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Religion
Mohsen Kadivar's Article Titled “Religious New-Thinking and Personal Reasoning”
Mohsen Kadivar considers Naraghi's account of his views misleading, the foundations of his political philosophy romantic, and his conclusions about the incompatibility of religious intellectualism with liberalism flawed.
Religious New-Thinking and Personal Reasoning
Mohsen Kadivar (Professor of Islamic Studies, Duke University, North Carolina) 5 September 2018
Arash Naraghi, a religious new-thinker, in his article “Religious Intellectualism and Its Role in Iran’s Political Future” has examined and critiqued the views of Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohsen Kadivar on the desirable government in Iranian society. While expressing gratitude for raising some excellent questions and thought-provoking critiques, I welcome critical dialogue on one of the pressing issues of contemporary Iran and, in turn, take a step toward clarification, transparency, and the removal of ambiguity.
Based on his particular understanding of political liberalism, the secular democratic system, and the fundamental rights of sexual minorities on the one hand, and his specific account of the earlier and later views of Soroush and Kadivar on the other, Naraghi has concluded that “the desirable democracy of these two religious new-thinkers is—in the final analysis—bound by religious constraints and within the radius of religious rulings, and for this reason is incompatible with liberalism. Their secular and non-liberal democracy is not committed to upholding the rights of minorities—if upholding these rights contradicts religious rulings—and they still wish to tilt the level playing field in favor of religious players. It is entirely natural to suppose that democratic believers who follow the views of Soroush and Kadivar, when they lean on the seat of power, would consider themselves ‘duty-bound’ to use their political power to restrict the human and civil rights and freedoms of sexual minorities in society.”
Naraghi makes three sets of claims: first, claims related to theories of political philosophy and fundamental rights; second, an account of the views of the two religious new-thinkers; and third, his inferences about their views being non-liberal and violating the rights of LGBT citizens, particularly sexual minorities, in cases of conflict with the opinion of the religious new-thinkers. It is clear that the validity of his inferences depends on the validity of both of its premises, and an error in any of the aforementioned stages, or in most or all of them, means the invalidity of his inferences.
In this article, Kadivar has confined himself solely to what pertains to his own views and has not, affirmatively or negatively, addressed the views of Abdolkarim Soroush. Kadivar’s claim is that Naraghi’s claims in all three sets are contestable and, consequently, his inferences are flawed. In summary, his first set of claims diverges from the standards of political philosophy and fundamental human rights, and he has expressed opinions based on a romantic approach. The second set of claims, i.e., the account of the views, and specifically Kadivar’s later views, often lacks precision, is misleading, and cannot be attributed to his later perspective. As a result, the third set of claims is incomplete and his critiques are unfounded.
This article contains two sections as follows: The Romantic Approach, and The Misleading Account.
Section One. The Romantic Approach
In this section, I am not concerned with what points Naraghi has—correctly or incorrectly—attributed to Soroush and Kadivar. The main question of this section is an inquiry into Naraghi’s perspective and position in the locus of dispute. More specifically, in which formulation is “the right to be wrong” the essence of political liberalism? In a secular democratic system, is legislation necessarily bound to having rational foundations independent of religion? In a secular democratic system, is the activity of Islamic parties and the formation of a government (the executive branch) by believers absolutely prohibited? Can international human rights instruments be disregarded in order to recognize fundamental human rights, including those of minorities, particularly sexual minorities? Naraghi’s answer to all four questions is affirmative. This section comprises five discourses.
First Discourse. “The Right to Be Wrong” and Political Liberalism
According to Naraghi, “The essence of liberalism is ‘the right to be wrong.’ ... Soroush and Kadivar defend a secular but non-liberal democracy. That is, they are advocates of secular democracy but opponents of liberalism. From the perspective of liberalism, ‘the right to be wrong’ is bound by no restriction unless that restriction is determined and justified on the basis of common reason and the public interest of society.” If there is any ambiguity in this statement, his intent regarding political liberalism is expressed more clearly in another passage:
“Liberalism is a political theory that considers the most important duty of the state to be the provision and guarantee of the fundamental political and civil rights of the individuals in society, including individual and social freedoms (such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of conscience and religion, and the like). But the liberal political structure is, in fact, a kind of arrangement in the political institutions of society that protects and guarantees a portion of the fundamental freedoms of society. An individual may not believe in the theory of liberalism, but, due to certain considerations (including pragmatic considerations), may find the liberal political structure defensible.... These three categories (i.e., liberalism, the liberal socio-political structure, and liberal ethics) are related to one another, but it does not seem that any one necessarily entails the other... On this basis, in my opinion, the cornerstone of liberal ethics can be considered the recognition of the ‘right to be wrong’ of human beings.... A Muslim individual may not be reconciled with philosophical liberalism, and may, based on rational and faith-based reasons, consider it incorrect or incomplete.... In my view, a Muslim, by virtue of being a Muslim, can (and, I believe, should) accept this type of political structure—that is, a political structure in which the ‘right to be wrong’ of citizens is recognized.” (Tolerance and Civility, 1390, pp. 68-69 and 70-71)
It is not important how accurate it is to define liberalism primarily and essentially as a political theory. What is relevant to our discussion is the non-necessity of the school of liberalism entailing liberal ethics and political liberalism. That is, for political liberalism to be realized, one need not believe in the school of liberalism and liberal ethics. In Naraghi’s political liberalism, the state is the guardian of the fundamental political and civil rights of citizens, that is, those fundamental rights that are inviolable under any circumstances. Naraghi has considered “the right to be wrong” to be both the essence of the school of liberalism, the cornerstone of liberal ethics, and, most importantly, the distinguishing feature of a liberal versus a non-liberal political structure. A political structure that recognizes the “right to be wrong” of citizens is liberal, and a secular democratic political structure that does not recognize such a right is not liberal.
