Abdolkarim Soroush's Lecture Series: The Method of Critiquing Ideas (5)

Regarding fictive ideas, a number of other important matters remain, which we will present this time and draw the attention of all listeners to, given their importance. We have so far said and emphasized that fictive ideas are not subject to truth and falsity, and they cannot be judged by logical and philosophical methods based on non-fictive ideas. The question will naturally arise: how, then, can one judge these ideas, and by what means can their acceptability or unacceptability be explored and examined? What we are now attempting to explain is the answer to this very question that our previous remarks have raised in the minds of listeners. In general, regarding non-fictive ideas, our assumption is that the path of judgment is easy, namely that the correspondence or lack of correspondence of fictive ideas with external reality will determine the matter of their truth and falsity. Although this is the general formula, between this statement and what can be done in practice, the path is very difficult and full of obstacles, and one should never be simplistic and think that this judgment can be made as easily as it initially seems. However, since we are not currently speaking about non-fictive ideas and have deferred them to another occasion and opportunity—and, God willing, we will address them in this same series of discussions—we will pass over them for now and merely point out that because non-fictive ideas encompass universal concepts and abstract matters, that kind of correspondence with the external world, which is the initial and simplistic concern of humans, will not be so easily accessible, and we will encounter great difficulty there as well. The reason we bring this up and mention it here is that, in principle, this difficulty is inherent in the very fabric of human thought, and those who are simplistic would do better never to engage in thought. In thinking, one must always be prepared to confront ideas and staggering complexities, and one must equip oneself with the appropriate tools, weapons, and apparatus for this confrontation. I say this so that it is not thought that if there is difficulty in the matter of fictive ideas, this difficulty is specific to them. In every type of thought, we will encounter a kind of difficulty appropriate to that thought...

... But let us turn to fictive ideas and the method of critiquing, examining, analyzing, and distinguishing the acceptable from the unacceptable among them.

In the first place, as we were saying, we also call ideational thoughts instrumental thoughts, and this is precisely due to the characteristic and nature of these thoughts. Ideational and instrumental thoughts are not thoughts that have been discovered from the external world; rather, they are our creations and are made by our hands, and that too for the sake of a goal we have. One can imagine many needs that we do not have, and for this reason, we have not built suitable instruments for them. And if we refer to any one of our instrumental thoughts, as we have said before, we will see that it is an instrument for achieving an end. From this perspective, the status, nature, and the entire work and function of an ideational thought is to be a good instrument for attaining an end. And as soon as it lacks this merit and this ability, or it is taken away from it, or it collapses from it, for any reason and under any condition, that ideational thought will automatically be annulled and will disappear. From this perspective, one of the criteria by which we examine and critique ideational and instrumental thoughts is the discovery and examination of the ability of these thoughts and their sufficiency in achieving the end we expect of them. So, firstly, it is a matter of ability and inability; this is the first criterion. As we said, the criterion of truth and falsehood does not govern here. For example, we expect language to convey our intention to the other person; this instrument is made solely for this purpose. If we choose very complex signs that our counterpart never succeeds in discovering the codes and meanings of those signs, then such a language will automatically be annulled, because language, more than having the value of a carrier, is an instrument for transmitting information—it is nothing else. Language itself, in its essence, is not an entity among external entities that has its own existence, personality, and consistency. The consistency of language lies in its ability to acquire and attain the goal intended of it. When it fails to fulfill such a goal, that complex language will automatically be annulled and will disappear. This is a very interesting point. The history of the evolution of ideational (conventional) thoughts over the course of...

