A Reflection on Translating the Concept of Deduktion in Kant's Philosophy into Persian

A Reflection on Translating the Concept of Deduktion in Kant's Philosophy into Persian

Mehdi Ranaei

The translation of classical philosophical texts faces a great challenge: the translator must, while providing an accurate translation, refrain from imposing a specific interpretation upon it. This issue takes on new dimensions in the translation of texts by a philosopher like Kant. Among other reasons, this is because he, unlike his Persian translator, has no interest in coining new terms and uses familiar words from earlier philosophical traditions to express his sometimes revolutionary concepts; for example, to refer to his own philosophical system, he calls it transzendental, a word with many associations in Scholastic traditions. In such cases, the translator, besides having to avoid presenting a specific interpretation of these terms in the target language, also faces another question: should two different equivalents be used for this word in different contexts, or only one word? And in the latter case, should the reader be warned in a footnote? Translators of Kant into European languages, of course, encounter this problem less than those into other languages. For instance, in this particular case, the English translator can easily use the word transcendental, which shares a root with its German equivalent. In this case, he no longer faces the difficult question of which equivalent to choose, nor the other question of whether to choose one word or two, since Kant himself used the same word. But in a language like Persian, where not only is the word transzendental itself not used, but there has also been no precise equivalent for it, the translator must, in any case, make a choice. First, what should the equivalent of this word be, and second, should this equivalent be used both in the context of Kant's philosophy and in the context of Scholastic philosophy, or should a separate word be chosen for each?

My aim here is to examine one of these difficult choices facing the Persian translator of the first "Critique of Pure Reason," or the first "Critique," namely the concept of "Deduktion," which Kant himself sometimes considers the most important and sometimes the most difficult part of the "Critique" (Axvi)[1]. This word, like the previous example, poses no particular problem for the translator of Kant into European languages, because they can easily choose the equivalent of this word in their own languages, for example, "deduction" in English or French, and leave the task of understanding it to the reader. In languages like Persian or Arabic, however, difficulties arise that, in the end, probably cannot all be resolved simultaneously, and the translator faces a difficult choice. In this short note, I will try to point out some of these difficulties and choices and examine the suggestions of two Persian translators and one Arabic translator of the first "Critique." The Persian translations I have in mind are, first, the translation by Behrouz Nazari and Mohammad Mehdi Ardebili, published by Qoqnoos under the title "Critique of Pure Reason" (hereafter "Qoqnoos Translation"), and second, the translation by Mir Shamseddin Adib Soltani, published by Amir Kabir under the name "Critique of Pure Reason" (hereafter "Adib Translation"). The Arabic text I will examine is the translation by Musa Wahba, published by Dar al-Tanwir in Beirut under the title "Critique of Pure Reason." At the outset, however, I must point out that although I will ultimately indicate my preference for translating this concept, my main goal is not to judge between the different translations of Kant's text—as I will not address the translation of other terms and sections. My aim is merely a reflection on the translation of this specific concept into Persian.

اما پیش از تصمیم برای انتخاب معادلِ مناسب برای این مفهوم، باید درکی حداقلی از آن داشته باشیم. تمایز بین دو قوه‌ی حاسه (Sinnlichkeit/sensibility) و فاهمه (Verstand/understanding) در فلسفه‌ی کانتی مشهور است. حاسه، که صورِ پیشینیِ آن زمان و مکان هستند، مسئولِ به دست دادن شهود (Anschauung/intuition) از اشیاء است و فاهمه به وسیله‌ی مقولات یا همان مفاهیمِ محضِ فاهمه، که کاملاً پیشینی و لذا مستقل از تجربه هستند، امکانِ تفکر در باب این اشیاء را برای ما فراهم می‌آورد. حال پرسشِ اساسی که کانت در بخش transzendentale Deduktion که خود فصلی از تحلیلِ استعلایی (transzendentale Analytik) است مطرح می‌سازد (A85/B217) از این قرار است: این مفاهیم، که پیشینی، ناب و لذا کاملاً مستقل از تجربه‌اند، چگونه ممکن است به اشیائی که از طریق شهود به دست می‌آیند حمل شوند؟ به بیانِ خودِ کانت:

تبیینِ شیوه‌ای که مفاهیم از آن طریق می‌توانند به طورِ پیشینی به اشیاء مرتبط شوند را transzendentale Deduktion می‌نامیم.