This conception of political liberalism is derived from Naraghi's narrow rational analysis or interpretation. In his view, this political structure is not exclusive to Western societies but is a universal and global matter. Rational necessity is not confined to a specific geography and can be prescribed for any society that has chosen such a method for its governance. There is no doubt that liberalism contemplates maximum individual freedoms and minimum government power. Does the right to be wrong encompass all domains? Such as economic rights, for example? The answer is negative, and it apparently pertains mostly to the realm of religious obstacles. In other words, this right cannot represent all the freedoms of political liberalism. Moreover, it is clear that it cannot be applied absolutely, for its absolute application would lead to anarchism. For this reason, Naraghi has accepted that the only thing that can constrain this right is “common reason and the public interests of society,” which again points to the exclusion of religion from the position of judgment. Now, one must ask: is the manifestation of “common reason and the public interests of society” anything other than the law of society? It is clear that it is not. That is, the right to be wrong is limited by law. In no court is a violation of the law admissible by invoking the right to be wrong. Consequently, the notion that political liberalism is based on the right to be wrong is a futile matter that has no substantive meaning in the political sphere. Such a conception of liberalism is romantic.
Of course, Naraghi has not provided an argument that political liberalism entails the “right to be wrong.” This is his subjective and personal understanding of the liberal political structure. Everyone is free to define and analyze political concepts as they wish, but these subjective and personal conceptions impose no obligation on anyone until they are accepted in the convention of political philosophy, especially if this personal, subjective conception is to be considered a criterion for evaluating the political theory of others. The lack of a coherent theoretical framework is not a minor flaw to be glossed over with pleasantries. Has this romantic conception been accepted by the prominent liberal political philosophers of the last two centuries? No! Can one not be a liberal and, in explaining the liberal political structure, not subscribe to such a right? The answer is yes.
To refute Naraghi's claim, a single counterexample suffices: the political liberalism of the later John Rawls, which is intensely minimalist and neutral towards existing philosophical and moral doctrines. This neutrality is towards specific moral and religious theories and values, as well as specific philosophical viewpoints, which, as a matter of principle, would also encompass being based on the right to be wrong. Specifically, the political liberalism of the later Rawls guarantees only political freedoms and has nothing to do with other basic liberties. To put it more simply, his political liberalism is not an advocate of the right to be wrong.
If the criterion of the liberal right to be wrong does not encompass a major figure like the later John Rawls, how can it be considered a significant criterion for evaluating the political views of others? The conception of political liberalism being based on the right to be wrong, besides being subjective and personal, lacking substantive meaning in the legal structure of society, and not being inclusive of many social domains, is a “maximalist conception” of the liberal political structure. This maximalist conception bears no proportion to political liberalism in its historical context.
The main problem with Naraghi in his personal, subjective reasoning is his “ahistorical view.” He looks at legal, political, and even human categories ahistorically. A maximalist rationalist view of categories that are fundamentally historical is problematic. He does not say which thinker's teachings the liberalism he defends is based on, nor which school it is close to. He assumes a doctrine as the essence of liberalism and, as a matter of principle, attributes certain things to this school of thought; this is the liberalism that, in his opinion, ought to be, not the liberalism that has been realized in the course of history or is the subject of discussion and examination in the works of experts. Whether this romantic, hypothetical, imaginary, subjective, and personal liberalism of his corresponds to everyday and historical reality is a matter of ifs and buts.
Naraqi is enamored with a principle called “the right to be wrong.” This infatuation is to such a degree that it evokes the line “wherever I turn my face, I see you.” If, in the proverb, “all roads lead to Rome,” for Naraqi, all paths to salvation culminate in the right to be wrong. We have seen the foundation of the school of liberalism, ethics, and political structure upon this principle. Now it is time to examine his ahistorical conception of the concept of secularism.
After explaining secularism according to his own mental constructs, he concludes: “A precondition for secularism in the aforementioned sense is a kind of tolerance or forbearance. The essence of tolerance is the recognition of (at least a degree of) the right to be wrong. (This degree must be determined based on conventional collective reason.)” (Is a “Secular Muslim” Possible? 1389 [2010]) In his rational analysis of secularism, he once again arrived at the right to be wrong. Is the secular government he has depicted liberal or not? He has not specified. As long as the right to be wrong is observed in it, everything is resolved! Is this conception of secularism a contingent one, or the view of the majority of political philosophers? No. Once again, Naraqi has not provided any argument that secularism is based on a degree of the right to be wrong (and what degree?).
