William Shepherd's article 'The Right to Be Wrong'

The Right to Be Wrong

Author: William Shepherd

Translator: Hooman Panahandeh

Human rights is a title that encompasses a vast domain. I do not intend to precisely delineate the rights recognized and discussed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; suffice it to say that this declaration consists of thirty articles, and many of these articles define more than one right.[1] A similar statement can be made about other human rights declarations of which I am aware, including the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, which has twenty-five articles, many of which also define more than one right.[2] These rights are usually divided into two major categories: civil rights, such as freedom of expression, and social rights, such as the right to an adequate standard of living.[3] These two categories are sometimes referred to as negative and positive rights, because the former primarily entails freedom from undue constraints, and the latter is a condition for securing positive and justified entitlements.

It is evident that, in accordance with the objectives pursued in an article of this kind, the topic of discussion must be limited and specified. Thus, I have preferred to address only the first category, namely "civil" or "negative" rights, and within this scope, my attention is specifically directed to the rights enshrined in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (the first part of the Bill of Rights). These rights include freedom of religion, speech, the press, assembly, and the freedom to petition the government for a redress of grievances, all of which, for the sake of convenience, can be called "freedom of expression."[4] If you ask why I have targeted this category and scope in my lecture, my answer is this: in one respect, it happened by chance, as this matter has currently captured my attention, and it is partly related to my profession, which is teaching in the field of religion. But this reason can also be adduced: these are the most fundamental freedoms. Of course, some argue that as long as human beings do not have, for example, adequate food and a minimum of education, rights such as freedom of expression do little to remedy their plight. I am aware of the strength of this argument and have no doubt that it is a valid claim. But in response, my point is that in the long run, achieving an adequate standard of living and universal education, if it is to have a firm foundation, is impossible without freedom of expression and other civil rights. Science depends on the free exchange of ideas, and accordingly, civil rights provide the most suitable environment for the growth of science and the discovery of means to eradicate hunger and ignorance. Civil rights also facilitate criticism of political injustices and administrative inefficiencies, which often constitute a barrier to sufficient production and education. I believe that freedom of expression functions as a corrective mechanism in society. Of course, I am not saying that it always prevents failure and abuse. But at least for rectifying them, it is probably a far more efficient and effective tool than any other.

The main and principal point I wish to raise regarding the subject of freedom of expression is that an essential and inseparable component of freedom of expression is the freedom to be wrong. Freedoms such as: the freedom to worship in an erroneous manner, the freedom to publicly express wrong opinions and publish those views, the freedom to petition and thereby incite others to achieve unsound goals—all these, to the extent that is tolerable for society. In the first part of the discussion, my sources of information are mostly Western and primarily American, because I am both more familiar with these sources and have had the most access to them. Undoubtedly, these very materials have shaped a large part of my views on this matter. After the first part, I wish to speak briefly about the relevance of my claim to Christian and Islamic traditions.

According to a broad classification, two domains can be distinguished from one another, in each of which human beings may be right or wrong. There are propositions concerning matters of fact or expressing scientific laws whose truth or falsity can—at least in theory—be clearly determined. For instance, whether the prime minister performed a certain act last night, or whether the earth revolves around the sun or not. There are also moral judgments, such as the evil of murder, which approach this same level of clarity. On the other hand, there are many propositions that are primarily matters of taste, or cases where the truth is not easily discernible, or at least there is little hope of reaching a consensus on them in the short term. Most of the topics debated in the realms of art, religion, and ideology, or the greater part of discussions in economics and certain debates within the empirical sciences, fall into this category.

Regarding the first category, the fundamental reason in favor of the right to be wrong is that truth is most likely to be attained in the context of free discussion, or, as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, put it, in the "free trade in ideas." He said: "The best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."[5] This statement can seemingly be endorsed without question. In opposition to this view, one might at most say that debate is sometimes time-consuming and fruitless. Nevertheless, I believe experience shows that there really is no shortcut. Someone might think they are aware of a truth and can, by imposing that truth on others, avoid wasting time and potential trouble. But it often turns out in the end that they were mistaken, and their efforts to impose their beliefs, even if successful, merely delay the emergence of truth rather than bringing it closer.

