Arash Naraghi's Article “Toleration and the ‘Right to Be Wrong’”

In this essay, I intend to critically examine the solution proposed by Arash Naraghi regarding the “paradox of toleration.” Arash Naraghi has attempted, by defending “the right to be wrong,” to offer a formulation of this right capable of resolving the paradox of toleration.[1] I will first briefly outline the paradox of toleration, followed by Naraghi’s proposed solution. I will then argue that Naraghi’s understanding of toleration as respect for the right to be wrong will not lead to the desired outcome.

The Paradox of Toleration

Toleration requires the tolerant person to refrain from intervening in, and preventing, the realization of a belief or action that the tolerant person considers rejected, reprehensible, or morally wrong. The first question that rightly comes to the mind of someone who is advised to tolerate others is as follows: Why should I not prevent the realization of what is reprehensible and morally wrong? Is it not the case that disrupting a morally wrong act is not only not incompatible with moral standards, but is a good thing and constitutive of right and truth? Questions of this sort clearly illustrate the paradoxical nature of toleration and being tolerant. When faced with a false and rejected matter, the tolerant person, on the one hand, has justified reasons for rejecting and denying the position and action that is the subject of their negative judgment, and, on the other hand, possesses compelling and duty-imposing reasons that dictate accepting and refraining from disrupting the matter in question. This very dual judgment gives rise to what has been termed the “paradox of toleration”: tolerating what is reprehensible and morally wrong is a morally right and praiseworthy act, and perhaps even a moral duty. In other words, the paradox of toleration can be formulated as follows: It seems that not tolerating a reprehensible and morally wrong belief and action is itself a morally wrong and blameworthy act, and even punishable.

Exposition of Naraghi’s View

Naraghi believes that recourse to the right to be wrong will cleanse toleration of the taint of contradiction. In Naraghi’s view, defending toleration as the observance of the “right to be wrong” requires conceptual refinement and removing the taint of internal contradiction from this right. The contradiction of toleration only manifests itself when the contradictions latent in the concept of the right to be wrong have not been resolved. Once the rust of contradiction is removed from the face of the right to be wrong, the knot of toleration will also be untied. According to Naraghi’s claim, the concept of the “right to be wrong” initially brings two contradictions to mind. It is the existence of these two contradictions that is reflected in what is called the paradox of toleration. These dual contradictions are as follows: the “contradiction of moral permissibility” and the “contradiction of intervention.” The contradiction of moral permissibility arises from the assumption that one cannot have a right to perform an action that is wrong. This notion rests on the belief that having a right to an action means the action is right (morally permissible). Therefore, we conclude: since an action being right itself signifies moral correctness, one cannot have a right to do a wrong thing. Because merely having a right to do something issues moral permission for performing that action.

The contradiction of intervention originates from the belief that the wrongness of a matter permits another’s intervention to prevent its occurrence. In other words, the mere moral judgment regarding the incorrectness of an action places the duty of intervening in the wrongdoer’s affairs and preventing the realization of the wrong act upon the shoulders of others. The assumption of such a duty obligates the individual to intervene and prevent the realization of an action that the individual deems morally wrong. It is for this reason that not intervening to stop a morally wrong action (toleration) appears to contradict the duty that the individual bears when faced with such an action.

In the continuation of his article, Naraghi questions the validity of the assumptions that lead to the emergence of the above contradictions. The summary of his argument is this:

a) Having a right to perform an action is different from that action being right, and no logical or moral link exists between the two. Having a right to perform an action merely signifies the “duty of non-intervention” on the part of others in relation to the right-holder.

“When we prove right R for an individual, we have in fact only and solely proven that others do not have the right to prevent that individual from performing action R. That is all. In our analysis, proving that right absolutely does not entail that the individual is permitted to perform action R or not to perform it.”

Understanding the right to have a right as a “moral right” that merely signifies the non-interference of others in performing an action the individual is entitled to perform resolves the concern about the contradiction of moral permission.

b) The wrongness (moral impermissibility) of an action in no way means obligating others to intervene to prevent the performance of the action in question. In other words, from “performing action R is morally impermissible,” it does not logically follow that “others are obligated to stop the performance of R.” Negating the logical and moral relationship between the moral impermissibility of an action and the obligation of others to intervene in order to stop that action will lead to the dissolution of the contradiction of intervention from the foundation of the right to be wrong.