If we pay attention to Naraqi’s explanation of liberalism and secularism, we reach the conclusion that instead of an objective discussion of political or legal schools within their historical context, he has engaged in hypothetical, a priori, subjective, and personal rational discussions, which are of course useful, but with these romantic explanations, one cannot accuse anyone of departing from the circle of any of these concepts. In his works, Naraqi has not offered any clear distinction between secularism, democracy, and liberalism. Is separating liberalism from democracy necessary? One view is this: “Separating liberalism from democracy in the discussion of political thought is not only unnecessary, but sometimes comes across as artificial.” (Hossein Bashiriyeh, History of Political Thought in the Twentieth Century, Volume Two, Liberalism and Conservatism, 1378 [1999], p. 22) We have clearly seen the artificiality of separating liberalism from secular democracy in Naraqi’s writings. There are other views regarding the relationship between liberalism and democracy.
Now, considering the above explanation, it is Arash Naraqi who must answer the serious objections to his comprehensive, maximalist, hypothetical, subjective, and personal liberalism, and explain what virtue this romantic liberalism possesses that if someone does not believe in it, they deserve reproach and the absolute label of having departed from political liberalism. Instead of speaking in generalities under absolute and elastic titles like liberalism, it is fitting that claims be presented clearly and transparently, that the provenance of each claim—including the thinkers who subscribe to it or have written in critique of it—be introduced, and if someone has added a word to this scholarly claim, it be precisely specified. Political discussions such as liberalism, secularism, and democracy differ from metaphysics and philosophical theology, both in their mode of discussion and in their method of reasoning. These discussions must be presented in their historical context, specifying the type and school. This discussion has the potential for expansion and elaboration. I will suffice with this brief account.
Second Discourse. Limiting the Religious Majority in Legislation
What kind of government is a secular democratic government? Naraghi’s answer appears in the book Tolerance and Civility (1392/2013, pp. 186–187), where there is, in brief, no dispute. Two years later, he adds another qualification to majority rule. Naraghi’s main concern is religious rulings, even if these rulings have passed through all the filters of a secular democratic system, have secured the majority vote of citizens, and have also observed the fundamental rights of the minority. His statement: “A Sharia ruling and religious law (even if it is rational, efficient, just, and ethical) cannot, by virtue of its religiousness, acquire the status of positive law or civil law. Religious rulings or religious laws are morally and rationally permissible in two types: first, those for which there exists no independent rational basis or reason beyond intra-religious foundations and proofs. Second, those which, in addition to religious validity, also have independent rational reasons justifying them. Rulings of the first type can under no circumstances be transformed into binding civil laws in the public sphere (because the principle of justice requires that the public sphere, as the common property of all citizens, be accessible regardless of their religious beliefs). However, religious rulings or laws of the second type, so long as they do not violate the fundamental rights of human beings—for example, do not violate the rights of minorities in society—can, through democratic mechanisms such as securing the majority vote of society, become binding civil law for civil society.” (Tradition and Open Horizons, 1394/2015, pp. 99–100)
Two conditions are necessary for the validity of a law: one, that it enjoys the support of the majority vote; the other, that it safeguards the fundamental rights of citizens. The most important of these fundamental rights is the possibility for the minority to become the majority. Fundamental rights are inviolable under any circumstances by anyone, even the majority. The first condition is to prevent the tyranny of the minority, and the second condition is to prevent the tyranny of the majority. Naraghi has deemed a third condition necessary, which is that the background of the law must be scrutinized; if the law is derived from a religious ruling, there must necessarily be rational reasons independent of religion justifying it. That is, the understanding of the majority of citizens and their consent is not sufficient.
Citizens, as the owners of the common property of the public sphere, by accepting the social contract, consider the principle of justice to lie in observing it. This contract deems recourse to majority rule, while observing the fundamental rights of citizens, to be sufficient. That the principle of justice necessitates the accessibility of laws to citizens is not self-evident, no reason has been adduced for it, and its validity is scientifically contestable. This is one of Naraghi’s personal subjectivities, which is, of course, respectable as a scholarly discussion. But for what reason does he expect others to make his personal subjectivities the criterion for organizing society? And if someone does not accept it, do they not believe in a secular democratic system? Anyone’s rational analysis is respectable for themselves, but it does not create a legal obligation for others. If someone, based on their own rational arguments, imposes other qualifications on majority rule and the observance of citizens’ basic rights, so long as it does not become a legal convention, it lacks practical value.
Even if the scholarly dispute over the aforementioned qualification is not valid, accepting this qualification has an insoluble practical problem. For the practical realization of this condition of Naraghi’s, a Guardian Council composed of moral philosophers is necessary, vested with the right of approbative supervision to veto laws with an intra-religious background that lack independent rational justification. It is clear that the implicit presupposition of such a qualification is the legal incapacity of religious citizens. Religious proofs suffer from a permanent immaturity, and unless an independent rational reason compensates for their minority and incapacity, they are not acceptable. Believing citizens are only permitted to exercise their legislative right under the permanent guardianship of philosophers.
Conclusion: A law enacted by the majority, while observing the fundamental rights of the minority, requires no further qualification for its validity. There is no need to investigate the background of enacted laws that have observed the two aforementioned conditions. The lack of an independent rational justification apart from religion does not invalidate any law. Raising such conditions constitutes a violation of majority rights based on personal subjectivities and maximalist rationalism.
