Ahmad Meydari's Article 'Amartya Sen's Critique of John Rawls: Two Strategies for Reformism'

Amartya Sen's Critique of John Rawls: Two Strategies for Reformism

Ahmad Meydari

Amartya Sen, in one of his books titled The Idea of Justice, published in 2009, critiques the theory of John Rawls.[1] It was always assumed that the theory of John Rawls, the great political philosopher, and the Nobel laureate economist complemented one another. John Rawls, as one of the great political philosophers of the twentieth century, and Amartya Sen, as one of the great contemporary economists, both developed the theory of justice within a single theoretical framework. John Rawls showed that within the liberal tradition one could defend the distribution of income and wealth, or distributive justice, and Amartya Sen elucidated the relationship between freedom and development, demonstrating that political freedom is highly effective in reducing poverty. One reconciled liberalism with distributive justice, and the other reconciled economic development with political freedom. These two, along with Kenneth Arrow, are considered to be influenced by John Rawls on the subject of justice. For example, Sen says: "I had the privilege of commenting on the book A Theory of Justice before its publication and benefited greatly from his theory. Rawls's theory has always cast a shadow over my thinking, but I have now arrived at fundamental flaws and inadequacies in Rawls's thought on justice (p. 84).[2]

The book The Idea of Justice is, on the one hand, dedicated to Rawls, and on the other, is solely a critique of his views. Amartya Sen divides the intellectual tradition into two categories: the transcendental tradition and the comparative tradition.

Amartya Sen places John Rawls in the first tradition and himself in the second. Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant are the founders of the first tradition, and Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx are the founders of the second. The book The Idea of Justice compares these two intellectual traditions from various aspects, from epistemology to practical applications. In the transcendental tradition, the realization of justice is contingent upon the creation of specific institutions. Hence, Amartya Sen calls it transcendental institutionalism. Within this intellectual framework, for justice to be realized, there must be just institutional arrangements, whereas in the comparative intellectual tradition, the exercise of justice is not possible under various institutional arrangements, and one should not wait for specific institutions to be realized in order for economic relations to become just. The difference between the transcendental tradition and the comparative tradition can be understood through Amartya Sen's quotation from Adam Smith:

The murder of newborn infants was a practice allowed of in almost all the states of Greece, even among the polite and civilized Athenians. Whenever the circumstances of the parent rendered it inconvenient to bring up the child, to abandon it to hunger, or to wild beasts, was regarded without blame or censure. Aristotle talks of it as of what the magistrate ought to encourage. The humane Plato is of the same opinion, and, with all that love of mankind which seems to animate all his writings, no where marks this practice with disapprobation (p. 499).

Amartya Sen quotes this passage from Adam Smith's book The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Today, this cruel practice has disappeared among humans, and mankind no longer engages in this heinous and oppressive act. How have we moved towards a less oppressive society? We no longer abandon our children to the wolves. Answering this specific question requires a deep exploration of human history, but in general, Amartya Sen intends to use this example to explain the project of moving towards justice. It is an acceptable assumption that the majority of civilized people in Greece did not feel this act was immoral, and for this reason, the behavior was common, and Aristotle and Plato also did not consider it immoral. Yet, despite this, there were people among the Greeks who considered this behavior immoral. Probably, by becoming acquainted with other societies, the Greek people gained more self-awareness about their own behavior and realized the incorrect outcomes of their actions. A public reasoning about this behavior occurred in that society, and that oppressive tradition was set aside.

In human history, many successes of this kind have been achieved. If we look closely at our own Iranian society, how much have children's rights at school, at home, in custody, and in public behavior towards them in cities and villages changed over the past fifty years? Humanity has moved towards a less unjust society and has not waited for the necessary institutions to be realized for the establishment of a perfectly just society. The starting point of practicing justice is these very different moral feelings towards the existing situation. If a dialogue takes place over this situation, we can hope to achieve a more just state of affairs. The public dialogue that Amartya Sen calls Government by Discussion is possible in various institutional arrangements.

James Mill's strange proposal and Ricardo's response to him illuminate Amartya Sen's approach more clearly. England faced a severe famine in the summer of 1816. The temperature that summer was constantly below zero, and for this reason, that year was called the year without a summer. Grain production drastically decreased, and many people died of starvation. James, the father of John Stuart Mill, wrote to Ricardo: cutting off the heads of the hungry people might be a mercy to them (p: 481).