... the transformations of human culture can be traced in this way, that many of them have gradually become more capable. And it is for this reason that one can clearly see that languages and scripts, from the beginning when they came into being until today, have become much simpler, and this simplification is solely in the direction of becoming more learnable, meaning they are more proportionate to the human mind's understanding and are learned with greater ease. The scientific languages that have emerged especially today, one can again clearly see, are much simpler and more learnable than natural languages. From this perspective, if an instrument does not fulfill the expectation we have of it, it becomes like a knife that was blunt and could not cut what we wanted it to cut; we will set this knife aside, and if we see that it is blunt, we will recommend that the knife be abandoned and another weapon and instrument be taken up in its place. Ideologies are such things. Ideologies are, in the capacity of instruments that human beings use to achieve ends, whether spiritual ends or material ends, depending on whether a school is spiritualist or purely materialist. When they lack such an ability in confronting external events and do not fulfill the end expected of them, and fall into agony and inability, then they will be annulled. Therefore, when encountering an ideational thought, the first question is whether it will fulfill the end that is intended and expected of it or not; is it capable or incapable? 1- So, instead of truth and falsehood, we will use capable and incapable for ideational thoughts. 2- In a collection of ideational thoughts, when it is presented to us as an ideology or a school, this collection can also be subjected to critique and examination. Here, we can employ a criterion that is exactly similar to the set of criteria for evaluating a collection of non-ideational thoughts. We all know that contradiction in a collection of thoughts is unacceptable. Therefore, in encountering a theoretical complex, an ideological collection comprising diverse thoughts—all of which we assume are of the type and nature of ideational thoughts, all speaking of good and evil, perfection and imperfection, baseness and sublimity, conventions, right, duty, commitment, obligation, prohibition, the obligatory, the recommended, and similar issues—there must not be among the components of this...

...set and among the various ideas within it, a contradiction is found, the discovery of such a contradiction is itself a sign of a weakness and ailment in that set. It may be possible, by resolving the contradiction, to arrive at a set that is free of contradiction. However, if all those ideas are interconnected and that contradiction arises from that overall interconnection, then that set suffers from a fatal disease and will collapse entirely, unless the ideas are unrelated and the contradiction exists between a few of these ideas, so that by removing those few ideas, the rest remain free of contradiction. So the second criterion is harmony and the absence of contradiction among the prescriptive ideas presented within an ideological set. At the third level, when in a school of thought we are faced with a set of worldview and ideology, in this set, the ideology must not contradict the worldview. If it does, this doctrinal set will be called into question and must be revised. For now, when we say ideology, our meaning of ideology is the prescriptive ideas within a school of thought, and when we say worldview, our meaning of worldview is the non-prescriptive ideas present in a school of thought. In a school of thought, when rights, ideals, commitments, and evaluations are mentioned, this belongs to the ideology section of that school, according to the narrower and more precise definition of ideology, and when there is talk of the structure of the world, of the general and philosophical laws pertaining to the world, then the worldview section of that school is introduced. Now, the point we have in mind is that in a school of thought, ideology cannot be in contradiction with the worldview. We have said that prescriptive ideas cannot be deduced from non-prescriptive ideas; inevitably, ideology cannot be deduced from worldview. But there is a limitation for ideology, and that is that ideology cannot be in contradiction with the worldview. That is, if in the worldview, for example, any being that could be worshipped is negated, we cannot have something in the ideology that is to be worshipped. For instance, if in our worldview we think that the world has no purpose, we cannot in the ideology invite and recommend that we move towards the purpose of the world...

...and strive for its realization. These are the points that create a contradiction between ideology and worldview. Something that you do not have here, you cannot recommend there; something that you have here, you cannot recommend its negation there. If such recommendations existed, if there were such oughts and ought-nots that led to violating some of the matters and principles you have in your worldview, then this ideological set of yours would not be acceptable due to its collision with the worldview. Criterion 4 is this: if the principles we present, the ideas we offer as prescriptive and conventional matters, are themselves inherently impracticable, then they will eliminate themselves. If you command patients (patients whose legs are broken and in casts) to run, and stipulate for them that they must run around the hospital several times a day, this command will be null and void. 'You must run around the hospital' is a conventional (prescriptive) matter according to the definitions we gave, but this is not achievable by patients with broken legs; for this reason, it will be null and void. If you order scientists to come and build a machine that produces useful work for us without consuming fuel, without consuming any kind of energy, if you devise such a theoretical plan for industry, such a thing will be null and void. It is a futile command; it is not possible. Therefore, things that are themselves not possible, oughts, recommendations, and commands that are unfeasible—these are not false, they are unfeasible, but due to their unfeasibility, they will be expelled from an ideological and prescriptive set that we wish to adopt for human relations, to act upon, and to value. Similarly, if you come and express a prescriptive idea and say that all people must be slaves, or that all people except a minority group must be slaves to that minority, this is a recommendation, a matter, a conventional and prescriptive matter, and no one can tell you that this is incorrect in the sense of being false, not corresponding to reality. There is no reality at play for this to correspond to or not correspond to. From the perspective of wanting to determine whether this is true or false, such a thing here...

