would consider itself "duty-bound" to use its political power to restrict the human and civil rights and freedoms of sexual minorities in society. Of course, the rights and moral dignity of sexual minorities can always be a subject of dialogue, acceptance, and rejection in society. But what is important here is that some individuals within the structure of political power, on a purely religious basis and without reference to any scientific discussion or reasoning, would exclude a group of human beings from the fabric of society and deprive them of some of their human and civil rights.

(3)

But what can be said about the role and position of religious intellectuals or reformists in Iran's political future? It seems that Soroush and Kadivar believe that religious intellectuals and reformists are the best political options for Iran's political future, because they both have a greater chance of winning the majority of votes within a religious society, and their presence in the structure of political power would equally satisfy both the religious and the non-religious.

But in my opinion, the direct participation and presence of religious reformists in the structure of political power is a risky and mistaken decision. The political playing field in Iranian society is, to some extent, tilted in favor of the religious. The clergy advocating political Islam exploited this tilt and, after coming to power, completely changed the rules of the political game in their own favor, and also chose the game's referees from among their own loyal agents. Religious reformists, like Soroush and Kadivar, rightly protested against the unjust rules and the biased referees and judgments in Iran's political playing field, and in their views, they tried to present a model of governance in which the rules of the political game are regulated fairly to a large extent and impartial referees are chosen to oversee the game. But Soroush and Kadivar still wish to take advantage of the tilt of the playing field in favor of religious players. Both Soroush and Kadivar are aware that in Iran's political game, even if the rules of the game are fair and the overseeing referees are impartial, the playing field is tilted in favor of religious players, and their team will most likely emerge victorious from political competitions. But the truth is that one of the fundamental problems of politics in contemporary Iran is precisely this pre-existing "tilt" of the field in favor of the religious. In the absence of political and civil institutions independent of the state that can curb the deviations and abuses of political power by rulers, democratic believers will, sooner or later, be at risk of unfairly exploiting the favorable tilt of the political playing field for their own benefit. (A phenomenon we are witnessing, for example, in Erdogan's Turkey^[38].)

Therefore, in my view, the best political service religious intellectuals and their supporters can render is to serve the political sphere from outside the power structure and within civil society. That is, they should strive to use their influence (i.e., society's favorable inclination) not to consolidate the foundations of their own political power, but to strengthen independent and robust civil institutions. And they should utilize their social influence and force not for victory over a political rival, but to ensure the health of the political game in society. In other words, they should help strengthen independent political forces that oversee the government, including the independent and free press and media.^[39] Therefore, in my opinion, given that the political structure in religious societies is often not very advanced, and civil society independent of the state is very frail and weak, and the political playing field has a prior gentle or sometimes steep slope in favor of religious players, a government of democratic believers sooner or later faces a dilemma: either it must, in order to gain and maintain political power, prioritize its commitment to religion and its believing supporters and sooner or later (for example, through violating the rights of minorities) resort to undemocratic methods and negate its democratic and secular nature; or it must prioritize its commitment to democracy and secularism, and set aside its own religious concerns and those of its supporters. It seems that a government of democratic believers, due to its non-liberal nature, harbors the seeds of its own collapse within itself.

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^[1] Roundtable "Party, Freedom, Democratic Religious Government," Jame'eh newspaper, 20 Farvardin 1377 [April 9, 1998].

^[2] "So That the Faithful Do Not Flee from Democracy and Secularism," interview with Abdolkarim Soroush by Noushabeh Amiri

and also, "The Powers of the Vali-e Faqih Should Be Removed Through a Referendum," interview with Abdolkarim Soroush

^[3] Ibid.

^[4] Ibid.

^[5] Soroush, Abdolkarim, Razdani va Roshanfekri va Dindari [Knowledge of Secrets, Intellectualism, and Religiosity], Serat, 5th edition, pp. 151-152.

^[6] Ibid., 146-147

^[7] Ibid.

^[8] Soroush, Abdolkarim, essay "Tolerance and Governance" in Modara va Modiriyat [Tolerance and Governance], Serat, 306-309

^[9] Soroush, Abdolkarim, lecture "Armed Neoliberalism," April 2015, minutes 49 to 55

^[10] "The Humanities Have Been the Bloodiest Martyr Since the Revolution," interview with Abdolkarim Soroush

^[11] Ibid.