Moreover, as it is said: "If an opinion is imposed on someone against their will, they will not abandon their own belief," even if the person doing the imposing is in the right. Those who have been subjected to imposition often do not accept the imposed beliefs wholeheartedly and, as a result, either do not apply those beliefs effectively or discard them as soon as the coercion is removed. Of course, it is also true that in many cases (for example, when we follow a doctor's prescription), instead of ascertaining the truth of a statement ourselves, we trust in the authority of another person. But in such cases, we willingly accept the other's authority, because our assumption is that in those instances, the truth has already been determined through the free exchange of ideas—even if we ourselves did not participate in that exchange. The prevailing opinion in the West is that if Marxism has suffered its current bankruptcy, and if Western countries have progressed faster than Marxist countries economically and in other respects, this is largely due to the fact that Western countries have allowed more scope for freedom of expression than Marxist countries. That the West, in Washington and elsewhere, has been so elated by the circumstances of Marxist countries does not sit well with me, but I believe the argument mentioned regarding the failure of these countries has drawn heavily upon the truth.[6]

The second category, especially religious and ideological matters, appears to be more problematic. In these domains, attaining truth—at least in a way that leads to universal acknowledgment—is far more difficult. At the same time, these subjects involve the most fundamental values of society and naturally stir greater passion and concern. Nevertheless, the preceding argument can be extended to these areas as well. Precisely because the path to truth is more rugged in these domains, we are in greater need of free and extensive discussion. Precisely because more intense passion and emotion are stirred in these areas, the protection of expressions of opinion that are initially undesirable but may prove valuable in the long run becomes necessary. Moreover, opinions that gain acceptance after extensive debate stand a better chance of being embraced by the public compared to imposed beliefs, thereby creating a firmer ideological foundation for society. The remark I quoted from Justice Holmes was, in fact, made in precisely this context. His words concerned the distribution of leaflets praising the Russian Revolution and calling for a general strike in its support. It is worth quoting a larger portion of his statement:

But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.[7]

The right to freedom of expression in such cases can also be defended on another basis. Namely, that human rights “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.”[8] And human dignity requires that one be able to express one’s feelings or beliefs, whether what one says is true or false. This has nothing to do with the truth of the statement. One can go a step further and say that one aspect of an individual’s dignity is their distinctiveness, and when an individual’s views are distinctive—that is, different from the views of others—there is a possibility that their views are either wrong or at least appear wrong to others. Therefore, the right to be wrong must be upheld.

The foundation of the above claims rests on several basic convictions. The first is that in the realm of religion and ideology, attaining certainty, if not truly impossible, is at least extremely difficult. To consider this claim at least worthy of initial attention, it suffices to observe the diversity of people’s religious and ideological beliefs. The second basis is the idea that erroneous views may also be valuable; they may contain elements of truth that, at a particular time, cannot be found elsewhere. Or perhaps, in the process of refuting erroneous views, new truths may emerge. The third basis is the belief that while we may attain no certainty, at least in the short term, the nature of truth and the nature of humankind are such that the average person can, to some extent, perceive the truth and avoid falling into error. In the West, this belief is usually understood to mean that ordinary human reason is capable of discovering natural laws.[9] The fourth basis is the understanding that the sensitivity of these subjects and the passion and enthusiasm they generate strongly tempt people to coerce others into agreeing with them. Especially since, in these areas, there is a possibility that through self-deception we may regard our beliefs as more certain than they are, see ourselves as more impartial in adhering to our beliefs than we truly are, and consider ourselves more tolerant than our opponents.[10] The fifth basis is the assurance that society has the capacity to tolerate a great deal of dissent, even on fundamental matters.