در همان ابتدای بخش (A84/B216) کانت معنای واژه‌ی Deduktion را آن‌طور که خود از آن مراد می‌کند توضیح می‌دهد:

حقوق‌دانان، هنگامی که از حقوق و مدعیات صحبت می‌کنند، در عملی حقوقی بین پرسش از حق (quid juris) و پرسش از واقعیت (quid facti) تمایز قائل می‌شوند ... اثباتِ اولی را آنان Deduktion می‌نامند.

این توضیح باید کلیدِ فهمِ معنای مدنظرِ کانت از این مفهوم را روشن سازد، اما به دلیلِ این‌که این واژه در زبان‌های اروپایی کاربردِ دیگری نیز دارد باعثِ اشتباهِ برخی خوانندگان—حتی آلمانی‌زبان—کانت شده است. نکته‌ی اول این است که نه تنها زمینه‌ی بحث را کانت بحث از حقوق و مدعیات در نظر می‌گیرد، بلکه‌ی معنای مورد نظر خود از «Deduktion» را هم آن می‌داند که در بحثِ پرسش از حق مطرح می‌شود. این با پرسشِ اصلی که او در این بخش مطرح می‌سازد کاملاً سازگار است، یعنی پرسش از حقِ به کار بردنِ مفاهیمِ محضِ فاهمه بر اشیاء تجربه. اما این واژه هم در زمان کانت و هم در زمانه‌ی ما معنای دیگری علاوه بر این معنای حقوقی هم داشته است. «Deduktion» در معنای دوم یا منطقی به معنای برهان است، یعنی مهم‌ترین و مطمئن‌ترین نوعِ استدلال در سنتِ منطقی ارسطویی[2]. تمایزِ این معانی را دیتر هنریش (Dieter Henrich) در مقاله‌ی کلاسیک و بسیار تاثیرگذارِ خود، مفهومِ دیداکشن نزدِ کانت و عقبه‌ی روشیِ سنجشِ اول، توضیح داده است[3]. ضمنِ دعوتِ خوانندگانِ علاقمندْ به مطالعه‌ی این مقاله—که برای فهمِ کانت مطلقاً ضروری است—خلاصه‌ای بسیار فشرده را از آن‌چه به بحثِ من مربوط است در بندِ بعد می‌آورم.

Henrich first rightly points out that any interpretation of the Deduktion section of the Critique must be able to explain and account for Kant's specific use of terminology. Likewise, any reading must help us understand the manner of the Deduktion's exposition not only in the first Critique but also be consistent with Kant's other Deduktions, including those in the second—and of course the third—Critique. The first point he notes is precisely this distinction between the juridical and logical uses of the term. In fact, although both meanings were in use in Kant's time and Kant was certainly aware of this, the juridical meaning of the word was more prevalent. Moreover, not only was this meaning more prevalent, but it was so familiar to all readers that the reasonable assumption was that readers would grasp Kant's paratextual reference in using this term. This reference was to the tradition of Deduktion-writing in the Holy Roman Empire, which began in the fourteenth century and continued until after Kant's death. Indeed, in the juridical tradition of that time, there existed a genre in which Deduktions were written to prove various rights—for example, the right to exploit land. These Deduktions were finely printed and their form was more or less fixed. Kant, who according to the evidence was familiar with this genre, wrote this section of the book precisely in accordance with that genre and in response to a question about a specific right, namely the right to apply the categories to objects. In this respect, although the use of demonstrative proof is possible in these types of texts, equating and conflating Deduktion in the juridical sense with demonstration is mistaken and leads to a misunderstanding of Kant's text—an occurrence that has taken place over several centuries in both European and non-European languages. In fact, as Henrich points out, Kant is perfectly capable of formulating demonstrative arguments and, for example, provides such a proof in the "Refutation of Idealism" (Wiederlegung des Idealismus). But none of these are called "Deduktion," and this is further evidence, in addition to his own explicit statement in the first line of that section of the book, that we should not take this word to mean demonstration, deduction, or argument.