^[12] Ibid.

^[13] "We Advocate Political Secularism and the Separation of Religion from Politics," Roozonline interview with Abdolkarim Soroush

^[14] Ibid.

^[15] Roundtable “Party, Freedom, Democratic Religious Government”

^[16] Kadivar, Mohsen, “Velayat-e Faqih and Democracy,” Official Website of Mohsen Kadivar:

^[17] Kadivar, Mohsen, “I Am Thinking of a Secular Democratic Government,” Official Website of Mohsen Kadivar

^[18] “The Boundaries of Freedom from the Perspective of Religion,” Interview with Mohsen Kadivar

^[19] Ibid.

^[20] Ibid.

^[21] Ibid.

^[22] Kadivar, Mohsen, “What Should Be Done in the Event of a Potential Conflict Between the People’s Consent and Religious Rulings?” Official Website of Mohsen Kadivar

^[23] Kadivar, Mohsen, “Epistemological Foundations of Freedom in Religious Government,” Official Website of Mohsen Kadivar

^[24] Ibid.

^[25] Ibid.

^[26] “The Boundaries of Freedom from the Perspective of Religion”

^[27] “What Should Be Done in the Event of a Potential Conflict Between the People’s Consent and Religious Rulings?”

^[28] Ibid.

^[29] Ibid.

^[30] “So That the Religious Do Not Flee from Democracy and Secularism!” Interview with Abdolkarim Soroush.

^[31] For example, see: Soroush, Abdolkarim, “Democratic Religious Government?” Kiyan Magazine, No. 11, p. 15.

^[32] Kadivar, Mohsen, Haqq al-Nas: Islam and Human Rights, Kavir Publications, Tehran 1387 [2008], p. 164.

^[33] Ibid., pp. 164-165.

^[34] Ibid., p. 165.

^[35] Official Website of Mohsen Kadivar

^[36] Official Website of Mohsen Kadivar (Italics mine.)

^[37] Soroush, Abdolkarim, Lecture “Armed Neoliberalism.”

^[38] This danger is serious even in liberal democracies with strong and deep-rooted political and civil institutions. For example, look at recent developments in post-Trump America, where certain religious institutions are trying to take advantage of society’s favorable slope to consolidate their political power and deny the rights of minorities.

^[39] Ahmad Sadri also defends, from a largely pragmatic standpoint, the non-intervention of religious intellectuals and new thinkers in the construction of political power in Iran's future. (Lecture "A Comprehensive Program for Religious New-Thinking in Iran," conference "The Evolution of Religious New-Thinking in the Islamic World," and an unpublished article by him under the same title). Sadri rightly believes that "the formation of a religious party, especially in societies with highly unfavorable histories of the fusion of religion and state, can be de-escalatory." In Sadri's view, religious groups have the right to form a party and strive through democratic means to take control of the state, but practically speaking, it is in their interest and that of society not to enter this arena. He believes that the direct participation of religious groups (even new-thinking and progressive religious groups) in the construction of political power is inappropriate for several reasons:

First, there is always the real danger that mixing religion and politics will ultimately make religion a plaything in the hands of politicians. That is, "there is always the possibility that politicians of a religious party will succumb to the temptation of using the instrument of religion to gain power. A religion that is a means of gaining power (and ultimately, bread and fame, i.e., economic capability and social prestige) becomes worn out through this use. In this coexistence, politics suffers no harm. It is religion that is harmed."

Second, there is always the possibility or concern that the religious will climb to the roof of power using the ladder of democratic processes, and then (by virtue of their power and social influence) pull the ladder out from under their rivals.

Third, the non-entry of the religious into the power structure can rebuild the damaged public trust in religion and the religious. In this way, an opportunity is provided for "social religion" to gradually transform into a "religious society."

Fourth, institutionalized religions can rebuild their role as promoters of human values within the fabric of society, and thereby help to soften the atmosphere of civil society.

And finally, "religion, by being present in civil society, can even engage in political activity aimed at preserving the liberal democratic system without officially entering the political society and harboring ambitions for electoral competition to gain political power and conquer the government."

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