Arash Naraghi's Article 'The Paradox of Tolerance'

The virtue of tolerance requires peaceful coexistence with a belief or practice that, from the individual's perspective, is considered false or morally wrong. But does a noble and moral person have the right to endure what is false or morally wrong? Is the virtue of tolerance compatible with the virtue of truth-seeking? Is tolerance truly a virtue? How can a tolerant person defend tolerance as a moral virtue?

The Paradox of Tolerance

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The virtue of tolerance requires peaceful coexistence with a belief or practice that, from the individual's perspective, is considered false or morally wrong.[1] But does a noble and moral person have the right to endure what is false or morally wrong? Is the virtue of tolerance compatible with the virtue of truth-seeking? Is tolerance truly a virtue? How can a tolerant person defend tolerance as a moral virtue?

It seems that tolerance is attacked and doubted from two sides: on the one hand, the absolutist claims that the morally defensible approach toward what is false or morally wrong is to struggle to eradicate it, not (as the tolerant person would claim) to "come to terms" with it. On the other hand, the pluralist claims that in most cases, what is considered "false" is merely another way of living or thinking, and therefore, a "difference" in perspective and way of life cannot and should not be considered "false." Hence, the morally defensible approach toward what is different (contrary to the tolerant person's claim) is not "coming to terms" and "enduring," but "acceptance" and "recognition." [2]

Therefore, both the absolutist and the pluralist believe that there is no such thing as "that which is wrong yet worthy of tolerance." The absolutist draws a clear distinction between right and wrong, but considers what is wrong as deserving negation and rejection, not tolerance; and the pluralist believes in a diversity of rights, and considers the appropriate approach toward what is "different" to be not tolerance, but acceptance and recognition. Thus, if thing A is wrong, then it is not worthy of tolerance and must be negated (the absolutist position), and if thing A is not wrong, then it is worthy of acceptance and recognition, not tolerance and endurance (the pluralist position). It seems that in the middle of these two extremes, there is no place for the virtue of tolerance. Therefore, it is as if the virtue of tolerance is, in reality, either an impossibility or something morally indefensible.

According to this analysis, the virtue of tolerance is only possible if the concept of "that which is wrong yet worthy of tolerance" is not an empty concept devoid of instances.

For a more precise understanding of the concept of "tolerance" and its theoretical difficulties, my suggestion is to formulate that concept based on the "right to be wrong." The concept of the "right to be wrong" clearly demonstrates the paradoxical nature of the virtue of tolerance. Therefore, in this essay, I assume that the virtue of tolerance ultimately means recognizing the "right to be wrong," and I will try, through analyzing this concept, to formulate the paradox of "tolerance," propose a solution to resolve the paradoxical nature of the virtue of tolerance, and also show why tolerance is an independent virtue that cannot be reduced to absolutism or pluralism.

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What is the "paradox of tolerance"? To formulate this paradox, we must first analyze the concept of the "right to be wrong."

Suppose someone holds the following proposition:

(1) Arash has the right to perform action A, which is wrong.[3] (That is, here Arash's "right to be wrong" regarding performing action A is recognized.)

This proposition can be analyzed in the form of the following conjunctive proposition:

(2) "Arash has the right to perform action A" and "performing action A is morally wrong."

This compound conjunctive proposition entails the following two simple propositions:

(3) “Arash has a right to perform act A.”

and

(4) “Performing act A is morally wrong.”

Thus, proposition (1) reduces to the two propositions (3) and (4). From this analysis, it emerges that the “right to do wrong” actually involves two distinct concepts of “right” that must be carefully distinguished: the concept of “having a right” (as stated in proposition (3)) and the concept of “being right” (as formulated in proposition (4)). “Being right” is an attribute of a belief or action, and “having a right” is an attribute of the holder of the belief or the agent of the action. A belief or action can be right or wrong, but it is only the individual holding the belief or performing the action who can have a right or not.[4]

However, propositions (3) and (4) can, in turn, be analyzed into other propositions. Let us first reflect on proposition (3):

According to a well-known analysis in the realm of the philosophy of rights, a moral right is a composite concept consisting of two main components: a duty and a permission.

For example, suppose I have bought a pencil, and I now have a right to use that pencil, which belongs to me, and to write with it. This proposition that:

“I have a right to write with this pencil” (assuming it is true),

entails the following two propositions:

“You (or any other relevant agent) have a duty not to prevent me from using this pencil” (this proposition expresses a duty of non-interference that is assumed for you or any other relevant agent upon the establishment of that right for me);

and

“I am permitted to use this pencil, and I am also permitted not to use this pencil.” (A proposition expressing a kind of permission for me.)