با این‌همه، جای این پرسش است که واقعاً چه میزان مخالفت و چه‌قدر خطا را می‌توان تحمل کرد. حتی کسانی که هواخواه دوآتشه آزادی مدنی‌اند می‌پذیرند آنگاه که در نتیجه آزادی بیان جان، مال یا نظم عمومی مورد تهدید قرار می‌گیرد باید آن را محدود کرد. همین قاضی هومز که قولش را نقل کردیم این نکته مشهور را گفته است که «متعصب‌ترین مدافعان آزادی بیان هم روا نمی‌دارند که کسی در تالار نمایشی به دروغ فریاد بزند:آتش! و وحشت به بار آورد.»[11] به همین قیاس، عموماً افراد می‌پذیرند که در زمان جنگ و دیگر بحرانهای ملی آزادی بیان را باید محدود کرد.البته در تمام این موارد درباره حد و میزان محدودیت جای بحث بسیار است. در باب آزادی، مثلاً این پرسش مطرح است که آیا فرد مجاز است به خود یا خانواده اش آسیب برساند. برخی گروه‌های مذهبی فی‌المثل حاضر نیستند از اقدامات معمول پزشکی استفاده کنند. آیا می‌توان به معتقدان این مذاهب اجازه داد که تحت عنوان آزادی دینی با جان کودکانشان بازی کنند؟ تا آنجا که من می‌دانم در اکثر جاها برای این سنخ آزادی محدودیتی قائل می‌شوند.[12] حد مجاز تبلیغات درباره محصولات مضر به سلامت بشر نیز محل بحث است. ممنوعیت‌ها یا محدودیت‌هایی که دربسیاری از کشورهای غربی بر تبلیغات مربوط به سیگار اعمال می‌شود نمونه‌ای بارز و حیّ و حاضر است.[13] همچنین وقتی که آزادی مورد ادعا برای بیان مطلبی، مستلزم نقض هنجارهای اخلاقی اجتماع است - مثلاً در مورد پورنوگرافی- تکلیف چیست؟ در این مورد هم محدودیت‌هایی در کار است و باز در این‌جا هم اختلاف نظر بسیار است. درباره دو نمونه اخیر باید بگویم که من مایلم در آن دسته از کشورهای غربی که آشنایی‌ام با آنها بیشتر است محدودیتی بیش از آنچه هم‌اکنون معمول است اعمال شود. اگر کسی بپرسد که چرا میلم بر این است، می‌گویم به این دلیل که در این مورد، ما با ابراز عقایدی سروکار داریم که هدفشان قوه‌ی عاقله‌ی مخاطبان نیست؛ آنچه هست کوششی است به قصد بهره‌برداری از شور و تعصب آنان. حال آنکه مقصود از آزادی بیان، بیان معطوف به عقل بشر است. در مقام تأیید این مدعا، به یاد بیاوریم که وقتی به جای فرد بزرگسال، سروکارمان با کودک می‌افتد آزادی بیان محدودتر می‌شود زیرا قوای عقلانی کودکان را ناپخته‌تر می‌شماریم. به‌همین دلیل در خصوص سخنانی که هدفشان برانگیختن شور و تعصب است باید تا حدی محتاط بود، ولی این هم هست که خط فارق مقوله‌ی تمسّک به عقل و مقوله‌ی تمسک به شور و هیجان همه‌وقت قاطع و آشکار نیست. اینکه تمسّک به شور به چه اندازه باید کمتر از تمسّک به عقل باشد بی‌تردید مساله مهمی است و محتاج بحثی است که مجالش اینجا نیست.

Perhaps the most fundamental question is how much tolerance a society can show when confronted with an open and direct challenge to its most basic beliefs and ideology. If the society in question is founded on human rights, the aforementioned question should be posed as follows: can a society (based on human rights) tolerate the public statements of those who reject these rights and, if possible, destroy them? Many people draw that dividing line we mentioned at this very point. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not permit "any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration."[14] According to the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, "Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law."[15] A similar provision can be found in the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam.[16] In the United States, this debate has been opened several times, notably during the 1950s, a period commonly referred to as the "McCarthy era." A strenuous effort was made to restrict the rights and freedoms of communists and their "sympathizers." The justification offered was that communists were plotting a revolution which, if it occurred, would leave no trace of the very freedoms upon which they based their claim to free speech. The result was that some people lost their jobs or suffered other misfortunes. Nevertheless, the McCarthy era did not last long, and most of the restrictions were eventually lifted. As far as I am aware, most Americans today consider that entire endeavor to have been a mistake. Indeed, the threat posed by those actions outweighed any benefit, particularly because of the suffering endured by those who were unjustly suspected. It is noteworthy that although America was considered the leader of the anti-communist alliance, the Communist Party was never outlawed in this country. A more recent example, situated at the exact opposite pole of the political spectrum, occurred in 1977 when members of the American Nazi Party sought a permit to march in uniform, with their insignia and symbols, in the town of Skokie, Illinois. This town has a large Jewish population, many of whom had lived through the Holocaust.[17] The courts, despite the strong feelings of opponents, did not ban the march, reasoning that laws concerning freedom of speech did not permit them to do so. The American Civil Liberties Union defended the Nazis' right to march, and the union's executive director, who was himself Jewish and had narrowly survived the Holocaust, argued that to defend his own right to free speech, he had to defend the rights of his enemies. "I want constraints on the hands of those in power to prevent them from interfering with my right to speak, my right to publish, and my right to assemble with others who also feel threatened... To defend myself, I must restrain power with freedom, even if this grants a transient benefit to those who are themselves enemies of freedom."[18] As far as I know, this is the ultimate statement made on the right to be wrong. But should one go this far in defending the right to be wrong? In general, yes. However, certain considerations come into play here. The American Nazi Party posed no threat; indeed, it was almost universally seen as pathetic and ridiculous. If, at that time in America, a real threat had been perceived from the Nazis, a different reaction to this matter would have ensued. Whereas, when we look at the McCarthy era in the fifties, we see that during that period, the threat from communism was considered entirely real. The passing of that era and the change in circumstances, I suspect, partly stemmed from people gradually feeling that the measures taken were disproportionate to the nature of the threat in question. For that threat was more a matter of hatred felt in the heart and less openly manifested, and also a result of revulsion at the suffering that had been unjustly caused.

