Article by Minoo Zamanfar titled “Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR)”

Religion is a collection of beliefs, experiences, emotions, behaviors, and rituals; consequently, in terms of subject matter, the cognitive sciences can address religion and its topics, asking how, based on cognitive capacities, the human mind comprehends religious beliefs, ideas, concepts, actions, and schemas.

In this compilation, I will examine three domains of the cognitive science of religion:

1_ Cognitive Anthropology of Religion:

The concept most emphasized in this domain is the reciprocal relationship between the evolution of the mind and the evolution of religious concepts, including God, in human thought (1).

From the perspective of cognitive anthropologists, religious beliefs are divided into two categories: basic beliefs and theological beliefs. Basic beliefs are general beliefs such as belief in the existence of the supernatural, the purposiveness of the universe, and life after death, which, according to cognitive researchers, a tendency toward these beliefs typically exists in our mental structure; in other words, it is the evolutionary heritage of our ancestors. Theological beliefs, however, which are a network of interconnected specific beliefs, are acquired gradually through explicit and implicit instruction. Therefore, according to cognitive anthropologists, a portion of religious tendencies operate within the human mental structure or at the group level, whose selective advantages increase the chances of survival for religious individuals or populations. The evolutionary discussion about religion is a search for components within religion, or components co-occurring with religion, that have led to adaptation. There are differing views on the mechanism by which religion was selected:

The tendency toward religion was directly selected: Some researchers believe that religion is hardwired genetically into the human species. The VMAT2 gene, known as the “God gene,” refers to such theories, which consider the gene a predisposition for spirituality (2). These scientists believe that religion itself has a selective advantage; having religion makes individuals feel better, and this improves their fitness, such that there is a genetic selection in favor of individuals inclined to believe in religion. Specifically, the rituals, beliefs, and social connection typical of religious groups may play a role in calming the mind (for example, by reducing ambiguity and uncertainty arising from complexity) and allow individuals to function better under stress (3).

By-product: The tendency toward spirituality refers to belief in supernatural being(s) (spirit or God). According to many researchers such as Pascal Boyer and Stephen Jay Gould, these ideas are a by-product of mental systems that evolved for other reasons, not directly for religion and faith (4 & 5). For example, we are receptive to the concept of “God” or “spirit” because of our intuitive psychology—what psychologists sometimes call “theory of mind.” According to this group of scientists, the concept of God is a by-product of several other selected traits: theory of mind (TOM), generalization and causal understanding, and the ability to perceive agency. Theory of mind is a capacity that fosters greater coordination among individuals and, by increasing the fitness of social life, enhances the chances of survival and reproduction; if an individual is able to understand and predict the goals, desires, and thoughts of others, interpersonal coordination increases and the possibility of cooperation and collaboration arises (consider its importance in processes such as hunting). On the other hand, the ability to generalize is one of the important characteristics for any kind of classifying being, and causal understanding is essential for any kind of action. The ability to perceive agency also becomes highly important for a being that (for instance) must flee from a predator; according to Stephen Jay Gould, concepts like God or the spirit of things (even inanimate ones) arise from the ability to attribute mind to others, an ability we have generalized even to inanimate objects: just as the mind of other human individuals is invisible yet exists, and we observe its fruits in their behavior, other natural events and transformations are also the result of the mind of their agent (actor). Consequently, they generalize this agency to lightning, storms, death, birth, and so on (6).

Natural Selection at the Group Level: With the invention of agriculture, hunter-gatherer humans became sedentary, and the Neolithic Revolution led to a population explosion. As groups grew larger, individuals who had no kinship ties with one another came together in larger groups. Religion was a suitable tool for bonding non-kin individuals (7), and then gods with moral prescriptions were also able to facilitate cooperation and collaboration among individuals. Thus, it appears that societies which were religious experienced less intra-group killing and cooperated more with one another; consequently, their fitness increased. Religious systems encourage prosocial behaviors, and groups that exhibit prosocial behavior (cooperation, avoidance of cheating and theft) are more successful in survival and reproduction than groups that do not exhibit these traits (8). Since religious communities have more prosocial tendencies, they cooperate better. The more they cooperate, the longer their lifespan and prosperity will be compared to rival communities (9). The increase in cooperative behaviors within the group and the avoidance of selfish acts, as a result of moral teachings and belief in ever-watchful beings (whether the supervision of God, spirits, or ancestors), has given religious communities a selective advantage; because gods have unlimited perceptual access to socially harmful behaviors that occur in secret and are therefore outside the perceptual domain of everyday human forces (10).