The above results (a and b) enable Naraghi to dispel the suspicion of the paradox of toleration. If the right to be wrong does not entail an obligation for others to intervene, one can rightly conceive of cases where the tolerant individual refrains from intervening in a matter they deem morally impermissible. Since there is no relationship between the tolerant individual’s belief in the moral impermissibility of an action and an obligation to intervene in that action, the absence of intervention in the morally impermissible matter entails no contradiction in the tolerant individual’s action. Furthermore, if the right to have a right signifies the obligation of others not to intervene in the affairs of the right-holder, one can easily conclude that toleration corresponds to fulfilling the obligation of non-intervention arising from the right to be wrong. Observing the right to be wrong, in other words, in Naraghi’s discourse and belief, entails tolerance and “peaceful coexistence with a belief or practice that, from the individual’s perspective, is considered false or morally impermissible.” In his final analysis, Naraghi concludes that the right to be wrong, which falls under the category of “moral right,” or what some thinkers have called “objective or subjective right,” fulfills the purpose of “safeguarding the power and freedom of human choice.” Naraghi writes, “The primary goal of a moral right is to recognize the freedom and choice of the right-holder, without necessarily viewing their specific choice or decision with approval.” From his premise that the “right to be wrong” is identical to recognizing the freedom of human beings as autonomous moral agents, Naraghi concludes that toleration, as respecting the “right to be wrong,” is nothing other than “respecting the dignity of human beings as autonomous moral agents.”

Critique of Naraghi’s View

Up to this point, I have refrained from questioning Naraghi’s arguments for dispelling the contradictions raised regarding the right to be wrong, and have sympathetically accepted the results of his arguments. This does not mean that Naraghi’s arguments are without flaw or that a critical discussion cannot be raised concerning them. My avoidance of critiquing Naraghi’s arguments stems from my intention to show that accepting the results he presents regarding the contradictions of the right to be wrong does not lead to accepting toleration as the obligation corresponding to the right to be wrong. In what follows, I will show that regardless of the strength and validity of Naraghi’s arguments in dispelling the suspicion of contradiction from the domain of the concept of the right to be wrong, defending toleration as the obligation corresponding to a “moral right” appears not to be without difficulty. In other words, it is not the case that proving the absence of contradiction in the concept of the right to be wrong enables Naraghi to morally justify toleration based on the right to be wrong.

In defense of my claim, I will present two arguments. In the first argument, I will note that dispelling the contradiction of intervention, at best, only resolves the suspicion of the paradox of toleration in situations where the tolerant individual’s negative judgment of an action does not issue moral permission for intervention. However, as I will show, one can conceive of cases where the individual’s negative judgment will be coupled with permission for intervention. In the second argument, by referring to the lexical meaning and history of toleration, I will conclude that understanding toleration as an obligation corresponding to a moral right violates one of the conceptual components of toleration and ultimately leads to the emergence of a new contradiction in the concept of toleration.

In order to elucidate the above arguments, I would like to briefly analyze the concept of toleration and consider its constituent parts. Toleration involves a twofold judgment; in the first judgment, an individual, when confronted with an action or belief, finds it morally wrong and consequently rules to deny and reject it. The negative judgment concerning the action or belief that is the subject of toleration forms the “component of objection.” Without a moral disagreement and a judgment that represents the individual’s opposition to a particular act and belief, one cannot speak of toleration. Toleration, at the same time, requires refraining from interfering with the occurrence of an action that the individual dislikes and views with rejection and denial. Therefore, a positive judgment regarding the reprehensible and disliked matter is also needed, which prevents the tolerating individual from acting upon their negative judgment. A judgment that, on the one hand, confirms the wrongness of the subject of toleration and, at the same time, rules for the acceptance of and deference to the reprehensible matter. The component that encompasses the positive judgment is called the “component of acceptance.”