According to this analysis, the role of a right is to protect, by imposing a kind of duty on others, the domain within which I am permitted to do something. For example, in the above case, the non-interference of others gives me the latitude to use my pencil if I wish, and not to use my pencil if I wish. The role of the right is to protect this “permission.” (Let us call this analysis the “analysis of right as protector of permission,” or the “protector-of-permission analysis” for short.) [5]

By the same analogy, proposition (3) (“Arash has a right to perform act A”) can be analyzed into the following two propositions:

(5) “You (or any other relevant agent) have a duty not to prevent Arash from performing act A.” (The duty-imposing part of Arash’s right)

and

(6) “Arash is permitted to perform act A, and Arash is permitted not to perform act A.” (The permission part of Arash’s right)

And of course, the compound proposition (6), which is a conjunctive proposition, entails the following two propositions:

(7) “Arash is permitted to perform act A.”

and

(8) “Arash is permitted not to perform act A.”

Therefore, proposition (3), according to the “protector-of-permission analysis,” is equivalent to the conjunctive combination of propositions (5), (7), and (8).

Now let us turn to the analysis of proposition (4) (“Performing act A is morally wrong”):

According to a common analysis in the realm of moral philosophy, when we say that performing an action is morally bad or wrong, we are in fact prohibiting others from performing it. For example, suppose my child wants to slap his playmate on the ear, and I say to him reproachfully: "Son, that is a bad thing to do!" It seems clear that by uttering this statement I am warning that "You must not do that!" or, to put it a bit more intricately, "It is your duty not to slap your friend on the ear!" In other words, it appears that from something being morally bad or wrong it follows that we ought to refrain from performing that thing. This entailment relation is considered so natural in moral language that apparently even my child more or less grasps its import. Therefore, it seems that the proposition "Performing action A is morally wrong" (i.e., proposition (4)) entails the following proposition:

(9) "Arash ought not to perform action A."

But if Arash ought not to perform action A, that is, he is morally obligated to refrain from performing action A, then it seems obvious that he is not morally permitted to perform action A. In other words, proposition (9) appears to entail the following proposition:

(10) It is not the case that "Arash is permitted to perform action A." (That is, assuming the truth of proposition (9), the proposition "Arash is permitted to perform action A" will necessarily be false.)

Now, assuming these analyses, we can understand the problem or paradox of tolerance with greater precision. If we look at the above propositions, we clearly see that propositions (10) and (7) contradict one another, meaning the set of our assumptions in this analysis leads to the following contradiction:

(11) "Arash is permitted to perform action A" and it is not the case that "Arash is permitted to perform action A."

Moreover, from another angle, one might also be able to argue for the incompatibility of the concept of "the right to be in the wrong." For many people, proposition (4) (i.e., "Performing action A is morally wrong") entails the following proposition:

(12) "You (or any other relevant agent) are morally permitted to interfere with Arash's action and prevent him from performing action A."

And proposition (12) entails the following proposition:

(13) It is not the case that "You (or any other relevant agent) are obligated not to prevent Arash from performing action A."

And in this way we arrive at the following contradictory result, which is the conjunction of the two propositions (5) and (13):

(14) "You (or any other relevant agent) are obligated not to prevent Arash from performing action A" and it is not the case that "You (or any other relevant agent) are obligated not to prevent Arash from performing action A."

Proposition (11) and proposition (14) show that the concept of "the right to be in the wrong," and consequently the virtue of tolerance, involves an internal contradiction and is therefore an impossible concept (that is, an individual cannot simultaneously hold propositions (3) and (4) to be true), and thus, one must either be an absolutist (i.e., accept proposition (4) but deny proposition (3)), or must adopt the position of a pluralist (i.e., accept proposition (3) but hold proposition (4) to be false).

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But does this argument truly show that the virtue of tolerance is impossible? It seems that if we accept the "permission-preserving analysis" of the concept of a right, and also believe that the "badness" of a matter necessarily obligates the agent of the action to refrain from performing the action, and thus renders performing that action impermissible, then we must necessarily consider the concept of "the right to be in the wrong," and consequently the virtue of tolerance, to be impossible.

Let us first examine the first paradox (i.e., proposition (11)), which ultimately arises from the "permission" component of the concept of a right. It seems that one important way to resolve this dilemma and salvage the virtue of tolerance is to revise our analysis of the concept of "right" and evaluate the validity of the "permission-preserving analysis" more carefully.

Is the "permission-preserving analysis" of a right correct?

First, it is good to see which part of that analysis ultimately renders the concept of a "right to be wrong" contradictory. We recall that according to this analysis, "right" is a composite concept consisting of two components: a duty (which is of the nature of non-interference and pertains to others, formulated in proposition (5)), and a permission (which opens a sphere of freedom for the agent of the action, formulated in proposition (6)). As emerges from proposition (11), in the above argument, the contradiction or inconsistency arises from the concept of "permission" (i.e., proposition (6)). Therefore, if we could have a conception of the concept of "right" that is based solely on the duty component and lacks the permission component, then our assumptions would not lead to a contradiction.