2_ Cognitive Psychology of Religion

In this section, I will address the psychological mechanisms without which we would be unable to understand complex religious matters, and by means of which religious beliefs are produced or reinforced in humans. From the perspective of cognitive psychologists, the mind must be understood in terms of cognitive structures and processes. They call these structures and processes mental tools, which fundamentally have an evolutionary basis. Every cognitive matter, including religion, is studied within the context of mental tools; as if the condition of possibility for constructing any concept has been these mental tools, which are themselves products of evolution. In this way, various aspects of religion are considered cognitive inclinations. Thus, religious questions in this domain take the following form: Why does the human mind have a tendency to construct the concept of God, and how does it construct it? Why do humans have a tendency to believe in an afterlife? And so on.

Belief in God (Supernatural Intentional Agency):

The Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device (HADD): Humans have an innate bias toward detecting quasi-human agencies in their environment; that is, an intentional agent (11). As we mentioned in the previous section, one of the human capacities is the ability to recognize intentional agencies. However, our cognitive system produces false positives [1] in this detection (i.e., detecting an agent when no agent exists). Our agency detection device is overly sensitive, hence it is represented as HADD [2]. The reason for this excessive sensitivity is that it increases the individual's chance of survival (for example, if you mistakenly identify a rustle of wind in the grass as a snake—an agent that intends to bite—the cost is lower compared to the potential risk of failing to detect a snake). HADD is a cognitive bias that allows humans to increase their chances of survival, albeit sometimes by producing false beliefs. The sensitivity of HADD means that this mental tool undertakes the identification of an agent even with ambiguous or incomplete evidence, and sometimes errs (12). The justification for this high sensitivity, even to incomplete evidence, is that its cost is lower, and the danger to a person's survival if they falsely positively identify an attacker is less than ignoring a potential attacker.

Specifically, when individuals encounter a problem that is emotionally salient to them and whose degree of ambiguity is such that they fail to find a reason for it, HADD is driven toward postulating supernatural agents and plays a fundamental role in the formation of belief in supernatural beings. Consequently, the HADD mechanism plays an important role in the formation of supernatural agents—including God (13). If the attribution to a supernatural being is repeated many times, it also acquires collective plausibility, reinforcing belief in God and the transmission of this belief (14).

Causal Reasoning (CR): The evolution of the human mind is such that for an event—however random it may be—it concocts a complete cause-and-effect story. The human mind does not leave unusual and ambiguous matters unexplained and constructs a story for them (15).

Memory and “Minimally Counterintuitive Concepts”: “Mammals live on land, but the whale is a mammal that lives like a fish,” “The Virgin Mary is a mother, but unlike all mothers, she never had a husband.” Such cases, where the general concept is compatible with human understanding but one or more instances violate it, are remembered very well. Pascal Boyer considers most religious entities to be of this type. These ideas remain in memory and are recalled far better than intuitive ideas and also ideas that are maximally counterintuitive. These concepts both attract more attention and are more memorable (16).

3_ Neuroscience of Religion

This field has primarily focused on individuals’ religious experiences—the feeling of transcendent insight, extraordinary perceptions, communication with the Absolute, meditation, a sense of unity with the universe, etc. I will examine the theories in this field under two categories.

The idea of the first category is that one can identify the neural correspondences and correlates of all types of religious experiences. This category of theories, as John Hick points out, is the result of studying religious individuals who are considered “healthy” (17).