For further clarity, I will attempt to examine the “twofold judgment” in relation to the right to be wrong to show how, according to Naraghi, the twofold components of the right to be wrong correspond to the twofold components of toleration, namely the component of objection and the component of acceptance. The right to be wrong is a moral right that entails the existence of a duty that others are obligated to fulfill towards the right-holder. The duty corresponding to a moral right involves a moral obligation that the duty-bearer must actively or passively perform towards the right-holder. For example, when we say Armin has the right to use his pen, it means that others are obligated not to prevent Armin from writing with his pen (the duty-bearers in this example fulfill their duty passively, by not preventing the realization of Armin’s right to write with his pen). Or when we say Armin has a duty to keep the promise he made to Arash, it means that Arash has a right that is fulfilled by Armin’s active action (Armin is obligated to perform his duty towards Arash through an active action). The right to be wrong, therefore, signifies a duty that others bear towards the right-holder. This duty, whose fulfillment requires only the passive action of the duty-bearer, signifies the duty-bearer’s refraining from interfering with the realization of the “wrong” matter. Toleration, on the other hand, as mentioned above, means the tolerating individual’s refraining from interfering with the performance of an action about which the individual holds a negative judgment. The individual’s refraining arises from having sufficient reasons to accept the action that is the subject of their negative judgment. If we wish to explain this refraining based on the right to be wrong, the following example will be illuminating. Suppose Armin has a habit of smoking, and Arash, who is Armin’s friend, is not only disgusted by the smell of tobacco but also morally opposed to Armin’s smoking (Arash believes that the industrial production of cigarettes is carried out through morally wrong practices, such as the exploitation of workers). Here, Arash has sufficient reasons to consider Armin’s smoking a reprehensible and morally incorrect matter (fulfillment of the condition of objection). But Arash does not take action to prevent Armin from smoking and allows Armin to freely continue what he likes. Here, the duty corresponding to Armin’s right to freedom (the right to be wrong) and the fact that Arash’s mere opposition to smoking does not entitle him to interfere with Armin provide Arash with sufficient reasons to refrain from interference (the component of acceptance). Thus, the component of objection in the conceptual structure of toleration corresponds to the “wrong matter” in the conceptual structure of the right to be wrong, and the component of acceptance corresponds to the “right” or, better stated, the “moral right.”

It seems, then, that Naraghi has successfully formulated toleration based on the “right to be wrong,” and the correspondence between the conceptual components of toleration and the conceptual components of the right to be wrong can itself testify to Naraghi’s claim. But this correspondence does not always hold. Consider the above example in a different way. Armin has gone to Arash’s house for a visit and companionship, and as is his usual habit, lights a cigarette. Here, contrary to the example above, Arash’s negative judgment about his smoking entitles him to object to Armin and demand that he stop smoking. It is true that Arash’s right to interfere does not directly stem from his negative judgment about smoking, but this judgment, by virtue of Arash’s ownership of the place where the act of smoking occurs, grants him the license to interfere. This example clearly shows that the right to be wrong is not capable of justifying toleration in all cases. In cases where the individual’s negative judgment is coupled with the right to interfere, the paradox of toleration re-emerges. In these cases, the negative judgment and the right to interfere give the individual sufficient reason to prevent the objectionable act. In cases where the negative judgment involves a moral judgment, the moral form of the paradox manifests itself. Why should an individual refrain from interfering in a matter they deem morally reprehensible and in which they have the right to interfere? It seems that understanding toleration within the framework of the right to be wrong cannot answer this question.

So far, I have argued that, contrary to Naraghi’s view, recourse to the right to be wrong does not resolve the paradox of toleration in all cases. I now intend to go a step further and claim that formulating toleration by reference to the right to be wrong negates one of the essential components of toleration. Not only are there cases where the individual’s negative judgment is coupled with the right to interfere, but toleration only becomes possible when the right to interfere is present. In other words, toleration consists of refraining from interfering in a reprehensible and objectionable act when the right to interfere has arisen for the tolerator. According to this definition, when the individual does not possess the right to interfere, the issue of toleration does not arise at all. It is essential to note that in the absence of the right to interfere, the individual merely submits to the duty of non-interference, which pertains to the moral rights of others. Respect for the rights of others, including the right to be wrong, obligates the individual to non-interference. If the right to be wrong is a moral right that obligates others to non-interference, then others have never possessed the right to interfere, and their non-interference cannot be considered an instance of toleration; for toleration only takes shape when the individual possesses the right to interfere and refrains from exercising this right.

Now the question is: why should we consider the right to interfere as one of the conceptual components of toleration? What reason is there for the necessity of the right to interfere for toleration to come into being? What is the problem with counting the observance of others’ rights among the instances of toleration?