I do not think we should conclude from these examples that error must be permitted in every case, but this much is clear: error should be allowed to the greatest possible extent. And if, in certain situations, we are torn between the risk of granting too much liberty on the one hand, and imposing too much restriction on the other—situations where we might fall off either side of the roof—it is better to accept the first danger, the danger of granting more liberty than is warranted. My arguments in favor of this stance are as follows (essentially similar to those given above): given that no certainty is available to us in these matters, we must allow as many opinions as possible to be expressed. I may be absolutely certain that a particular opinion is wrong, but I cannot be sure that it has nothing to teach me or no role to play—even a role as modest as provoking opposition against itself, or opening a safety valve for those social tendencies that might become more dangerous if suppressed. Furthermore, public opinion may or may not be the most likely source for discerning the truth. But leaving that aside, in the end, for correcting the gravest errors, public opinion can be trusted more than personal opinion or even 'expert' opinion, and this task falls productively upon public opinion. Moreover, beyond the (negative act of) correcting error, even in the (positive task of) finding truth, public opinion is perhaps as likely as any other view to arrive at a version of the truth that holds validity for most people in a particular time and place. In any case, while I believe the Nazi position is wrong, someone may one day appear who is as convinced as I am that it is my position that is wrong; if that happens, I would prefer that person not have much historical precedent at their disposal for suppressing me.

So far I have expressed the matter in inherently secular terms, and for that reason I have based my discussion primarily on that Western tradition which initiated challenges against the authority of the church and the monarchy in the eighteenth century, and which is preserved especially in documents such as the American Declaration of Human Rights and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. I have employed such terms because, firstly, the circles with which I am connected usually discuss this subject in this very language. Secondly, regardless of how others treat human rights, it is predominantly the secular Western tradition that has brought human rights into public discourse. Nevertheless, the human rights tradition in the West is not a purely and exclusively secular tradition, but has deep roots in Christianity. For me, as a Christian, this matter is important. Therefore, I would like to offer some explanations concerning the relationship of the position I am defending (namely, the right to be wrong) to Christianity, and then (in view of the present gathering and also my scholarly interests) to Islam.

Most secularists I know are of the opinion that Christianity, fundamentally because it claims to possess the truth through divine revelation, seriously jeopardizes the right to be wrong. If one obtains the truth by means of divine revelation, one attains certainty of its correctness. In that case, will one not consider oneself entitled, or even obligated, to compel people to accept that truth? This line of reasoning is simplistic but by no means unreasonable. It is a fact that a sense of certainty has repeatedly driven Christians to impose their beliefs. From the conversion of the Roman Emperor Constantine to Christianity until quite recently—that is, throughout the period known as the Constantinian era—Christianity acted to restrict freedom of expression far more than it acted to defend or encourage it. For instance, Saint Augustine, early in his career, when his preferred type of Christianity was in the minority, advocated for freedom of conscience, but later defended coercion with this saying (which became a well-known phrase): "What is more deadly to the soul than the freedom to err?"[19] On this matter, the New Testament is almost silent, because it emerged long before Christians acquired the ability to deny anyone's freedom. However, to restrict freedom, sayings such as "Compel people to come in, that my house may be filled" (Luke, chapter 14, verse 23) could be employed.

