Ali Sabouhi's Critique of Kaveh Lajevardi's Translation: “Wittgenstein: Rules and Private Language”

A Critique of the Translation of “Wittgenstein: Rules and Private Language” translated by Kaveh Lajevardi, Nashr-e Markaz, First Edition 2017

Ali Sabouhi

In his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripke presents an important and challenging interpretation of Wittgenstein’s famous rule-following argument. This argument forms the central part of the Philosophical Investigations. Kripke’s interpretation not only demonstrates the significance of this argument for understanding the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language but has also led to the rule-following problem becoming, independently, one of the most important issues in contemporary analytic philosophy.

Kaveh Lajevardi has translated this book into Persian. In this note, I will try to point out problems in the translation of several key concepts of the book. Before examining the translation, it is necessary to outline the general contours of Kripke’s argument and provide brief explanations about the main concepts of the skeptical argument. I hope these explanations will help clarify the criticisms that will be leveled against the translation.

In sketching the overall picture of the argument, I will use the translation and the equivalents employed in the Persian translation, but for those concepts that I believe have been mistranslated, I will use other equivalents.

1) The Skeptical Argument

Kripke claims that the section of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations where the problem of rule-following is introduced puts forward a skeptical argument that denies the existence of any fact that constitutes meaning. Kripke’s plan for describing and interpreting the skeptical argument is to first show that there is no fact that determines meaning. He then discusses the “skeptical solution” and says that although there is no fact for the determination and attribution of meaning, and the skeptic’s claim is unavoidably acceptable, in response to the skeptic one can say that the attribution of meaning is based on things other than facts; and this means that the attribution of meaning has no constitutive basis but does have justification, and if a person has not violated the accepted rules of their linguistic community, we are justified in attributing meaning to them.

Let us look at the details of the argument. Each of us who knows the meaning of the word ‘plus’ (denoted by the sign +) and has had elementary math education, provided we are of sound mind and intelligence, can answer a question about the sum of numbers, even if we are encountering it for the first time. Suppose the question is: what will be the sum of 68+57? It is clear that the answer is 125. But the skeptic objects and says the correct answer is 5. Note that he does not object to our method of calculation or the mathematical definition of addition, but merely asks: when a person utters (uses) ‘plus’, what does he mean? [1]

It is clear that we would like to answer the skeptic that the person in this case means a function whose result for the sum of the two numbers 68 and 57 will be 125. The skeptic objects and says that perhaps what the person means is a function called quus, which for numbers smaller than 57 acts just like the addition function, but for numbers greater than or equal to it, the result is 5. The skeptic’s hypothesis is not logically impossible. He wants to know what fact it is that determines that the person means plus and not quus.

After introducing this hypothesis, any fact that could determine what a person means (plus or quus) is evaluated and shown to be sterile. The facts that can be considered for the determination of meaning are these:

One) The person’s previous uses of the words

Two) Dispositional properties

Three) The history of mental states (propositional attitudes and sensory experiences)

The problem with appealing to past uses is that they are finite, whereas the instances of use of a word are infinite. Therefore, finite past instances cannot determine meaning, which is infinite. The skeptic rightly says that all of a person’s past uses are compatible with the claim that in the past they used “plus” to mean quus.

The problem of the finitude of past uses might perhaps be answered in this way: although all of a person’s past uses have been finite, those uses are the result of the manifestation of properties that are not always present but emerge under specific conditions and in the presence of particular factors. These properties are characterized by being unlimited and are called dispositional properties. The standard analysis of dispositional properties is that a person has the dispositional property of meaning apple if and only if there is a causal relation between apples and their uses of the word “apple.”

Kripke also rules out this theory, because the suitable conditions for the manifestation of the dispositional property of meaning cannot be specified unless meaning, or concepts equivalent to it, are presupposed. Specifying the suitable conditions for meaning requires distinguishing correct from incorrect responses. For this reason, the defender of the dispositional view will be forced to presuppose the correct responses. But presupposing the correct responses itself means that they already know what it is to mean plus, whereas this is nothing other than the very question at issue.

But let us turn to mental states. Why can mental states not determine what a person means by a word? One can speak of two kinds of mental states: states whose distinguishing characteristic is their qualitative features (sensory experiences like pain), and states that have propositional content (such as belief, intention, meaning…). What is relevant to our discussion is the second category.

Propositional attitudes have content, and the constituent parts of content are concepts. Hence, when, in response to the skeptic, we refer them to mental states of this kind, the point is that the content of the person’s propositional attitude dictates that they should say 125 in answer to the sum of the two numbers mentioned.