Different parts of the brain create different experiences; for example, the frontal lobe is responsible for rational perception and evaluation, and the limbic system is responsible for our emotional motivations. Accordingly, in Newberg’s view, the frontal lobe creates a conceptual and rational understanding of God, and the limbic system creates emotional experiences of God (18).

In some extremist groups where individuals are raised with feelings of hatred toward other faiths and religions, a dysfunction is observed in the anterior cingulate cortex. The primary role of the anterior cingulate cortex is to create a balance between the frontal lobe (the rational center of the brain) and the limbic system (the emotional center of the brain), thus mediating thoughts and feelings. Consequently, its function appears to be correlated with the presence or absence of an aggressive disposition in religious individuals. On the other hand, the anterior cingulate cortex is highly important in creating a sense of empathy and compassion toward others. Those religious individuals who engage in meditation and mystical experiences, correlated with the activation of the anterior cingulate cortex and reduced activity of the amygdala (associated with fear), have a sense of empathy, compassion, and peace toward others (19).

The Experience of Unity with Absolute Reality: Through experiments on Tibetan Buddhists, Newberg found that during prolonged meditation, the activity of the parietal areas[1] (responsible for spatial orientation) of the brain decreases, and as a result, they feel a sense of unity and oneness with the idea or image on which they have focused (20).

Limbic System: The limbic system (amygdala, hypothalamus, hippocampus) plays a role in generating emotions. Stimulation of the limbic system leads to experiences similar to meditation (21). The hypothalamus has two main systems called "arousal" and "quiescence" that, in interaction with one another, create balance in the brain's neural activities; for example, when neural activity reaches its maximum level, a "spillover[2]" occurs, meaning the quiescence system is activated and brings the brain to harmony and equilibrium. In meditation, due to concentration on a subject, the neural activity of the attention area intensifies, and this leads to the stabilization of the image in the visual region. With the intensification of electrical discharge in the right attention area, the function of the hypothalamus's "arousal" system reaches its highest level and ultimately causes a spillover of neural activity; that is, the "quiescence" system is activated, and the person experiences a feeling of calm and stillness. Parallel to this process, one can point to other phenomenological features of this experience, namely "loss of the sense of self[3]" and "absorption[4]" or unity with the image or idea upon which the individual has concentrated during meditation, and express the neurological correlates of these components. When the hypothalamus's "arousal" and "quiescence" systems begin to operate simultaneously, the right and left parts of the attention area also reach their maximum activity. This event is then reflected in the right and left "orientation" areas. In the left orientation area, the hypothalamic neural flow is blocked, and so-called "neural flow blockade[5]" occurs, meaning the flow of afferent nerves or sensory inputs to that part of the brain is briefly halted. The left orientation area is responsible for perceiving the "self" in the spatial matrix, and with the blockage of its sensory inputs, the perception of the "self" as an entity distinct from other phenomena diminishes, and the person experiences a sense of "loss of self." Meanwhile, the activity of the right orientation area, under the influence of the "attention" region, continues to increase; such that the object of focus becomes larger and larger, and the person feels they have become unified with that image or idea. In other words, in the right orientation area, all inputs except the sensory inputs related to the object of focus are blocked, and the individual does not perceive the spatial matrix related to the "self" but solely perceives the spatial reality of the center of attention. Each of these mystics interpreted this experience within the framework of their own mystical culture and tradition; for example, the Christian mystic interpreted this experience in terms of absorption or union with Christ, and the Buddhist mystic considered mystical unity to mean dissolution into nothingness or non-being (22)(23).

The idea of the second category of neuroscience studies can be considered, by way of contribution, that transcendent religious experiences are the result of a dysfunction in the brain. Studies in this category have mainly been conducted either on patients (e.g., 24) or the brains of healthy individuals have been subjected to electrical stimulation (e.g., 25).