Although this view prevailed for centuries, it also had opponents, and many have pointed out that the kind of truth Christianity claims to possess through divine revelation is of the sort whose benefit reaches no one unless human beings accept it freely and without compulsion. Shortly before Augustine's time, Saint John Chrysostom had said: "It is not for Christians to abolish error by force and violence; rather, they must secure the salvation of men by perseverance, instruction, and love."[20] And according to Saint Hilary of Poitiers, "The manifest folly of our age is this ... that men imagine they must assist God with their human efforts and support the Christian religion with worldly ambitions."[21] Moreover, in the West, the first steps toward the modern conception of freedom of expression were taken not by the deists of the eighteenth century, but by Christians such as John Milton, Roger Williams, and William Penn in the seventeenth century. Historically, the new understanding of human rights has its roots in the natural law doctrine of the Middle Ages and also in ideas concerning authority, ideas that crystallized especially in the Calvinist and Free Churches during the Reformation. The French Revolution had an anticlerical tendency, whereas the American Revolution had no such tendency. In America, religious freedom both freed the hands of the churches and tied them just as much. Deists like Jefferson are renowned for their writings on this subject, yet it was the Presbyterians and Baptists who saw political strength and numbers in defending this idea. I think it is only fair to say that in our time, too, churches are often defenders of freedom rather than opponents of it.[22]

Nevertheless, I imagine that a fair assessment of the history of Christianity leads us to the view that the Church has usually been tolerant when it has either been in the minority or at least compelled to compete with other ideologies, sects, and religions under more or less equal conditions. Moreover, it can be argued that the greatest contribution of the churches to the growth of tolerance in the West has been a negative one, through the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. More than anything else, it was these wars that showed us that what is needed to prevent war is tolerance. The fact is that in the fundamental teachings of Christianity, as well as in its authoritative and primary sources, there is material both for and against tolerance. In this regard, I think the core doctrines include the doctrines of Creation, the Image of God, the Fall or Original Sin, and the Grace of God. The idea that human beings are created equal and therefore all are, in principle, equally the object of God's attention is certainly a foundation upon which a belief in human dignity, and through this a concern for human rights, can be built. The idea that human beings are created in the image of God is a basis for the belief that humans, by means of this very reason or ordinary understanding and intuition, are capable of accessing, at least to some degree, the realm of divine truth. This is one of the foundations of Christianity's turn toward the idea of natural law. On the other hand, according to the doctrine of the Fall, the divine image in humanity is more or less corrupted or ruined. And this condition can be interpreted to mean that humans are incapable of knowing the truth or submitting to it unless compulsion, and a great deal of it, is brought to bear. From another perspective, this same doctrine is an argument in favor of laws protecting freedom of expression. On the grounds that sin inevitably causes our opinions to appear more certain to us than they are, and thus drives us toward intolerance. And since this intolerance is an inseparable part of the human condition, it is necessary to erect strong safeguards against it. If we view the doctrine of (God's) Grace as the restorer of the divine image in humanity, then this doctrine can lead us to the assurance that ordinary human beings possess the ability to attain the truth. But if we consider some to be more recipients of God's Grace than others, then we might be inclined to the opinion that certain individuals, groups, kings, bishops, or orthodox believers in general have the right to impose their beliefs on the whole of society.

Thus, Christianity can act like a double-edged sword. If there is anything here that tips the scales to one side, it is the belief that the helm guiding human history is in the hands of divine power, and the lessons we learn from human history are part of the divine revelation that descends upon us. I must say that for these reasons, what has occurred in world history, especially the history of the West, from the sixteenth century onward clearly testifies in favor of tolerance. From the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to the totalitarian regimes of the present (twentieth) century, all provide us with sufficient evidence indicating that the attempt to impose a version of the truth, as well as the denial of the right to be wrong, leads to horrific and un-Christian consequences.

But what can be said regarding Islam? Since I have not had sufficient opportunity to examine the ins and outs of this debate in Islam to the depth I would desire, I therefore speak as a non-Muslim, very hastily and inconclusively, and I am sure my audience will take my explanations as such. It seems that much of what I said about Christianity fundamentally applies to Islam as well. The history of Islam, like the history of Christianity, has had its own ups and downs on the issue of tolerance. At times, such as the early Abbasid period, quite remarkable tolerance was established, and I think it is fair to say that at least until the eighteenth century, Muslims who held the reins of power displayed greater tolerance compared to Christians. Furthermore, in our own time, Muslims have also shown their attachment to human rights. Evidence for this claim are the two declarations by Muslims on this subject that I have in my possession. But there have also been times of intolerance, and I believe the historical record indicates that Islam, like Christianity, has shown itself compatible with both tolerance and intolerance.