This brief summary of Henrich's research suffices for my purpose. The point to note is that, up to this point, no interpretation of this important section has yet been offered. All that has been done is to identify the "genre" to which this section of the book belongs, thereby closing off the path to many misunderstandings of Kant. Now we must see how this concept can be translated into Persian or Arabic. Since this word has two irreconcilable meanings—a logical meaning and a juridical meaning—if a word can be found in Persian or Arabic that possesses these same two meanings, it would be the best translation. The only option that comes to mind is the word "qiyās," which has two different meanings in logic and the principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). In logic, "qiyās" means an argument such that if its premises are true, its conclusion will also be correct, and therefore it can be considered, with some latitude, close to—though certainly not identical with—the logical meaning of Deduktion[4]. In the principles of jurisprudence, however, "qiyās" means applying the religious ruling of one subject to a similar subject when the ruling of the second subject is not specified[5]. This jurisprudential meaning of "qiyās" does not align with the juridical meaning of "Deduktion." As noted, "Deduktion" means the proof of a right, and this proof can be achieved through various methods—including jurisprudential qiyās or otherwise. But jurisprudential qiyās is not limited to proving a right and can also pertain to other rulings—for instance, rulings related to prayer or fasting. Similarly, in qiyās, the method is solely the comparison of two similar subjects, whereas no such limitation exists in juridical Deduktion. Therefore, "qiyās" cannot be a suitable translation for Deduktion. Apart from "qiyās," however, I know of no other word that has two distinct logical and juridical applications, and thus we must either find two separate words for the two applications of Deduktion or coin a new word for it.

But before that, let us look at the suggestions made by the book's translators. In the Phoenix translation, this concept is rendered as "estentaj" (deduction/inference), and the chapter title appears as "On the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding." Given Kant's explicit reference to the juridical meaning of Deduktion and, of course, the findings of Henrich's research, it seems that this suggestion may not be the best possible translation. (A marginal note is that in the translation of the title, "pure" comes after "understanding," which can be misleading. The original German title is Der Deduktion der reinen Verstandbegriffe, in which "pure" refers to "concept" and not "understanding." Since Kant uses both the phrase "pure understanding" and "pure concept of the understanding"—in one, purity is an attribute of the understanding, and in the other, of the concepts—greater care must be taken in translation. Kant is speaking here of pure concepts, not pure understanding.)

Adib's translation proposes the equivalent "tanqih-e manat" (refinement of the basis), which is a term from the principles of jurisprudence (usul/fiqh) and thus shows an awareness of the juridical nature of the term Kant employs. The full translation of the title is also "Tanqih-e Manat-e Mafhum-ha-ye Nab-e Fahm" (Refinement of the Basis of the Pure Concepts of Understanding), which correctly applies "pure" as an attribute of "concept" and not "understanding," or as Adib puts it, "fahm." But what does this term mean? Tanqih-e manat means determining the cause of a ruling that is specified in religious law and then extending this ruling, based on the discovered cause, to similar cases[6]. In this respect, the status of this term is similar to "qiyas" (analogy) and does not quite correspond to Kant's intended use of Deduktion, which, unlike tanqih-e manat, seeks to provide a justification for the application of a concept entirely independent of experience to an object obtained through experience. Therefore, Adib's proposed translation cannot be a suitable equivalent for this Kantian term either.

But perhaps other words that Kant uses as equivalents for Deduktion can help in finding a suitable equivalent. For instance, near the end of the Prolegomena, in a discussion of the "concept of causality"—which is one of the Kantian categories—he says that it is necessary to provide a

Rechtfertigung und Deduktion seiner Möglichkeit

for it. This phrase appears in the English translation of Kant's works by Cambridge University Press as:

A justification and deduction of its possibility.

Here, Kant uses Rechtfertigung or justification as an equivalent for Deduktion. This usage is also consistent with his meaning for the word, for, as noted above, the purpose of this term is to provide a kind of justification for the application of a priori concepts to empirical objects. So, is "tawjih" (justification) not a suitable translation for this term in Persian? This proposed translation is, of course, closer to Kant's intended concept than all previous suggestions, but the problem is that in Persian, "tawjih" is tied to another philosophical term. What is meant by "tawjih" in Persian philosophical language these days is the equivalent of "justification" in analytic epistemology. In this usage, justification means having a basis for believing a proposition, not having a right to apply a concept to an object, or a predicate to a subject in a judgment. Therefore, this translation, although lexically close to the usage Kant intends, cannot be a suitable suggestion because, as a technical term, it carries a specific semantic load that is incompatible with Kant's concept.