Third Discourse: Depriving the Religious Majority of Forming a Government
From Naraqi’s perspective in a secular democratic system, Muslims are not permitted to form a government, even if they enjoy a majority vote and observe the fundamental rights of the minority. That is, in addition to the state, the executive branch and the government must also be secular. The meaning of this statement is the prohibition of Islamic parties and, consequently, the deprivation of believers from forming a government. Of course, Naraqi has not provided a rational reason for this deprivation and has merely contented himself with precautionary recommendations against the misuse of political power by believers. He finds Ahmad Sadri’s concerns regarding the preference, and not the necessity, of entrusting the government to non-believers (under specific post-Islamic Republic conditions) to be justified but expedient, and he himself inclines towards the necessity of believers withdrawing from government.
This condition lacks the slightest obligatory rational reason and ultimately reflects the personal, subjective concerns of its proponent. A secular democratic system is not bound by such a condition, and asserting such a condition is contrary to the principle of justice. According to the principle of justice, citizens must enjoy completely equal legal status and rights. And justice admits no exceptions. I do not deny that a certain approach may have political preference at a particular juncture; the discussion concerns a legally binding condition.
A reflection on these three discourses shows that Naraqi defends a romantic, subjective, hypothetical, and personal conception of liberalism and secularism. In these maximalist conceptions, his most important concern is creating additional restrictions for religious beliefs, Sharia rulings, and the governance of believers, even considering their being in the majority and the full observance of the fundamental rights of the minority.
Fourth Discourse: The Reference for Fundamental Human Rights
One of the axioms of a secular democratic system is the observance of fundamental human rights. What should be done when discussing whether a particular instance constitutes a fundamental human right? According to Naraqi, one must refer to independent rational and moral reasons, and international human rights documents are not a suitable reference in this regard. His exact wording is:
“Is the condition for something being a human right its inclusion in the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? Did humans lack rights before the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and only acquire rights after its publication? The Declaration of Human Rights is merely a legal and political statement that recognizes, within the international legal system, certain pre-existing fundamental rights of humans that have emerged unscathed from the crucible of political powers’ bargaining. However, the instances of human rights and their validity are determined independently of the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.... It is unlikely that human rights experts consider the list of fundamental rights to be limited to the items contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This declaration, like any legal document, changes and evolves alongside the intellectual and material progress of humans. Therefore, to determine whether the rights of sexual minorities are truly an instance of human rights or not, independent rational and moral reasons must be presented; the mere inclusion or non-inclusion of those rights in the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will not solve much of the problem.” (The Issue of Homosexuality in Contemporary Iranian Shiite Thought, Iran Namag, 3:1, Spring 2018, pp. 94-95)
Let us assume that independent rational and moral arguments have been established for fundamental human rights. Are these arguments of a kind that are accepted by all or the majority? If so, why has there been no global consensus on this matter to date? A portion of these rights, including fundamental human rights, has been accepted without the slightest disagreement, but another portion remains a subject of dispute and conflict. The claimed rational arguments established for these cases have not been acceptable to their opponents. Therefore, Naraghi's response (referring to independent rational and moral arguments) is of no use because these arguments are not accepted by all or even the majority.
Naraghi has once again approached the matter from a subjective, hypothetical, theoretical, and personal standpoint. His rational analyses are, of course, respectable. But for what reason do these subjective views create an obligation for others? In response to Naraghi, who has deemed it improbable for legal experts to refer to United Nations documents to identify instances of fundamental human rights, it has been stated from a legal perspective: "If we accept in brief that human rights are a set of values that the conscience of human society recognizes and considers their observance necessary for human dignity and worth, and from a legal standpoint, human rights are a set of norms, rules, and mechanisms whose aim is to identify, guarantee, promote, and encourage these values, we need a mirror to reflect the global conscience. The United Nations, despite all its problems and particularly the fact that it is composed of representatives of states, is currently the best place for the manifestation of this collective conscience. For all jurists, the resolutions of the various bodies of this organization are of fundamental importance in evaluating human rights norms. Theoretically, every individual can have their own opinion, but in the world of law, there is no doubt that the resolutions of this organization play the principal role in global human rights." (Ardeshir Amir-Arjomand, former director of the UNESCO Center and Chair for Human Rights, Peace and Democracy at Beheshti University)
Even among liberal philosophers, there is no consensus on the instances of fundamental human rights. Interestingly, Naraghi himself, in his article "John Rawls and the Problem of Human Rights in International Relations," has used the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the reference for his argument! Note this sentence: "Rawls defends a very minimal concept of human rights. In other words, the list he provides of the instances of human rights is much more limited than what is found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights... According to this approach, it would be difficult to justifiably defend all the instances of human rights mentioned in the text of the Universal Declaration at the international level." (The Ethics of Human Rights, 2009, pp. 46 and 49)
So even Naraghi knows that the reference for fundamental human rights is, in practice, the documents of the United Nations. Then why has he denied the validity of these documents? He assumed that no UN document exists regarding the rights of sexual minorities, and therefore, for the sake of argument, questioned the validity of these documents. His recent article on homosexuality begins by invoking the declaration read at the UN General Assembly on December 18, 2008. (p. 87) Was Naraghi unaware that the first United Nations document concerning gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals, dated November 17, 2011 (corresponding to 26 Aban 1390), was adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Council?