... is not current in principle, but can such a ruling be issued? Can such a recommendation be made and can one strive in its path? No, such a thing is not realizable in the external world, because people refuse to submit to such captivity and abasement. People are part of reality, just like external nature, which refuses to allow us, by means of it and with the help of natural tools, to build a machine that produces energy without consuming energy. Such a thing is impossible; nature rebels against accepting and receiving such a command. Humans {a question from one of the participants in the discussion... Why do people refuse? According to what criterion do they refuse?} For whatever reason people refuse—in our view, now, because of the knowledge people have, because of the culture they possess, because of upbringing, because of religion, and because of the long historical experience humanity has had—they will not accept such a thing for the time being. Of course, it is not at all impossible that in some era such a thing might become acceptable; in that case, of course, this command will emerge from being a futile command. Regarding external nature, we know that such a thing will not be; if it is impossible, it is impossible forever. Regarding humans, two kinds of issues can be considered: one is that, due to a particular kind of upbringing, they accept something or do not accept something; sometimes it is also due to their innate nature and human nature that they do not accept something. Now, consider that in our society, if they want to take a vote regarding certain specific individuals for candidacy, some will easily win votes and some will not win votes. Now, suppose we were to give the propaganda of this society into the hands of certain people, and suppose they were successful and changed people's thoughts in such a way, over ten years, twenty years, that after twenty years, when you take a vote for the same individual who did not win votes today, you see that they win the majority of votes. In this case, what does this indicate? Although the choice itself—that is, voting for someone, nominating someone, and the fact that someone is a candidate—is a construct (imaginary), yet the execution of this command to vote for a certain person is something that depends entirely on how those who are to execute the command...

... how they think. This 'how they think, how they act' has two reasons: one is educational reasons; we can construct thoughts so that later we want them to act as we wish. Sometimes it is also the case that there are reasons of innate nature, meaning human nature refuses to accept certain commands, and this has nothing to do with a specific upbringing; rather, simply by virtue of being human, one does not accept something. For now, in this present discussion, we are not concerned with the reason why someone accepts something or the reason why they do not accept something; these can have various reasons. We wanted to say that if it were not possible to be accepted, in that case, that command would be futile. For example, suppose that when you place a line of Persian script in front of someone who does not know the Persian language and tell them to read it, they cannot read it. This command is a futile command in relation to someone who does not know Persian. You might ask why this person cannot read; there are different reasons, and it is quite clear that one of the most important reasons is that they have not learned the Persian language. Learning the Persian language depends entirely on what society we live in, or, supposing we were not born and do not live in a Persian-speaking society, on there being motivations for us to want to learn this language. Those motivations themselves are the result of many educational, upbringing, and social conditions. But for whatever reason, if someone has not learned the Persian language and does not know it, the command to read a Persian text is a futile command, and at the very least, for them to read it, it is necessary that they go and create the prerequisites within themselves, learn Persian; then our command is executable. And of course, at the same time, even in that case, the person can render it futile and can not render it futile, but initially, this matter is a matter that is futile. Therefore, with regard to the context for which that command is issued, that 'ought' and 'ought not' and that recommendation are applied and enforced in relation to that domain; one must see whether it is possible or impossible, and this impossibility of it will itself automatically issue the ruling of the command being futile and its being in vain. In the human world, this point is very important, because in the inanimate natural world, when something is impossible, we have peace of mind that for...