The last option is the proposed translation by Mūsá Wahbah in his Arabic translation of the Critique. His suggested equivalent is "al-taswīgh," and he has rendered the section title as "Fī Taswīgh al-Afāhīm al-Fāhimīyah al-Muḥḍah." "Taswīgh" is a word used in both Persian and Arabic. Dehkhodā gives its primary meaning as "to permit, to deem permissible" and then cites its meaning from several authoritative Arabic lexicons. For instance, the meaning he cites from Muntahá al-Arab is "the permitting of something," and Tāj al-Maṣādir by Bayhaqī considers it equivalent to "deeming something permissible." This meaning is precisely equivalent to the traditional legal meaning of the genre of Deduktion-writing and is exactly what is intended by it in Kantian philosophy. Since this word, in addition to Arabic, is also used in Persian, as attested by Dehkhodā's dictionary, it could be the best option for translating this fundamental concept of Kantian philosophy into Persian. Furthermore, another advantage is that this word has no philosophical—or even non-philosophical—associations in Persian, and therefore it can easily be employed for this Kantian concept and become a standard term[7].

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References

Ibn Sīnā. (1383 [2004]). Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt; al-Juzʾ al-Awwal fī ʿIlm al-Manṭiq. Qom: Nashr al-Balāghah.

Immanuel Kant. (1362 [1983]). Sanjish-i Khirad-i Nāb [Critique of Pure Reason]. (Translated by Mīr Shams al-Dīn Adīb Sulṭānī). Tehran: Amīr Kabīr.

Immanuel Kant. (1394 [2015]). Naqd-i ʿAql-i Maḥḍ [Critique of Pure Reason]. (Translated by Bihrūz Naẓarī. Edited by Muḥammad Mahdī Ardabīlī). Tehran: Quqnūs.

ʿAmmānūʾīl Kanṭ. (2020). Naqd al-ʿAql al-Muḥḍ [Critique of Pure Reason]. (Translated by Mūsá Wahbah). Beirut: Dār al-Tanwīr.

ʿĪsá Valāʾī. (1387 [2008]). Farhang-i Tashrīḥī-yi Iṣṭilāḥāt-i Uṣūl [An Explanatory Glossary of the Principles of Jurisprudence]. Tehran: Nashr-i Nī.

Henrich, D. (1989). Kant's Notion of A Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First Critique. In E. Förster (Ed.), Kant's Transcendental Deductions. The Three 'Critiques' and the Opus Postumum (pp. 29-46). Stanfrod: Stanford University Press.

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[1] Reference to the Critique of Pure Reason is based on the standard system, which is observable in almost all editions.

[2] For the definition of this type of argument in the Islamic tradition, see (Ibn Sīnā, 1383 [2004], p. 289).

[3] See (Henrich, 1989).

[4] See (Ibn Sīnā, 1383 [2004], p. 233).

[5] See (Valāʾī, 1387 [2008], p. 276): "In the terminology of the science of legal principles (uṣūl), whenever the ruling for one of two similar subjects is known and the other is unknown, and by comparing them the unknown legal ruling is determined, this is called 'qiyās' (analogy)."

[6] See (Valāʾī, 1387 [2008], p. 157): "Tanqīḥ al-manāṭ means refining and purifying the basis and cause of a ruling, then generalizing it. In other words, tanqīḥ al-manāṭ means determining the cause of a ruling. If a ruling is explicitly stated in the Lawgiver's words without mentioning its cause, to discover the 'cause' (the basis for analogy), it is said one must resort to 'sabr wa taqsīm' (investigation and division). Sabr means testing, and taqsīm means the jurist selects the various attributes that could possibly be the 'cause' of the ruling in the 'original case,' and examines each attribute against the ruling of the original case, assessing whether there is a proportionality between that attribute and the ruling of the original case or not."

[7] An early version of this note was presented at the conference “Western Philosophy and Translation,” held in February 2021 at the Iranian Institute of Philosophy. I thank all the organizers of that conference, especially Messrs. Gholamreza Zakyani, Seyed Mahmoud Yousef Sani, and Amirhossein Khodaparast. I also thank Ms. Banafsheh Beyzaei and Messrs. Malek Hosseini, Mojtaba Ghorbani, and Mostafa Zali for reading the text before publication and offering useful suggestions and preventing several errors. And our final call is that all praise is due to God, Lord of the worlds.

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