James Mill's recommendation is very cruel, but Ricardo's response to solving the famine problem was different. He wrote the book On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation in 1817, and in that book, he introduced the liberalization of trade as the solution to combat food shortages in England and presented his theory of comparative advantage. Liberalizing imports solves the problem of food shortages, and not only in times of crisis, but according to Ricardo's theory, it is always to the benefit of the people of England and any country that adopts this theory. However, the landowning class of England opposed Ricardo's proposal because their income was compatible with the restriction and closure of foreign trade. The food shortage would be solved by liberalizing foreign trade and importing wheat, but the landowning class would lose its interests. Ricardo's theory changed England's economic policy. The government was forced to prefer the public interest over the interests of the landowners, and food imports were liberalized. It is said that Ricardo's book became so popular that mothers would hold and read this book while singing lullabies to their infants; of course, this level of popularity is probably a story, and reading Ricardo's book is not that easy, but a different method for dealing with famine was etched into the conscience of the English people.

Amartya Sen believes that by examining empirical cases one can arrive at rules that explain why the world becomes more just or more unjust. He calls this mode of thinking the comparative approach. By comparing a situation where food trade is closed with one where foreign trade is open, and by comparing different behaviors toward children in various societies, one can be guided toward more just conditions. Opposed to this mode of thinking is transcendental thought, which seeks to design a just society based on axiomatic principles. In the two examples above, let us note how human beings desisted from slaughtering famine victims and killing their own children, and behaved more justly. Probably in both experiences, many people loathed the existing state of affairs. This loathing, or the very sense of injustice or inhumanity, is the starting point. If people, especially officials, can do something to provide food for the populace but sit on their hands, public loathing of the existing situation is triggered. A group of people considers the killing or even the death of famine victims and children unjust, and demands that those who hold power or can prevent the death of their fellow human beings change the situation. The feeling of badness or revulsion is aroused when a solution is conceivable. This feeling of revulsion and the conceivable solution lead to dialogue; dialogue to exit the unjust situation. From public dialogue, sometimes proposals like those of Ricardo emerge, and sometimes an anonymous group places a solution before humanity. Dialogue over what has affected our lives, even if it begins with the strange proposals of James Mill, leads to impartial reasoning. Human beings compare existing situations in terms of their degree of goodness and badness, prefer one over another, and rank them according to their desirability; of course, not everyone assigns the same score to every situation; just as some prefer apples to oranges, some favor trade restrictions and others favor openness, and some consider child murder right and others wrong. If dialogue takes place over this situation, one can hope to achieve a more just state of affairs. Public dialogue, which Amartya Sen calls government by discussion, has taken place in various societies. Dialogue over the justice or injustice of the existing situation leads to change and steers society toward a less unjust state. The starting point for approaching a less unjust state is dialogue to remedy remediable injustices. The term remediable injustices is a central concept in Amartya Sen's thought. Instead of designing perfectly just institutions, we must think about remediable injustices. Our surroundings are full of injustices, but not all of them are remedied. The transcendental institutionalist tradition wants to build a society in which all forms of oppression are eliminated, to finish the job once and for all and eradicate the evil of injustice forever. If these right institutions can be established, we will have a just world. Consider John Rawls's first two principles, which, if realized, would establish perfectly just institutions or a perfectly just society:

a. Each person has an equal right to the basic liberties, compatible with a similar liberty for others;

b. Social and economic inequalities are justified only if they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.

If rational human beings agree on the above principles and a society is built on their basis, justice will prevail once and for all.

Why does Amartya Sen oppose this approach? The examples he provides make the reason for his opposition easier to understand:

First example: Suppose the greatest painting of humanity is the Mona Lisa, but you do not have access to it, and before you are two works by two other painters (one by Picasso and another by Van Gogh), and you wish to choose one of these two works. Will contemplating the Mona Lisa and understanding the magnificence of that work help solve your actual problem? In Amartya Sen's view, contemplating da Vinci's work not only does not help our actual choice, but can also be misleading for choosing among possible alternatives. In the real world, we must choose one from among the available options. The choice is not between perfect justice and injustice; rather, we are compelled to choose among less unjust situations. We must choose one from among those situations and strive to realize it, whereas in the intellectual tradition of many political philosophers—of which John Rawls is also a member—the aim is to design an ideally just society (p. 43).

