Ali Moazzami's Lecture: 'The Concept of Freedom from Two Perspectives'

In keeping with the aims of this course, which compares philosophical activities in the analytic and continental traditions, we will present the views of two political philosophers on freedom across two sessions. Each of these two can be placed within one of these analytic and continental categories. The common problem we have chosen between these two thinkers is the problem of freedom. The reason for this choice is that freedom has been one of the most debated concepts in political philosophy at least since the French Revolution, and diverse views about it have been and continue to be offered. Thus, the aim of choosing this problem is both to have an example of the analysis of a problem using these different approaches and to be able, by means of these analyses at the end of the second session, to engage in a more general comparison of these approaches. In what follows, I will provide a general picture of what will take place in these two sessions.

Session One: The Concept of Freedom in Philip Pettit; Freedom as Non-Domination

Audio of Session One

If you have read the essay "Two Concepts of Liberty" in Isaiah Berlin's book Four Essays on Liberty, you will notice that Berlin, following an extensive discussion in the history of Western political philosophy, draws a decisive distinction between philosophical conceptions of freedom and divides these conceptions into two major categories: positive liberty and negative liberty. We will discuss this in greater detail, but it is good to briefly mention that, in Berlin's view, those who subscribe to positive liberty are those who try to show what characteristics a subject must possess in order to achieve freedom, and thus they address the affirmative or "positive" properties that must be in place for freedom to be realized. In contrast, those who subscribe to negative liberty try to show that the subject's being free means that there must be no restrictions or obstacles in their path. Berlin, in this discussion, sides with the conception of negative liberty, and his arguments have had a significant influence on political philosophers after him. However, serious criticisms have also been leveled against Berlin from various directions, whether from those who do not accept this division; from those who accept the division but side with positive liberty within it; and from those who think the framework of negative liberty is generally suitable but that Berlin's formulation is not the best formulation for negative liberty. Philip Pettit, the philosopher we will address in the first session, belongs to this last group. Pettit refers to a discussion raised before him by the historian of ideas Quentin Skinner, who, relying on his methodology of reading historical texts, showed how the ancient Romans had a negative conception of freedom that was nonetheless different from the Berlinian conception and had advantages over it. The point relevant to our discussion here is that Skinner's methodology is derived from the views of the twentieth-century analytic philosopher of language J. L. Austin. Pettit also uses this same methodology and, moreover, in developing his own conception of freedom, chooses a method that fits within the framework of analytic philosophy of language.

Session Two: Hannah Arendt: Freedom in Distinction from Liberation and the Link Between Freedom and Revolution

Audio of Session Two

In the second session, I want to address some fundamental aspects of Hannah Arendt's conception of freedom. Hannah Arendt is a German philosopher who was forced to emigrate to America during the Second World War, and from then on wrote most of the works published in her lifetime in English. Arendt's writings in political philosophy, even the most theoretical among them, have a clear connection to the concerns of the day. For Arendt, the discussion of freedom is raised above all in connection with the historical discussion of revolution: in almost all revolutions, the slogan of freedom-seeking is heard, but there has been and continues to be a serious and contentious debate over the extent to which each revolution has addressed the realization of freedom and how successful it has been, and this very debate, on a more philosophical level, has led to an inquiry into the concept of freedom. Arendt addresses all of these, and I will try, in the limited time I have, to focus on her more conceptual discussion of freedom.

Comparison and Conclusion (at the end of the second session)At the end of the second session, I will try to explain what these two exemplary approaches we have chosen tell us more generally about the analytic and continental approaches, what expectations we can have of these approaches, and with what intention we might turn to each of them. Naturally, this comparative discussion will also bear the mark of the thematic limitations we have chosen, and if it has any validity, it will be more meaningful within the domain of political philosophy; although I will endeavor to make the context of the discussion more general.

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Sources you can study:

For the first session:

Skinner, Quentin, Liberty before Liberalism, translated by Fereydoun Majlesi, Farhang-e Javid Publications Berlin, Isaiah, "Two Concepts of Liberty" in the book Four Essays on Liberty, translated by Mohammad Ali Movahed, Kharazmi Publications Pettit, Philip, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, translated by Farhad Majlesipour, Shirazeh Publications.

For the second session:

Arendt, Hannah, On Revolution, translated by Ezzatollah Fooladvand, Kharazmi Publications. Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition, translated by Masoud Olia, Phoenix Publications.

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Ali Moazzami's Lecture: 'The Concept of Freedom from Two Perspectives'

University of Tehran, Philosophy Department Academic Association, 19 and 20 Aban 1398