The title of this annual report is "Discriminatory laws and acts of violence against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity," which was prepared by the representative of South Africa and adopted by a weak affirmative vote of 23 out of 47 members (19 negative votes, 3 abstentions, and 2 non-votes), meaning less than half of the members of the Human Rights Council. This resolution is derived from Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is further written that "this Covenant and other human rights instruments have deliberately left the grounds of discrimination open by using the phrase 'other status.'"
the Universal Declaration approved in 1948 and the two International Covenants approved in 1966. Both were approved in an era when the four sexual orientations (LGBT) were considered a type of psychological disorder. It was in the mid-seventies that the scientific consensus shifted. Therefore, the intent of the drafters of all three documents cannot have been the sexual orientations accepted several decades later or about a decade later! In other words, the reasoning used in the text of the resolution is debatable. But even if the above dispute is not accepted, this resolution has counted the aforementioned rights among human rights, and its approval as the first UN document (albeit from one of its subsidiary bodies) is a major step in paving the way for it to become customary law.
However, the rights stipulated in the said resolution of the United Nations Human Rights Council are divided into the following two categories: a. Negation of any punishment and violence against individuals due to different sexual orientation or identity (decriminalization); b. Equality in all rights absolutely, minus sexual matters. Regarding sexual relations, which has been the main focus of disagreement between proponents and opponents, it has been deliberately left unspecified and has sufficed with generalities and absolutes. What has been stipulated in this resolution is acceptable as fundamental human rights. But the cases that have not been explicitly stated, namely their sexual relations such as legal marriage, are not considered among fundamental human rights, and there is a fundamental difference of opinion about them.
To be more precise, although marriage is among the fundamental and basic rights of humans, legal and customary marriage is exclusive to the marriage of opposite sexes, and its interpretation as marriage between two people of the same sex is subject to intense dispute and has not been stipulated in any credible international document; therefore, it is not considered among fundamental human rights, and if a country does not recognize such a thing—just as numerous countries have not recognized it—they are not considered violators of human rights. Of course, Naraghi and his like-minded colleagues can disagree with this legal interpretation. The theoretical debate continues, and in practice, customary law is relied upon.
Fifth Discourse. A Master Key for Opening All Locks
Is ethics a key for opening all locks? Can one, with the aforementioned master key, aspire to solve all the problems of the world and humanity? Does "the condition of ethics being necessary in all human actions" mean independence from the sciences of law and politics and sufficing with absolute obedience to moral philosophers? This discourse seeks to provide a brief answer to the aforementioned questions and includes two discussions.
First Discussion. Methodological Reflection
Is the realm of philosophical theology or theoretical rationality identical to the realm of law, including the religious legal system and practical rationality, from a methodological perspective? What is the relationship between ethics and law? Can one determine the task of the various branches of legal science solely through deductive rational analyses of the kind current in analytical ethics or normative ethics?
There is no debate about the necessity, importance, and even the priority of the two branches of ethics over the legal sciences. In other words, ethical discussions are a necessary condition for legal discussions, but not a sufficient condition. That is, even if we conclude in an ethical analysis that A has moral goodness or badness, it does not necessarily mean complete goodness and badness; there may be actions that have contingent goodness or badness, or are non-conditional and have been accidentally attributed with goodness and badness. In any case, one should not exaggerate the importance of ethical analyses and consider oneself independent of legal analyses. The degree of influence of legal discussions in determining the task of practical domains is several times greater than that of ethical analyses. For this reason, those who enter practical discussions without paying attention to legal standards fall into gross errors.
In legal and jurisprudential discussions, alongside the method of logical deduction and the importance of legal and jurisprudential rules, the inductive method holds greater significance. In this domain, the scope of the rules' applicability is far more limited than in philosophical theology, and most errors occur in appealing to the generality or absoluteness of rules that are not, in fact, such. In the realm of practical discussions, Naraqi has treated analytical ethics as a necessary and sufficient condition, disregarding the achievements of legal science, which have a far greater influence on reaching a conclusion; consequently, numerous flaws have crept into his deductions.
Another standard whose neglect is problematic is "legal custom." For a matter to transform from the domain of analytical ethics into legal custom sometimes takes decades. Legal science, as well as jurisprudence, are very conservative. One must understand this methodological conservatism. To transform individual rational analyses into legal custom, one must be patient and uphold the rules of the legal game. The sweetness of rational discussions should not become a highwayman for discussions of legal custom, which is the arbiter of collective reason in various social disputes. In areas of conflict, the opinion of no single person, including no philosopher, is the arbiter. Naraqi is intensely enamored with abstract rational contests and is completely detached from legal realities.
This deficiency is more serious in the political arena. "Taking society and its states and modes seriously in political theory is not only marginal, accidental, and secondary, but is the focal point and source of all theoretical discussions. Why should we submit to this outdated individualistic assumption that we can have a desirable political theory, free and independent from the society that is the subject of our political action and thought, even though society will, willy-nilly, reveal its color and effect in practice through the choices and reactions it shows? This is, first and foremost, the problem of a political theory that does not start from a specific society and its modes and states, and takes the effect of society as secondary and subordinate. Society is the point of departure for political theory."