It is clear that this proposal does not have the problems of the causal view, but its objection is that concepts, like words, are interpretable in such a way that the correct interpretation cannot be distinguished from the incorrect one. The skeptic asks why the concept of counting cannot be interpreted in a way that is compatible with the answer 5. Here Kripke recounts Wittgenstein’s saying that interpretations come to an end without meaning having been determined.

This was a hurried overview of Kripke’s skeptical argument. I will now proceed to examine the Persian translation of the book.

2) Examination of the Translation of Several Concepts and Their Explanations in the Translator’s Notes Section

The word Disposition

Lajevardi has translated this word as تمایل [tamāyol] and noted that “although this may have been the best choice, the word is not very pleasing to the ear” (p. twelve).

The problem, however, goes beyond it not being pleasing to the ear. تمایل, meaning (desire and wish), is an incorrect translation for disposition. Having a تمایل cannot be reduced to physical properties. But we said that in the standard analysis of dispositional properties, they are reduced to a causal relation (a physical property). Therefore, تمایل cannot be a correct translation of disposition.

Of course, Lajevardi clarifies that he has not used تمایل in the sense of desire or wish as an equivalent for disposition:

“…having a تمایل toward something does not necessarily mean that a desire or wish is involved. For example, one speaks of a person who, when adding numbers, has a تمایل to make a certain mistake – that is, they are susceptible to making such a mistake, or are prone to that type of mistake” (p. thirteen).

اما این توضیحات کمکی به رفع ابهام نمی‌کند. ترجمۀ disposition سرانجام چیست؟ آیا از نظر مترجم به معنای استعداد است؟ در این صورت چرا استعداد را برای ترجمۀ disposition و استعدادی را برای dispositional پیشنهاد نداده است؟ انتخاب تمایل چگونه می‌تواند «بهترین انتخاب» بوده باشد در صورتی که حتی مشخص نشده است معنایش چیست وما چگونه باید آنرا بفهمیم؟ مترجم می‌گوید تمایل را به معنای میل و خواسته نفهمید، اما مگر معنای دیگری هم دارد؟

ترجمه فعلِ Mean

یکی از مهمترین مفاهیم کتاب mean است و به نظرم مترجم آن را اشتباه ترجمه کرده است. لاجوردی آن را به مراد کردن ترجمه کرده و می‌گوید «این فعل البته گاهی به معنای به معنای چیزی بودن است و واژۀ meaning هم عمدتاً یعنی معنا».(ص، سیزده)

اما مترجم توضیح نمی‌دهد که چرا ازمیان به معنای چیزی بودن و مراد کردن، دومی را انتخاب کرده است. به بیان دیگر، چرا او تصمیم گرفته است mean را به معنای چیزی بودن بکار نبرد؟ با توجه به اینکه mean مفهوم اصلی استدلال مطرح شده در کتاب کریپکی است، لازم است دلیل این انتخاب مترجم روشن باشد. در ادامه می‌کوشم تا نشان دهم انتخاب مراد کردن برای mean نا‌درست است و باعث شده است مسیر استدلال کریپکی در ترجمه‌ی فارسی مخدوش شود.

مراد کردن نوعی گرایش گزاره‌ای است و گفتیم یک گرایش گزاره‌ای محتوایی دارد. برگزیدن مراد کردن در ترجمه فارسی، استدلال شکاکانه را به این صورت می‌نمایاند که آنچه شکاک ازابتدا هدف قرا‌ر داده است محتوای گرایش‌های گزاره‌ای بوده است؛ یعنی شکِّ شکاک اساساً در این است که شخص چگونه می تواند بگوید محتوای آنچه مراد کرده  چه بوده است. اما چنین نمایشی از استدلال شکاکانه نادرست است چرا که این استدلال با پرسش از معنای واژگانِ زبان آغاز می شود نه از محتوای حالات ذهنی. کریپکی آشکارا استدلال شکاکانه‌اش را علیه معنای واژگان آغازمی‌کند و آنرا گسترش می‌دهد به محتوای حالات ذهنی. و این که استدلال شکاکانه بتواند از معنا به محتوا گسترانیده شود خود مبحث مهم و گشوده‌ای است. اما مشکل این است که در ترجمه فارسی چنین مسیری اساساً بی معنا است.

شاید در پاسخ گفته شود هر استدلال شکاکانه‌ای را که بتوان بر ضدّ معنا اقامه کرد، بر ضدّ محتوا نیز می‌توان و از این رو انتخاب مراد کردن  – که واژه‌ای است در باره‌ی محتوای حالات ذهنی –  بر درستیِ استدلال خدشه‌ای وارد نمی‌کند.