I would also like to reiterate a point I made earlier, historically and doctrinally. Islam, like Christianity, claims divine revelation and consequently claims special access to the truth. To my mind, the presence of this meaning is very prominent in the Quran: "Truth has come, and falsehood has vanished. Indeed, falsehood is bound to vanish."[23] Such a statement, whether in an Islamic or a Christian context, may give rise to the temptation to impose the truth on others. On the other hand, Islam fundamentally holds the same belief as Christianity regarding creation, along with the same implications concerning the equal dignity of every individual human being. The Christian belief in the divine image of humanity can also be seen as a counterpart to the theory of fitrah, according to which human nature is created such that it is capable and predisposed to receive divine truth. Indeed, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam makes use of this very belief: "Islam is the religion of fitrah. It is not permissible to exert any kind of pressure on a person by exploiting his poverty or ignorance in order to convert him to another religion or to atheism."[24] There is no doctrine of original sin in Islam, but the idea of Adam's fall is part of its teachings, and an overly optimistic view of human nature is not presented in this religion either: the famous verse concerning the burden of trust that humanity took upon itself ends with the phrase: "He was indeed unjust and ignorant."[25] Thus, I imagine there is room for maneuver for both sides: both for the one who, by flaunting human weakness, argues in favor of suppressing error, and for the one who, citing the existence of repressive desires in human beings, which originate from that very human weakness, defends the right to freedom of expression as a safeguard against those desires.

Unlike Christian religious texts, the Quran also contains positive teachings regarding tolerance. In this context, the statement "To you your religion, and to me my religion"[26] is usually cited, which is undoubtedly as firm and clear as one could wish. On the other hand, there are also statements commanding jihad against the unbelievers: "Slay the polytheists wherever you find them, and take them (captive)... but if they repent, let them go their way"[27] and "Fight against those of the People of the Book who do not believe in God... and do not embrace the true religion, until they pay the jizyah with their own hands, in a state of humiliation."[28] These statements can be interpreted in various ways, as they have been. One particularly liberal interpretation I have heard is that the aforementioned words only pertain to circumstances where Islam is weak and its opponents use force and violence or threaten Muslims with its use. According to this interpretation, the said statements refer only to the specific situation of the Arabian Peninsula in the era of Muhammad (PBUH) or, with some modification, to the era of the early conquests—that is, to a time when the purpose of the conquests was not the imposition of Islam but the creation of a situation for the call of this religion to be heard. With the mention of jizyah in the second of the above verses, the observance of tolerance towards the People of the Book, in exchange for the payment of jizyah, is introduced. This belief, which has a Quranic root, has moderated the temptation to impose Islam, which Muslims believe to be the true religion (the same temptation we mentioned above). And perhaps it is for this reason that when we refer to the conduct and tradition of Muslims, we see that their record in this domain is better than that of Christians. Nevertheless, the practice of jizyah does not entirely satisfy the proponents of civil liberty either, because this practice apparently necessitates that Christians and Jews be subjects and subordinates of Muslims, and as far as I am aware, this is the meaning usually derived from the payment of jizyah. I am not in a position to say that this is the only or the appropriate interpretation.

It can be said that Islam, in the discussion of civil rights, and at least in the eyes of a non-Muslim, presents a dual image of itself. I hope that Muslims, as well as Christians and others, will learn this lesson from history: that the right to be wrong must be protected. Muslims and Christians can learn things from one another that they cannot learn from secularists, because the kind of concern for ultimate truth that exists among Muslims and Christians is probably not found among secularists, and especially not among champions of civil liberties. Christians can learn from deeply rooted Muslims how to combine a fundamental certitude in the realm of theology with a high degree of tolerance. On the other hand, the way human rights grew in the often inhospitable soil of Christianity can be instructive for Muslims. And, of course, both Muslims and Christians can learn points from further exploration of their own traditions on this matter. One of the difficult problems plaguing us in this age is learning to combine a feeling of abundant certainty about our foundational beliefs with maximum tolerance for the expression of what we consider error.

Allow me to conclude my remarks by referring to the parable of the wheat and the tares found in the Christian Gospels. A farmer sowed wheat in his field. His enemy came and sowed tares among the wheat and went away. When both the tares and the wheat sprouted, the farmer's servants asked him if he wanted them to go and gather the tares. He said no, lest while gathering the tares, you uproot the wheat with them. He told them they must wait until the harvest, then gather both (Matthew.