... is always impossible, and from this perspective, one would set aside that command forever. However, in the realm of human relations, such a thing is not forever certain; there are cases where a command is impossible, but by preparing the prerequisites, that impossibility becomes possible. Therefore, in the world of societies, we face a great difficulty in the critique and examination of conventional (imaginary) ideas—not in identifying which idea is conventional (imaginary); we have no problem in identifying it. The debate lies in its acceptability or unacceptability. There, we will encounter a difficulty, which is that we cannot determine with absolute certainty what is impossible for humans and what is possible. If we accept that in the case of physical matters we can know well what is definitely impossible, we would not issue a command regarding it. Since ancient times, we have all known that one cannot counsel the insane. This is a matter recognized psychologically: the insane must be treated by another method, or must not be treated, or must be left alone; but the way to treat them is not counsel, nor is it preaching—it has no effect. Therefore, it is very futile and pointless for someone to sit down and bring a preacher for an insane person, or read the sermons of the ancients, or ask, plead with, and invite them to abandon those madness-inducing ways. Such a thing is futile; it is also futile with respect to animals. {Question from the participants in the discussion: I imagine that this example you are giving might be somewhat inadequate—in my view, of course. In human behaviors, especially at the social level, some 'oughts' take on value aspects. When they take on a value aspect, then an aspect of better and superior emerges, and in this relation, human evolution is raised. In the totality of these issues, how can we accept that a society, for example, must undergo an internal transformation? I only want to examine this topic from the perspective of whether it is possible or not, and what things are possible or impossible for humans.} If a matter is proven to be impossible for humans, can a command still be given and carried out? {Certainly not, because this...

... its scope is so vast and inaccessible, so it is better that we confront it with the criterion of value, with the criterion of better and worse. That is, we always seek the better situation and pursue it. This is a more reliable criterion than whether this task is possible or not, because the scope of that is very vast and unknown.} The criterion of better and worse: whatever good thing you consider, as soon as it becomes clear that this good thing is unattainable and its realization is impossible, you are compelled to abandon it. {But the history of human life shows almost the opposite of this; that is, whenever humanity has advanced, it has advanced in relation to becoming better—though not necessarily always, at least this has been in its thought. So, in individual and social evolutions, it has unconsciously moved towards a value, not towards whether my possibilities are sufficient.} That does not contradict what I said. There is no dispute that humanity has sought perfection and wanted to move towards the better. However, we have not been able to create every better thing; we have not been able to create it so far. I am not saying, nor do I deny, that we can never do so, but at least we know this: we humans, who are a meter and a half tall, have a tangible intellectual capacity, have limited visual ability, have limited auditory ability—we cannot do everything. Although there are many tasks that we might imagine to be very useful, pleasant, or perfect, nevertheless, if they are impossible, we naturally cannot perform them. Suppose we might very much like to be able to cure diseases, infectious diseases, for example, simply by drinking plain water. Wouldn't that truly be easier? And if it were so, we could free ourselves from many cumbersome things and turn to easier methods and better pursue our thoughts of evolution in other fields. {This is easier, but since our discussion had somewhat of an ideological context, and this ideology in fact shows us the path of our life, I wanted to speak in this regard: if the ruling ideology of a society cannot answer the needs of that society, necessarily because the conditions of that society do not require it...