To answer this question, one must refer to the lexical meaning and history of toleration. Toleration is the English equivalent for what is rendered in Persian as modara. Toleration literally means endurance, patience, and gritting one’s teeth in the face of a phenomenon that is outside common and usual frameworks. It also signifies granting permission and giving the green light. An endurance and permission issued out of grace and magnanimity towards an objectionable act. These three meanings point to the existence of a hierarchy of power and unequal standing between the tolerator and the tolerated. Toleration places the tolerator in a superior position, a position that enables them to judge and decide regarding the exercise of power. The tolerated, in their inferior position, is deprived of the privilege of judgment and decision-making. The history of the formation and evolution of toleration in the modern era confirms the above semantic analysis. Toleration first emerged in Europe in response to the Reformation and the religious wars. From the very beginning, it was the advantage and superiority of the power apparatus (the Church and the monarch) that, at its own discretion, looked with grace upon the acts of those under the power’s wrath and, at its own discretion, delineated the scope of their activities. Where expediency dictated, some of their activities were permitted, giving birth to the tradition of toleration.

It is this very meaning and history that has led many to view with skepticism the conformity of toleration with the principle of equality and mutual respect. How can a relationship that is formed on the basis of a hierarchy of power, in which one party to the relationship acts with absolute authority and the other is the recipient of the favor of those in power, be reconciled with the principle of equality? It is in confronting the incompatibility existing in the conceptual and historical realm of toleration that the importance and necessity of the right to interfere becomes doubly apparent. In fact, asserting the necessity of the right to interfere is an effort aimed at preventing unequal toleration. The right to interfere only permits a form of toleration in which the hierarchy of power is legitimate—a relationship in which the tolerator's negative judgment concerning an action grants them a position to possess the right to interfere. The absence of the right to interfere and inattention to power relations within the conceptual structure of toleration opens the door to what is known as the "paradox of the racist tolerator." If merely refraining from interfering with what one dislikes or deems morally reprehensible were sufficient for toleration to occur, then the racist's turning away from interfering in the affairs of those they consider racially inferior would be an instance of toleration. The paradox particularly violates our moral intuitions where the more an individual clings to their racial beliefs or adopts new beliefs regarding the inferiority of other races, the more tolerant they become. It is the emergence of this very paradox that compels us to cry out and demand the racist's respect for the rights of others, not their toleration. What justice and equality require is mutual respect for others and observance of their rights. Our moral intuitions in this example clearly show that there is a difference between toleration and non-interference regarding the observance of others' rights, a difference that Naraghi's formulation of toleration is unable to explain, for in his view, these two are a single phenomenon.

Conclusion

Therefore, one can only speak of the toleration of an action or belief when the tolerator is morally permitted to interfere with and suppress the act in question. A mere negative moral judgment about an action or belief is not sufficient to speak of toleration; rather, moral judgment only opens the space for toleration when it issues a license to interfere with and suppress an action.

As Naraghi has shown in his argument to dispel the suspicion of paradox regarding the license to interfere within the concept of the right to be wrong, it is not the case that a negative moral judgment necessarily implies a right to interfere in all instances. In the example above, Arash can only speak of tolerating Armin's smoking when Arash is entitled to interfere with Armin's smoking. A mere negative moral judgment about smoking does not permit Arash to interfere with Armin's smoking. Only under conditions where Arash's negative moral judgment creates a right to interfere with Armin's smoking can Arash's non-interference in Armin's smoking be construed as toleration. Arash's non-interference in Armin's smoking under conditions where Arash has no right to interfere merely signifies Arash's respect for Armin's freedom, or in Naraghi's terms, Armin's right to be wrong. I hope the above reasons have clarified the claim that the latter non-interference is distinct from toleration and cannot be interpreted as toleration.

Toleration requires overlooking and turning away from exercising the right to interfere that the tolerator morally possesses. Turning away from interference based on respect for another's freedom, or in Naraghi's terms, based on another's right to be wrong, in no way involves overlooking and relinquishing a morally permitted right to interfere, because the tolerator initially lacks such a right. Equating toleration with respect for another's freedom and autonomy, as Naraghi believes, is a problem that arises from formulating toleration as respecting the right to be wrong.

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Footnotes

[1] Arash Naraghi (2013), Toleration and Management: Essays on Social Ethics. Tehran: Negah-e Moaser Publishing. pp: 91--102

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Toleration and the "Right to Be Wrong"

Author: Armin Khameh

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