24:30). I, too, firmly believe that we must allow, in the field of truth, the wheat to grow until the Lord's harvest.

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Notes:

[1] The source I used for the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights is:

The Human Rights Reader, ed. Walter Laqeur and Barry, New York, (American Library, 1979) , pp. 197-201.

[2] The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, (English Translation) 15 August 1990,Organization of the Islamic Congress.

The version available to me has English, French, Arabic, and Persian texts. I have referred to the English and Arabic texts. One can also refer to the following declaration issued in 1991:

Universal Proclamation of Human Rights in Islam

The text and translation I used are found in this source:

Islamochristiana (Rome), Vol. (1989) 9

The text in question has twenty-three articles, some of which again discuss more than one right.

[3] In the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights – where a broad interpretation of the term "social" is given, thus placing the economic matter within its semantic domain. It speaks of "economic, social, cultural rights, as well as… civil and political rights" (Reader, p. 209).

[4] Comparable rights can be found in Articles 20 and 18 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Reader, p. 199), in Articles 18 and 19 of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (English Translation, op. cit., pp. 6-7), and in Articles 12 and 13 of the Universal Proclamation of Human Rights in Islam (Islamochristiana, 9:112). I accessed the text of the First Amendment to the US Constitution in the following source:

Reader, p. 115.

[5] Quoted by Lee C. Bollinger in The Tolerant Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 18.

[6] President George Bush (Sr.), in his first speech as president, stated this same point more bluntly than I, and with reasoning:

We know what works: Freedom works. We know what's right: Freedom is right. We know how to secure a more just and prosperous life for man on Earth: through free markets, free speech, free elections, and the exercise of free will unhampered by the state. (New York Times, January 21, 1989).

[7] Quoted in: The Tolerant Society, p. 18.

[8] From the preamble to the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Reader, p. 209).

[9] In moral philosophy and the philosophy of law, natural law is a prescriptive law that determines how people ought to behave. The root of this law is considered to lie in human nature and his rationality, and not in anything produced by convention or civil legislation. In moral philosophy and the philosophy of law, famous theorists in the category of natural law include: the Stoics, Aquinas (in whose view natural law is ultimately derived from divine law), Grotius, and Kant. Adapted from the Cambridge Encyclopedia, third edition, under the entry natural law. – Ed.)

[10] Bollinger argues that this point, although less emphasized, is an extremely important aspect of American legal thought on this subject.

(The Tolerant Society, esp. ch. 3)

[11] The Tolerant Society, p. 16.

[12] For example, claims have been made regarding Christian Scientists, about which I recently read something in the Christian Science Monitor magazine. I regret that I did not have the opportunity to organize and specify this source.

[13] Even as I write this, a debate is underway in New Zealand. The cause of the debate is that, as a result of the recent ban on cigarette advertising, a major cricket tournament might not be held at all, because a cigarette company has traditionally been the financial sponsor of this tournament. Since sport is the "religion and creed" of New Zealand, it seems the government will make an exception in this case to get the tournament going.

[14] Article 30, Reader, p. 201.

[15] Article 20,1; Reader, p. 223.

[16] Article 22 d.

[17] The Tolerant Society, pp. 23-44 and passim.

[18] The Tolerant Society, p. 99.

[19] Quoted by M. Searle Bates in Religious Liberty: An Inquiry (New York: Harper and Bros, 1954), p. 139.

[20] Religious Liberty, p. 138.

[21] Ibid. Bates quotes several other statements that were expressed by both sides during the same period.

[22] For example, according to a declaration issued by the Roman Catholic Church in 1977: "It is necessary to distinguish between error and the one who errs. Error must always be rejected and denied, but the person in error always retains his human dignity, even when he is afflicted by false or incomplete religious beliefs."

[23] Quran, Surah 17, Verse 81. According to Pickthall's note (the English translator of the Holy Quran), this verse was revealed after the idols in the Kaaba were destroyed. [The Persian text of the verses is from the Holy Quran, translated by Abdolmohammad Ayati. — Ed.]

[24] Article 10 (my translation from the Arabic text).

[25] Quran, Surah 33, Verse 72.

[26] Quran, Surah 109, Verse 6.

[27] Quran, Surah 9, Verse 5.

[28] Quran, Surah 9, Verse 29.

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