a better situation may come about, it may not; that is my point. That is, in the hope that this society now, perhaps due to its innate disposition or its upbringing, may not accept this, we cannot refrain from moving toward improvement. That is, if we want to think in this direction, we have practically denied human progress.} Let me give an example to clarify my point. Suppose we have a monarchical system; a king exists, and we have entrusted all powers to him. And just as it truly was in the former regime, all other legal institutions of the country are practically idle; that is, it is pure despotism and dictatorship, and the king's word is the law, and the law is the king's word. In this society, with this tyrannical and dictatorial situation, is advising him to "be just," to "be mindful of the needy and the dervish, not in pursuit of your own comfort" — those very sayings of the ancients — a useful recommendation or not? It is precisely futile. Why do I say it is futile? Because it is impossible; because this expectation is unfulfillable. We are not saying one cannot pursue justice; we are saying one should not take paths that cannot be traveled. This path cannot be traveled. Through the path of advising a dictatorial king who is accustomed to seizing all authority for himself, for whom all possibilities exist, and whose word is the very law, justice cannot be established through this path. Therefore, advising the king to be just is a futile command. Why is it futile? It is not ethical; it does not fit within an ideological framework either. It is a conventional command; we have no objection to its conventionality — it is among decrees, it must exist — but it is not acceptable. Why? Because it is incapable of achieving the goal we desire; it does not lead us to that purpose. Now, I gave an example of a society in which a dictatorial monarchical system exists. We did not say that{ regarding slavery, where some are slaves and a small number are masters, I say this is fundamentally a value-laden subject and a conventional subject. This convention is just as valid as saying that truly, in a society, everyone should be free. So here, only the criterion is determinative. Right, I say if there is no criterion of better and worse, then all of these are equal to one another. What difference do they make from each other? Now, in a society, for instance, a large number must be slaves and a small number become masters; that is just as feasible as saying no, everyone must be masters...

... be themselves } is not equally feasible{ and without positing a value, it is as if we have said nothing } no, regardless of value, these are all value-laden statements; we are fundamentally discussing value-laden statements, so these are entirely value-based, there is no doubt, but some value-based matters are feasible and some are not. The difference lies precisely here. We want to say this: we want to say that when we examine value-based matters, which criteria should we consider so that our examination is practicable? If you were to come into a society and all of you be slaves to a particular group, or if it were to say everyone be free, it is completely acceptable; both are equally valid statements. But which of them is more feasible and which is less feasible? It is clear that inviting people to captivity and abasement is something they will not submit to. Now, the reason they do not submit is another matter, but at least one of the reasons is that it is agreeable to our nature, the very thing I say is innate. It is innate for us, meaning we are all made in such a way that we approve of and accept it, but not the other. Innate nature is precisely our psychological constitution, similar to our physical constitution. If they were to recommend in a society that everyone eat bitter food, this would not be implemented. A small number of people might, with difficulty, oblige themselves and do this for a few days, but such a thing would not take hold as a custom, a form of etiquette in a society. Why? Because it is not agreeable to our nature, meaning it conflicts with our physical innate nature. Just as the call to not marry, to remain celibate, whether for women or for men, is a call that will naturally not take hold and is a command that will not be implemented. Again, there may be individuals who, in some cases, as has happened, exercise restraint and spend their entire lives in celibacy, but on the whole, as a social custom, it is something that will not be followed, meaning it is not innate, in other words. From this perspective, in examining and evaluating a series of value-based matters, we must keep this point well in mind: which of these clashes with realities, falls to the ground, and shatters, and which can take realities as...

... a mount, ride upon them, and charge forward. Let us give another example: the notion that the end justifies the means is a conventional matter. We all know this is itself a value; it is among the values of an ideology that says you can use any means to achieve your goals, and another ideology can negate this value and say it is not so, and it is not permissible to use any means to achieve the goals of this school; some means can be used. So, a school declaring the means permissible is a value, a conventional matter. Now let us see which schools are more acceptable, in the sense of clashing less with realities. Naturally, the one that believes not every end justifies every means—we all know that we do not approve of people using lies, deception, fabricating cases, accusations, and false imputations to push someone out of the arena to whom none of those accusations stick, simply because they think they have a good goal that will be secured if they crush this person and humiliate them in public view. If we push this to its logical conclusion and see that we will not accept this—even schools or people who do this are not inclined to present the issue in this way, but rather offer another justification for it—in this case, I believe that schools, ideologies whose values include this value that the end justifies the means, will never succeed. Because these clash with what is called innate nature, just like the instruction to build machines that produce energy without consuming energy. Now, that is in the physical world; it is never feasible. In the human world, a school might, with these same methods, achieve some success a few times, but such a thing will never be permanently possible. { The question that arises here, in the fourth part that our brother mentioned, is this issue: you are using your own oughts and ought-nots to judge another school's series of oughts and ought-nots based on whether it is feasible or not. Since you are speaking about the world of humans, that individual...