If someone issues a political decree based on the standards of analytical ethics and neglects the point that the analyses of political philosophy and realpolitik have a far greater impact than ethical rulings in political matters, this neglect sometimes causes irreparable damage. There is no dispute that being ethical is a necessary condition for a political act. However, the ethical permissibility of a political act does not prove its political obligation! It does not even prove its preferability under all circumstances. No political direction emerges from ethical permissibility.
Scientific self-sufficiency is prevalent among the masters of many sciences. If a jurist imagines that all political, economic, social, cultural, and even military issues have a jurisprudential solution (which is the official theory of the Islamic Republic of Iran), because all human actions are subject to one of the five prescriptive rulings! What difference is there if a moral philosopher imagines that all the world's problems, from politics, economics, culture, etc., have an ethical solution, because being ethical is a necessary condition for the permissibility of any action! The sufficient conditions for these necessary conditions are so broad that proving these necessary conditions does not cure much pain. There is no key that opens all the world's locks. Analytical ethics is not such a master key either. I will suffice with this brief account. The discussion has the potential to expand.
Second Discussion. Examples of Ethical Decrees in Legal and Religious Matters
In this discussion, as examples, I will refer to three ethical rulings in legal and religious matters, all of which were issued and published by Naraqi between 2007 and 2015, and there is no evidence that he has retracted them.
A. “Among the unjust matters whose exercise must be recognized as a right and whose legal prohibition must be deemed unjust is the right to express hateful speech and to insult sanctities (or what is considered sacred). ... In many cases, recognizing the right to insult or express hateful speech is a price society must accept to safeguard the principle of freedom of expression. But defending the right to free speech does not always mean agreeing with the content of that speech.... From a moral standpoint (and sometimes from a legal standpoint), it is wrong for an individual or group to use their right to free speech to make vulnerable minorities in a society, who are already subject to discrimination and violence, even more vulnerable, and to expose them further to discrimination and violence.” (Tradition and Open Horizons 1394 [2015], pp. 105-106) Is this truly what the principle of justice and legal equality of citizens entails?
B. “If there is no expediency for the tradition of circumcision [of boys] other than religious reasons, then the performance of this tradition must be postponed until the child reaches the age of intellectual maturity, and the decision about it should be left to him... If it becomes clear that circumcision has important health benefits for the child and postponing it is harmful to him, then in that case, and not for religious reasons, performing it on the child will be permissible; in this respect, circumcision becomes similar to, for example, vaccination. My point is that performing this act on children based on purely religious grounds is morally impermissible.” (Facebook Musings, p. 89) This moral criterion is issued for a religious ruling, not even for law in a Muslim society. Religious proofs are wards who never reach maturity and are completely invalid without a rational guardian!
C. “Killing myself by my own hand, if done with heartfelt consent, does not violate my right to my life and therefore seems morally justified.” (Ibid., pp. 7-8) The aforementioned views require no explanation or critique.
Part Two: The Misleading Report
In Naraghi’s report of Kadivar’s views, the date of each quotation is not mentioned, earlier and abrogated views are not distinguished from later and abrogating ones, Kadivar’s public announcement of changes in his views is disregarded, earlier views are attributed to Kadivar’s later theory, there is an expansiveness in quoting earlier and abrogated views, conversely, there is a complete parsimony in quoting later and current views, many important components of the later and current views are not quoted, there is a clear error in the interpretation of some views, and in the interpretation of others, a narrow interpretation has been made contrary to contextual evidence. Overall, sufficient investigation and precision have not been exercised in the descriptive report, and in some instances, a report far from reality and misleading has been presented. This part consists of two sections.
Section One: A Confused Report on the Desirable Government
First Discussion: Kadivar’s Earlier and Later Views on the Desirable Government
A. From Naraghi’s perspective, in a secular democratic system, Muslims are not permitted to form a government, even if they enjoy a majority vote and observe the fundamental rights of the minority.
B. Kadivar's view since the aforementioned date is this: “My ideal model of government is a secular democratic government, meaning that all its institutions, officials, laws, and decisions are determined without any exception in a democratic manner; they come by the people's vote, they go by the people's vote, and they are placed under the institutionalized supervision of the people in a glass room. No special privileges or rights are accepted for any individual, guild, or class. There is no lifelong or supra-legal official in it. All laws are enacted, interpreted, and repealed with the consent of the people's representatives. The basic rights of all citizens are guaranteed, rights that are absolutely inviolable under any circumstances. One of these rights is the possibility of the minority becoming the majority. Freedom is observed within the limits of international human rights standards.” (I am thinking of a secular democratic government, 11 February 2010)
Eight years ago, Kadivar published a chronological list of his intellectual developments in the field of political thought. (Answers to Intellectual Questions, Jaras, 26 July 2011) which apparently has been overlooked by Naraqi.
Second Discussion. Examples of the Report's Confusion
First. Kadivar has held two different theories about the ideal government: the earlier, abrogated view, and the later, abrogating view. Characterizing these two views as “maximal and minimal” is incorrect. Maximum and minimum are a comparison within a common subject. Our subject is “secular democratic government,” not democratic government in general. What Naraqi has called maximal falls outside the subject of discussion.
