Religious New-Thinking in Three Acts

The current of religious new-thinking in Iran has undergone significant transformations since the Islamic Revolution. Among these transformations is the emergence of distinct intellectual tendencies within this parent intellectual current. It appears that in recent years, at least three relatively distinct and important tendencies have taken shape within the current of religious new-thinking.

These three tendencies can be called the tendency of "Reform of Religious Thought," the tendency of "Reconstruction of Religion," and the tendency of "Trans-religious Spiritualism." The broad characteristics of these three intellectual tendencies are, in brief, as follows:

(1)

The current of Reform of Religious Thought strives to transform religious thought or thinking by considering and adhering to the internal logic of that religion itself (in this case, Islam). Here, the subject of transformation is "religious thought or thinking." The essence of religious thought is its hard central core. The hard central core of religion can be considered to comprise three main parts: canonical sources, canonical teachings, and canonical methods.

"Canonical sources" are the primary sources of religious authority and validity. These sources can be regarded as a kind of "Rule of Recognition" in the realm of religion. That is, these sources play a legitimizing role, and it is by reference to and on the authority of them that something can be considered inside or outside that particular religion. Therefore, beliefs or practices must first be presented to those sources, and on the condition of non-incompatibility with those sources, those beliefs or practices can be considered acceptable within the realm of that religion.

The "canonical teachings and methods" of a religion are the set of theoretical and practical beliefs that directly result from the "canonical sources" of the religion, and entail the core message and identity of that religion. To put it more precisely, the relationship between "canonical teachings and methods" and "canonical sources" goes far beyond mere non-incompatibility. "Non-incompatibility" is the minimal condition for the permissibility of a belief or practice in the realm of religion. "Canonical teachings and methods" have a more intimate logical relationship with the sources of religious authority. In a sense, it can be claimed that the sources of religious authority entail those beliefs. That is, the relationship between these teachings and those sources is a kind of "entailment" relationship, which is far stronger than the relationship of "non-incompatibility." The "canonical teachings and methods" of a religion can be regarded as the "constitution" of that religion. For example, in Islam, from the perspective of a Muslim individual, the Quran and the authentic Sunnah of the Prophet of Islam are considered the two main sources of authority and validation. That is, evidence based on the Book and Sunnah functions for a Muslim individual as justifying and legitimizing reasons. Of course, the relation of these "intra-religious evidences" to all beliefs and practices is not the same: some beliefs and practices directly result from these sources, some beliefs and practices are merely compatible with the content of these sources or at least are not incompatible with them, and some beliefs and practices are in contradiction with those sources. The beliefs of the first group are part of the hard core of the religion, the beliefs of the second group can become part of the "protective belt or peripheral beliefs" of that religion, and the beliefs of the third group fall outside the realm of that religion, and by this criterion have no entry into that religion.

For example, belief in a single personal God (i.e., a God possessing consciousness who enters into interpersonal and linguistic relationships with humans), or belief in the Quran being the Word of God, or belief in the prophethood of Muhammad, or belief in the Resurrection, directly results from the sources of religious authority in Islam (i.e., the Quran and authentic Sunnah), and therefore, these beliefs can be considered part of the "canonical teachings" and hence part of the "hard core" of the religion of Islam or its "constitution." Or, performing the ritual prayer and fasting are among the practices that directly result from the sources of religious authority in Islam, and therefore, they can be considered part of the "canonical methods" and consequently the "hard core" of the religion of Islam.

It is important to note that within the framework of the “reform of religious thought” tendency, the hard core, which serves as the constitution of that religion, resists change, meaning it cannot be altered except in specific cases and under special conditions. In other words, “reform of religious thought,” insofar as it concerns the hard core or constitution of the religion, adopts a conservative approach. “Reform of religious thought” seeks to begin the reformation of religious thought by altering the “protective belt” beliefs of the religion, and only under specific conditions does it drive the blade of reform deeper, cutting into the body of the religion’s hard core. “Protective belt” beliefs are a set of safeguarding beliefs whose alteration, without leading to a change in the hard core beliefs, protects the hard core beliefs from the line of fire of external critiques.