... that determines whether it is raised, fundamentally, by what criterion does this individual who is determining that this is feasible or not feasible make this determination? Of course, you have now turned these into a series of realities—whether it is in accord with innate nature or not. Again, the question arises: does the school of thought you hold consider these oughts and ought-nots practicable or not? Does it believe in innate nature or not? The prerequisite for this is that we must have previously proven a premise, and then come to determine whether this is feasible or not feasible}  Let me first correct one point: I did not say something is in accord with innate nature or not; I said something is not in conflict with innate nature. There is, of course, a great difference between these two. We did not say that in our examination we consider things that are in accord with innate nature; we did not say that. Yes, we said that during the examination, commands that clash with innate nature are annulled. But at the next level, what is said is that if matters are infeasible—contingent matters that are infeasible—these are eliminated, they are annulled. This infeasibility itself is a real matter, not a contingent matter. Therefore, what you alluded to—that we are examining other schools with our own oughts and ought-nots—is not the case. We are examining them with real matters. That a matter is impossible, is infeasible, this is a real matter, not a contingent one. Now, from where can infeasibility be understood? From the sciences, from philosophy. If a science exists called sociology—let us suppose—if a science exists called psychology, and these conduct the same kind of inquiry into society and the human being that the sciences of physics, chemistry, and astronomy conduct into nature and the heavens, and show us what is feasible and what is infeasible, what exists and what does not exist, if we acknowledge the existence of such sciences in sociology and psychology and trust their findings, then we can more or less ascertain what things are impossible in the social world, and what things are impossible in the psychological world. Now, medical science, physiology, biochemistry, and the like have, in general, told us that the ability of the earthly human being from...

... a physical standpoint is how much? What things are impossible for him, what tasks he cannot do, and what tasks he can do. And regarding our psyche, matters are more obscure, more difficult, and more hidden than this; there is no doubt whatsoever, and those sciences have never attained the precision of these exact sciences—we have no doubt about this. However, if we accept that, in any case, for discovering the feasible and infeasible in the realm of the soul and character, in the realm of society and the individual, a science stands ready to serve, and there is a knowledge that is responsible for discovering those matters, then, firstly, it is a science whose constituent ideas are non-constructed, and secondly, we can use them with confidence, while knowing that sciences are fallible. Therefore, they may declare something infeasible today, and after a while we see it is feasible, and vice versa; things we once imagined to be feasible may later have their infeasibility completely proven. If we know, for example, that a certain hormone is excessively secreted in someone's body—thyroid hormone, for instance—and this person is perpetually angry, we know that until this illness is treated, one cannot invite this person to suppress their anger. This anger is the natural and inevitable result of the increased secretion of thyroid hormone in a person. This is our capability in the psychological world. Exactly the same regularities apply in the social world as well. How much of these laws we have succeeded in discovering or not is another issue, but we all know that every scientific law expresses an impossibility in the external world. Every scientific law prohibits the occurrence of a set of events. Scientific laws, in other words, convey a prohibition; they tell us what things cannot happen. If we encounter such prohibitions in the realm of society and the psyche as well, and discover them, then the ethical commands issued in relation to them will, of course, be null and void. Therefore, in our examination of contingent and constructed matters—the discussion was about them—one of the criteria we employ in this examination is science itself, is philosophy itself, albeit employed in this way: if they have ascertained, through the discovery of real external laws, that some matters are impossible and infeasible, a command that...