But can the concept of "permission" be removed from the concept of a "moral right"? To put it more clearly, can one claim that "Arash has a right to write with his pencil, but he is not permitted to write with his pencil"? This formulation seems very strange and clearly false. It seems that from the statement "Arash has a right to write with his pencil," it necessarily follows that "Arash is permitted to write with his pencil." If the first statement logically entails the second, then the concept of permission cannot be separated from the concept of a "moral right." But does such a relation of entailment hold between these two concepts?

To clarify this meaning, let me pose the question in another way: Can the concept of "right" be considered anything other than imposing the "duty of non-interference" on others? Does imposing the "duty of non-interference" on others (proposition (5)) entail the permission for the right-holder to perform that specific action (i.e., proposition (6))?

Let us examine the answer to this question in the form of an example: Suppose I give you my pencil and say to you:

(15) "If you write with this pencil, I will not stop you, but this pencil is mine and you are not permitted to use it!"

By uttering this statement, I impose the duty of non-interference upon myself (i.e., proposition (5) becomes true of me), but I do not grant you permission to use that pencil (i.e., I have not made proposition (6) true of you). Is there a contradiction hidden in proposition (15)? As far as I understand, proposition (15) entails no internal contradiction or inconsistency. In other words, the "duty of non-interference" (proposition (5)) and the concept of "permission" (proposition (6)) are two logically independent concepts, and proving the former does not necessitate proving the latter.[6]

The concept of "permission" also does not entail the concept of the "duty of non-interference."[7] For example, suppose I say to you:

(16) "You are permitted to write with my pencil—(as long as I am not using it)."

Here, I have given you permission to use that pencil (i.e., proposition (6) is true of you), but I have not assumed the "duty of non-interference" upon myself (i.e., proposition (5) has not become true of me). In other words, you are permitted to use my pencil, but at the same time, I can interfere in your action and prevent you from using that pencil whenever I wish. As far as I understand, proposition (16) also entails no internal contradiction or inconsistency. This example shows that one can prove the concept of "permission" (proposition (6)) without that proof necessarily leading to the proof of the concept of the "duty of non-interference" (proposition (5)).

From these examples, it emerges that the concepts of "permission" and "duty of non-interference" are logically independent of one another, and one can have one without the other.

            We can now claim that a “moral right” is in fact nothing other than a claim right. In other words, when we establish right A for an individual, we have in fact established only and solely that others do not have the right to prevent that individual from performing act A. That is all. In our analysis, establishing that right absolutely does not entail that the individual is permitted to perform act A or not to perform it.

            Therefore, when we say:

            (3) “Arash has the right to perform act A.”

our statement is nothing other than the following proposition:

            (5) “Others are obligated not to prevent Arash from performing act A.”

That is all.

            If we consider moral rights, according to this definition, to be nothing other than claim rights, then our assumptions will not lead to the contradiction formulated in proposition (11).[8]

            Therefore, tolerating another person or recognizing their “right to be wrong” in relation to matter A means that:

(One) Performing act A is (morally) wrong;

(Two) (At least in my opinion) they are not permitted to perform that act;

(Three) But I am obligated not to prevent them from performing that act.

These three propositions are consistent with one another, and a rational person can accept them together, in a coherent manner, within their system of beliefs.

            But what can be said about the second contradiction, namely proposition (14) (which ultimately arises from the “obligation” part of the concept of right)? This contradiction is valid only if one considers proposition (4) to logically entail proposition (12). Does it logically follow from “performing act A is morally wrong” that “I or any relevant agent in the situation is (morally) permitted to prevent that act from being performed”? As far as I can tell, the answer to this question is negative. One can easily imagine conditions in which an individual is performing a morally wrong act, but I am not permitted to intervene and prevent that act from being performed. For example, suppose my intervention might severely endanger my life, or that intervening in such matters might impose enormous financial costs on the government, citizens, or oversight bodies, and so on. Of course, act A remains morally wrong, but under the mentioned conditions (or conditions of that type), it is possible that I or any other relevant agent is not permitted to intervene in the act of its agent. Of course, when I sincerely state proposition (4), that is, when I sincerely believe that “performing act A is morally wrong,” I have committed myself to refraining from performing that act. But affirming that proposition does not obligate or permit me to intervene in the affairs of others who undertake to perform act A. Therefore, proposition (4) absolutely does not entail proposition (12), and by negating this entailment relation, the contradiction expressed in proposition (14) will of course also be eliminated.[9]