Temporal Lobe[6]; Epileptic Seizures and Stimulation: Some individuals who experience epileptic seizures have experiences (auditory or visual) of a religious nature: a feeling of connection with God and perceiving His presence, separating from the body, encountering Christ, or seeing a brilliant light (26). Persinger invented a helmet (the God Machine) that, through electrical stimulation of the temporal lobe, generated mystical experiences for individuals, and the subjects underwent a mystical experience (seeing God, the Devil, Christ, etc.). An interesting point in his findings was that these experiences were culture-dependent and varied according to the individuals' belief and cultural backgrounds. Persinger claimed that individuals with a sensitive temporal lobe or who suffer from epilepsy in this area are more susceptible to such experiences (27). Penfield, in his experiments on conscious individuals with epilepsy, also noticed that stimulating specific areas of the temporal lobe led to the individual hearing sounds or seeing images (28). Epilepsy in the temporal-limbic region also produces experiences such as trance, loss of self, spacelessness, etc. (29). Based on this, some neuroscientists believe that mystical and even revelatory experiences result from a disorder in the brain.

Reduction of Oxygen and Glucose in the Brain: Research by Persinger and Carter indicates that a lack of vital oxygen or glucose in the brain leads to experiences, visions, and auditions with religious content, and this is a good explanation for the phenomenon of why individuals, primarily in their crises—whether physical or mental—have the experience of finding God (30). Oxygen deficiency, reduced blood flow and glucose, causes a surge of glutamate release and excessive activation of NMDA receptors. This, in turn, produces a chemical similar to ketamine (a type of narcotic), which leads to altered states of consciousness (31).

The Limbic System: Hyperactivity of the limbic system can also produce effects similar to temporal lobe hyperactivity, as well as terrifying hallucinations (specifically concerning the amygdala), and so on.

As stated, in all three domains of the cognitive science of religion, the focus is on the commonalities of all religious and mystical experiences—such as presence before the absolute, continuation after death, and common mystical experiences like interlocution and selflessness (loss of self), placelessness, and so on. The main point in these findings—especially in the field of neuroscience—is that it seems individuals articulate this single experience based on the culture to which they belong (for example, in the experience of union, the Christian individual finds themselves in union with Christ, and the Buddhist individual finds themselves dissolved in nothingness); in other words, these individuals find different phenomena in their consciousness. Consequently, it seems that if we are interested in explaining religion from the perspective of cognitive science, we cannot, beyond these three mentioned domains (as explainers of the common denominator of the foundations of religious experience), neglect culture (as the distinguishing feature of this experience).

Summary and Evaluation: Does the cognitive science of religion pose a threat to religion?

Cognitive anthropology, based on evolutionary foundations, enumerates characteristics that give selective advantage to religious individuals and groups. This does not seem to be a very challenging matter for religion. Because the positive impact of religion on individual peace and health, and group cohesion and durability, is not only not challenging but is one of the desired outcomes of religion. Cognitive psychology, however, speaks of mechanisms for concept construction (HADD and CR) that, at the cost of a higher chance of survival, sometimes create false beliefs in the individual. The fact that these mechanisms "sometimes" cause false beliefs in individuals, if it cannot deem belief in the existence of God false, at least weakens this belief. Biabanaki critiques such a conclusion through two arguments: 1. The case of a belief's nature is not closed at the moment of that belief's production. It is possible that at moment A, upon hearing the sound of something breaking, we automatically and non-reflectively form the belief in the existence of a burglar (an intentional agent) in the next room, but then, upon observing the room and considering the evidence, we abandon the belief in the burglar and realize that the wind was the cause (in the author's opinion, Biabanaki leaves room for this objection in his first critique, that it is precisely for this reason that as history progresses, due to the observation of natural evidence of matters, religion and divine explanations carry less weight). But his second argument seems to have more force. 2. Even if we accept that belief in the existence of God was produced by cognitive mechanisms, such as HADD, and accept that these mechanisms sometimes lead us into error, it is not only our religious beliefs that are produced by this mechanism; rather, a belief such as "other humans also have minds like me" is also a product of this same mental tool (32). If we are to abolish all beliefs that are the output of these mechanisms that sometimes err, we would have to abolish belief in many matters, which would probably lead us to skepticism regarding those matters (13).