But the important question within the framework of the “reform of religious thought” tendency is: how and under what conditions can and must the blade of reform be driven into the body of the religion’s hard core? That is, under what conditions will the “constitution” of the religion require revision? It appears that the reform of religious thought—especially revision of the hard core or constitution of the religion—more or less follows the following logic:

First, the hard core beliefs of a religion are considered true from the perspective of its adherents unless proven otherwise. In other words, for the adherents of that religion, the principle is the truth of those beliefs and commitment and fidelity to the constitution of the religion; it is abandoning those beliefs or revising the constitution of the religion that requires a reason.

Second, the process of revising the hard core of the religion begins when the hard core beliefs are exposed to counter-instances—that is, evidence and indications are presented to the believers that threaten the truth or reasonableness of those core beliefs.

Third, if the adherents of the religion can refute those counter-instances with convincing reasons, they will have no necessity to revise the hard core beliefs or reform the constitution of the religion, and their commitment to those beliefs remains reasonable.

Fourth, however, if the adherents of the religion cannot refute those counter-instances, then the hard core beliefs will be faced with unrefuted counter-instances.

Fifth, in the face of unrefuted counter-instances, the adherents of the religion strive to repel those counter-instances with the least necessary change to the core beliefs of the religion. That is, when it comes to reforming the hard core beliefs of the religion, the assumption is that deep jurisprudential efforts within the text of the religion’s constitution must remain exceptional and minimal. For example, if counter-instances can be repelled by altering the protective belt beliefs of the religion, altering the protective belt beliefs will have a definite preference over altering the hard core beliefs of the religion.

Sixth, however, within the framework of the reform of religious thought tendency, the reform and alteration of the hard core beliefs of the religion is not ruled out. In conditions where repelling counter-instances through altering protective belt beliefs is not possible, the rationalist adherents of the religion must inevitably subject the hard core beliefs of the religion to the blade of reform as well. But even when altering hard core beliefs, the rationalist adherents of the religion must adopt a conservative approach, meaning that if a core belief can be kept safe from the line of fire of unrefuted counter-instances with minor alterations, minor alterations will have a definite preference over (for instance) abandoning that belief. For example, suppose the problem of evil is an unrefuted counter-instance to the assumption of a personal God within the framework of an Abrahamic religion like Islam. And also suppose that two paths are open to the adherents of that religion to repel this counter-instance: (first option) repel the problem of evil with a minor alteration in some divine attributes; or (second option) replace the image of the personal God of Abrahamic religions entirely with the image of an impersonal God, for example in Eastern and pantheistic religions. Both methods can be considered an appropriate response in repelling that unrefuted counter-instance. But within the framework of the reform of religious thought tendency, the first option has a definite preference over the second option, because the first option, compared to the second, entails fewer alterations to the hard core beliefs of the religion.

Seventh, the reinterpretation of the core beliefs of a religion can be carried out in different ways. But all these ways must share one principle: the utmost effort of religious scholars must be to preserve the spirit of the religion’s “constitution,” meaning that no interpretation of its principles and provisions should be offered that ultimately negates those very principles and foundations.

Eighth, one can imagine circumstances in which the followers of a religion, in order to defend its hard core against unrefuted counter-instances, have no choice but to submit to radical reforms in some of the hard core’s beliefs, offering radical and anomalous interpretations of those beliefs, or even, in some cases, abandoning those beliefs altogether. That is to say, the reform of religious thought is not entirely closed to the possibility of deep ijtihād within the hard core—so long as these instances of ijtihād remain exceptional and minimal.

Ninth, when undertaking deep ijtihād, religious scholars cannot entirely ignore the conventions of society in general and the conventions of the religious community in particular. The process of ijtihād, while following the formal criteria of deduction and interpretation, must necessarily also take into account the fundamental values and beliefs of the relevant society. In other words, the reform of religious thought, while deeply committed to the concept of truth and reality, does not lose sight of the element of expediency. Of course, this conventionalism does not necessarily mean following convention. Deep ijtihād can also bring about changes (sometimes profound ones) in societal conventions. But this undertaking will not be practical or realistic without considering convention and the capacity for change within the context of the relevant society.