Second example: Consider a situation where two children want a flute, and you have only one flute. One of these children has no toys at all, while the second has other toys as well. On the other hand, the first child cannot play the flute, but the second child is an artist. If you give the flute to the first child, it is closer to equality, but many people will enjoy the second child's music, and the total utility of society will increase. Can rational individuals solve this problem and give the flute to one of these two children? John Rawls attempts to create this agreement, but Amartya Sen considers it impossible. Each of these two children has their own argument for obtaining the flute. One says that depriving me entails a feeling of deprivation, and you will take away my chance to become a musician or even to be happy; the other says I will benefit society, and the total utility of all people will increase. Egalitarian philosophers vote in favor of the poor child, and philosophers who favor maximizing utility vote in favor of the second child. Agreement between these two children is not possible, but can other human beings reach an agreement and all concur on a single verdict regarding the distribution of the flute between the two children? Amartya Sen's answer is negative; humanity cannot, through logical reasoning, arrive at a single understanding of justice. Conversely, John Rawls sought to arrive at principles upon which all reasoning human beings would agree (p. 39).

Thus, Amartya Sen believes that creating agreement for designing transcendental institutions is neither possible nor useful, but in addition to this, he raises another major objection to transcendental thought. His objection to his other friend, Thomas Nagel, demonstrates Sen's third critique of transcendentalism:

Consider the complete negation of the subject of "the idea of global justice" in the view of one of the most principled, capable, and humane philosophers of our age, my friend Thomas Nagel, from whom I have learned a great deal. In a highly engaging 2005 article, by meticulously setting out his transcendental conception of justice, he concludes that global justice is not a subject for discussion, because the precise requirements of just institutions cannot be achieved at the global level. Nagel writes, "I believe it is very difficult to resist Hobbes's claim concerning the relation between justice and sovereignty." If Hobbes's view is correct, the idea of justice in the absence of a world government will be nothing more than a chimera (p. 53).

In other words, just as Hobbes believed that in a dual political structure (church and state) resolving the fundamental problems of any country is impossible and that power must be unified, Nagel also considers achieving justice at the global level to require a specific structure of political sovereignty in the international arena, and since this global political structure is impossible, the discussion of global justice is taken off the agenda. This approach leads to inaction in the realm of global justice, because as long as the structure of international governance does not change, nothing can be done to advance justice.

Although Amartya Sen's discussion and his critique of Rawls are focused on justice, the difference between the two fundamentally represents two distinct approaches to reformism. In one tradition, reformism is an effort to design transcendent institutions, and in another tradition, it is an effort to move away from a relatively bad situation to a relatively better one. The current situation does not give way to an ideal state. Which set of institutions will make this change possible is unknown in advance and emerges from social dialogue; it is an exercise in social and public justice, not philosophical reflection.

In the thought of Amartya Sen and other proponents of the comparative tradition, one must delve into humanity's movement toward less unjust situations and grasp certain rules. In his journey through the history of East and West, the author arrives at a simple rule: hatred of a situation and dialogue about changing it guide us toward a better world. Alongside this general rule, every attempt at better collective living, whether successful or failed, teaches us how to succeed in the pursuit of justice. Hatred of injustice and dialogue or negotiation to resolve it must never cease, at any time or in any place. In Sen's interpretation, this dialogue did not cease under the rule of Akbar the Great (the Great Mughal), the third Gurkani emperor in India, nor after Alexander's conquest of India. The pursuit of justice as envisioned by Sen never comes to a halt; the pursuit of justice is an unceasing effort to eliminate injustices, both small and large.

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[1] Sen, Amartya. 2009. The idea of justice. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

It should be noted that two Persian translations of this book are available in Iran: one translated by Hormoz Homayounpour and Vahid Mahmoudi, published by Kandokav Publications in 1390 (2011) in 456 pages; and another translated by Ahmad Azizi, published by Ney Publishing in 1394 (2015) in 547 pages.

[2] In this piece, references are made to Ahmad Azizi's translation of the book The Idea of Justice.

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