... متوجه آن‌ها است عبث خواهد بود. به عنوان مثال، یک مثال اجتماعی دیگری می‌زنیم آنارشیسم یعنی هرج و مرج طلبی، یعنی قول نبودن دولت، یعنی قول نبودن هیچ گونه قانون در اجتماع، آیا چنین چیزی شدنی است یا نه؟ دعوت به برداشتن همه قیود، به همه رسوم، به هر گونه اعمال محدودیتی از ناحیه دولت، آیا می‌شود قبول کرد هم چنین چیزی در اجتماع انسان‌ها که برقرار بشود؟ «کلمه الحق یراد بهل باطل» سخن حقی است ولی انگیزه باطلی‌ست آن مراد چه بود؟ آن مراد باطل، امیرالمومنین می‌گفت: این‌ها می‌گویند الا امرت الا الله، ما قبول داریم که باید قانون، قانون الهی باشد، ولی مجری هم می‌خواهد و کسی را هم می‌خواهد که این قانون الهی را اجرایش را عهد دار بشود، این‌ها، این دومی را  در واقع دارند انکار می‌کنند، می‌گویند کسی نمی‌تواند امیر باشد حاکم نمی‌خواهیم حکم را می‌گویند ولی منظورشان حاکم است یعنی دولت نمی‌خواهیم یعنی دولت نمی‌خواهیم حاکم نمی‌خواهیم و ایشان البته مخالفت می‌کرد آنارشیست‌های قرن نوزدهم عیناً همین را می‌گفتند  ما همه می‌دانیم که این کار فعلاً ما می‌دانیم نشدنی است گر چه که سوسیالیست‌ها به یک معنا می‌گویند شدنی است اگر ما دولت را کار گزار یک طبقه خاص بدانیم، کار گزار طبقه حاکم بدانیم، در آن صورت دولت، فرزند یک جامعه طبقاتی خواهد بود مطابق آن تئوری و اگر جامعه بی‌طبقه شد بی دولت هم خواهد شد، این نتیجه قهری آن است بنابراین مطابق تئوری‌های سوسیالیستی و سوسیالیسم علمی اگر کسی قبول داشته باشد که آن علمی است، واقعاً علوم کشف کردن یک چنان حرکتی را در تاریخ، در آن صورت می‌تواند بپذیرد توصیه به جامعه بی‌دولت، توصیه محالی نیست و این جزء دستورهای لغو واقع نخواهد شد اما اگر کسی آن سوسیالیسم علمی را واقعاً مبتنی بر علم نداند و این را هم وهمی از اوهام بداند شبیه همان که خود سوسیالیست‌های علمی، سوسیالیسم‌های تخیلی را می‌گفتند شما اوهام می‌گوید اگر کسی هم پیدا بشود به خود این‌ها بگوید شما اوهام می‌گوید در این صورت دعوت به ایجاد جامعه بی‌دولت مبتنی بر تئوری است که آن تئوری علماً نادرست است و به این لحاظ باطل است یعنی باطل است به چه معنی به  معنی دستور لغوی است که حذف خواهد شد و ایدئولوژی که مبتنی بر این...