(2)

The tendency toward the reconstruction of religion begins with the belief that deep but minimal and exceptional ijtihād in the core beliefs of the hard core of a religion (in this case, Islam) is not sufficient to save the religion, and the process of reforming religious thought must give way to the process of reconstructing the religion itself. The process of reconstructing religion is shaped by several important presuppositions:

First, the central beliefs of the mother religion’s hard core (in this case, Islam) face numerous unrefuted counter-instances.

Second, the central beliefs of the mother religion’s hard core cannot be defended against unrefuted counter-instances through changes in that religion’s protective belt of beliefs.

Third, the only remaining path is to revise the central beliefs of the mother religion’s hard core themselves.

Fourth, these revisions must be both extensive and deep. That is, the revision of the central beliefs of the hard core must be, firstly, radical, offering interpretations of the central beliefs that are sometimes entirely new and anomalous, and secondly, encompass a large number of those beliefs.

Fifth, in many cases, even an extensive and deep revision of the central beliefs of the hard core is not sufficient on its own; rather, in addition to this, some new beliefs must also be added to the previous set of beliefs of the hard core. In other words, in the tendency toward the reconstruction of religion, it is assumed that the “constitution” of the mother religion cannot be saved, and therefore, it must be rewritten. Let us call the process of extensive and deep revision of the central beliefs of the hard core, along with the introduction of some new beliefs into that core, “maximal ijtihād.”

Sixth, “maximal ijtihād” is not possible by relying solely on the sources of authority and validation of the mother religion, because many of the new beliefs, as well as the radical and anomalous interpretations of previous beliefs, cannot be legitimized solely on the basis of the mother religion’s sources of authority and validation.

Seventh, therefore, in addition to refining the sources of authority and validation of the mother religion, other new sources must also be added to their number, and by the authority and citation of these new legitimizing sources, new beliefs and radical interpretations of previous beliefs must be admitted into the hard core and officially recognized.

Thus, the phenomenon of the “reconstruction of religion” can be seen as the outcome of two main processes: (a) maximal ijtihād in the central beliefs of the mother religion’s hard core, and (b) the refinement and multiplication of the sources of authority and validation in the mother religion.

Thus, within the reconstruction-of-religion tendency, the most central beliefs of the hard core of Islam undergo fundamental changes in content: for example, the Quranic image of a personal, conscious God who enters into a linguistic relationship with human beings is entirely transformed into an impersonal God devoid of any consciousness, for whom the possibility of a linguistic relationship with humans is ruled out in principle. Consequently, the realist interpretation of the phenomenon of revelation, which entails the linguistic communication of a transcendent being with the Prophet, turns into dreams that are entirely rooted in the inner life and personality of the Prophet, and rather than indicating an objective relationship with a transcendent being, are considered a reflection of the Prophet’s own personality and subjective interiority. Or the phenomenon of the Resurrection, which signifies the continuation of a person’s individual life after their physical death, receives an entirely non-realist interpretation, and its declarative content is reduced to a wholly metaphorical expression reflected in the Prophet’s dreams. These new, often radical and anomalous interpretations encompass almost all the central beliefs of the hard core of Islam. In this way, at least according to a particular current within the reconstruction-of-religion tendency, the realist conception of the central beliefs of the hard core of Islam gives way to almost entirely anti-realist interpretations of the principal elements of the religion. And these interpretations are legitimized on the basis of sources that are not necessarily confined to the primary sources of authority of the parent religion. This process can be considered a clear instance of “maximalist ijtihad.”

On this basis, the reconstruction-of-religion tendency can be seen as an attempt to transform the parent religion through its “reconstruction.”

However, the phenomenon of the “reconstruction of religion” can take two different forms:

If the authority of the new legitimizing sources added to the traditional sources of the parent religion in the reconstruction process is considered subordinate to, or more or less equivalent to, the sources of authority and validation of the parent religion, then the result of the “reconstruction” process can be seen as the emergence of a new “sect” within the parent religion.

But if the authority of the new legitimizing sources added to the traditional sources of the parent religion in the reconstruction process subordinates and overshadows the authority and power of the parent religion’s sources of authority, then the result of the “reconstruction” process can be seen as the founding of a new “religion.”