اما چنین دفاعی موفق نیست زیرا که استدلال شکاکانه علیه معنا با استدلال شکاکانه علیه محتوا همانند نیست. برای اثبات شکاکیت در معنا سرانجام باید نشان داده شود که محتوای حالات ذهنی نیز نامتعین است و هیچ امر واقع‌ای نیست که بتواند آن را متعین کند. پیش از این گفته شد که کریپکی مسأله تعین محتوای حالات ذهنی را نیز بررسی کرده است و برای بی‌اعتبار کردن آن همان استدلالی را مطرح می کند که علیه معنای واژگان مطرح کرده بود. اما در اینجا باید دقیقتر بگوییم که ساختاراستدلال شکاکانه کریپکی علیه محتوا تفاوت مهمی دارد با ساختار استدلال او علیه معنا. در صورتی می‌توان گفت محتوای حالات ذهنی– همچون معنای واژگان– تفسیرپذیر هستند که محتوا را برگرفته از بازنمایی‌هایی در زبانِ فکر بدانیم؛ چرا که در نظریه‌ی زبان فکر محتوای یک حالت ذهنی چیزی نیست جز ویژگی‌های معنایی بازنمایی‌های  ساختار زبان مانندی در ذهن. اما زبان فکر و اینکه محتوا ضرورتاً به آن نیازمند است احتیاج به استدلال مستقلی دارد. و این یکی از انتقادات مهم وارد شده به استدلال شکاکانه کریپکی است.[2]

هدف من در اینجا بررسی درستی استدلال کریپکی نیست. آنچه می‌خواهم بگویم این است که نباید گمان کرد هر آنچه در بارۀ معنا می‌توان گفت در بارۀ محتوا نیز می‌توان. در کتاب کریپکی تفاوت معنا و محتوا مشخص است. اما به نظر نمی‌رسد که خواننده‌ی ترجمه فارسی بتواند چنین تفاوتی را مشاهده کند. او از ابتدا با ابن روبرو است که استدلال شکاکانه علیه مراد کردن و تعین محتوای آن است.

Another response to the objection concerning the choice of “meaning-intending” in the Persian translation could be that meaning-something is a function of meaning-intending; that is, for a person to mean something by a word, they must first intend to follow the rule that determines its use. If this claim is correct, it is natural to accept that the skeptical argument is in fact an argument against meaning-intending. In response to such a claim, one could say that although Kripke begins the skeptical argument by asking about how to follow a rule, the course of the argument shows that the problem of meaning skepticism is independent of the problem of rule-following; that is, even if meaning-something did not require rule-following, one could still skeptically ask what constitutes the foundation of the correct use of a word, and if no such thing can be found, one must surrender to the skeptic.[3] However, by accepting that meaning-something is a function of meaning-intending how to follow a rule, the problem of meaning skepticism will only be valid within the context of rule-following.

3) An Objection in the Translation Related to Disposition

On page 29 of the Persian translation, we read:

...and those concepts of inclination whose use is common in philosophy and science are concepts involving ceteris paribus conditions, and not crude and rigid concepts.

But in the English text, there is no word in the above sentence that needs to be translated into Persian as rigid. The English sentence is:

And ceteris paribus notions of dispositions, not crude and literal notions, are the ones standardly used in philosophy and in science (Kripke,1982, p.27).

It seems that rigid is intended as a translation of literal. But literal here does not mean rigid. In the continuation of his examination of the dispositional theory, Kripke introduces an improved version of that theory, namely that dispositional properties could determine meaning if we had considered the possibility of their manifestation under ideal conditions; conditions in which interfering factors were absent.

The issue here is not the rigidity of the analysis of dispositional properties; rather, Kripke's aim is to alert the reader not to understand disposition in its literal and crude sense. And its literal meaning involves ignoring the role of interfering factors in the manifestation of dispositional properties.

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I am grateful to Mohsen Zamani for his points and suggestions.

References:

1) Boghossian, P, (1989), “The Rule following considerations”, Mind, 98

2) Kripke, S, (1982), Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language-An Elementary Exposition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge

3) McGinn, C (1984), Wittgenstein on Meaning, Oxford, Basil Blackwell

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[1] I use “meaning-something” for the verb mean, and by it I mean what meaning a person conveys when they utter (use) an expression. I will say more about the translation of this verb later.

[2] For details on this subject, see:

McGinn, C (1984, p.147)

Boghossian, P, (1989)

[3] Discussions in recent decades have made it clear that the main problem of the determinacy of meaning and content lies in their normativity. The necessity of rule-following is one of the reasons proposed for the normativity of meaning.

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