Second. If Naraqi had mentioned the date of each quotation (even in the version published on his website), it would have become clear that the quotations from the note “The Epistemological Foundations of Freedom in Religious Government” (March 1997) and the interview “The Boundaries of Freedom from the Perspective of Religion” (Winter 1999 and Summer 1999), both in Kadivar's book “Concerns of Religious Government” (2000), which belong to the period when he believed in “democratic religious government,” cannot serve as evidence for the view of “secular democratic government”!
Third. Naraqi has cited Kadivar's earlier, abrogated view on apostasy, but alongside it, he has not even deemed his later, abrogating view—which he has published since 2001 and about which he wrote the independent book “Punishment for Apostasy and Freedom of Religion: A Critique of the Punishment for Apostasy and Blasphemy against the Prophet According to the Standards of Discursive Jurisprudence” (2014)—worthy of citation or mention. Kadivar has referred to the evolution of his views in detail and with dates in the introduction to this book. (pp. 11-15)
Fourth. Naraqi has not separated Kadivar's earlier and later views; in explaining the earlier views (belief in democratic religious government), he has spoken, among other things, of legal supervision after publication and, from analyzing them, has concluded that “Kadivar's secular democratic government is also not liberal.” Disregarding that what he has cited has no connection to “secular” democratic government! And entirely belongs to the earlier period, the departure from which has been explicitly declared.
Fifth. Naraghi has written: “It seems that in his eyes, the most important deficiency of liberalism remains its view on sexual matters, or in Kadivar’s terms, ‘sexual freedoms and freedom of social relations.’ That is, Kadivar, like Soroush, seeks the ugliness of liberalism particularly in the realm of matters related to sexual affairs.” The history of this latter phrase, which Naraghi has generously attributed to Kadivar’s later views, is taken from this interview: “The Boundaries of Freedom from the Perspective of Religion (Winter 1999 and Summer 1999), that is, twenty years ago! Kadivar officially announced his farewell to any form of religious government in 2009, nine years ago, which is now past.
Sixth. Naraghi has claimed: “From the perspective of Soroush and Kadivar, the ultimate arbiter of laws and macro-policies, and the limits of freedoms in society (both in the maximalist and minimalist conceptions), is still ultimately religion—but this time, a new-thinking interpretation of religion. ... It is for this reason that the desirable democracy of Soroush and Kadivar—in the final analysis—is bound by religious constraints and within the radius of religious rulings, and by this very criterion, it is incompatible with liberalism. Therefore, it seems that in practice, there is no significant difference between their maximalist and minimalist conceptions of government.”
Naraghi’s judgment regarding Kadivar’s later view is a completely baseless claim. The secular democratic government in Kadivar’s view bears no religious mark. The only difference lies in the society in which this government is to be established. Cultures and subcultures, including the religion and faith of the majority of the people, influence legislation and policymaking. The principle of influence in the actual structure of any country is undeniable. However, the legal structure is neutral towards religious and denominational beliefs. The problem—if there is a problem—is not with Kadivar’s political theory; the problem is with a society that adheres to its religious teachings.
Eighth. Naraghi has repeatedly written: “The secular and illiberal democracy of Soroush and Kadivar is not committed to respecting the rights of minorities—if respecting these rights contradicts religious rulings.” This attribution is absolutely contrary to fact. In Kadivar’s view, whatever is approved by the legislative assembly, whether it conforms to religious law or contradicts it, whether it is compatible with matters termed the necessities of religion, denomination, and jurisprudence or contradicts them, is legally valid and must be followed. Every citizen, including religious scholars, is legally permitted to campaign against an enacted law or policy that they deem incorrect for any reason—including the religious standards they accept—and to mobilize public opinion for its repeal through legal channels. Legal validity is not equivalent to religious correctness. No citizen is required to have doctrinal commitment to the law. One can theoretically oppose the law and practically observe it.
Ninth. Naraghi has attributed to the religious new-thinkers: “Soroush and Kadivar believe that intellectuals and religious new-thinkers are the best political options in Iran’s political future, because they both have a greater chance of winning the majority of votes within a religious society, and their presence in the political power structure satisfies the religious and the non-religious equally. The political terrain in Iranian society is sloped to some extent in favor of the religious. ... But Soroush and Kadivar still wish to take advantage of the slope of the playing field in favor of the religious players.”
If Naraqi means that Kadivar considers himself or the religious new-thinkers to be the best political options in Iran's political future, that is incorrect. He has publicly declared his explicit view regarding his disinclination to participate in governance and government. (Interview with Farid Adib Hashemi, Jaras, 31 July 2010) Neither jurists nor philosophers make good politicians. If this statement means that, in Kadivar's view, the followers of religious new-thinking are the best options for Iran's political future, this is also not correct. The best options for Iran's political future are individuals who possess three qualities together: competence, trustworthiness, and popular backing. There is no other mandatory religious condition in this regard.
However, the first part of the latter statement is an acknowledgment of the social influence of religious new-thinkers. Although the analogy to the slope of the ground is not an appropriate expression. The appropriate expression is a team playing on its "home ground" with the enthusiastic encouragement of spectators against a team with few supporters. The second part of the latter statement, at least regarding Kadivar, is a claim for which Naraqi has provided not the slightest evidence. Kadivar has concerns more important than politics. He will never expend his potential credibility and influence on politics. The notion that religious authorities and figures of weight should not expend their social influence and credibility on petty, day-to-day politics is a sound statement with which Kadivar agrees with Naraqi.