In order to justify the reconstruction process epistemically, advocates of the reconstruction-of-religion tendency must be able to argue for the following three claims:

(First claim) The central beliefs of the hard core of the parent religion face undefeated defeaters that cannot be defended against except by abandoning those beliefs or offering anomalous and radical interpretations of them.

(Second claim) The alternative beliefs or interpretations proposed in place of the central beliefs of the hard core of the parent religion are themselves safe from the undefeated defeaters that threaten the central beliefs of the hard core of the parent religion.

(Third claim) The alternative beliefs or interpretations proposed in place of the central beliefs of the hard core of the parent religion are not themselves subject to any independent undefeated defeaters.

In the absence of convincing arguments for the three claims above, the move from the project of reforming religious thought to the project of reconstructing religion does not appear epistemically justified, or at least there is no compelling reason to prefer the project of reconstructing religion over the project of reforming religious thought.

(3)

The “trans-religious spiritualism” tendency begins from the belief that the projects of reforming religious thought and reconstructing religion are ultimately either unsuccessful and sterile or excessively costly and meager in yield. In other words, the results of these projects often turn out contrived and artificial—as if one is painting the face of a lifeless corpse or passing off one being behind a mask as another. The basis for this judgment can be sought in the following presuppositions:

First, the central beliefs of the hard core of religion possess certain general and important characteristics upon which the very religiousness of the religion depends. For example, the element of “ta‘abbud” (devotional submission) is considered one of the important hallmarks of religion (insofar as it is religion). And “ta‘abbud” is fundamentally something that occurs beyond reasoning.

Second, the essence of modernity necessitates rationalism. That is, within the framework of modern rationality, no belief can be accepted on the authority of religious sources of legitimacy, independent of autonomous rational arguments.

Third, therefore, the rationalism of modernity is an undefeated defeater of a fundamental element of religion, namely, devotionalism beyond reason.

Fourth, in this respect, any attempt to save religion (as religion) within the framework of modern rationality will be unsuccessful or contrived.

Fifth, the important ultimate end of an individual human life is the realization of an "ideal life"—that is, a pleasant, good, and valuable life. And a spiritual life is precisely a life that, within the framework of modern rationality, possesses these three important characteristics.

Sixth, however, the realization of this "ideal life" is absolutely not contingent upon adherence to religion, although religious sources can be considered among the sources of some of the spiritual elements necessary for this "ideal life."

Seventh, therefore, the human individual must recognize the diversity of sources of spirituality and consider its scope far broader than "religion."

Eighth, therefore, although some spiritual elements can be found in religious sources, it is better for the human individual, instead of expending their theoretical and practical efforts on unsuccessful or contrived projects, to pass through those passes and bring themselves directly to the diverse wellsprings of spirituality necessary for the realization of an "ideal life."

Thus, the project of "trans-religious spiritualism" can ultimately be considered the outcome of two fundamental beliefs: (a) the core beliefs of the hard kernel of religion cannot be so reformed or reconstructed as to become compatible with the undefeated defeaters arising from modern rationality. In other words, even with "maximal ijtihad" in the core beliefs of the hard kernel of religion, as well as the refinement and multiplication of the sources of religious authority, the ship of religion cannot be safely brought to shore from the storm of modern rationality, and (b) there is no source of authority and validation other than the source of modern rationality; that is, instead of recognizing the sources of authority of a religion or refining and multiplying the sources of authority of that religion, it is better to entrust authority entirely to modern rationality.

Therefore, the tendency of "trans-religious spiritualism," without necessarily negating religion, passes beyond religion in order to save the spiritual elements of individual human life.

(4)

In sum, the current of religious new-thinking in Iran, over the past few decades and in the course of its evolution, has cultivated at least three different tendencies within itself: reform of religious thought, reconstruction of religion, and trans-religious spiritualism. Of course, the boundaries between these three tendencies are not always clear, decisive, and unambiguous, but attention to the important distinctions among these three tendencies can make our understanding of the current of religious new-thinking and its transformations in contemporary Iran at least somewhat deeper and more precise.

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Religious New-Thinking in Three Acts

Arash Naraghi - Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion, Moravian College, Pennsylvania

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