اندیشهفلسفهخردگفتگوحکمتمعناپرسشفرهنگ
Racism attributes essential characteristics to an ethnic group, claims inherent superiority and the inferiority of others, and leads to discrimination. The denial of the biological reality of race and racial superiority, together with the moral illegitimacy of discrimination, are three major objections to this phenomenon.

What is today called anti-Arabism — as an example of racism — is not, in the contemporary era, a phenomenon observable solely among some — and I emphasize, some — Iranians (from secular to religious), but can also be found in other countries. For instance, anti-Arabism can be observed after the occupation of Palestine among some Israelis, and also, especially after September 11, 2001, in the form of Islamophobia among some Westerners, and even among some non-Muslim or secular Arabs critical of Islamic culture (particularly among some Egyptians). Although examining the historical-identitarian as well as the political-international aspects of racism is of great importance for understanding the phenomenon of racism, I do not intend to address these aspects in this essay. My aim in this essay is merely an attempt to provide a thoroughly preliminary and cursory answer to this important question: What, in general, is wrong with racism?
The Main Assumptions of the Critique of Racism
My discussion in the critique of racism has three main assumptions:
Although the second and third claims have been the subject of much dispute (and, for instance, some have spoken of the end or severe decline of racism in the modern world, or have deemed argumentation in confronting racism to be fundamentally ineffective), in this short essay I cannot argue in favor of these two claims and will therefore focus my discussion solely on the first claim, namely the moral wrongness of racism.
What is Racism?
It seems that the common feature of various types of racism is as follows:
3. And, most importantly, this racial “superiority” or “inherent inferiority” ultimately leads to negative moral judgment and racial discrimination.
For example, depicting Arabs as “lizard-eaters” or “desert-dwellers,” and then using this depiction as the basis for a negative moral judgment about Arabs as a whole, and finally raising the cry of “Get out of this land!” is a clear instance of anti-Arab racism.
What is Wrong with Racism?
Three major problems with racism, out of the many that apply to it, are, in brief, as follows:
1. Fundamentally, race, in the biological sense of the word, does not exist.
2. Racial superiority, in the biological sense of the word, does not exist.
Let me explain these three problems, in utmost brevity.
The First Problem: The Illusion of Race
Today, philosophers and scientists agree that there is no such thing as race in the common sense of the word. The common conception of race, called "Racial naturalism," is a biological conception of race. According to this conception, which has a long history, races possess a natural (and perhaps genetic) core that: 1- is heritable, 2- all members of a race, and only members of that race, possess this core, and 3- this natural core explains the behavioral, personality, and cultural tendencies of the members of that race. As I mentioned, race in this sense has no serious proponents among philosophers and scientists today. Although philosophers and scientists agree in their opposition to the naturalistic conception of race, they do not agree on what alternative conception of race is defensible. This disagreement is such that some philosophers have suggested that the concept of race should be abandoned altogether. For further reading on philosophical race studies, see the entry on "race" in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
Second Problem: The Illusion of Racial Superiority
Having rejected the naturalistic conception of race, we do not have a long way to go to reject the idea of "racial superiority." Pseudo-scientific attempts to demonstrate an "inherent" or "necessary" biological characteristic in a people or race have always met with failure. An example of these attempts has been pseudo-scientific research to defend the claim that people of color are essentially less intelligent compared to white people. Several examples of this type of pseudo-scientific research in proving racial superiority are critically examined in the entry on "racism" in the Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics, second edition, Elsevier, 2012. If race in the biological sense of the word does not exist, then racial superiority is also indefensible because either the concept of race must be abandoned altogether or a non-biological meaning (for example, race as a socially constructed concept) must be assigned to it. Non-biological conceptions of race, however, leave no room for the "inherent" and "necessary" superiority of one race over another.
Third Problem: The Illegitimacy of Racial Discrimination
Let us, merely for the sake of advancing the discussion, assume that race in the biological sense of the word exists and that scientific research also hypothetically demonstrates the superiority of one race in one or more areas over all or some other races. In such a case, does this mean that race can be a basis for discrimination in various contexts? The answer is no. It seems that racial affiliation, in and of itself, cannot be a factor for reasonable discrimination (assuming there is such a thing as reasonable discrimination). To better understand this issue, consider this example: You witness a person drowning whom there is still hope of saving, and you are a professional swimmer, and consequently, saving that person does not pose a high risk to you, and there is no one else to help the person. Suppose in such a situation you are morally obligated to save the drowning person. In such a situation, does the race of the drowning person (for example, whether they are a person of color or white, Persian or Arab) play a role in determining your duty? Would you have a lesser or greater duty to save their life if that person were, for example, a person of color? The answer is no. The racial affiliation or non-affiliation of the drowning person has no positive or negative effect on our moral duty towards them. This is true not only regarding the situation of saving a drowning person but also regarding any other normal or abnormal situation. This means that: human beings, regardless of skin color and racial and ethnic affiliation, have rights and duties towards one another, and affiliation or non-affiliation with a race (even a, hypothetically, "superior" or "inferior" race) does not change this duty. For further reading on the moral critique of racism, see the article on "racism" in A Companion to Applied Ethics, Blackwell Publishing, 2003.
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Conclusion
In this short piece, I have tried to outline the prospect of a philosophical critique of racism. I have argued, in a cursory manner, that race in the biological sense of the word does not exist, that “racial superiority” has no scientific or philosophical basis, and that race cannot justify discrimination. It is well known that Abul-Hassan Kharaqani, the great Iranian mystic, wrote above the entrance to his lodge: “Give bread to whoever enters this abode, and ask not of their faith; for one who is worthy of life at the threshold of the Almighty is certainly worthy of bread at the table of Abul-Hassan.” The wise words of Sheikh Kharaqani should today be applied not only to faith, but also to race, gender, sexual orientation, political views, and other such matters.
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Discussion3 comments
من خودم یکی از مخالفان نژادپرستیم. اما این هیچوقت نفرت نکرده.
مساله این است که در دنیای کنونی به علت محدودیت منابع دست به گزینش میزنیم. این است تحقق برتری نژادی در مقام عمل وگرنه اگر صرفا یک عقیده بود مساله ای ایجاد نمیکرد. مثال در مثال شناگر، بهتر بوددمساله اینگونه طرح میشد. که اگر یک سیاه و یک سفید در حال غرق شدن بودند و فقط فرصت نجات یکی وجود داشت کدامیک را نجات میدادیم؟
مطمئنا ان کسیکه به او نزدیکتر بودیم اورا نجات میدادیم فرقی نمیکرد که سیاه باشد یا سفید