... باشد یا مشتمل بر این باشد یک ایدئولوژی است که در آن ما یک نارسایی سراغ می‌کینم می‌بینید که وقتی مسئله وارد قلمرو انسانی و اجتماعی می‌شود داستان خیلی پیچیده می‌شود به راحتی نمی‌شود قضاوت کرد دلیلش این است که علوم اجتماعی ضعف دارند از این نظر آن‌ها موجودات ناتوانی‌اند و این ناتوانی آن‌ها به قلمرو اخلاق و باید و نبایدها توصیه‌های اخلاقی هم منتقل می‌شود اگر آن‌ها توانا بشوند ما حربه تواناتری برای بریدن و تصفیه ایدئولوژی‌ها خواهیم داشت یکی از معیارها ما البته این بود و بلاخره ما یک معیاری هم در نهایت باید ذکر بکنیم که این پنج معیار برای بررسی و ارزیابی امور پنداری و اعتباری تمام بشود عبارت است معیار  نبودن تخالف بین اندیشه اعتباری که در یک ایدئولوژی است با اندیشه‌های اعتباری آغازین و مادر که در طباع عموم انسان‌ها وجود دارد ما نمی‌توانیم البته اثبات کنیم که چرا عدالت خوب است ما نمی‌توانیم اثبات کنیم، ما از اول هم گفته‌ایم، حتی تصورش هم غلط است، اگر کسی خوب بفهمد که عدالت خوب است یعنی چه؟ متوجه می‌شود اثبات پذیر نیست،  ابطال‌پذیر هم البته نیست، دلیل منطقی نمی‌شود آورد برایش ولی ما آدم‌ها طوری که یک میوه‌هایی برای‌مان شيرين و خوشمزه است یک موجوداتی برایمان زیباست یک اعمالی برای ما رضایت بخش است و خرسندی‌آور است یک اعمالی برای ما تنفرآور است و این‌ها را هم ما هیچ اثبات نمی‌کنیم عدالت هم خوب است و مورد پذیرش ما انسان‌هاست از نظر آن که انسانیم  و ما تا آن جا که اعمال نظر می‌کنیم در تمام انسان می‌بینیم که چنین چیزی وجود داشته است می‌توانیم بگویم یک امر فطری است ما در این نام‌گذاری هیچ تاکیدی هم نداریم هیچ مناقشی هم نداریم فطری غریزییست انسان غریزه عدالت خواهی دارد، بله درست است به این معنا که شما از هر انسانی که بپرسید از ظلم متنفر است اگر ایدئولوژی‌هایی بیایند که با این نوع اندیشه‌های مادر و آغازین در امور اعتباری مخالفت و منافات داشته باشند این‌ها هم قابل قبول نیستند ما نمی‌گویم غلط‌اند اصلاً غلط و درست در این جا جاری نیست بلکه مقبول نیستند به دلیل اینکه اندیشه‌های دیگری مقبولاً ‌که اگر بخواهیم این بعدها را بگیریم مجبوریم از آن‌ها صرف نظر کنیم و صرف نظر از آن‌ها برای ما موثر نیست شدنی...

... in other words, if it tells people, "Come, let us all practice oppression," this is an impossible task. We again encounter that same matter which will be futile, and a command that will be in vain. These, in their totality, are five criteria by which one can examine an idea, or a set of these contingent ideas, an ideology which is a complex of contingent constructs, and to some extent distinguish the acceptable from the unacceptable among them. One point that was among the questions received, and I must refer to it and bring this discussion to a close, is that one can derive other fictive ideas from fictive ideas themselves. This is logically effective and permissible. What was not permissible was crossing from the fictive to the non-fictive, or from the non-fictive to the fictive. If we accept that justice is good—this is a fictive idea—if we accept that a certain type of action is justice, then we can conclude that a certain type of action is good. "A certain type of action is good" is itself a kind of fictive idea. But from what was it born? From another fictive idea, which was that justice is good. It is also the case that one can extend these deductions far back and continue them, and draw very novel conclusions. So the path of deduction is open, for the fictive from the fictive, as long as we follow the logical method. But for that bridging between the contingent and the non-contingent, of course, we cannot consider such a thing permissible. On the other hand, as we said before, we cannot prove by scientific and logical methods what thing has what value. A question came here: can it be shown by scientific methods what exploitation is? No, it cannot. We must first decide, based on our value foundation, what we consider unjust or impermissible exploitation. What happens in the external world between two beings is that one works and another enjoys, benefits, finds comfort, and so on. What limit of this is permissible and what limit is impermissible, whether it is entirely permissible or entirely impermissible, is one hundred percent a value-based and contingent decision. But once we have made this convention—what amount we consider permissible and what amount impermissible—once we have made this convention, other conventions can be generated from it. That is, from this convention, one can deduce that if I see a certain amount of profit accruing to someone somewhere, we will say exploitation has occurred, or vice versa. But the initial decision, the determination of this value, and the production of this convention is ours. Science itself does not produce conventions. Science itself does not produce fictive and instrumental ideas.

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Abdolkarim Soroush's Lecture Series: The Method of Critiquing Ideas (5)

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