Second Discourse. An Incomplete Report on Homosexuality
First Discussion. Citing Earlier and Later Views
Kadivar's first response to a question about homosexuality dates to November 2006 (book Haqq al-Nas, 2008, pp. 163-165). There, he viewed the issue from the standpoint of traditional Islam, without any difference: prohibition and the severest punishment. The outlines of Kadivar's later view, expressed from March 2013 to January 2014, are as follows: Revising the religious rulings on same-sex sexual relations requires proving these two premises: a. Same-sex sexual relations, according to the consensus of empirical scientists, is an instinctual and non-acquired inclination in some humans. b. The unanimous diagnosis of empirical scientists constitutes the entire subject of the religious ruling, and no other matter intervenes in the subject of the religious ruling. The first premise has not been proven to Kadivar to date. At the very least, in the cases of marriages, edibles, and potables, there is evidence contrary to the second premise, and despite an explicit religious prohibition, an act cannot be deemed permissible even if agreed upon by empirical scientists.
The religious prohibition and sanctity of same-sex sexual relations is among the certainties of the religion (defining ruling). Whether homosexuality is an illness or a natural matter, it is not punishable (declaratory ruling). Sexual minorities are equal to others in all rights (with the exception of the right to same-sex marriage). Anyone who considers themselves a Muslim, has uttered the two testimonies of faith, and practices some of the religious teachings is a Muslim. Committing a forbidden act does not invalidate one's being a Muslim. An individual's gender is a personal matter, and no one has the right to change it without their consent.
Second Discussion. An Inaccurate Report
First. The meaning of this phrase, “a society that considers such sexual relations an anomaly and a disruption of public morality is obliged, alongside enacting restrictive laws, to provide the necessary facilities for sex reassignment for these individuals,” is an obligation to provide the necessary facilities for sex reassignment, which differs vastly from an obligation to undergo sex reassignment. The object of the obligation is the creation of facilities for sex reassignment so that if someone freely and voluntarily chooses such an option, they have the means to carry it out. Naraghi has mistakenly assumed the object of the obligation to be sex reassignment itself, attributing compulsory sex reassignment to Kadivar!
Second. In his narrow interpretation of the text, he has reduced the decriminalization of homosexuality to the negation of the death penalty and ignored this explicit statement: “Whether homosexuality is an illness or a natural matter, it is not punishable.” (August 2013) Kadivar’s view was the absolute negation of punishment, not merely the death penalty.
Third. It has been publicly announced that Kadivar has been subject to a total publication ban in Iran since 2009, and is not permitted to publish new editions of his previous works or, in most cases, even to reprint his earlier works, let alone publish a new book. Overlooking this key point, Naraghi has undertaken to cite an opinion whose alteration and abrogation he was aware of. He repeated this unfair account of Kadivar’s views in his recent article (Spring 2018) on homosexuality.
Fourth. Kadivar has not published an independent article on homosexuality to date, and his few remarks on this matter have been limited to brief answers to a few questions. It is obvious that in a short answer to a religious question, there is no room for a detailed discussion and exposition of religious proofs, let alone scientific and philosophical proofs. The proper place for such discussions is law or discursive jurisprudence. Undoubtedly, if research priorities appropriate to Iran someday necessitate it, he will address the subject in detail. Given this point, Naraghi’s expectation from a short answer to a few questions is out of place: “Kadivar absolutely does not enter into a scientific and philosophical discussion about homosexuality, and condemns it on purely intra-religious grounds.”
Fifth. Let us assume Naraghi’s argument is complete and that in a secular democratic government within a Muslim society inclined toward Kadivar’s view, the sexual minority rights desired by Naraghi are not secured. Is sexual minority rights an appropriate measure for evaluating the degree of secular democracy? Meaning, if someone, hypothetically, considers marriage to be exclusively between a man and a woman and does not defend illegitimate sexual relations outside of marriage, are all of their achievements in the political, social, and cultural spheres invalid? The answer is no.
A reflection on the two recent articles shows that Naraghi has not cited the important points of the later opinion even to the extent of one-third the volume of the abrogated earlier opinion. That he and other defenders of homosexuality before him have focused their efforts on the generous citation of an opinion that Kadivar bid farewell to years ago indicates that they are displeased with Kadivar’s later views. What befits everyone is the observance of scholarly ethics. In light of the above points, it must be said that Naraghi’s account of Kadivar’s opinion on homosexuality and its evolution is imprecise, incomplete, and far from reality.
Final word. According to Naraghi in his last book: “The realization of minimal secularization should be considered the end of the work of religious intellectualism. ... The success of religious intellectualism in practice leads to the negation and erasure of religious intellectualism.... When religion and other components of culture each settle into their own specific place in a new arrangement, the mission of religious intellectualism comes to an end, and special attention to the matter of religion will also become moot.” (Tradition and Open Horizons, 1394, p. 82) Naraghi’s recent article showed that he has apparently revised his earlier prediction, and even in the event of the realization of minimal (political) secularism, the religious new-thinker still plays a central role in a religious society. A role so decisive that it has compelled Naraghi to write his recent article.
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PDF file of Mohsen Kadivar's article titled “Religious New-Thinking and Personal Reasoning”
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