But to what extent does the neuroscience of religion appear threatening to religion? The first category of neurological studies included research on individuals who, as normal people, engage in religious experiences within their culture (for example, brain imaging of Tibetan Buddhists during meditation). This area does not seem to pose a challenge to religious ideas. Methodologically, the neuroscience of religion has limited itself to examining the neural and physiological correlates of religious and spiritual phenomena and cannot (and does not seek to) judge the external existence of God or ultimate reality. In other words, this field does not have the capacity to speak negatingly or affirmingly about the existence of God, but merely seeks to examine the brain processes involved in generating spiritual experiences (23). The neuroscience of religion discusses the correlation between religious experiences and neural substrates, and based on this relationship, one cannot precisely determine whether the brain is the cause of the spiritual experience or merely plays a receptive or receiving role in the face of supernatural factors. These findings are not particularly challenging for religion, as they make no claim about the noumenal origin of these experiences; they could only be challenging for someone who believes that religious and mystical experiences arise through a "path" other than the natural path of other thoughts and states in the human mind, because for such a person, the fact that religious experiences have physical correlates would likely pose a challenge.

But the second category of neuroscience studies considered religious and revelatory experiences to be the result of brain dysfunction. These studies were either conducted on ill individuals (e.g., Ramachandran and Penfield) or artificially stimulated specific areas of the brains of healthy individuals (e.g., Persinger) and observed mystical and religious experiences in the subjects. Undoubtedly, from the fact that some ill individuals have religious and revelatory experiences, one cannot conclude that every religious and revelatory experience is therefore the result of illness. Based on the scientific method, these pathological and brain stimulation studies cannot draw such a generalization, and at the behavioral level, we cannot label a behavior as pathological without considering cultural components. Cognitive science, within a specific scope and committed to its methodology, examines the processes and phenomena of religious experiences and their neural correlates, and as stated, makes no substantive claim, negatingly or affirmingly, about transcendental matters. It seems that if there is any incompatibility between science and religion, it does not pertain to the findings of the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) but could stem from a debate or conflict with more general theories such as evolution and mind-brain identity, which also manifest themselves here. To put it more clearly, the fact that religious groups have a greater chance of survival, or that individuals with spiritual inclinations endure better under stressful conditions, or that such brain mechanisms occur during the meditation of mystics—none of these contradict religion, and if there is a debate, it is over the foundations of these propositions and religion, which is beyond the present subject.

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References:

1_ Tremlin, T. (2006), Minds and Gods: The Cognitive Foundations of Religion, New York: Oxford University Press. 77

2_ Kluger, Jeffrey; Jeff Chu; Broward Liston; Maggie Sieger; Daniel Williams (2004-10-25). "Is God in our genes?". TIME. Time Inc. Retrieved 2007-04-08.

3_ Tiger, L., & McGuire, M. (2010). God's brain. Prometheus Books. P.202-204

4_ Boyer, P. (2002). Religion Explained: The Human Instincts that Fashion Gods. Spirits and Ancestors, New York: Vintage.

5_ Pinker, S. (2006). The evolutionary psychology of religion. HUMANIST-BUFFALO-, 66(5), 10.

6_ Dávid-Barrett, T., & Carney, J. (2016). The deification of historical figures and the emergence of priesthoods as a solution to a network coordination problem. Religion, Brain & Behavior, 6(4), 307-317.

7_ Norenzayan, A., & Shariff, A. F. (2008). The origin and evolution of religious prosociality. science, 322(5898), 58-62.

8_ Wilson, D. (2010). Darwin's cathedral: Evolution, religion, and the nature of society. University of Chicago press.

9_ Shermer, M. (2004). Why are we moral: The evolutionary origins of morality. The Science of Good and Evil.

10_ Rossano, M. J. (2007). Supernaturalizing social life. Human Nature, 18(3), 272-294.

11_ Guthrie, S. (1993). Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of Religion. New York. Oxford University Press.