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            In fact, based on the analysis of the concept of "moral right" presented in contrast to the "permissibility analysis," the primary function of a "(moral) right" is to safeguard the power and freedom of choice of human beings. For a right, within the framework of this analysis, is nothing other than non-interference in the affairs of another. Proving Arash's right to action A simply means that others are obliged not to interfere with Arash's performance of action A. In other words, the ultimate goal of a moral right is to recognize the freedom and choice of the right-holder, without necessarily endorsing their choice in a particular instance.[10] Therefore, I may deem your choice regarding matter A to be incorrect and mistaken, yet I respect your decision in that regard, insofar as it represents your human identity as a free and moral agent. And this is precisely the meaning of recognizing the "right to be wrong," which is manifested in the virtue of tolerance.[11] Within this framework, the meaning of respecting human dignity is ultimately nothing other than respecting the human right to choose, that is, recognizing their "right to be wrong." The virtue of tolerance is respecting the dignity of human beings as free and moral agents.

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The Paradox of Tolerance

Arash Naraghi

24 July 2011

Moravian College, Pennsylvania

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[1]  For example, see:

Williams, Bernard, “Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?”,  in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue”, ed., by David, Heyd, Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 18-27, esp. 19-20.

For a more detailed analysis of the concept of tolerance, see also:

McKinnon, Catriona, Toleration: A Critical Introduction, Routledge,  2006, Ch.1.

[2]  For an example of discussions on the relationship between tolerance, absolutism, and pluralism, see:

Heyd, David, “Introduction”, in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, p.4., and, Graham, Gordon, “Tolerance, Pluralism, and Relativism”, in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, pp. 44-59.

[3]  For simplicity, I have limited my analysis here to the "wrongful act," but the same analysis can also be applied to "wrongful belief." I leave this second task to the reader.

[4]  To become familiar with the distinction between these two concepts of "right," see:

Dworkin, Ronald, “Taking Rights Seriously, in his book, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, 7^th edition, 1999, Ch. 7, esp. 189-190.

[5]  For example, see:

Edmundson, William A., An Introduction to Rights, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 134-135.

[6]  Judith Thomson is among those who believe that obligation does not entail permissibility, and permissibility does not entail obligation. For a detailed account of her argument on this matter, see:

Thomson, Judith J., The Realm of Rights, Harvard University Press, 1990, pp.48-50.

[7] See the previous source.

[8] Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights, pp. 135-139.

[9] Waldron, in the following article, adopts such an approach to resolve the paradox of the "right to do wrong." To become acquainted with his view on this matter, refer to the following article:

Waldron, Jeremy, “A Right to Do Wrong”, Ethics, Vol. 92, No. 1, Special Issue on Rights (Oct., 1981), pp. 21-39.

For an introduction to a critique of Waldron's opinion on this matter, see:

Galston, Willimam A., “On the Alleged Right to Do Wrong: A Response to Waldron”, Ethics, Vol. 93, No.1 (Jan., 1983), pp. 320-324.

[10] For a detailed introduction to this particular conception of "right" and also its rival conception, which emphasizes the element of interests and benefits rather than the element of autonomy and choice, see:

Kramer , Matthew H., N. E., Simmonds, and Hillel Steiner, A Debate Over Rights, Oxford University Press, 1998.

[11] Of course, one should not forget that tolerance is not an unconditional virtue. For example, not every wrongful act is worthy of tolerance. For instance, if a ritual recognizes sexual relations with children, tolerating this unjust tradition is not appropriate. Therefore, the analysis of the virtue of tolerance is not complete unless a criterion is provided for distinguishing between "wrongful beliefs and acts that are worthy of tolerance" and "wrongful and intolerable beliefs and acts." For example, among the criteria that can be used to distinguish between wrongful but tolerable acts and wrongful and intolerable acts is a form of the "harm principle." (See, for example: McKinnon, Toleration: A Critical Introduction, Ch. 6, “Political Harm: The Liberal Paradigm”.) However, the subject of my discussion in this essay is merely the analysis of the logical structure of the concept of the "right to do wrong" and tolerance, and its conclusion, assuming the validity of its arguments, is simply that the virtue of tolerance, according to this analysis, does not entail an internal inconsistency, and is therefore possible. The discussion of the "criterion for distinguishing" between those two categories of beliefs and acts is a very important discussion that must be addressed independently. As an example of discussions related to the limits of tolerance, see:

Harel, Alon, “The Boundaries of Justifiable Tolerance: A Liberal Perspective”, in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, ed. By David Heyd, Princeton University Press, pp. 114-126. Also, Horton, John, “Toleration as a Virtue”, in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, pp. 28-43, esp. 38-41.

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