12_ Barrett, J. (2004). Why Would Anyone Believe in God? MD. Altamira Press. P.23

13_ Biabanaki, S. M. Theism And Cognitive Science of Religion: Compatibility or Incompatibility.

14_ Barrett, J. (2007a). Cognitive Science of Religion: What Is It and Why Is It? Religion Compass, 1(6), 768-786. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8171.2007.00042.x

15_ Barrett, J. (2004). Why Would Anyone Believe in God? MD. Altamira Press. P.52

16_ Boyer, P. (1994). The naturalness of religious ideas: A cognitive theory of religion. Univ of California Press.

17_ Hick, J. The New Frontier of Religion and Science Religious Experience, Neuroscience and the Transcendent; Y.: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2006. P.79

18_ Newberg, A., & Waldman, M. R. (2009). How God changes your brain: Breakthrough findings from a leading neuroscientist. Ballantine Books.p. 13 & 62

19_ Newberg, A., & d'Aquili, E. G. (2008). Why God won't go away: Brain science and the biology of belief. Ballantine Books.P.56

20_ Newberg, A., & d'Aquili, E. G. (2008). Why God won't go away: Brain science and the biology of belief. Ballantine Books. P.57

21_ Mohandas E. (2008). Neurobiology of spirituality. Mens sana monographs, 6(1), 63–80. doi:10.4103/0973-1229.33001

22_ Newberg, A., & Waldman, M. R. (2009). How God changes your brain: Breakthrough findings from a leading neuroscientist. Ballantine Books.75

23_ Sanaei, A. (1395). A Philosophical Analysis of Newberg's View in Neurotheology (A Model for the Relationship between Science and Religion), Science and Religion Research, No. 2 (Serial 14)

24_ Ramachandran, V. S.; Phantoms in the Brain; New York: William Morrow, 1998.

25_ Persinger, M., “ Persinger’s God Machine”, by Ian Cotton, Independent on Sunday, July 2nd, 1995.

26_ Hick, J. The New Frontier of Religion and Science Religious Experience, Neuroscience and the Transcendent; Y.: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2006.(71&73)

27_ Zahedi M., Hagh-Shenas R. (1392). An Examination of the Cognitive Science Approach in the Study of Religion, Journal of Philosophy of Religion (Formerly Nameh Hikmat), Year Eleven, No. 2 (Serial 22)

28_ Penfield, W. (2015). Mystery of the mind: A critical study of consciousness and the human brain. Princeton University Press.

29_ Alper, M. (2008). The" God" part of the brain: A scientific interpretation of human spirituality and God. Sourcebooks, Inc. p203

30_ Carter, R. (1998). Mapping the mind. Univ of California Press.

31_ Alper, M. (2008). The" God" part of the brain: A scientific interpretation of human spirituality and God. Sourcebooks, Inc. p. 188 &189

32_ Barrett, J. (2007 b). Is the spell really broken? Bio-psychological explanations of religion and theistic belief. Theology and Science, 5(1).

Sources 1 and 16 as cited in:

Zahedi M., Haqqshenas R. (1392). An Examination of the Cognitive Science Approach in the Study of Religion, Philosophy of Religion Research Journal (formerly Hikmat Nameh), Year Eleven, No. 2 (Serial 22)

Sources 11, 12, 14, and 15 as cited in:

Biabanaki, S. M. Theism And Cognitive Science of Religion: Compatibility or Incompatibility.

Sources 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 as cited in:

Sanaei, A. (1395). A Philosophical Analysis of Newberg's View in Neurotheology (A Model for the Relationship between Science and Religion), Science and Religion Studies, No. 2 (Serial 14)

Sources 17 and 26 as cited in:

Abdollahi S., Nasiri M. (1395). An Examination of John Hick's View on Religious Experience and Neurology, Zehn, No. 65

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[1] pariatal

[2] Spill over

[3] lose the sense of self

[4] absorption

[5] deafferentation

[6] temporal

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Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR)

Author: Minoo Zamanfar

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